Wednesday, 28 January 2026

Why There Is No Such Thing as the World (A Faculty Dialogue)

Dramatis Personae

  • Professor Quillibrace — dry, precise, quietly devastating

  • Mr Blottisham — confident, impatient, incurious, fond of “surely”

  • Miss Elowen Stray — attentive, thoughtful, notices what disappears



Blottisham (with satisfaction):
Surely, Professor, all this talk of cuts and perspectives is very clever — but there is still the world. Everything exists somewhere, after all.

Quillibrace (without looking up):
No, Mr Blottisham. Things exist. Systems exist. Phenomena exist.
The world does not.

Blottisham (laughs):
That’s just wordplay. Of course the world exists. That’s what physics studies.

Quillibrace:
Physics studies phenomena under specified constraints.
You have just replaced that sentence with a noun.

Blottisham:
You can’t seriously deny that there is a total reality — everything that is.

Quillibrace:
I deny only that “everything” names something.

Blottisham:
But surely there is a whole!

Quillibrace:
A whole of what, precisely?

(Pause.)

Blottisham:
Well — of everything.

Quillibrace:
Ah. The definition returns wearing its own coat.


Elowen Stray (gently):
Professor — is the problem that “the world” sounds like an object?

Quillibrace:
Exactly, Miss Stray.
“The world” behaves grammatically like a thing, and ontologically like a mistake.


Blottisham:
This is absurd. Are you saying there isn’t a reality out there?

Quillibrace:
No. I am saying there is no view from which all of it is given at once.

Blottisham:
But surely reality exists independently of us!

Quillibrace:
Independently of which cut?

Blottisham:
The… complete one?

Quillibrace:
You see the difficulty.


Blottisham (irritated):
Physics aims to describe the world as it really is.

Quillibrace:
Physics aims to produce stable symbolic systems that organise phenomena.
You keep adding a metaphysical flourish at the end.

Blottisham:
So there’s no final description?

Quillibrace:
Descriptions are always of something, under conditions, for purposes.
Finality is not a scientific achievement — it is a failure of restraint.


Elowen Stray:
Is this why you say totality isn’t false, but category-mistaken?

Quillibrace:
Yes.
Totality is what happens when abstraction forgets the cut that made it possible.


Blottisham:
But if there’s no world, what are we in?

Quillibrace (finally looks up):
You are in a sentence, Mr Blottisham.
You are mistaking its grammar for ontology.

(A long silence.)


Blottisham:
So you’re saying “the world” is just… a convenience?

Quillibrace:
A convenience with delusions of grandeur.


Elowen Stray (thoughtfully):
And every time we say “the world”, we erase the perspective that let us say it.

Quillibrace:
Precisely.
The world is what remains after all cuts are denied — which is to say, nothing that can be encountered.


Blottisham (muttering):
This seems… unsatisfactory.

Quillibrace:
Completion often does.


Elowen Stray:
So ontology doesn’t describe the world?

Quillibrace:
No.
Ontology disciplines what we are allowed to say instead of pretending we have it all.


(Blottisham stares into his tea, which stubbornly refuses to become Totality.)

Curtain.

Relation Without Totality: 7 Symbolic Systems as Second-Order Meaning

By this point in the series, several temptations have been refused:

  • meaning is not value,

  • phenomena are not objects,

  • systems are not inventories,

  • instantiation is not process,

  • ontology is not completion.

What remains is a question that can no longer be postponed:

What, then, are symbolic systems?

Language, mathematics, logic, theory, notation — if they are not mirrors of reality, and not engines of value, what ontological role do they play?

The answer is precise, and surprisingly modest.

Symbolic systems are systems of second-order meaning.


First-Order vs Second-Order Meaning

First-order meaning belongs to phenomena.

A phenomenon is meaningful because it is a difference under a cut — an articulated distinction within a system of possibilities.

Second-order meaning arises when meanings themselves become the relata.

Symbolic systems do not primarily relate things to things.
They relate meanings to meanings.

They:

  • stabilise distinctions,

  • transport them across contexts,

  • recombine them,

  • and allow them to be re-instantiated elsewhere.

Symbolic systems are not about the world directly.
They are about how meaning is organised.


Symbols Do Not Create Meaning

This point cannot be stressed enough.

Meaning does not originate in language, mathematics, or representation.

It originates in phenomenal articulation.

Symbols come after meaning — not temporally, but ontologically.

They presuppose:

  • distinctions already drawn,

  • phenomena already articulated,

  • systems already capable of sustaining difference.

This is why attempts to ground meaning in syntax, information, or formal structure always fail.

They reverse the dependency.


What Symbolic Systems Actually Do

Symbolic systems perform three indispensable functions:

  1. Stabilisation
    They hold distinctions steady across time, agents, and situations.

  2. Transport
    They allow meanings to be carried beyond the circumstances of their instantiation.

  3. Reconfiguration
    They enable new relational patterns among existing meanings.

None of these require symbols to correspond to reality.

They require only that symbols be internally coherent and relationally disciplined.

Truth, in this frame, is not mirroring.
It is successful re-instantiation under appropriate cuts.


Why Mathematics Works So Well

Mathematics is often treated as the paradigmatic access point to reality.

In this ontology, its power comes from something else.

Mathematics is extraordinarily effective because it is:

  • maximally explicit,

  • maximally constrained,

  • and minimally dependent on context.

It is a symbolic system optimised for relational stability, not for ontological revelation.

It does not tell us what exists.
It tells us what follows, given a system of distinctions.

Confusing this with metaphysical access produces Platonism by accident.


Language Is Not a Weaker Mathematics

Nor is language a defective formal system.

Language is a symbolic system tuned for:

  • contextual elasticity,

  • perspectival variation,

  • and interpersonal coordination of meaning.

Its apparent imprecision is a feature, not a flaw.

It trades formal closure for relational adaptability.

Trying to force language into mathematical ideals — or mathematics into linguistic ones — misunderstands both.


Second-Order Meaning Is Not Interpretation

It is tempting to describe symbolic systems as “interpretive”.

But interpretation suggests:

  • an underlying fixed meaning,

  • distorted or filtered by symbols.

That picture is wrong.

Second-order meaning does not interpret first-order meaning.

It re-articulates it under new constraints.

Symbols do not sit between us and the world.
They restructure the space of possible articulations.


Why Ontology Must Stop Here

This is where ontology properly ends.

Not because nothing more can be said, but because the temptation to overreach becomes irresistible beyond this point.

Ontology can:

  • describe systems of possibility,

  • explain instantiation as cut,

  • ground meaning in phenomenon,

  • locate symbols as second-order meaning.

It cannot:

  • legislate value,

  • complete reality,

  • or guarantee final descriptions.

Symbolic systems extend meaning.
They do not close it.


What We Have Gained

Across this series, a coherent architecture has emerged:

  • No totality without perspective

  • No system without incompleteness

  • No meaning without distinction

  • No value without coordination

  • No symbols without prior meaning

What remains open is not a gap, but a discipline.

Ontology, properly understood, is not a theory of everything.

It is a theory of how meaning can continue.