Saturday, 15 August 2026

The Senior Common Room: The Boundary That Isn’t There

The Senior Common Room at St Anselm’s was unusually quiet.

Professor Quillibrace was standing at the window, looking out across the quadrangle.

Mr Blottisham was reading the newspaper with the expression of a man who had discovered that the world was once again failing to behave sensibly.

Miss Elowen Stray was turning the pages of the latest essay.

She looked up.

Miss Stray: There is something rather odd about this business with the event horizon.

Mr Blottisham: Only something?

Miss Stray: We keep calling it a boundary.

Mr Blottisham: It is a boundary.

Miss Stray: Yes. But what is it a boundary of?

Mr Blottisham lowered the newspaper.

Mr Blottisham: Of the black hole.

Professor Quillibrace: That answer merely moves the question one noun to the right.

Mr Blottisham: I was afraid you were going to say that.

Professor Quillibrace turned from the window.

Professor Quillibrace: We have a remarkably persistent habit of assuming that every boundary must have something on either side of it which the boundary separates.

Miss Stray: Like a wall.

Mr Blottisham: Or a fence.

Professor Quillibrace: Or a border.

Miss Stray: But the event horizon isn't a wall.

Mr Blottisham: No. It is a one-way door.

Professor Quillibrace: Which is considerably better.

Mr Blottisham: Thank you.

Professor Quillibrace: Unfortunately, it is still wrong.

Mr Blottisham sighed.

Mr Blottisham: I knew there was a catch.

The boundary that isn't a thing

Miss Stray: The essay says that the event horizon is a boundary in causal structure rather than a material surface.

Mr Blottisham: Yes.

Miss Stray: I think that's the part I find most interesting.

Mr Blottisham: Why?

Miss Stray: Because it means the boundary isn't defined by what is there.

Professor Quillibrace: Excellent.

Miss Stray: It is defined by what can happen.

There was a brief silence.

Mr Blottisham: That's an unnecessarily philosophical way of saying that things can't get out.

Professor Quillibrace: On the contrary. It is a physically precise way of saying something that our ordinary language encourages us to misunderstand.

He picked up a pencil.

Professor Quillibrace: A wall is a thing which imposes a constraint. The event horizon is a feature of the structure that determines which future-directed causal paths are available.

Mr Blottisham: So the horizon doesn't stop you leaving.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Mr Blottisham: It merely means that leaving is not among the possibilities.

Professor Quillibrace: Precisely.

Miss Stray: Which makes the phrase "trapped inside" slightly misleading.

Professor Quillibrace: Very.

Mr Blottisham: But surely if you're inside a black hole and can't get out, you're trapped.

Professor Quillibrace: In ordinary conversation, yes.

Miss Stray: But physically?

Professor Quillibrace: Physically, the more interesting statement is that the causal structure does not permit an outward-directed future trajectory that reaches the exterior.

Mr Blottisham stared at him.

Mr Blottisham: That sounds remarkably like being trapped.

Professor Quillibrace: It is.

Mr Blottisham: Thank you.

Professor Quillibrace: But without the unnecessary image of a cosmic jailer.

The cosmic jailer

Miss Stray: I hadn't thought of it that way.

Mr Blottisham: I hadn't either. But now that you've mentioned it, I rather like the cosmic jailer.

Professor Quillibrace: Naturally.

Mr Blottisham: Perhaps the black hole simply refuses parole.

Miss Stray: On what grounds?

Mr Blottisham: Irreversible causal misconduct.

Professor Quillibrace: I see that the morning is going to be difficult.

Miss Stray smiled.

Miss Stray: But there is something important about the metaphor, isn't there?

Professor Quillibrace: Yes. The jailer metaphor makes the horizon sound like an agent which prevents things from escaping.

Miss Stray: Whereas the geometry itself determines what is possible.

Professor Quillibrace: Exactly.

Mr Blottisham: So there isn't anything doing the trapping.

Professor Quillibrace: Not in the ordinary sense.

Miss Stray: The structure of spacetime is enough.

Professor Quillibrace: And that is one of the genuinely remarkable conceptual achievements of general relativity.

He put down the pencil.

Professor Quillibrace: Geometry does not merely describe where things are. It participates in determining what can happen.

Inside and outside

Miss Stray returned to the essay.

Miss Stray: There's another thing I noticed.

Mr Blottisham: The fact that you noticed it suggests that it will soon become my problem.

Miss Stray: We keep saying "inside" and "outside."

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: But those words sound much more straightforward than they really are.

Mr Blottisham: Inside means inside.

Professor Quillibrace: Does it?

Mr Blottisham: Surely.

Professor Quillibrace: Inside a box?

Mr Blottisham: Yes.

Professor Quillibrace: Inside a country?

Mr Blottisham: More or less.

Professor Quillibrace: Inside a black hole?

Mr Blottisham paused.

Mr Blottisham: Ah.

Miss Stray: That's the problem.

Professor Quillibrace: The word "inside" encourages us to imagine spatial enclosure. But the decisive distinction at an event horizon is causal.

Miss Stray: So "inside" really means something like "in a region from which signals cannot reach the relevant exterior."

Professor Quillibrace: Better.

Mr Blottisham: Which means that "outside" is not simply another place.

Professor Quillibrace: Precisely. It is a region from which those signals can still reach the exterior.

Miss Stray: So the boundary separates different possibilities rather than different substances.

Professor Quillibrace: Now you have it.

Mr Blottisham folded the newspaper.

Mr Blottisham: I dislike this.

Miss Stray: Why?

Mr Blottisham: Because I was perfectly happy with inside and outside.

Professor Quillibrace: Most metaphors are perfectly happy until you ask them to do physics.

A horizon made of future

Miss Stray: There's something even stranger.

Mr Blottisham: Of course there is.

Miss Stray: The event horizon is defined in relation to the future.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: So we draw it as though it were a thing sitting there in space, but its definition depends upon what can ultimately happen.

Mr Blottisham: You mean the horizon somehow knows the future?

Professor Quillibrace: No.

Mr Blottisham: Good.

Professor Quillibrace: The mathematical definition depends upon the global causal structure of spacetime. That is not the same thing as an object possessing foreknowledge.

Mr Blottisham: I was about to object.

Miss Stray: But it does mean that the horizon isn't simply a local surface.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Miss Stray: Which is extraordinary.

Professor Quillibrace: It is one of those features of relativity that become stranger the more precisely you state them.

Mr Blottisham: I preferred it when it was a dark sphere.

Professor Quillibrace: That was an image.

Mr Blottisham: It was a good image.

Professor Quillibrace: It was.

Mr Blottisham: Thank you.

Professor Quillibrace: And it was not the thing itself.

Mr Blottisham sighed.

The astronaut

Miss Stray: What about the astronaut crossing the horizon?

Mr Blottisham: Now there's a reassuring subject.

Miss Stray: From the astronaut's perspective, nothing locally dramatic has to happen at the horizon.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Mr Blottisham: But from far away, the astronaut appears to freeze near it.

Professor Quillibrace: In an appropriate sense, yes.

Mr Blottisham: So which is actually happening?

Professor Quillibrace: Both descriptions are valid within their respective frames and coordinates.

Mr Blottisham: That sounds suspiciously diplomatic.

Professor Quillibrace: It is mathematical.

Miss Stray: Perhaps the point is that there isn't one ordinary object called "the horizon" whose behaviour everyone is watching.

Professor Quillibrace: Exactly.

Miss Stray: The horizon is a feature of the causal structure connecting events and observers.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Mr Blottisham: So the observer matters.

Professor Quillibrace: The observer's position in the causal structure matters.

Miss Stray: But that doesn't make the horizon subjective.

Professor Quillibrace: An important distinction.

He returned to the window.

Professor Quillibrace: The horizon is not created by somebody looking at it. But what information is accessible to an observer depends upon the observer's causal relationship to events.

Miss Stray: So accessibility is relational without reality becoming subjective.

Professor Quillibrace: Precisely.

The horizon and information

Mr Blottisham: Which brings us back to information.

Professor Quillibrace: Inevitably.

Miss Stray: We said in the previous essay that information is relational.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: And now the horizon turns out to be relational too.

Mr Blottisham: Are you suggesting that the horizon and information are secretly dating?

Professor Quillibrace: I am suggesting that they are both concepts whose significance lies partly in relationships rather than substances.

Mr Blottisham: Much less entertaining.

Miss Stray: But quite interesting.

Professor Quillibrace: Information concerns distinctions and correlations among physical states. The horizon constrains which causal relations can exist between events.

Miss Stray: So the horizon constrains the possible organisation of information.

Professor Quillibrace: Exactly.

Mr Blottisham frowned.

Mr Blottisham: So a causal boundary becomes an information boundary.

Professor Quillibrace: That is a very useful way of putting it.

Mr Blottisham: Without being an information wall.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Mr Blottisham: This is becoming unnecessarily subtle.

Miss Stray: I think that's because the physics is subtle.

Mr Blottisham: I prefer theories with furniture.

The missing information

Miss Stray: But now I see why the disappearance of the horizon matters.

Professor Quillibrace: Go on.

Miss Stray: If information falls across the horizon, then from outside it becomes inaccessible. But if the black hole eventually evaporates, the horizon disappears.

Mr Blottisham: And there goes the cosmic filing cabinet.

Professor Quillibrace: There was never a cosmic filing cabinet.

Mr Blottisham: We have established that.

Miss Stray: But that's exactly the problem. If we imagined information as being stored inside, then evaporation leaves us asking where the stored information went.

Professor Quillibrace: And that question already assumes too much.

Miss Stray: Because information isn't a substance.

Professor Quillibrace: And the horizon isn't a container.

Mr Blottisham: So we have a non-substance in a non-container.

Professor Quillibrace: You are learning.

A boundary without a surface

Miss Stray looked thoughtful.

Miss Stray: Perhaps the most interesting phrase in the essay is "a boundary without a surface."

Mr Blottisham: It sounds like something the Dean would say about a committee.

Professor Quillibrace: An excellent example.

Miss Stray: A committee can have a boundary without there being a physical line around it.

Mr Blottisham: Although sometimes there is a physical door.

Professor Quillibrace: And sometimes the door is locked.

Miss Stray: But the point is that a boundary can be a difference in organisation.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: It doesn't have to be a thing.

Professor Quillibrace: That is worth dwelling upon.

He took the pencil again.

Professor Quillibrace: We tend to think that reality consists of things, and that relations merely connect the things. But modern physics repeatedly complicates that picture.

Mr Blottisham: Objects first, relationships second?

Professor Quillibrace: That is the habitual picture.

Miss Stray: And perhaps sometimes the relationship is the more fundamental feature.

Professor Quillibrace: Perhaps.

The membrane

Mr Blottisham: But physicists themselves sometimes talk about the horizon as a membrane.

Miss Stray: The membrane paradigm.

Professor Quillibrace: Indeed.

Mr Blottisham: So surely we're allowed to think of it as a membrane.

Professor Quillibrace: We are allowed to use the model.

Mr Blottisham: Ah.

Professor Quillibrace: That does not mean we should mistake the model for ontology.

Miss Stray: The membrane is useful because it captures certain relationships.

Professor Quillibrace: Exactly.

Mr Blottisham: So when the physicist says "membrane", the physicist may mean "behaves mathematically in certain respects as though there were a membrane."

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Mr Blottisham: And when the popular article says "membrane", it means "there is a membrane."

Professor Quillibrace: Frequently.

Mr Blottisham: I see.

He looked pleased.

Mr Blottisham: So the problem isn't metaphor.

Professor Quillibrace: No.

Mr Blottisham: It's forgetting that it is metaphor.

Professor Quillibrace: Now you are learning very quickly.

The horizon acquires entropy

Miss Stray turned another page.

Miss Stray: Then there's the really strange part.

Mr Blottisham: The part involving entropy?

Miss Stray: Yes.

Professor Quillibrace: Black-hole thermodynamics.

Miss Stray: The entropy is proportional to the area of the horizon.

Mr Blottisham: Why not the volume?

Professor Quillibrace: Precisely.

Mr Blottisham: I knew you would say that.

Professor Quillibrace: Our ordinary intuition about storage is volumetric.

Miss Stray: A larger room contains more things.

Mr Blottisham: A larger hard drive stores more data.

Professor Quillibrace: Yet black-hole entropy scales with area.

Miss Stray: Which makes the boundary itself suddenly look informationally important.

Professor Quillibrace: Very much so.

Mr Blottisham: Perhaps the universe has discovered shelving.

Professor Quillibrace: Or perhaps we should resist that metaphor too.

Mr Blottisham: I was afraid of that.

Does the boundary contain the interior?

Miss Stray: The temptation is to say that the information is stored on the horizon.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: But that sounds almost as though we've simply moved the storage metaphor from the inside to the surface.

Professor Quillibrace: Exactly.

Mr Blottisham: We have upgraded the filing cabinet to a filing membrane.

Professor Quillibrace: Which is not a conceptual improvement.

Miss Stray: The deeper question is why the number of possible states associated with the black hole scales with its boundary area.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: Not "what is written on the surface?"

Professor Quillibrace: Precisely.

Mr Blottisham: So the area is a clue, not an answer.

Professor Quillibrace: An excellent formulation.

Holographic

Miss Stray: And this is where holography comes in.

Mr Blottisham: I knew we were heading there.

Professor Quillibrace: The holographic principle is one of those cases where the metaphor is extraordinarily suggestive and extraordinarily dangerous.

Miss Stray: Because a hologram is an image.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Mr Blottisham: So saying the universe is holographic makes one imagine that reality is a projection.

Professor Quillibrace: Which is not what the slogan, by itself, establishes.

Miss Stray: The deeper idea is that a description formulated in terms of degrees of freedom associated with a boundary can encode the same physical content as a description involving a volume.

Professor Quillibrace: Very roughly, yes.

Mr Blottisham: So the boundary doesn't necessarily contain a little picture of what's inside.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Miss Stray: It may be that what we call the interior can be described through another set of degrees of freedom.

Professor Quillibrace: And that possibility is far more radical than simply putting information on a surface.

The trouble with location

There was a longer silence.

Miss Stray looked back at the first page.

Miss Stray: I think this changes the question we've been asking.

Mr Blottisham: Which question?

Miss Stray: "Where is the information?"

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: We have been assuming that information must have a location.

Mr Blottisham: Inside or outside.

Miss Stray: Exactly.

Professor Quillibrace: And if information is fundamentally relational, that assumption may already be too strong.

Miss Stray: A correlation isn't necessarily located in one of the systems it relates.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Miss Stray: And a boundary isn't necessarily a thing located between two things.

Professor Quillibrace: Correct.

Miss Stray: So perhaps the question "Where is the information?" is itself built from the wrong ontology.

Mr Blottisham looked at Professor Quillibrace.

Mr Blottisham: You know, she has a point.

Professor Quillibrace: She does.

Mr Blottisham: That's becoming quite a habit.

What if inside and outside are emergent?

Miss Stray: Suppose, just for a moment, that spacetime itself isn't fundamental.

Mr Blottisham: Must we?

Miss Stray: Suppose the geometry emerges from deeper relationships.

Professor Quillibrace: A perfectly respectable possibility.

Miss Stray: Then perhaps the horizon emerges too.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Miss Stray: And if the horizon emerges, then perhaps "inside" and "outside" emerge with it.

Mr Blottisham: Meaning that the distinction between them isn't fundamental either?

Professor Quillibrace: That would be one possible implication.

Mr Blottisham: Then what is fundamental?

Professor Quillibrace smiled.

Professor Quillibrace: That, Mr Blottisham, is generally what one discovers at the end of an essay rather than the beginning.

Mr Blottisham: Very inconvenient.

The shape of the problem

Miss Stray: It seems to me that the argument has shifted.

Professor Quillibrace: How so?

Miss Stray: We began by asking what happens to information at a black hole.

Mr Blottisham: Then we asked what "lost" means.

Miss Stray: Then we asked what the horizon is.

Professor Quillibrace: And?

Miss Stray: Now I'm wondering whether the real question is what we mean by where.

Professor Quillibrace looked pleased.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Mr Blottisham: That sounds ominous.

Professor Quillibrace: It is promising.

Miss Stray: Because if information can be encoded in correlations, and if correlations are not necessarily localised in ordinary spatial objects, then asking where information is may be like asking where a relationship is.

Mr Blottisham: In the room?

Miss Stray: Between the people.

Mr Blottisham: That seems annoyingly sensible.

The Common Room gets quiet

For a while nobody spoke.

Outside, the gardener was pushing a wheelbarrow across the quadrangle.

Mr Blottisham watched him.

Mr Blottisham: I have just realised something.

Professor Quillibrace: This should be interesting.

Mr Blottisham: We started with a line.

Miss Stray: The horizon.

Mr Blottisham: Yes.

Miss Stray: And now the line has disappeared.

Professor Quillibrace: Not disappeared.

Mr Blottisham: Become less substantial.

Professor Quillibrace: Better.

Miss Stray: It was never a wall.

Mr Blottisham: It was a difference in possible futures.

Professor Quillibrace: Yes.

Mr Blottisham: And the more we investigate it, the more the boundary seems to belong to the relations rather than the things.

Professor Quillibrace nodded.

Professor Quillibrace: That is the interesting lesson.

Miss Stray: A boundary can be real without being a thing.

Professor Quillibrace: And information can be real without being a substance.

Mr Blottisham: Which means the two things we thought we were locating—

He paused.

Mr Blottisham: —may not be the sort of things that have locations.

Miss Stray smiled.

Miss Stray: Then perhaps the black hole isn't hiding information somewhere.

Professor Quillibrace: Perhaps.

Miss Stray: Perhaps it is changing the relationships in which information can be found.

Professor Quillibrace looked once more through the window.

Professor Quillibrace: And if that is so, then the horizon has done something rather remarkable.

Mr Blottisham: What?

Professor Quillibrace: It has turned a question about location into a question about structure.

Mr Blottisham considered this.

Mr Blottisham: I suppose that's progress.

Professor Quillibrace: It may be.

Mr Blottisham: Although I still think a filing cabinet would have been easier.

Miss Stray: Perhaps.

She closed the essay.

Miss Stray: But I don't think the universe is obliged to be easy to file.

There was a pause.

Professor Quillibrace: An unfortunate omission in the original design.

Mr Blottisham: I shall raise it with the appropriate committee.

And the Common Room returned, with some relief, to its tea.

The Senior Common Room: What Does It Mean to Lose Information?

The Senior Common Room was unusually quiet.

Professor Quillibrace was reading the newspaper.

Miss Elowen Stray was looking thoughtfully out of the window.

Mr Blottisham entered carrying a cup of tea and the expression of a man who had just discovered a serious problem with the universe.

BLOTTISHAM: I have it.

QUILLIBRACE: That is generally when I become concerned.

BLOTTISHAM: The black-hole information paradox is really quite simple.

STRAY: Is it?

BLOTTISHAM: Yes. Information goes into the black hole and gets lost.

QUILLIBRACE: You have managed to solve the paradox by repeating its name.

BLOTTISHAM: No, no. I'm being precise.

QUILLIBRACE: Then let us test the precision. What do you mean by "lost"?

BLOTTISHAM: Gone.

QUILLIBRACE: Excellent. And what do you mean by "gone"?

BLOTTISHAM: Not there.

QUILLIBRACE: And what do you mean by "not there"?

Blottisham paused.

BLOTTISHAM: I see where this is going.

QUILLIBRACE: Then we are making progress.

Elowen smiled.

STRAY: Perhaps "lost" is doing rather more work than we usually notice.

BLOTTISHAM: I don't see the difficulty. If I lose my keys, I don't have my keys.

QUILLIBRACE: Precisely. But have the keys ceased to exist?

BLOTTISHAM: No.

QUILLIBRACE: Then you have distinguished between losing something and destroying it.

BLOTTISHAM: Obviously.

QUILLIBRACE: Good. We shall now apply that obvious distinction to information.

Blottisham looked suspicious.

BLOTTISHAM: Information isn't keys.

QUILLIBRACE: An excellent beginning.


The lost keys

STRAY: Suppose you lose your keys. There are several possibilities.

BLOTTISHAM: I can't find them.

STRAY: Yes. But they might be under the sofa.

BLOTTISHAM: They might.

STRAY: Or in your other coat.

BLOTTISHAM: Also possible.

STRAY: Or you might have left them at the college.

BLOTTISHAM: Less pleasant, but possible.

STRAY: In each case, your access to the keys has changed. The keys themselves have not necessarily changed in the relevant way.

QUILLIBRACE: We therefore have a useful distinction.

He put down the newspaper.

QUILLIBRACE: Inaccessibility is not destruction.

BLOTTISHAM: Fine.

QUILLIBRACE: It becomes considerably less fine when people say, "The information is lost."

BLOTTISHAM: Because they might merely mean that nobody can get at it.

QUILLIBRACE: Correct.

STRAY: And in the black-hole problem, that distinction is not merely linguistic. It is physically decisive.

BLOTTISHAM: But if the information is behind the event horizon, then from outside we can't get it.

QUILLIBRACE: Certainly.

BLOTTISHAM: So it's lost.

QUILLIBRACE: To you.

BLOTTISHAM: Isn't that what lost means?

QUILLIBRACE: In ordinary life, often. In fundamental physics, we need rather more discrimination.

STRAY: Otherwise we slide from "unavailable from this perspective" to "no longer present in the physical state."

BLOTTISHAM: Which aren't the same.

QUILLIBRACE: Congratulations.


Hidden, scrambled, destroyed

Elowen rose and went to the blackboard.

She wrote:

ACCESSIBLE

INACCESSIBLE

SCRAMBLED

TRANSFORMED

DESTROYED

STRAY: These are not synonyms.

BLOTTISHAM: They all sound rather bad.

STRAY: For the person trying to recover the information, perhaps.

She pointed to the first word.

STRAY: Information can be accessible.

Then the second.

STRAY: It can be present but inaccessible.

Then the third.

STRAY: It can be scrambled among an enormous number of physical degrees of freedom.

Then the fourth.

STRAY: It can be transformed into a different physical organisation.

And finally—

STRAY: It could, in principle, be fundamentally destroyed.

QUILLIBRACE: The paradox concerns the last possibility.

BLOTTISHAM: So if it is merely scrambled, there's no paradox?

QUILLIBRACE: Not in the same sense.

BLOTTISHAM: Then black holes just scramble things.

QUILLIBRACE: That would be a rather premature conclusion.

BLOTTISHAM: I thought you said scrambling was fine.

QUILLIBRACE: I said scrambling is not destruction.

BLOTTISHAM: Ah.

QUILLIBRACE: You have just demonstrated why distinctions are useful.

Elowen laughed softly.

STRAY: There is something rather revealing here. The ordinary word lost compresses all these possibilities into one event.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

STRAY: I cannot find it.

I cannot access it.

I cannot reconstruct it.

It has been radically reorganised.

It no longer exists in the physical description.

Ordinary speech permits us to move among these without noticing.

QUILLIBRACE: Physics does not have that luxury.


The black hole as scrambler

BLOTTISHAM: So perhaps the black hole is just an extraordinarily good filing system.

QUILLIBRACE: No.

BLOTTISHAM: A bad filing system?

QUILLIBRACE: Worse.

STRAY: Perhaps a filing system that has shredded the filing system.

BLOTTISHAM: That's not particularly reassuring.

STRAY: It isn't meant to be.

QUILLIBRACE: The point is that a black hole is thought to be an extraordinarily efficient scrambler.

BLOTTISHAM: Meaning?

QUILLIBRACE: Suppose a complicated quantum state falls into it. The information associated with that state need not remain in any recognisable form.

BLOTTISHAM: So the black hole destroys the pattern.

QUILLIBRACE: No. It destroys the recognisable organisation of the pattern.

BLOTTISHAM: That sounds suspiciously like destruction.

STRAY: Not necessarily. Consider a book.

BLOTTISHAM: A book?

STRAY: Tear it into pieces.

BLOTTISHAM: I can see where this is going.

STRAY: If the pieces remain available and their relationships are known, the book can be reconstructed.

BLOTTISHAM: Yes.

STRAY: Scatter the pieces across a warehouse.

BLOTTISHAM: More difficult.

STRAY: Mix them with pieces from a million other books.

BLOTTISHAM: Practically impossible.

STRAY: But impossibility in practice is not automatically destruction in principle.

QUILLIBRACE: Precisely.

BLOTTISHAM: And a black hole does this on a rather larger scale.

QUILLIBRACE: Conceptually, yes.

BLOTTISHAM: So it is less like a cosmic shredder and more like a cosmic scrambled egg.

QUILLIBRACE: I regret saying anything about eggs.


The thermal problem

STRAY: But now we encounter the real difficulty.

BLOTTISHAM: The radiation.

STRAY: Yes.

QUILLIBRACE: Hawking radiation has a thermal character.

BLOTTISHAM: Which means it has no information.

QUILLIBRACE: No.

BLOTTISHAM: I thought thermal meant random.

QUILLIBRACE: Thermal behaviour does not automatically mean informational emptiness.

STRAY: The important question is what level of description we are using.

BLOTTISHAM: Explain.

STRAY: Imagine two decks of cards.

BLOTTISHAM: Again with the household objects.

STRAY: Each deck contains exactly the same cards.

BLOTTISHAM: Obviously.

STRAY: But the ordering can be completely different.

BLOTTISHAM: Yes.

STRAY: If I inspect only one card at a time, I learn almost nothing about the ordering of the complete deck.

BLOTTISHAM: Right.

STRAY: The information can reside in the relationships among the cards.

QUILLIBRACE: Likewise, radiation can have thermal-looking individual statistics while the complete quantum state contains highly nontrivial correlations.

BLOTTISHAM: So the information isn't necessarily in the particles.

QUILLIBRACE: Not in the sense you appear to want.

BLOTTISHAM: Where is it, then?

QUILLIBRACE: In the correlations.

BLOTTISHAM: That's not somewhere.

QUILLIBRACE: Exactly.

There was a short silence.

STRAY: That may be one of the important conceptual points.

BLOTTISHAM: Information doesn't have to have a location.

QUILLIBRACE: At least not an ordinary spatial location.

STRAY: A relation is not a thing sitting in one place.

BLOTTISHAM: So asking "Where is the information?" may already be the wrong question.

QUILLIBRACE: It may be.

BLOTTISHAM: That's becoming an irritatingly common conclusion.

QUILLIBRACE: Reality is under no obligation to avoid irritating conclusions.


The whole and the parts

STRAY: Quantum entanglement makes this even stranger.

BLOTTISHAM: I knew you were going to say that.

STRAY: The individual parts of an entangled system can appear highly random.

BLOTTISHAM: While the whole is structured.

STRAY: Exactly.

QUILLIBRACE: The correlations are not reducible to what you find by examining each component independently.

BLOTTISHAM: So you can look at every particle separately and still miss the information in the whole system.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: That's rather unfair.

QUILLIBRACE: It is quantum mechanics.

STRAY: And it gives us an important conceptual possibility for black-hole evaporation.

BLOTTISHAM: That the Hawking radiation can look thermal while the complete radiation state contains information.

STRAY: Precisely.

BLOTTISHAM: Then the information hasn't escaped as a message.

QUILLIBRACE: Correct.

BLOTTISHAM: It has become a pattern in the relationships among the radiation.

QUILLIBRACE: Much better.

BLOTTISHAM: I'm learning.

QUILLIBRACE: Slowly.


Transport or transformation?

STRAY: There is another metaphor we may need to reconsider.

BLOTTISHAM: Let me guess. Information travels.

STRAY: Yes.

QUILLIBRACE: We tend to imagine information as cargo.

BLOTTISHAM: It goes in.

QUILLIBRACE: It waits.

BLOTTISHAM: It comes out.

QUILLIBRACE: A surprisingly persistent picture.

STRAY: But perhaps the more useful idea is transformation.

BLOTTISHAM: Rather than transport?

STRAY: Yes.

QUILLIBRACE: The physical state evolves. Its correlations change. Its organisation changes. What was once represented one way may later be represented another way.

BLOTTISHAM: So nothing has to travel.

QUILLIBRACE: Not in the metaphorical sense of a little parcel called information moving through spacetime.

STRAY: The physical system changes.

BLOTTISHAM: And the distinctions can survive that change.

QUILLIBRACE: If evolution is unitary.

BLOTTISHAM: Even if the final state looks completely different?

QUILLIBRACE: Indeed.

STRAY: Preservation does not necessarily mean persistence of form.

Elowen paused.

STRAY: That may be worth keeping.


The broken glass

BLOTTISHAM: But surely irreversible things happen.

QUILLIBRACE: Of course.

BLOTTISHAM: A glass falls and smashes.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: It doesn't spontaneously reassemble.

QUILLIBRACE: Not in any realistic circumstance.

BLOTTISHAM: So the information is lost.

QUILLIBRACE: Not necessarily.

BLOTTISHAM: Again?

QUILLIBRACE: The microscopic state after the glass breaks contains vastly more detail than the macroscopic description "broken glass."

STRAY: The fragments, air, vibrations, heat and surrounding environment all participate in the resulting state.

BLOTTISHAM: So the information about the original glass has been dispersed.

QUILLIBRACE: Precisely.

BLOTTISHAM: But recovering it would be absurdly difficult.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: So it is effectively lost.

QUILLIBRACE: For practical purposes.

BLOTTISHAM: But not fundamentally.

QUILLIBRACE: That distinction is the whole point.

STRAY: The universe can make something effectively inaccessible without making it nonexistent.

BLOTTISHAM: Which means "lost" can describe our relationship to a state rather than the fate of the state itself.

Quillibrace looked up.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: I wish you would occasionally admit that I have said something useful.

QUILLIBRACE: I have just done so.

BLOTTISHAM: I hadn't noticed.


The black hole evaporates

There was another pause.

Then Elowen turned back to the board.

She erased everything except one phrase:

THE BLACK HOLE DISAPPEARS

STRAY: But now the analogy with the broken glass reaches its limit.

BLOTTISHAM: Because the black hole evaporates.

STRAY: Yes.

QUILLIBRACE: If the black hole were eternal, one could at least imagine the information remaining associated with the interior indefinitely.

BLOTTISHAM: Inaccessible, but still there.

QUILLIBRACE: Perhaps.

STRAY: But if the black hole completely evaporates, the supposed container is gone.

BLOTTISHAM: Which leaves us with the obvious question.

QUILLIBRACE: "Where did the information go?"

BLOTTISHAM: Exactly.

QUILLIBRACE: And we have just spent an hour explaining why that may be the wrong question.

BLOTTISHAM: Then what is the right one?

STRAY: Perhaps:

What physical structure now carries the distinctions that were present in the initial state?

Blottisham considered this.

BLOTTISHAM: That's considerably less catchy.

QUILLIBRACE: It is also considerably less misleading.


Information changes its address

BLOTTISHAM: So we shouldn't say the information was inside and then moved outside.

QUILLIBRACE: Correct.

BLOTTISHAM: We should say the correlations were reorganised as the system evolved.

QUILLIBRACE: Better.

STRAY: The important question becomes what structure currently carries the relevant distinctions.

BLOTTISHAM: Which means information doesn't have an address in the ordinary sense.

QUILLIBRACE: Precisely.

BLOTTISHAM: But surely something physical has to carry it.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: So information is not unreal.

QUILLIBRACE: Certainly not.

STRAY: But neither is it necessarily a substance being transported.

BLOTTISHAM: It's structure.

STRAY: Or, more carefully, we use the word information to describe structures of distinctions and correlations realised in physical states.

BLOTTISHAM: That's rather less mystical than "information is everywhere."

QUILLIBRACE: It is also considerably more defensible.


The Page curve

Blottisham sat down.

BLOTTISHAM: All right. But how do we know any of this isn't just clever wordplay?

QUILLIBRACE: An excellent objection.

BLOTTISHAM: Thank you.

QUILLIBRACE: You should enjoy it while it lasts.

STRAY: The point is that the mathematics gives us constraints.

BLOTTISHAM: The Page curve?

QUILLIBRACE: Among other things.

STRAY: Don Page considered what the entanglement between a black hole and its radiation should do if evaporation were unitary.

BLOTTISHAM: And?

QUILLIBRACE: Roughly speaking, at first the radiation becomes increasingly entangled with the remaining black hole.

STRAY: But after the Page time, the pattern should turn around.

BLOTTISHAM: Meaning?

STRAY: The later radiation must begin to carry information about the earlier state if the complete evaporation is unitary.

BLOTTISHAM: So the information eventually comes back.

QUILLIBRACE: Be careful.

BLOTTISHAM: What now?

QUILLIBRACE: You have reverted to the transport metaphor.

BLOTTISHAM: Right.

STRAY: The more precise statement is that the correlations in the radiation must evolve in such a way that the final radiation state preserves the distinctions encoded in the initial state.

BLOTTISHAM: So the Page curve isn't a story about messages escaping.

QUILLIBRACE: No.

STRAY: It is a statement about the changing organisation of quantum correlations.

BLOTTISHAM: Which means the mathematics itself pushes us away from the metaphor.

Quillibrace nodded.

QUILLIBRACE: Now you are paying attention.


Two histories

STRAY: There is an even deeper way of putting the problem.

She wrote:

A

B

STRAY: Suppose two genuinely different quantum states collapse into black holes.

BLOTTISHAM: Different initial states.

STRAY: Yes.

QUILLIBRACE: If both black holes evaporate completely into precisely the same final state, what has happened?

BLOTTISHAM: The difference has disappeared.

QUILLIBRACE: Exactly.

BLOTTISHAM: Not merely that nobody can find it.

QUILLIBRACE: No.

BLOTTISHAM: The final physical state itself no longer distinguishes A from B.

STRAY: And that is much stronger.

BLOTTISHAM: So the deepest problem isn't really that information has been misplaced.

QUILLIBRACE: Correct.

BLOTTISHAM: It's that a distinction that existed between two possible histories has ceased to exist.

STRAY: Yes.

She looked at Quillibrace.

STRAY: Which makes the paradox begin to look like a problem about identity.

QUILLIBRACE: Or, perhaps more cautiously, about the persistence of difference through physical evolution.

BLOTTISHAM: What makes A remain different from B?

QUILLIBRACE: Precisely.

BLOTTISHAM: And if physical evolution can erase that distinction, then something very fundamental has changed.

QUILLIBRACE: That is the difficulty.


The cost of genuine loss

BLOTTISHAM: But perhaps information really can be destroyed.

QUILLIBRACE: Perhaps.

BLOTTISHAM: You can't simply assume unitarity because you like it.

QUILLIBRACE: Quite right.

STRAY: The paradox would have no force if the conclusion were built into the premises.

BLOTTISHAM: So if information really is destroyed—

QUILLIBRACE: Then quantum evolution is not unitary in this situation.

BLOTTISHAM: Which would mean—

QUILLIBRACE: That a foundational principle of quantum theory would require modification.

STRAY: And that would be a very expensive theoretical conclusion.

BLOTTISHAM: Expensive?

QUILLIBRACE: Conceptually.

BLOTTISHAM: Ah.

STRAY: The strength of the paradox comes from the fact that quantum theory has survived an extraordinary number of experimental tests.

QUILLIBRACE: So abandoning unitarity is possible in principle.

BLOTTISHAM: But not something one should do merely because the metaphor of "lost information" sounds convincing.

QUILLIBRACE: Precisely.


What does the word "lost" conceal?

Elowen returned to the blackboard.

She wrote:

LOST

Then underneath:

TO WHOM?

Blottisham frowned.

BLOTTISHAM: That's interesting.

STRAY: Is information lost to an observer?

BLOTTISHAM: Or lost from the complete physical state?

QUILLIBRACE: Those are different questions.

STRAY: And there is another.

She wrote:

UNDER WHAT PARTITION?

BLOTTISHAM: Meaning?

STRAY: Suppose we divide the world into systems.

Black hole.

Radiation.

Inside.

Outside.

Observer.

Observed.

QUILLIBRACE: Then we ask where the information is located within those divisions.

STRAY: But quantum correlations need not respect our preferred partitions.

BLOTTISHAM: So the information may be in the relation between the things we've decided to separate.

QUILLIBRACE: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: Which means our question about location may depend on how we divided the system in the first place.

STRAY: Exactly.

She paused.

STRAY: Perhaps the most interesting question is not:

Where is the information?

but:

In what relations is the information encoded?

Quillibrace nodded slowly.

QUILLIBRACE: That is considerably better.


A small rebellion against nouns

BLOTTISHAM: I notice something.

QUILLIBRACE: This should be interesting.

BLOTTISHAM: We keep replacing nouns with verbs.

STRAY: Go on.

BLOTTISHAM: Information doesn't sit somewhere.

It becomes encoded.

It becomes scrambled.

It becomes distributed.

It becomes correlated.

It becomes transformed.

QUILLIBRACE: An astute observation.

BLOTTISHAM: And the black hole isn't really a thing with information inside it.

It's a region in which physical relationships evolve in a particular way.

STRAY: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: So perhaps our problem comes partly from turning processes into objects.

Quillibrace looked almost pleased.

QUILLIBRACE: That is a useful suspicion.

BLOTTISHAM: Thank you.

QUILLIBRACE: Do not become ambitious.


From loss to transformation

The fire had burned low.

Elowen looked again at the words on the board.

LOST

HIDDEN

SCRAMBLED

TRANSFORMED

STRAY: Perhaps we have now changed the question.

BLOTTISHAM: From "Where did the information go?"

STRAY: To:

What happened to the informational structure of the state?

QUILLIBRACE: Better.

BLOTTISHAM: And if the answer is that the structure was transformed into correlations in the radiation—

QUILLIBRACE: Then the information has not been fundamentally destroyed.

BLOTTISHAM: Even if nobody can practically reconstruct it.

QUILLIBRACE: Correct.

STRAY: And if the final state truly contains no distinction corresponding to the initial alternatives—

BLOTTISHAM: Then we have genuine information loss.

QUILLIBRACE: And therefore a serious challenge to unitary quantum evolution.

BLOTTISHAM: So the word "lost" conceals an entire hierarchy.

STRAY: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: And the paradox is really about which level of that hierarchy nature permits.

QUILLIBRACE: Exactly.

There was a silence.

Then Blottisham frowned.

BLOTTISHAM: But we've only moved the problem.

QUILLIBRACE: Naturally.

BLOTTISHAM: We now have information being reorganised into correlations in the radiation.

STRAY: Yes.

BLOTTISHAM: Fine.

But how does that happen?

QUILLIBRACE: An excellent question.

BLOTTISHAM: And where are those correlations encoded?

STRAY: Another excellent question.

BLOTTISHAM: And what has the horizon got to do with it?

Quillibrace folded his newspaper.

QUILLIBRACE: Now you are beginning to ask the right questions.

BLOTTISHAM: I thought you were going to say I was confused.

QUILLIBRACE: You are.

BLOTTISHAM: Oh.

QUILLIBRACE: But you are becoming confused in increasingly productive directions.

Elowen smiled.

STRAY: Which may be what progress looks like at the edge of a conceptual system.

Quillibrace glanced at the blackboard.

QUILLIBRACE: We have discovered that information need not be a thing.

That loss need not be destruction.

That invisibility need not be absence.

That scrambling need not be erasure.

And that preservation need not mean persistence of form.

BLOTTISHAM: Which leaves the horizon.

STRAY: Yes.

QUILLIBRACE: The boundary that is not a wall.

BLOTTISHAM: The place where nothing crosses, except apparently information.

QUILLIBRACE: And there you have already smuggled the next metaphor into the room.

BLOTTISHAM: Which one?

QUILLIBRACE: Crossing.

Blottisham looked at him.

Elowen looked at the blackboard.

Then she added one final word beneath the others:

BOUNDARY

STRAY: Perhaps our next question is not where the information goes.

She underlined the word.

STRAY: Perhaps it is what kind of thing a boundary is, when the thing being bounded is a set of possible causal relations.

Quillibrace picked up his newspaper again.

QUILLIBRACE: That should keep us occupied.

BLOTTISHAM: I had hoped for a simpler answer.

QUILLIBRACE: You have been given one.

BLOTTISHAM: What is it?

QUILLIBRACE: There isn't one.

BLOTTISHAM: That's not an answer.

QUILLIBRACE: It is an accurate description of the situation.

Miss Stray laughed.

Outside, the evening light had begun to fade.

The Common Room settled back into silence.

But on the blackboard, four words remained:

LOST.

HIDDEN.

TRANSFORMED.

BOUNDARY.

The Senior Common Room: The Thing That Wasn't a Thing

Professor Quillibrace was standing at the blackboard.

This was not unusual.

What was unusual was that the blackboard contained only one word.

INFORMATION

Mr Blottisham entered, glanced at it, and stopped.

“I see.”

Quillibrace turned.

“What do you see?”

“The subject.”

“Do you?”

“Yes.”

“What is it?”

“Information.”

Quillibrace waited.

Blottisham looked at the board.

“Information.”

“Yes.”

“So…”

“Yes?”

“That is information.”

Quillibrace looked at the word.

“No.”

Blottisham stared at him.

“You wrote it.”

“I did.”

“It's a word.”

“Yes.”

“And the word refers to information.”

“Perhaps.”

“Then what exactly is the problem?”

Quillibrace put down the chalk.

“The problem is that we have been using this word for years without ever deciding what sort of thing it is.”

Miss Elowen Stray looked up from her tea.

“That may be rather more important than it sounds.”

Blottisham sat down.

“I have a feeling we're going to spend the afternoon discovering that nouns aren't nouns.”

“An excellent preliminary hypothesis,” said Quillibrace.


I. Information everywhere

Elowen looked at the blackboard.

“We use the word constantly.”

“We store information,” said Quillibrace.

“Transmit it.”

“Process it.”

“Encode it.”

“Retrieve it.”

“Lose it.”

Blottisham nodded.

“Yes.”

“And now,” said Elowen, “people increasingly speak as though information belongs on the same list as matter and energy.”

Quillibrace wrote:

MATTER

ENERGY

SPACE

TIME

INFORMATION

Blottisham nodded approvingly.

“Looks perfectly respectable.”

“Does it?”

“Yes.”

“Why?”

“Because they're all basic features of reality.”

Quillibrace looked at him.

“Are they?”

Blottisham paused.

“Well…”

Elowen smiled.

“The list feels natural.”

“Exactly,” said Quillibrace. “Which is why we should be cautious.”

Blottisham sighed.

“You really don't like natural-looking lists.”

“Not when they contain concepts from different categories.”


II. The message

“Let's start with the ordinary meaning,” said Elowen.

“Information is something communicated.”

Blottisham nodded.

“I tell you it is raining.”

“You receive the information.”

“A newspaper contains information.”

“A book contains information.”

“A photograph contains information.”

“Exactly.”

“So information is content.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Useful.”

“Good.”

“Incomplete.”

“Of course.”

He turned to Elowen.

“Take a photograph.”

She held up an imaginary camera.

“A photograph of a tree.”

“Yes.”

“What is the information?”

Blottisham answered immediately.

“The picture of the tree.”

“Which part?”

“The pixels.”

“Only the pixels?”

“The colours.”

“The shapes?”

“Yes.”

“The arrangement?”

“Yes.”

“The fact that I can infer something about the tree?”

Blottisham paused.

“Yes.”

“The meaning I give it?”

“Perhaps.”

“The physical correlations between the photograph and the tree?”

Blottisham frowned.

“Those too.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“And where exactly is the information?”

Blottisham pointed at the photograph.

“In the photograph.”

“Which part?”

“The whole thing.”

“Then is the information the photograph?”

“No.”

“Is it the ink?”

“No.”

“The pixels?”

“No.”

“The meaning?”

“No.”

“The correlations?”

“Yes.”

Blottisham stopped.

“So…”

“Yes?”

“It isn't any one of those things.”

“Not straightforwardly.”

Elowen leaned forward.

“The physical things are physical.”

“Yes.”

“But the information about the tree arises from the relationships among them.”

Blottisham nodded slowly.

“So information is not another substance.”

“Now we're making progress.”


III. The invisible fourth substance

Blottisham looked again at the list.

“Suppose I have a book.”

“Yes.”

“The book is physical.”

“Yes.”

“The information in the book is…”

He hesitated.

“Also physical?”

“Not in the sense of being a second material substance.”

“So if I weigh the book—”

“You weigh the paper and ink.”

“Not the information.”

“Correct.”

“But if I destroy the book—”

“You may destroy the physical pattern that encoded the information.”

“So information depends upon physical things.”

“Yes.”

“But isn't itself another physical thing.”

“Not in the ordinary substance sense.”

Blottisham looked irritated.

“That's terribly inconvenient.”

Quillibrace smiled.

“Many useful concepts are.”

Elowen added:

“The distinction matters because otherwise we start imagining information as though it were a fluid.”

“A fluid?”

“Something that can be poured from one container into another.”

Blottisham brightened.

“Like wine.”

Quillibrace looked at him.

“An analogy I fear you have selected with ulterior motives.”

“Not at all.”

Elowen laughed.

“But the analogy is revealing.”

“Because information isn't wine.”

“Correct.”

“Though it can be transmitted.”

“Yes.”

“Stored.”

“Yes.”

“Processed.”

“Yes.”

“And still not be a substance.”

“Precisely.”

Blottisham frowned.

“That is deeply unsatisfactory.”


IV. Shannon enters the Common Room

Quillibrace wrote another name on the board.

SHANNON

“Claude Shannon.”

“Information theory,” said Blottisham.

“Yes.”

“What did he actually do?”

“One of the most important things he did was separate information from meaning.”

Blottisham looked surprised.

“Separate them?”

“Yes.”

“Surely information means something.”

“Not in information theory.”

Quillibrace wrote:

THE MEETING IS TOMORROW

Then:

XQJ7KPL9

“Which contains more information?”

“The first.”

“Why?”

“Because it means something.”

“Ah.”

Elowen smiled.

“You have just supplied the intuition Shannon's framework asks us to resist.”

Blottisham looked at the second string.

“It doesn't mean anything.”

“Perhaps not to you.”

“So it has information?”

“In the information-theoretic sense, certainly.”

“How?”

“Because it can distinguish among possibilities.”

Blottisham looked at Quillibrace.

“Even if nobody understands it?”

“Yes.”

“Even if it is nonsense?”

“Yes.”

“Even if it means absolutely nothing?”

“Yes.”

“That seems wrong.”

“It seems wrong because you are using information in the semantic sense.”

“And Shannon wasn't.”

“Correct.”

Quillibrace wrote:

MEANING ≠ INFORMATION

“Or, more carefully, semantic information and information-theoretic information are not identical.”

Elowen nodded.

“This is one of the crucial distinctions for the black-hole problem.”


V. Two kinds of information

Blottisham considered the two messages.

“So in ordinary life, information means meaningful content.”

“Usually.”

“And in information theory?”

“Something more austere.”

“What?”

“Uncertainty, probability, distinguishability, encoding.”

“That sounds terribly dry.”

“It is mathematically productive.”

“I knew there had to be a catch.”

Elowen smiled.

“Imagine a system that can be in one of two states.”

She wrote:

A / B

“If A and B are physically distinguishable, then the distinction between them matters.”

“Yes.”

“If the system is in A rather than B, something is physically different.”

“Yes.”

“That difference can carry information.”

Blottisham nodded.

“Because I can tell them apart.”

“Exactly.”

“So information is the distinction.”

“Or associated with the distinction.”

“Between possible states.”

“Yes.”

Blottisham looked at the board.

“That is very different from a message.”

“Exactly.”

“No sentence.”

“No.”

“No meaning.”

“Not necessarily.”

“No one has to understand anything.”

“Correct.”

“Then the universe can contain information without anyone reading it.”

“Yes.”

Blottisham paused.

“That sounds rather important.”

“It is.”


VI. Information without an observer

Quillibrace took over.

“Suppose there are four possible states.”

He wrote:

A B C D

“Before we know which state the system occupies, there is uncertainty.”

“Yes.”

“Once we determine the state, the uncertainty is reduced.”

“Yes.”

“We can quantify that.”

“Information theory.”

“Correct.”

“And does someone have to experience the uncertainty?”

“No.”

Blottisham frowned.

“But uncertainty belongs to someone.”

“Psychological uncertainty does.”

“But this isn't psychological.”

“Not necessarily.”

“Then whose uncertainty is it?”

Quillibrace looked at him.

“The probability distribution describes the possibilities available in the physical model.”

“So information isn't simply what someone knows.”

“Correct.”

“Then it isn't subjective.”

“Not so quickly.”

Elowen intervened.

“The distinction still depends on a space of possible states and on what counts as physically distinguishable.”

“So…”

“Information is neither simply a private mental state nor a mysterious substance floating independently of physical description.”

“What is it, then?”

She paused.

“Something like a relation among state, possibility and distinction.”

Blottisham looked at Quillibrace.

“She is going to make you work for the noun.”

“Quite rightly.”


VII. The two coins

Elowen picked up two coins from the table.

“Suppose these are correlated.”

“How?”

“If the first is heads, the second is heads.”

She turned them over.

“If the first is tails, the second is tails.”

Blottisham nodded.

“So if I know the first, I know something about the second.”

“Exactly.”

“Information.”

“Yes.”

“Where is it?”

Blottisham looked at the first coin.

“In the first.”

“No.”

“The second?”

“No.”

“Both?”

“Closer.”

“In the relationship?”

“Yes.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“The information lies in the correlation.”

Blottisham looked uncomfortable.

“But a correlation isn't a thing.”

“Precisely.”

“Where is a correlation?”

“That's the point.”

“It doesn't have a location.”

“Not in the same sense as a coin.”

Elowen smiled.

“So we have moved from information as a thing to information as a relation.”

Blottisham stared at the coins.

“This is becoming increasingly inconvenient.”


VIII. Quantum mechanics makes it worse

Quillibrace wrote:

ENTANGLEMENT

“Quantum mechanics takes this relational character further.”

Blottisham looked at the word.

“Entanglement.”

“Yes.”

“Two systems can have correlations such that the state of the whole cannot always be reduced to independently specified states of the parts.”

“So the whole contains something the parts don't.”

“Careful.”

“Sorry.”

“The point is that the information associated with the joint state need not be assignable to either subsystem independently.”

“So again…”

“The relation.”

“Yes.”

Elowen nodded.

“Information may be distributed across correlations.”

Blottisham looked alarmed.

“Distributed?”

“Yes.”

“Where?”

“Across the relationship.”

“That isn't an answer.”

“It is the answer.”

“It's not a location.”

“Exactly.”

Blottisham leaned back.

“I begin to see the attraction of saying information is a substance.”

Quillibrace smiled.

“Because substances are easier to locate.”


IX. Scrambling

Elowen took a sheet of paper.

“Suppose this is a book.”

Blottisham nodded.

“We shred it.”

She tore the imaginary sheet.

“The information is gone.”

“Not necessarily,” said Quillibrace.

“If every fragment survives, and we know where every fragment is…”

“We can reconstruct it.”

“So the information is scrambled.”

“Exactly.”

“Not destroyed.”

“Correct.”

“Now mix the fragments with millions of other fragments.”

“Reconstruction becomes practically impossible.”

“But the physical distinctions may remain.”

“Yes.”

“And only if those distinctions genuinely disappear do we have something stronger than scrambling.”

“Precisely.”

Quillibrace wrote:

ACCESSIBLE

INACCESSIBLE

SCRAMBLED

ENCODED

DESTROYED

“Not the same.”

Blottisham nodded.

“Important distinction.”

“Very.”

“Especially for black holes.”

“Especially.”


X. The quantum state

Quillibrace sat down.

“Now we can return to the real problem.”

“The quantum state.”

“Yes.”

“A quantum state isn't simply a list of classical properties.”

“No.”

“It encodes possible measurement outcomes and the relations among them.”

“Yes.”

“And for a closed system, unitary evolution preserves the structure of the quantum state.”

“Yes.”

“So if a pure state evolves unitarily…”

“It remains pure.”

“But Hawking's semiclassical argument seems to produce…”

“A thermal mixed state.”

Blottisham looked at the board.

“So…”

Quillibrace wrote:

PURE → MIXED

“That is the problem.”

“Not merely that the radiation looks messy.”

“Correct.”

“A scrambled pure state can look thermal if we ignore some of its correlations.”

“Exactly.”

“So the real question is whether the complete final state contains the distinctions necessary to distinguish the possible initial states.”

“Yes.”

Blottisham nodded.

“That is much more precise than saying the message disappeared.”

“And much less likely to generate a cartoon of a little letter being swallowed by a black hole.”


XI. The black hole as hard drive

Blottisham suddenly brightened.

“I have it.”

Quillibrace looked worried.

“The black hole is a hard drive.”

“No.”

“Information goes in.”

“No.”

“It gets stored.”

“No.”

“It gets encrypted.”

“No.”

“Then the radiation retrieves it.”

“No.”

Blottisham looked disappointed.

“That was quite a good model.”

“It was an excellent collection of metaphors.”

“Thank you.”

“And an inadequate account of the physics.”

“Why?”

“Because storage suggests a container.”

“The black hole isn't one.”

“Correct.”

“And information becomes a thing inside it.”

“It need not be.”

“And retrieval makes it sound like a parcel coming back out.”

“Again.”

Elowen added:

“The deeper physical issue is whether the correlations and distinctions encoded in the initial state remain present in the later state.”

“So the radiation doesn't need to contain little files.”

“No.”

“It needs to contain the relevant correlations.”

“Precisely.”

Blottisham nodded.

“That is annoyingly less visual.”

“Fundamental physics is frequently disappointing in this respect.”


XII. Information as something carried

“But we say information is transmitted,” Blottisham objected.

“Yes.”

“And that's useful.”

“Very.”

“Then information can travel.”

Quillibrace considered this.

“Something can travel that carries information.”

“Isn't that the same thing?”

“No.”

“Explain.”

“The physical carrier travels. The information concerns the distinctions encoded in its state.”

“So a radio wave travels.”

“Yes.”

“And it carries information.”

“Yes.”

“But the information isn't a little object sitting inside the wave.”

“Correct.”

“It is a pattern in the physical state.”

“Better.”

“And the pattern is defined through possible alternatives.”

“Yes.”

Blottisham looked pleased.

“So information travels by being instantiated in changing physical relationships.”

Quillibrace paused.

“That will do.”

Elowen smiled.

“You see how the verb travel has changed?”

Blottisham nodded.

“It no longer requires information itself to be a traveller.”

“Exactly.”


XIII. Information about what?

Elowen returned to the photograph.

“We have another problem.”

“What now?” asked Blottisham.

“We often say that information is information about something.”

“The photograph is information about the tree.”

“Yes.”

“The thermometer gives information about temperature.”

“Yes.”

“DNA contains information about an organism.”

“Yes.”

“But does information in the black-hole problem have to be about something?”

Blottisham frowned.

“The initial quantum state.”

“About what?”

“The thing that formed the black hole.”

“Not necessarily.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“The quantum state is not a little description of some other physical object. It is the physical state itself.”

“So information doesn't always mean representation.”

“Correct.”

“That is another ordinary-language assumption.”

“Yes.”

Elowen smiled.

“We keep finding the same pattern.”

“What pattern?”

“A word that works perfectly well in ordinary contexts carries several relationships with it. Then we move it into fundamental physics, and the relationships begin to separate.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Information is content.”

“Sometimes.”

“A message.”

“Sometimes.”

“Knowledge.”

“Sometimes.”

“A pattern.”

“Sometimes.”

“A correlation.”

“Sometimes.”

“A distinction among possible states.”

“Yes.”

“And those are related but not interchangeable.”

“Precisely.”


XIV. The ontology of information

Blottisham looked again at the original list.

MATTER

ENERGY

SPACE

TIME

INFORMATION

“I have a question.”

Quillibrace looked wary.

“Go on.”

“Is information real?”

“Yes.”

Blottisham looked surprised.

“That was quick.”

“Relations can be real.”

“Such as?”

“Gravitational relations.”

“Yes.”

“Causal relations.”

“Yes.”

“Entanglement correlations.”

“Yes.”

“So the fact that information is relational doesn't make it imaginary.”

“Correct.”

“But is it fundamental?”

Quillibrace paused.

“That is a more difficult question.”

Elowen nodded.

“Perhaps we should resist turning information into a substance simply because it is physically significant.”

“So it might be fundamental without being stuff.”

“Possibly.”

“Like a relation.”

“Perhaps.”

“Or a constraint.”

“Yes.”

“A structure.”

“Yes.”

“An organisation of possibilities.”

“Yes.”

Blottisham looked at the board.

“That sounds more plausible than another cosmic fluid.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Marginally.”


XV. “It from bit”

Blottisham pointed at Quillibrace.

“You mentioned Wheeler.”

“Not yet.”

“You were going to.”

“I was.”

“Then mention him.”

Quillibrace wrote:

IT FROM BIT

“The slogan associated with John Wheeler.”

Blottisham nodded.

“Meaning?”

“Roughly, that physical reality might ultimately be understood in informational terms.”

“Excellent.”

“Yes.”

“Then information is fundamental.”

“Not so fast.”

“Why not?”

“Because a slogan isn't a theory.”

“What is a bit, then?”

Blottisham paused.

“Information.”

“No.”

“A piece of information.”

“No.”

“Zero or one.”

“Better.”

“What is the physical significance?”

“The distinction between two alternatives.”

Blottisham looked at the board.

“So even the bit isn't a little piece of information-stuff.”

“Correct.”

“It is a distinction.”

“Yes.”

Elowen smiled.

“Once again, relation appears before substance.”

Blottisham looked slightly defeated.

“I feel as though I am being systematically deprived of things.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“That is one of the educational benefits of philosophy.”


XVI. The possibility of difference

Elowen stood.

“Perhaps we can put the matter another way.”

She wrote:

COULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE

“This may be the hidden structure.”

Blottisham looked at it.

“What does?”

“Information.”

“How?”

“If there is only one possible state, there is nothing to distinguish.”

“Yes.”

“If there are alternatives, then there are distinctions.”

“Yes.”

“If a physical system occupies one alternative rather than another, that difference can carry information.”

“Yes.”

“So information requires possibility.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Or, at least, a structured space of alternatives.”

Elowen continued.

“To preserve information is therefore to preserve distinctions among possibilities.”

“And to destroy information?”

“To erase distinctions that could otherwise have remained distinct.”

Blottisham looked at the phrase.

“So the black-hole paradox can be rewritten.”

“How?”

He thought.

“Not ‘Where did the information go?’”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Good.”

“But…”

He paused.

“‘What happened to the differences between the possible initial states?’”

Elowen smiled.

“Yes.”

Blottisham sat down.

“That is much nastier.”

“Indeed.”


XVII. The observer disappears

Blottisham looked thoughtful.

“There is something else.”

“Yes?”

“If information isn't about what someone knows…”

“Yes.”

“And doesn't require meaning…”

“Yes.”

“And can exist in correlations…”

“Yes.”

“Then the observer can disappear.”

“From the fundamental description, yes.”

“So the universe doesn't need somebody to read the information.”

“Correct.”

“Then what does it mean for information to be available?”

“It means, roughly, that the relevant physical distinctions are accessible through some physical relation.”

“Accessible to whom?”

“An observer, perhaps.”

“Or an apparatus.”

“Or another physical subsystem.”

“Or…”

Elowen smiled.

“Or simply preserved in the structure of the state, whether or not anyone ever reconstructs it.”

Blottisham nodded.

“So there is a distinction between information existing in the physical state and information being available to an observer.”

“Precisely.”

“And that matters for black holes.”

“Enormously.”


XVIII. The final return to the black hole

Quillibrace stood and returned to the board.

He drew the outline of a black hole.

Then radiation emerging from it.

“Suppose the radiation looks thermal.”

“Yes.”

“Does that automatically mean it contains no information?”

“No.”

“Why?”

“Because the information might be encoded in correlations among the radiation quanta.”

“So particle by particle…”

“It may look thermal.”

“But collectively…”

“The full state may contain the distinctions.”

Blottisham nodded.

“Like a scrambled book.”

“Precisely.”

“Except vastly more complicated.”

“Vastly.”

“So the appearance of randomness doesn't prove information has disappeared.”

“No.”

“Because randomness at one level can coexist with structure at another.”

“Exactly.”

Elowen looked at the diagram.

“That is one of the most important conceptual distinctions in the whole problem.”

“Thermal appearance versus complete quantum state.”

“Yes.”

“Local appearance versus global structure.”

“Yes.”

“Accessible information versus information encoded in correlations.”

“Yes.”

Blottisham looked at the black hole.

“And now the question becomes…”

He paused.

Quillibrace waited.

“Whether the correlations really survive.”

“Precisely.”


XIX. The thing that wasn't a thing

The room had grown darker.

Elowen returned to her chair.

“I think we can now see why the word information is so troublesome.”

Blottisham nodded.

“It sounded like a thing.”

“Yes.”

“Then it became a message.”

“Yes.”

“Then a quantity.”

“Yes.”

“Then a distinction.”

“Yes.”

“Then a correlation.”

“Yes.”

“And now…”

He looked at the board.

“A relation among possibilities.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Not bad.”

“I'm getting better.”

“Don't ruin the moment.”

Elowen smiled.

“And notice what has happened to the black hole.”

Blottisham looked at the earlier diagram.

“In the previous discussion, it stopped being a container.”

“Yes.”

“And now information has stopped being a substance.”

“Yes.”

“So the two metaphors are beginning to come apart at the same time.”

“Exactly.”

“And perhaps that is why they fit together so badly.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“Now you are saying something interesting.”


XX. A better question

Blottisham stood.

“So let's ask the better question.”

Quillibrace looked at him.

“What happens to the distinctions and correlations encoded in the initial quantum state?”

“Yes.”

“If they survive…”

“The information has not been fundamentally destroyed.”

“If they become extraordinarily scrambled…”

“Then accessibility may be the problem.”

“If they are encoded in correlations among the radiation…”

“The apparent thermality need not imply information loss.”

“And if the distinctions disappear altogether…”

“Then we have a genuine challenge to unitary quantum evolution.”

Blottisham nodded.

“So the paradox is about what physical evolution can do to difference.”

Quillibrace looked at Elowen.

She nodded.

“Yes.”

“Can physical evolution erase a distinction between two genuinely different initial states?”

“Yes.”

“Can information survive without being locally accessible?”

“Yes.”

“Can it exist in correlations rather than objects?”

“Yes.”

“Can a black hole destroy it?”

“That,” said Quillibrace, “is precisely what we do not yet know how to reconcile with our best theories.”

Blottisham looked at the board.

“Then perhaps information isn't what disappears.”

“What?”

“Perhaps our picture of where information is supposed to be is what disappears.”

There was a silence.

Quillibrace looked at him.

Miss Stray smiled.

“That,” she said, “is worth keeping.”


XXI. The Common Room conclusion

Quillibrace erased the word INFORMATION.

Then he wrote:

DISTINCTION

Underneath it:

CORRELATION

Then:

POSSIBILITY

Then:

TRANSFORMATION

Blottisham read them.

“Is that information?”

“No.”

“Then what is it?”

“The structure in which information becomes meaningful as a physical concept.”

Elowen nodded.

“Perhaps information is the name we give to what becomes visible when we attend to differences among possibilities and to the relations that preserve those differences.”

Blottisham looked at the four words.

“So not another ingredient of reality.”

“Not necessarily.”

“Not a substance.”

“No.”

“Not a message.”

“Not necessarily.”

“Not meaning.”

“Not necessarily.”

“Not knowledge.”

“Not necessarily.”

“Not something sitting inside a black hole.”

Quillibrace smiled.

“Now you are learning.”

Blottisham looked satisfied.

“But if information is really a relation…”

“Yes?”

“…then asking where it is might be the wrong question.”

Quillibrace nodded.

“And what would be the right one?”

Blottisham thought.

“How is the relation realised?”

Elowen looked at him.

“Or perhaps…”

She glanced at the blackboard.

“…how is the distinction preserved?”

Quillibrace picked up his coat.

“Both will do.”

They walked toward the door.

Blottisham stopped.

“One final thing.”

Quillibrace sighed.

“Yes?”

“If information isn't a thing…”

“Yes?”

“…why does everyone keep talking about it as though it were?”

Quillibrace opened the door.

“Because,” he said, “language prefers nouns.”

Elowen smiled.

“And reality is under no obligation to provide them.”

Blottisham nodded thoughtfully.

“That's rather inconvenient.”

Quillibrace stepped into the corridor.

“Almost invariably.”

The door closed.

On the blackboard remained four words:

DISTINCTION

CORRELATION

POSSIBILITY

TRANSFORMATION

There was no word for information.

And somehow, for the moment, that seemed rather informative.