If ethics concerns the local maintenance of coordination, then politics concerns the systemic organisation of the constraints under which coordination occurs at scale. Politics is not primarily about beliefs, ideologies, or representations of collective will. It is about how constraints are established, distributed, maintained, and revised across complex fields of coordination.
Politics, on this account, is an ecology of constraints.
1. Why Politics Is Not About Representation
Political theory often begins with representation: who speaks for whom, which interests are expressed, which values are encoded in institutions. But representation presupposes a field of intelligibility already capable of sustaining collective coordination.
What politics must explain is not how preferences are expressed, but how coordination at scale becomes possible at all.
Before representation can function, there must already be:
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stabilised expectations,
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durable distinctions,
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and mechanisms for maintaining coordination across time and space.
These are not representational achievements. They are constraint achievements.
2. Institutions as Sedimented Coordination
Institutions are often treated as structures that impose order on otherwise unruly social life. But institutions are better understood as sedimented solutions to recurrent coordination problems.
An institution stabilises:
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particular cuts (what counts as relevant),
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particular constraints (what can and cannot be done),
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and particular trajectories of action.
Its power does not lie in enforcement alone, but in making certain forms of coordination routine and others difficult or unintelligible.
Institutions endure not because they are correct, but because they successfully maintain coordination under prevailing conditions.
3. Constraint Distribution and Political Asymmetry
Politics enters most sharply where constraints are unevenly distributed.
Some actors operate within narrow, rigid constraint fields; others enjoy wide latitude to reconfigure them. This asymmetry is not merely economic or coercive. It is structural: differential access to constraint-setting itself.
Political conflict often arises not over outcomes, but over:
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who gets to define the constraints,
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whose cuts stabilise,
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and which breakdowns are taken seriously.
Seen this way, politics is not primarily struggle over resources or values, but struggle over the shape of the coordination field.
4. Legitimacy Without Consent
Legitimacy is usually grounded in consent, representation, or shared values. But these are late-stage phenomena. More basic is whether constraints actually sustain coordination.
A political arrangement is legitimate insofar as:
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it maintains intelligibility across diverse actors,
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it enables coordination without constant breakdown,
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and it can adapt when sedimented patterns no longer hold.
This does not make legitimacy purely functional. Constraint systems that maintain coordination for some by systematically destabilising it for others generate latent breakdown pressure. What appears stable may be brittle.
Legitimacy, then, is not agreement. It is resilience under coordination stress.
5. Political Change as Constraint Reconfiguration
Political change is often imagined as the replacement of one ideology with another, or one representation with a better one. But durable political change occurs when constraints themselves are reconfigured.
This can happen through:
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gradual drift as sedimented patterns lose efficacy,
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collective re-cutting in response to breakdown,
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or the emergence of new coordination mechanisms.
Revolutionary moments are not explosions of will. They are cascading failures of coordination followed by rapid experimental re-stabilisation.
Conclusion
Politics is not the art of representation. It is the ecology of constraints through which large-scale coordination becomes possible, durable, and revisable. Power operates through constraint-setting; legitimacy through coordination resilience; change through reconfiguration rather than replacement.
In the next post, we will sharpen this analysis by focusing explicitly on power — understood not as domination or force, but as differential access to the making, stabilising, and revising of cuts.