Saturday, 27 December 2025

On the Intolerances of Scientific Thought: 2 The Intolerance of Incompleteness

Scientific thought is remarkably good at living with uncertainty. Error bars, confidence intervals, stochastic models, and probabilistic laws are routine. What it does not easily tolerate is incompleteness.

Uncertainty can be reduced.
Incompleteness cannot.

This distinction matters more than is usually acknowledged.

Uncertainty Is Admissible

Uncertainty is treated as a temporary condition: a measure of what is not yet known, not yet resolved, not yet observed. It is a function of limited data, noisy instruments, or insufficient refinement.

Because uncertainty is framed as remediable, it does not threaten the ideal of explanation. It motivates further work.

Incompleteness does something else.

Incompleteness as Threat

Incompleteness is not about missing information. It is about the impossibility of closure.

A theory may be internally consistent, empirically successful, and mathematically precise — and still be unable, in principle, to exhaust the domain it addresses.

This is not a gap to be filled.
It is a limit to be acknowledged.

Scientific thought has historically struggled here.

The Quiet Reinterpretation

When incompleteness appears, it is rarely accepted on its own terms. It is quietly reinterpreted as something else:

  • as provisional ignorance

  • as dependence on deeper theory

  • as artefact of scale or approximation

  • as limitation of formalism rather than of description

  • as evidence that the “real” explanation lies elsewhere

In each case, incompleteness is displaced.

What cannot be completed is treated as not yet complete.

Formal Success, Ontological Discomfort

The sciences have repeatedly encountered results that force incompleteness into view without undermining formal success.

The response is telling.

Rather than questioning the expectation of completeness, scientific thought often preserves it by multiplication: more parameters, more levels, more mechanisms, more worlds, more structure.

The explanatory edifice grows — but closure remains deferred.

Incompleteness is not denied.
It is postponed indefinitely.

Why Incompleteness Is Hard to Bear

Completeness promises finality. It offers the reassurance that, in principle, nothing essential escapes description.

Incompleteness threatens this promise. It suggests that no matter how refined the theory, something constitutive will remain outside its reach — not because it is hidden, but because description itself is part of what brings phenomena into being.

This is not a technical discomfort.
It is an ontological one.

The Relational Stance

Relational ontology treats incompleteness not as a defect, but as a condition.

A description does not fail because it cannot say everything. It succeeds because it says something — by cutting a field of possibility in a particular way.

No description can be complete, because no description is neutral. Each instantiation brings some possibilities into actuality and leaves others unactualised.

Incompleteness is not the absence of information.
It is the presence of constraint.

The Cost of Refusal

When incompleteness is intolerable, scientific explanation is forced into compensatory strategies:

  • appeals to underlying totalities

  • promises of ultimate theories

  • deferral to infinite limits

  • replacement of description with simulation

  • conflation of explanatory power with exhaustiveness

These strategies are not illegitimate. But they do something quietly consequential.

They erase the distinction between what can be described and what can be actualised.

Incompleteness and Meaning

Meaning depends on incompleteness.

If a description exhausted its domain, it would leave nothing open — no contrast, no relevance, no selection. Meaning arises because description is partial, because it makes a difference rather than a mirror.

Scientific thought often treats this partiality as a weakness.

Relational ontology treats it as generative.

What This Post Refuses to Do

This post does not argue that science should abandon the search for deeper explanations. It does not celebrate ignorance. It does not deny the value of unification.

It names a pattern: the repeated discomfort with the idea that explanation might be structurally incomplete, not accidentally unfinished.

Incompleteness as Condition, Not Failure

To tolerate incompleteness is not to give up on understanding. It is to accept that understanding does not converge on totality.

Scientific descriptions do not approach the world asymptotically from outside. They participate in its articulation from within.

Incompleteness is the mark of that participation.

Looking Ahead

The next intolerance follows directly from this one.

If descriptions are incomplete, then identities cannot be fully preserved across time. What persists must do so without being fully specified.

This is difficult to bear.

The next post will address The Intolerance of Non-Identity — the unease scientific thought displays when things do not remain fully themselves.

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On the Intolerances of Scientific Thought: 1 The Intolerance of Perspective

Scientific thought prides itself on its escape from perspective.

The ambition is not merely to correct for bias, but to remove viewpoint altogether — to describe the world as it is, independent of where it is described from. This ambition has been extraordinarily successful. It has given us invariant laws, reproducible experiments, and shared standards of evidence.

It has also produced a persistent discomfort with perspective itself.

Perspective as Contamination

Within scientific explanation, perspective is rarely treated as constitutive. It is treated as a problem to be managed.

Measurements must be corrected for observer effects. Coordinates must be transformed away. Frames of reference must be rendered interchangeable. Subjective contributions must be bracketed.

Perspective is tolerated only insofar as it can be eliminated.

When it cannot, it is reclassified — as error, bias, ignorance, or limitation of access.

The Quiet Assumption

Underlying this intolerance is a quiet assumption: that perspective is a feature of our relation to the world, not a feature of how the world becomes available at all.

The world, on this view, is already fully there. Perspective merely obscures or distorts it.

Scientific progress, accordingly, is imagined as a gradual thinning of perspective — an approach to a view from nowhere.

This image is powerful. It is also historically specific.

When Perspective Refuses to Leave

Certain domains resist this thinning.

Quantum phenomena cannot be described without specifying an experimental arrangement. Biological traits make no sense outside ecological and developmental contexts. Thermodynamic quantities depend on coarse-graining. Neural signals acquire significance only within functional frames.

In these cases, perspective is not noise.
It is part of the phenomenon.

The response is rarely to accept this fact. It is to relocate perspective somewhere safer.

Strategies of Removal

When perspective cannot be eliminated, scientific thought typically deploys one of several strategies:

  • treat it as epistemic rather than ontological

  • confine it to measurement rather than reality

  • distribute it across many observers or systems

  • internalise it into models or agents

  • defer it to deeper levels of description

Each strategy preserves the ideal of perspective-free reality — even as it admits perspective back in through a side door.

Why This Matters

The intolerance of perspective is not merely methodological. It is ontological.

It expresses a commitment to the idea that reality must be describable independently of how it is construed. When this commitment is threatened, explanation becomes compensatory.

Limits of description are redescribed as limits of knowledge. Dependence on context is reframed as lack of precision. Constitutive cuts are treated as unfortunate intrusions.

The world is protected — but at a cost.

Perspective as Constitutive

Relational ontology does not deny the achievements of perspective-neutral description. It denies their universality.

Perspective is not a viewpoint on a pre-given world. It is a condition under which phenomena become available at all.

To say this is not to collapse science into subjectivity. It is to recognise that description does not merely record reality — it participates in its articulation.

Perspective does not distort actuality.
It makes actuality possible.

The Cost of Intolerance

When perspective is treated as contamination, scientific thought is forced into increasingly elaborate repairs:

  • deeper structures to carry determinacy

  • broader ensembles to absorb indeterminacy

  • abstract invariants to mask contextual dependence

These repairs work. But they also teach us what cannot be said.

What remains unsayable is not chaos, but becoming.

What This Post Refuses to Do

This post does not argue that science should abandon objectivity, nor that all descriptions are equally valid. It does not propose perspectivism as a doctrine.

It names an intolerance.

It notices how often scientific explanation strains to avoid admitting that perspective is not merely a limitation on knowledge, but a constituent of reality’s articulation.

Looking Ahead

The posts that follow will trace related intolerances:

  • the intolerance of incompleteness

  • the intolerance of non-identity

  • the intolerance of genuine novelty

  • the intolerance of constraint without cause

Each is distinct. None is independent.

But perspective is the place where they first become visible.

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On the Intolerances of Scientific Thought: Introduction

Science is often praised for its tolerance: of uncertainty, of revision, of error. This praise is not misplaced. Few human practices have shown greater capacity to abandon cherished beliefs in the face of recalcitrant evidence.

And yet.

Across its history, scientific thought has displayed a set of remarkably stable intolerances — limits beyond which it repeatedly refuses to go, even when its own successes push it there.

This series is about those limits.

Intolerance Is Not Failure

An intolerance is not a mistake. It is a pressure point.

Scientific theories do not fail when they encounter phenomena they cannot comfortably accommodate. On the contrary, this is often when they become most productive. What follows, however, is rarely neutral.

At such moments, explanatory strategies emerge whose function is not simply to explain, but to restore bearability.

What is restored may be clarity, continuity, determinacy, identity, causality, objectivity — or meaning itself.

What is lost is harder to see.

Recurrent Moves

Across very different domains — quantum physics, evolutionary theory, thermodynamics, neuroscience, economics — strikingly similar moves appear:

  • limits of description are reinterpreted as limits of knowledge

  • perspectival constraints are treated as subjective distortions

  • possibility is collapsed into probability, probability into ignorance

  • novelty is redescribed as recombination

  • constraint is rebranded as optimisation

  • relation is reduced to interaction between pre-given entities

These moves are rarely explicit. They feel natural. Often they are mathematically elegant.

They are also compensatory.

Why These Moves Matter

Each of these strategies performs a quiet repair.

They take something that has become ontologically uncomfortable — indeterminacy, relationality, incompleteness, non-identity — and relocate it somewhere safer:

  • beneath the surface

  • across many worlds

  • inside the observer

  • into deeper structure

  • into longer timescales

The science continues to function.
The discomfort recedes.

But the cost is cumulative.

What is repeatedly refused is the possibility that the limits encountered are not defects in our theories, but features of the kind of reality those theories have made visible.

The Relational Stance (Implicit, Not Asserted)

This series does not argue that science should abandon explanation, nor that it should embrace indeterminacy as a virtue. It does not propose an alternative methodology.

It proceeds more cautiously.

It asks what scientific thought systematically cannot tolerate, and what that reveals about its inherited commitments — especially its residual attachment to representation, completeness, and independence from construal.

Relational ontology is present here not as a framework to be applied, but as a discipline of attention: a way of noticing when explanation quietly becomes repair.

What This Series Will Do

The posts that follow will not track individual theories in detail. They will examine:

  • intolerances of indeterminacy

  • intolerances of perspective

  • intolerances of non-identity

  • intolerances of meaning

  • intolerances of constraint without cause

Each post will isolate a pattern, trace its recurrence, and let it speak — without resolving it.

What It Will Not Do

This series will not recommend reforms, propose new foundations, or offer a meta-theory of science.

It will not ask science to become philosophy.

It will ask it to notice where philosophy has been quietly smuggled in already — under the pressure of discomfort.

Why This Matters Now

The sciences are not in crisis. They are extraordinarily successful.

But success has a shadow.

When explanation works too well, it becomes difficult to see what it has learned not to see.

This series is an attempt to look there — not to undermine scientific thought, but to take it seriously enough to notice what it cannot bear.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: 6 Concluding Reflections — The Field of Constrained Possibility

This series has not argued for a preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. It has not attempted to adjudicate among competing ontologies, nor to repair the theory’s discomforts with a better story.

Instead, it has traced a pattern.

Each interpretation we have encountered is an attempt to manage the same pressure: quantum theory refuses to say that reality is fully specified prior to its instantiation.

What follows from that refusal has proven difficult to tolerate.

The Pattern of Refusals

The interpretations differ in form, but not in structure.

  • Bohm refuses indeterminacy by hiding it beneath an inaccessible order.

  • Many Worlds refuses exclusion by ensuring that nothing ever fails to occur.

  • QBism refuses objectivity by withdrawing ontology into belief.

  • Rovelli refuses absolutes by distributing facts across relations while retaining independent systems.

  • Objective collapse theories refuse ambiguity by forcing the cut into dynamics.

Each saves something precious.

Each does so by refusing to let something else remain unconstrained.

None of these moves is incoherent.
None is neutral.

What Was at Stake All Along

Beneath the technical disagreements lies a single unresolved question:

Is reality complete in advance of its actualisation?

If it is, then indeterminacy must be explained away, relocated, or compensated for. Possibility becomes a deficit — something waiting to be redeemed by deeper structure, proliferation, belief, relation, or force.

If it is not, then actuality cannot be understood as the unfolding of what already is. It must be understood as a cut — not a temporal process, but a shift in what counts as real.

This is the question none of the interpretations can fully face.

The Field, Not the Thing

Relational ontology proposes neither a new entity nor a deeper layer. It proposes a different stance.

Reality is not a collection of things with properties, nor a catalogue of worlds, nor a set of beliefs, nor a network of interacting systems, nor a wavefunction awaiting interruption.

It is a field of constrained possibility.

This field is not abstract. It is structured. It affords certain actualisations and not others. But it is not already actual.

Actuality does not emerge from it through process or force.
It emerges through construal.

Instantiation is not something that happens to the field.
It is a perspectival shift within it.

Why the Cut Cannot Be Eliminated

Every interpretation we have examined attempts, in its own way, to soften the cut.

Some bury it.
Some universalise it.
Some privatise it.
Some relativise it.
Some weaponise it.

But the cut persists, because it is not a flaw in the theory. It is the theory’s most honest consequence.

Without the cut, nothing would ever matter.
Without exclusion, there would be no event.
Without failure, no outcome would count.

Possibility as First-Order

Quantum theory forces a reversal that many interpretations resist.

Possibility is not a shadow cast by actuality.
Actuality is an interruption of possibility.

Probability, on this view, does not measure ignorance, belief, or branching weight. It expresses readiness — the structured openness of a field to be cut in particular ways.

When probability is reified, privatised, or dynamised, this readiness is lost.

Why There Is No Final Interpretation

The desire for a final interpretation is itself a refusal — a refusal to accept that construal is constitutive.

To interpret quantum mechanics once and for all would be to deny that its meaning emerges relationally, through repeated cuts across theory, experiment, and world.

Relational ontology does not offer closure.

It offers discipline.

The Becoming of Possibility

This blog is titled The Becoming of Possibility for a reason.

Possibility does not precede the world as a catalogue.
Nor does it dissolve once the world is actual.

Possibility becomes — and in becoming, it gives rise to actuality without being exhausted by it.

Quantum theory did not reveal that reality is strange.
It revealed that reality is unfinished.

The interpretations we have examined are not mistakes. They are symptoms — of our varied tolerances for indeterminacy, relation, and construal.

This series has allowed those tolerances to speak.

It ends not with a resolution, but with a stance:

That reality is not what is already there,
but what can be cut into being,
again and again,
within a field of constrained possibility.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: 5 Objective Collapse Theories — When Mathematics Is Made Violent

(GRW, Penrose, and the Demand for an Event)

If earlier interpretations attempted to avoid the cut — by hiding it, multiplying worlds, personalising it, or relativising it — objective collapse theories do the opposite.

They insist on it.

Collapse, they say, is not epistemic.
It is not perspectival.
It is not optional.

It is a physical event.

From Ambiguity to Intervention

Objective collapse theories begin from a shared dissatisfaction: quantum mechanics seems unable to say when something happens.

Superposition persists too long. Measurement appears too vague. The theory predicts outcomes but refuses to mark their arrival.

For GRW-type theories, the solution is direct: modify the dynamics. Add stochastic collapses to the wavefunction. Make localisation a real process that occurs spontaneously, whether observed or not.

For Penrose, the motivation is different but the move is similar. Superposition, he argues, cannot survive indefinitely in the presence of gravitational differences. Nature itself forces a resolution.

In both cases, the ambiguity is no longer tolerated.

The mathematics is made to decide.

Collapse as Process

What unites these approaches is the treatment of collapse as a temporal process.

Something evolves.
Something jumps.
Something interrupts continuity.

Collapse becomes an event in time, governed by law, even if probabilistic law.

The cut is no longer perspectival.
It is dynamical.

The Relational Question

From a relational ontology perspective, this is the crucial mistake.

The problem quantum theory posed was never a lack of physical violence. It was a confusion about what kind of transition instantiation is.

Objective collapse theories answer the wrong question:

When does collapse occur?

Relational ontology asks instead:

What changes when something is actualised?

And the answer is not: a wavefunction jumps.

It is: a perspective is cut.

The Error of Temporalisation

By treating collapse as a process, objective collapse theories import a classical reflex: the idea that becoming must be something that happens over time to an already-existing entity.

But instantiation, in a relational frame, is not a process that unfolds. It is a shift in construal — a change in what counts as actual.

There is no intermediate state between potential and event.

To force collapse into dynamics is to misunderstand the nature of the cut.

Probability Becomes Violence

Objective collapse theories also harden probability.

What was once a measure of readiness becomes a trigger. Randomness is no longer expressive of possibility; it becomes a mechanism that acts on the world.

Chance does not describe openness.
It causes closure.

This is why these theories feel aggressive. They take the indeterminacy of quantum theory and weaponise it — turning uncertainty into force.

Saving Reality at a Cost

The appeal of objective collapse is understandable. It restores a single world. It resolves superpositions decisively. It promises an ontology that does not wait on observers.

But this clarity comes at a price.

The cut is no longer meaningful.
It is merely causal.

What is lost is the idea that actuality is constituted, not imposed.

The World Becomes Bruised

In forcing collapse to be physical, these theories treat the world as something that must be periodically struck into definiteness.

Reality becomes fragile, constantly requiring intervention to prevent it from diffusing into possibility.

This is a curious reversal.

What began as an attempt to defend realism ends by depicting reality as unstable — dependent on random jolts to remain intact.

The Cost of Forcing the Cut

Relational ontology does not deny that events occur. It denies that their occurrence requires violence.

Actualisation does not need to be caused.
It needs to be construed.

Objective collapse theories confuse decisiveness with explanation. They insist that something must happen in order for something to be.

In doing so, they trade ambiguity for brutality.

Between Evasion and Enforcement

At this stage in the series, the pattern is unmistakable.

  • Bohm hid the cut.

  • Many Worlds dissolved it.

  • QBism internalised it.

  • Rovelli relativised it.

  • Objective collapse theories enforce it.

Each move makes sense.
Each reveals a limit of tolerance.

Relational ontology does not seek a gentler collapse mechanism.

It asks whether collapse was ever the right metaphor at all.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: 4 Carlo Rovelli — Relation Without Construal

After Bohm, who hid indeterminacy, Many Worlds, which abolished failure, and QBism, which withdrew the world, Carlo Rovelli proposes something that at first glance seems finally adequate:

Reality, he says, is relational.

Properties do not belong to systems absolutely. They exist only relative to other systems. There is no observer-independent state of affairs — only interactions.

For many readers, this feels like the long-awaited ontological turn.

It is not.

The Relational Promise

Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) begins by rejecting a classical inheritance: the idea that physical systems possess determinate properties independently of interaction.

Instead, a property is always a property-for something. A spin is up relative to one system, down relative to another. No contradiction arises, because there is no absolute standpoint from which all properties must agree.

This move is decisive.
It releases physics from the demand for a God’s-eye view.

And yet, something crucial remains untouched.

Systems First, Relations Second

Despite its name, RQM does not treat relation as ontologically constitutive.

Systems still exist independently. They enter into interactions. Properties arise between them. Relation is fundamental in description — but not in being.

The world, on this view, is composed of interacting systems whose identities are given in advance. Relations modulate properties, but they do not bring systems into being.

This is relation as relativity, not relation as constitution.

The Relational Question

From a relational ontology perspective, this is the pivotal hesitation.

If properties exist only in relation, what of the systems themselves?
What individuates them prior to interaction?
What makes a system this system rather than another?

RQM does not answer these questions — because it does not think they need answering.

Relational ontology insists that they cannot be avoided.

The relational challenge is therefore this:

What if systems are not prior to relation, but are themselves products of construal?

Phenomena Without Cuts

Rovelli often echoes Bohr’s insistence on phenomena rather than objects. But where Bohr treated phenomena as irreducible events — inseparable from experimental arrangements — Rovelli treats them as relative property-assignments within a pre-existing network of systems.

What is missing is the cut.

In RQM, nothing is brought into being through instantiation. There are only relative facts, always already there for someone or something.

But instantiation, in a relational ontology, is not the registration of a fact. It is the actualisation of a possibility through a perspectival shift.

Without that shift, relation becomes bookkeeping.

Indeterminacy Revisited

RQM rejects absolute indeterminacy by distributing determinacy across perspectives. What is indeterminate globally is determinate locally, relative to each system.

This is an elegant move — but it relocates rather than resolves the problem.

Indeterminacy becomes a mismatch between descriptions, not a feature of becoming. The limits of description are acknowledged, but not treated as constitutive.

The temptation here is subtle: to treat perspectival constraint as a limitation on access rather than as the condition of actuality.

Relation Without Meaning

RQM is admirably austere. It avoids metaphysical inflation. It refuses collapse as a global event. It treats description as context-bound.

But it stops short of releasing the final representational reflex: the idea that descriptions, however relative, still describe something.

Relational ontology parts company here.

Descriptions do not describe a pre-given world from different angles. They participate in the construal through which phenomena emerge at all.

Without this move, relation remains epistemic.

The Cost of Restraint

Rovelli’s achievement is to show that physics does not require absolutes. His refusal is to let go of independent systems.

By holding onto systems while relativising properties, RQM preserves a minimal realism — but at the cost of making relation secondary.

What is lost is the possibility that reality itself is not a collection of things in relation, but a field of constrained possibility that only ever actualises through cuts.

Rovelli brings us very close.

But closeness is not arrival.

Between Relativity and Relationality

Relational ontology does not reject RQM.
It clarifies its limit.

RQM shows that there is no view from nowhere.
Relational ontology goes further: it denies that there is a there independent of construal.

Relation is not how systems meet.
It is how systems become.

At this point in the series, the pattern is clear.

Each interpretation saves something precious — determinacy, continuity, agency, relation — by refusing to release something else.

The remaining question is whether any interpretation can tolerate the full cost of the cut.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: 3 QBism — Probability Without a World

If Bohm preserves determinacy by insisting that the world is fully specified, and Many Worlds preserves it by ensuring that nothing is ever excluded, QBism preserves quantum theory by refusing to say what the world is at all.

Probability, here, is not a property of systems.
It is a statement of belief.

The cut is not denied.
It is personalised.

Quantum States as Belief States

QBism begins with a radical reinterpretation of the quantum state. The wavefunction does not describe a physical system. It encodes an agent’s expectations about the outcomes of their future experiences.

Measurement does not reveal a property of the world.
It updates belief.

Collapse is not a physical event, nor even a perspectival cut in the world. It is a change in the agent’s bookkeeping.

Quantum mechanics, on this view, is a normative guide for how rational agents should manage uncertainty when acting in the world.

What that world is, beyond its resistance to expectation, is left unspecified.

Saving Agency by Sacrifice

QBism’s motivation is clear and admirable.

It refuses the fantasy of a view from nowhere. It rejects the idea that quantum states exist independently of those who assign them. It takes seriously the role of the agent as irreducible.

But the price of this move is also clear.

In order to secure agency, QBism evacuates ontology.

The world becomes a source of surprises, not a structured field of potential. Relations collapse into personal expectation. Shared reality survives only as a constraint on belief revision.

The Relational Question

Relational ontology agrees with QBism on a crucial point: quantum states are not properties of systems.

But it parts company immediately on what follows.

For QBism, the alternative to objectivism is subjectivism.
For relational ontology, this is a false dilemma.

The relational challenge is therefore this:

What if probability belongs neither to the world nor to the agent, but to the relation that makes instantiation possible?

Probability as Readiness

In a relational frame, probability is not belief.
Nor is it ignorance.

It is an expression of readiness: the structured openness of a system, under a given construal, to actualise in particular ways.

This readiness is not private.
It is not psychological.
And it is not reducible to frequencies or credences.

QBism collapses probability into belief because it has no place to locate readiness except in the agent’s head.

Relational ontology insists that readiness is real — but not independent of construal.

The World Reduced to Resistance

QBism often speaks of the world as that which “pushes back” against the agent. Experience is real. Outcomes occur. Surprises happen.

But these surprises are not expressions of a shared field of potential. They are merely constraints on expectation.

What is lost is precisely what quantum theory made visible: that outcomes are not arbitrary interruptions of belief, but actualisations from a structured domain of possibility.

Without that domain, experience becomes brute.

The Cost of Personalisation

QBism succeeds in dissolving many traditional puzzles. There is no measurement problem if nothing is being measured about the world. There is no collapse problem if collapse is merely belief update.

But this success is purchased by withdrawing any account of how multiple agents inhabit the same reality — except by coincidence and negotiation.

The world becomes something we bump into, not something we co-constitute.

Between Objectivity and Subjectivity

Relational ontology refuses the trade QBism offers.

It does not return to objectivity.
But neither does it retreat into belief.

Construal is not private opinion.
Instantiation is not personal experience.
Meaning is not psychological.

QBism protects the agent by abandoning the world.

Relational ontology insists that the world itself is relational — not something agents describe, but something that comes into being through cuts that are neither purely subjective nor purely objective.

The Cost of Withdrawal

QBism is a disciplined refusal. It refuses to speak where speaking would mislead. It protects quantum theory from metaphysical excess by saying less.

Relational ontology names the cost of that restraint.

By removing probability from the world, QBism removes possibility from it as well. What remains is experience without becoming, belief without readiness, and a reality that can surprise but not mean.

The cut survives — but only inside the agent.

What is lost is the field in which possibility itself can become.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: 2 Many Worlds — When Nothing Is Allowed to Fail

If Bohm preserved determinacy by placing it beyond reach, the Many Worlds interpretation preserves it by making it unavoidable.

Nothing is hidden.
Nothing collapses.
Nothing ever fails to occur.

Every possibility is realised.

No Collapse, No Privilege

The Many Worlds interpretation begins with a refusal that is deceptively modest: the wavefunction never collapses.

The formalism of quantum mechanics, taken seriously, describes continuous, deterministic evolution. Collapse, on this view, is not part of the theory but an ad hoc intrusion — a gesture toward classical intuition rather than a necessity of the mathematics.

Remove collapse, and the dynamics remain smooth.
Remove collapse, and superposition never ends.

What appears to be a single outcome is, instead, a branching of the universe: every possible result occurs, each in its own world.

Determinacy is preserved not by selecting an outcome, but by actualising them all.

Branching as Ontology

In Many Worlds, probability does not mark uncertainty about what will happen. It marks uncertainty about where one will find oneself after branching has occurred.

The wavefunction does not describe possibility.
It describes plenitude.

Every term in the superposition is equally real. No outcome is privileged. No alternative is denied.

The world does not choose.
It proliferates.

The Refusal at the Core

What Many Worlds cannot tolerate is not indeterminacy, but the cut itself.

Collapse introduces a distinction between:

  • what could have happened, and

  • what did happen.

Many Worlds refuses that distinction. It treats unactualised outcomes as an embarrassment — a residue that must be eliminated. The solution is elegant in its extremity: ensure that nothing remains unactualised.

Possibility is redeemed by universal actualisation.

The Relational Question

From a relational perspective, the difficulty is not the extravagance of multiple worlds. It is the quiet elimination of instantiation.

If everything happens, then nothing is brought into being through a cut. There is no moment of actualisation, no perspectival transition from potential to event.

There are only already-existing branches and an observer who discovers which one they inhabit.

The relational challenge is therefore this:

What becomes of meaning when nothing is ever excluded?

When Actuality Becomes Cheap

Relational ontology treats actuality as costly.
An event matters because it is one among many possibilities that did not actualise.

Many Worlds removes that cost.

Outcomes no longer distinguish themselves by occurring; they differ only by location in a branching structure. Failure disappears. Loss disappears. So does commitment.

Actuality becomes cheap because it is no longer selective.

Probability Without Risk

In this framework, probability loses its bite.

Nothing risky occurs, because every alternative is guaranteed. No outcome is genuinely at stake. The future cannot disappoint, only distribute.

Probability becomes a measure of branch-weight, not readiness for instantiation.

But readiness is precisely what probability expresses in a relational frame: the structured openness of a system to become otherwise.

Many Worlds converts openness into abundance.

Determinacy at Any Price

The achievement of Many Worlds is consistency. It keeps the mathematics intact, the dynamics continuous, and determinacy unbroken.

The price is subtle but severe.

By refusing collapse, it refuses the idea that reality is brought forth through construal. It treats perspective as an index, not as a constitutive act. Worlds exist independently of being encountered.

Nothing depends on the cut — because the cut never truly occurs.

The Cost of Universal Actualisation

Relational ontology does not deny the coherence of Many Worlds.
It names what is lost when no possibility is allowed to fail.

If everything happens, then nothing happens for a reason.
If all outcomes occur, then no outcome is meaningful as an outcome.
If actuality never excludes, then becoming has no teeth.

Determinacy is preserved — but only by abolishing instantiation.

The universe becomes complete at every moment, and possibility survives only as bookkeeping.

The Many Worlds interpretation offers comfort to those who cannot bear collapse.

Relational ontology insists on something more fragile — and more demanding:

That reality is not complete in advance,
that instantiation is a cut, not a census,
and that possibility matters precisely because it can fail.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: 1 David Bohm — Hidden Variables and the Refusal of Indeterminacy

If the formalism of quantum theory made indeterminacy unavoidable, David Bohm’s response was to make it unacceptable.

Bohm did not deny the empirical success of quantum mechanics. Nor did he attempt to modify its predictions. His dissatisfaction was ontological, not technical. A world in which fundamental events were not determined — even if only probabilistically — was, for him, a world left incomplete.

Indeterminacy was not something to be accommodated.
It was something to be explained away.

Beneath the Appearances

Bohm’s proposal is often summarised as “hidden variables,” but this description understates its ambition.

What Bohm sought was not merely an addition to the theory, but a restoration of determinacy. The apparent randomness of quantum outcomes was to be understood as the surface manifestation of an underlying, fully specified order — one inaccessible in practice, but real nonetheless.

The wavefunction, on this view, is not an expression of possibility. It is a guiding field. Particles follow definite trajectories, even if we cannot know them. Probability enters only because of ignorance, not because the world itself is indeterminate.

The price of this move is well known: non-locality must be embraced without reservation. What happens here may depend instantaneously on what happens there.

Bohm accepted this price without hesitation.

Wholeness Without Construal

To make this vision intelligible, Bohm introduced the language of wholeness and the implicate order. Reality, he argued, is fundamentally undivided. Apparent separations are abstractions imposed by classical habits of thought.

This is often taken to sound “relational.” But the resemblance is superficial.

Bohm’s wholeness is ontological, not constitutive. The world is whole in itself, prior to and independent of any construal. Relations do not bring phenomena into being; they merely reveal an already-determinate structure.

In this respect, Bohm is not relaxing realism.
He is radicalising it.

The Relational Question

From a relational perspective, the crucial question is not whether hidden variables exist, but what work they are doing.

Hidden variables function to re-actualise possibility. They treat uninstantiated outcomes not as genuine possibilities, but as unrealised actualities — facts that already exist, but are concealed.

In doing so, they collapse the distinction between:

  • a distribution of outcomes, and

  • a field of potential for instantiation.

What appears as probability is, in truth, only ignorance.

The relational challenge is simple but uncompromising:

What if determinacy is not hidden — but absent?

Readiness, Not Randomness

Relational ontology does not replace Bohmian determinism with randomness. It replaces it with readiness.

Probability is not a measure of how often an already-fixed outcome will occur. It is an expression of the structured potential of a system to actualise differently under different construals.

Nothing lies beneath the event waiting to be revealed.
The event is the cut.

To insist otherwise is to treat possibility as a defective form of actuality — something that must be redeemed by an underlying story.

Bohm’s theory provides such a story.
But only by refusing the very lesson quantum theory forced into view.

The Cost of Refusal

Bohm’s achievement is clarity. He saw exactly what quantum mechanics threatened: not locality, not causality, but the idea that reality might not be fully specified prior to its instantiation.

His refusal is equally clear.

To preserve determinacy, he accepts non-locality, hidden structure, and an ontological order forever beyond access. The world remains complete — but at the price of becoming fundamentally unanswerable.

Relational ontology does not rebut Bohm.
It names the cost of his insistence.

Determinacy is saved, but possibility is lost.

And with it, the becoming of possibility itself.

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Interpreting Quantum Reality: Relational Ontology and the Interpretation of Quantum Physics

Quantum theory did not end with its formal success.
It ended with discomfort.

The mathematics worked. The predictions held. The experiments agreed.
And yet something essential had been broken: the assurance that reality could be described without remainder, without perspective, without cuts.

The architects of quantum theory lived inside that break. Their debates were not about technique, but about what could still be said — and at what cost. When they left the stage, the formalism remained, but the unease did not dissipate.

It intensified.

What followed was not a single interpretation, but a proliferation of them — each attempting, in its own way, to repair the rupture quantum theory had opened between description and reality.

This series stages conversations between relational ontology and those attempts.

Interpretation as Repair

Interpretations of quantum physics are often presented as neutral explanations layered atop an otherwise complete theory. This framing is misleading.

Each interpretation is a response to an intolerance:

  • intolerance of indeterminacy

  • intolerance of non-locality

  • intolerance of the constitutive role of construal

  • intolerance of collapse

  • intolerance of the failure of classical realism

Interpretations do not merely explain the theory.
They re-stabilise what the theory destabilised.

They decide — often implicitly — what must be preserved at all costs.

Not Competing Ontologies

This series does not evaluate interpretations in order to select a winner. It does not propose relational ontology as a “better interpretation” of quantum mechanics. That move would simply repeat the gesture under examination.

Relational ontology does not compete here.
It converses.

The aim is not to correct these interpretations, but to expose the work they are doing: what they must posit, reify, or deny in order to make the theory bearable again.

After the Cut

Quantum theory forced a cut — but it did not specify how that cut should be understood.

Was it:

  • epistemic or ontological?

  • subjective or objective?

  • perspectival or physical?

  • a limit of knowledge, or a feature of being?

The interpretations that followed can be read as answers to that ambiguity.

Some bury the cut beneath hidden structure.
Some multiply worlds until nothing ever fails to occur.
Some relocate the cut into consciousness or belief.
Some attempt to dissolve it into relation itself.
Some force it into dynamics, turning it into a physical event.

Each of these moves is intelligible.
Each comes at a cost.

The Relational Stance

Relational ontology approaches these interpretations from a different angle.

It does not ask whether collapse is real, or whether worlds branch, or whether variables are hidden. It asks:

  • What is being treated as independent of construal?

  • What is being treated as ontologically primary?

  • What is being reified in order to stabilise meaning?

Above all, it insists on a distinction that many interpretations quietly erase:

Instantiation is not a temporal process.

When this distinction is lost, collapse becomes a jump, branching becomes a fact, probability becomes substance, and relation becomes relativity.

This series keeps that distinction alive.

What This Series Is — and Is Not

This series is:

  • a relational examination of how quantum discomfort has been managed

  • an exploration of the ontological choices hidden inside interpretive moves

  • a continuation of the inquiry into the becoming of possibility

This series is not:

  • a survey of quantum interpretations

  • a defence of any mainstream position

  • a proposal for a new physical theory

Readers looking for resolution will not find it here.
Readers interested in what resolution costs may find something more useful.

The Stakes

Interpretations of quantum physics are not merely technical options. They are commitments about what may be treated as real, what must be bracketed, and what kinds of possibility are allowed to actualise.

They are decisions about whether construal matters.

This series does not aim to settle those decisions.
It aims to make them visible.

What follows are conversations with the ways we have tried to live after the cut — and with what those attempts reveal about our tolerance for uncertainty, relation, and possibility itself.

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Conversations at the Edge of Possibility: Concluding Reflections — The Field of Constrained Possibility

Mapping the edge where physics and relation meet

Over the course of these conversations, we have traced the emergence of quantum theory through the perspectives of its architects: Planck, Born, Heisenberg, Bohr, Schrödinger, and Einstein. Each contributed decisively to the field of constrained possibility, and each illustrates in a different way the interplay between formal discovery, ontological ambition, and relational limitation.

Opening the Door: Planck

Planck introduced quantisation — a formal discontinuity. He opened the door to the strange without stepping through it. Discreteness existed in the calculation, not in reality. The threshold was crossed formally but not perspectivally. Here we see the first instance of discovery without ontological transformation. Possibility is constrained, but the cut remains unstaged.

Probability Without Perspective: Born

Born introduced probability as an objective property of systems. Chance replaced certainty, but perspective vanished. Probabilities floated free of construal, re-establishing realism at a higher level. This is the first major fault line: probabilistic realism. Relationally, the move mistakes measures of potential for actualisation for features of being.

Indeterminacy and the Collapse of Description: Heisenberg

Heisenberg revealed that the limits of description are structural, not merely instrumental. But he wavered, at times reifying those limits as ontological fuzz. The relational cut — indeterminacy as perspectival constraint rather than evolving property — remains unclaimed. Here, the distinction between system and instance, and the insistence that instantiation is not a temporal process, becomes critical.

Complementarity and the Phenomenon: Bohr

Bohr approaches the relational insight most closely. Phenomena, not objects; complementary descriptions; mutually exclusive but jointly necessary accounts. Yet he retains the lingering notion that descriptions somehow reflect something “behind” phenomena. Bohr shows us the fertile tension: relational cuts are visible, but not fully enacted.

The Wave That Would Not Decide: Schrödinger

Schrödinger formalised the space of possibilities with unparalleled precision. But the wavefunction was treated as a thing. Collapse was conceived as a mysterious physical process rather than a perspectival cut. The system/instance distinction is illuminated: formal completeness is insufficient without recognising instantiation as actualisation within construal.

Reality, Locality, and the Refusal of Construal: Einstein

Einstein reminds us of the cost of refusing relational cuts. Reality, separability, and locality are preserved, but at the expense of openness to possibility. Indeterminacy is rejected as ontic; the observer is externalised. His clarity makes visible what relational ontology must refuse: the insistence that reality exists independent of construal closes off potential.

Lessons for Relational Ontology

Taken together, these encounters map a field of constrained possibility:

  • Discovery and formal success do not equal ontological transformation.

  • Probability, indeterminacy, and complementarity mark the edges of what can be actualised.

  • The relational cut — the move from potential to instantiation — is neither temporal nor object-bound.

  • Representation and reality are not identical; treating them as such produces artefacts and paradoxes.

  • The cost of refusing relationality is clarity, consistency, and ultimately, the foreclosure of new forms of possibility.

This series does not resolve quantum theory. It does not declare winners or losers. It does not reconcile the past with a present framework. Instead, it traces the evolving structure of possibility itself — showing what each thinker made possible, what they foreclosed, and where relational cuts might be enacted.

Concluding Thought

Quantum theory, when read through the lens of relational ontology, is not a story of objects and waves, of particles and probability. It is a landscape of potential instantiations, constrained by formalism, perspective, and conceptual commitment. Each figure we have encountered illuminates a different facet of this landscape — sometimes edging toward relational insight, sometimes resisting it entirely.

The field of constrained possibility is never closed. It is always open to new cuts, new actualisations, new ways of attending to phenomena. What this series offers, at last, is a map — not a destination — for those willing to trace the boundaries of the possible, and to follow relational cuts wherever they may lead.

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