Thursday, 19 November 2026

When Knowledge Became a Question of Relations: IX. When Theoretical Validity Became a Question

If theories help us recognise possibilities that might otherwise remain unnoticed, we must ask what makes a theory worth adopting. Its capacity to organise observations, identify relationships and suggest new avenues of inquiry is important. But these achievements do not, by themselves, establish its theoretical validity.

This distinction is particularly important in the sociology of knowledge, where the social circumstances surrounding the production and recognition of knowledge are themselves objects of investigation.

A theory is developed within particular historical, institutional and intellectual circumstances. Its concepts emerge through relations with existing knowledge, its proponents participate in disciplinary communities, and its claims are evaluated through established practices. These circumstances matter because they influence what can be investigated, which questions receive attention and how theoretical proposals acquire recognition.

But theoretical validity cannot simply be inferred from these circumstances.

A theory may become institutionally influential without providing an adequate explanation of the phenomena it addresses. Another may initially receive little recognition despite offering a more productive account. Institutional acceptance and theoretical adequacy are therefore different matters, even though they can influence one another.

To understand this distinction, we need to consider what a theory actually does.

A theory is not simply a collection of propositions about the world. It provides a conceptual organisation through which phenomena can be identified, differentiated and related. It establishes distinctions, proposes relationships and makes certain forms of explanation possible. Its concepts organise the meanings through which researchers construe their objects of inquiry.

In systemic functional terms, theoretical knowledge belongs to the meaning potential through which experience can be construed. Particular theoretical explanations are instances of that potential, developed in relation to particular phenomena and questions.

But the availability of a conceptual framework does not guarantee the adequacy of its explanations. Theoretical claims must be examined in relation to the phenomena they seek to explain. Their assumptions, distinctions and proposed relationships must withstand investigation, criticism and comparison with alternative explanations.

Scientific method is important here, not because it provides a mechanical procedure for determining truth, but because it establishes disciplined ways of investigating claims. Observation, measurement, experimentation, logical argument and the evaluation of evidence contribute to the assessment of theoretical explanations. Different disciplines employ different methods, but the underlying requirement remains: theoretical claims must be answerable to what they purport to explain.

This also means that theoretical validity cannot be reduced to empirical correspondence alone. A theory may accommodate existing observations while failing to explain the relationships that produce them. Another may initially encounter difficulties because its concepts require new forms of observation or investigation. Explanatory adequacy involves more than fitting a collection of observations; it concerns the quality of the conceptual and relational account being offered.

Our relational ontology makes this particularly significant.

If phenomena are constituted through relations, then an adequate theory must do more than identify entities and classify their properties. It must investigate the relations through which those entities acquire their particular forms, properties and consequences. It must also account for the emergence of new forms of organisation without reducing them to the phenomena from which they develop.

This is one reason Halliday's taxonomy is useful. It provides a way of distinguishing physical, biological, social and semiotic organisation while investigating their interdependence. A theory that explains a social phenomenon exclusively through physical processes, for example, may overlook the distinctive organisation of social relations. Equally, an account that treats social phenomena as exclusively matters of meaning may overlook their material and biological conditions.

Theoretical adequacy therefore involves recognising both the distinctions and the relations that organise reality.

Here our distinction between mattering and meaning offers another useful perspective. A theory matters through the consequences of its adoption and application. It means something through the conceptual system in which its claims are construed. But neither its social consequences nor the meanings attributed to it establish its validity. That requires examining the adequacy of the relationships it proposes between its concepts and the phenomena it seeks to explain.

This has particular implications for theories concerned with the legitimation of knowledge. Explaining how knowledge acquires institutional recognition is a legitimate sociological undertaking. But the theoretical framework used to provide that explanation must itself be evaluated. Its conceptual distinctions must be defensible, its assumptions must be examined, and its explanations must be assessed in relation to the phenomena they address.

A theory of legitimacy cannot exempt itself from the question of validity simply because legitimacy is its subject matter.

Nor should a theory's institutional success be confused with its explanatory success. The two may coincide, but their relationship is itself something to investigate.

Theoretical validity is therefore not an optional consideration added after knowledge has acquired social recognition. It is part of what must be examined whenever a theory claims to explain the world.

This brings us to the final question in our comparison. If knowledge, knowing, social structure and possibility are all understood through relations, what happens when we bring two different ontological approaches into direct conversation?

Rather than asking which theory has acquired greater legitimacy, we can ask what each enables us to explain, what assumptions each requires, and what becomes visible when their conceptual resources encounter one another.

That is where our examination of Legitimation Code Theory and relational ontology can finally meet.

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