Sunday, 16 August 2026

Beyond Quantum Gravity: An Ontological Investigation — III. Can Relations Be Quantised?

The question sounds strange.

Can relations be quantised?

We know what it means to quantise a physical system.

We can quantise a field.

We can quantise a harmonic oscillator.

We can quantise angular momentum.

But a relation?

What would that even mean?

If Alice is standing two metres from Bob, what would it mean to quantise the relation between them?

Would the distance become a quantum object?

Would it exist in a superposition of different values?

Would Alice and Bob somehow be two metres apart and three metres apart simultaneously?

The language quickly becomes obscure.

Perhaps this is because we are trying to force a relational ontology into an ontology of things.

If relations are fundamental, however, we need to take the question seriously.

Perhaps the problem is not that relations cannot be quantised.

Perhaps we have not yet understood what it would mean for a relation to be quantum.


The thingness problem

Quantum theory has traditionally been interpreted in terms of things possessing quantum states.

An electron has a state.

A photon has a state.

A field has a state.

The quantum state tells us what can happen when the system interacts with something else.

This encourages an ontology in which the world is populated by entities, each carrying a state.

Relations then appear to be secondary.

There are things first.

The things subsequently enter into relations.

But our relational ontology reverses the order.

A particle is not fundamentally a tiny object possessing intrinsic properties which subsequently happens to interact.

It is an actualised instance of potential structure.

Its identity is partly constituted by the relations in which that actualisation participates.

The relation is therefore not merely something that happens to the thing.

It is part of what the thing is.

That changes the problem.

If relations help constitute physical identity, then quantising the relation may not mean adding quantum properties to an otherwise classical relationship.

It may mean describing the potential and actual structure of physical relations themselves.


A simple example

Suppose two events, A and B, occur.

There may be a spatial relation between them.

There may be a temporal relation.

There may be a causal relation.

In ordinary language, we are tempted to imagine:

first there are A and B;

then there is a relation between them.

But perhaps that is backwards.

The identity of A as a physical event is partly determined by its position within the network of relations.

Change all its relevant relations and we may no longer be talking about the same physical event.

This is familiar in less fundamental contexts.

A note in a melody is not fully identifiable independently of its relations to the surrounding notes.

A word in a sentence acquires much of its meaning from its relations to the other words.

A chess piece has a role defined partly by the structure of the game.

The piece is physically real.

But its being a bishop, in the relevant sense, is relational.

Likewise, perhaps physical entities are not fundamentally self-sufficient things which merely possess relations.

Perhaps they are stable patterns within relations.

If so, then asking whether relations can be quantum is no longer quite as strange.

It becomes:

Can the fundamental structures from which physical entities themselves emerge be quantum?


Quantum theory already contains relations

There is an important clue here.

Quantum mechanics is not actually as object-centred as its everyday language sometimes suggests.

The most revealing quantities in quantum theory are often relational.

An observable is not simply a property that a particle carries around with it.

It is something that acquires physical significance through a measurement interaction.

A measurement produces an outcome.

An outcome establishes a relation between physical systems.

The familiar language of “the particle has spin” can therefore conceal something important.

Spin is not simply a little classical arrow hidden inside the particle.

Its physical significance appears through particular interactions and possible measurement outcomes.

Quantum theory is saturated with relations.

The difficulty is that we often describe those relations using the language of properties belonging to things.


Entanglement makes the problem unavoidable

Quantum entanglement pushes this issue into the open.

Consider two quantum systems prepared in an entangled state.

It may be impossible to assign each system a complete independent state that fully captures the state of the pair.

The correlations between the systems are not merely additional information about two independently specified objects.

The joint state contains structure that belongs to the relationship.

This is one reason entanglement is so conceptually unsettling.

Our ordinary ontology expects:

two things + properties of each thing + perhaps a relation between them.

Quantum theory permits something more radical:

a relational structure that cannot be reduced to independently specified states of the relata.

This is already very close to a relational ontology.

The quantum world does not merely contain objects which happen to become correlated.

Sometimes the correlation is more fundamental than the independent description of the objects.


Information is relational

This also connects directly with our earlier investigation of the black-hole information problem.

We found that information is not naturally understood as a mysterious substance stored inside physical objects.

Information concerns distinctions.

And distinctions are relational.

To say that a system contains information is to say that its physical state stands in a structured relation to possible alternatives, measurements, or other systems.

A bit is not a tiny object labelled 0 or 1.

It is a distinction between alternatives.

A quantum state contains a richer structure of possible distinctions and correlations.

This suggests that information is relational through and through.

If physical information is relational, and quantum theory is fundamentally concerned with physical information, then perhaps it should not surprise us that quantum theory repeatedly resists an ontology of independent things.

The resistance may be telling us something.


What would a quantum relation be?

We can now return to the question.

Suppose A and B are physically distinct events.

We write:

A ≠ B

and suppose that a relation R connects them.

We might write:

R(A,B)

In a classical description, the relation has a definite value.

Perhaps the spatial interval is (d).

Perhaps the temporal interval is (τ).

Perhaps A can causally influence B.

The relation is determinate.

But suppose the underlying physical situation admits several possible relational structures.

Then the quantum description might not assign a single actual relation.

Instead, it might represent a structured set of potential relations.

This would be analogous to the wavefunction.

The wavefunction does not represent an actual particle distributed through all its possible positions.

It represents structured potential for actualisation.

Likewise, a quantum relational structure need not mean that an actual distance literally has several incompatible values simultaneously.

It could mean that several relational actualisations remain possible.

The distinction is essential.


Potential relation is not actual relation

This gives us a useful conceptual vocabulary.

A relation can be:

  • potential, as part of a quantum description of possible actualisations;

  • actual, when a physical event instantiates a particular relational structure;

  • persistent, when the relation remains stable across a sequence of events;

  • emergent, when large numbers of relations organise into a higher-level structure such as geometry.

This produces a hierarchy:

potential relation

actual relation

stable relational pattern

emergent geometry

The hierarchy is not necessarily temporal.

It is ontological.

The potential does not happen “before” the actual in the ordinary sense.

Rather, the actual is an instantiation of what was previously available as potential.

This is precisely the distinction we drew between the wavefunction and particles.

The wavefunction is potential structure.

Particles are actual instances.

Now we can extend that distinction.

Perhaps geometry is a stable organisation of actualised relations.


Quantum geometry without quantum spacetime

This allows us to make an important distinction.

There is a great deal of difference between:

quantum spacetime

and

quantum relational structure from which spacetime emerges.

The first suggests that spacetime itself is a quantum object.

The second says that the underlying relations are quantum, while spacetime is the emergent classical organisation of those relations.

The two ideas are not equivalent.

Indeed, they predict different conceptual pictures of the fundamental level.

If spacetime is fundamental, we should expect some form of quantum geometry.

If spacetime is emergent, we should expect the fundamental description to become increasingly non-geometric as we go deeper.

This is a crucial point.

The absence of ordinary geometry at the fundamental level would not mean that geometry has disappeared.

It would mean that geometry is an emergent achievement.


The surprising possibility

We can now see why the question “Can relations be quantised?” may be more fruitful than “Can spacetime be quantised?”

The latter begins with an object.

The former begins with structure.

And structure may be closer to what quantum theory is actually telling us.

Suppose the fundamental physical description consists of:

  • possibilities for events;

  • rules governing their actualisation;

  • correlations among actualisations;

  • and transformations of the relational structures thereby produced.

Then there may be no need for fundamental particles moving through a fundamental spacetime.

There are processes of actualisation.

There are relations among their outcomes.

Stable patterns of those relations give us objects.

Large-scale patterns give us geometry.

And sufficiently stable geometry gives us the spacetime description.

The ontology has become dynamic.

Nothing needs to be permanently present as a fundamental object.

What persists are patterns.


A particle may be a relation that persists

This is perhaps the most radical consequence.

We usually imagine a particle as something that exists and then enters into relations.

But perhaps a particle is better understood as a persistent pattern of relations.

Its identity consists partly in the regularity with which certain interactions occur.

Its properties are expressed through the relations it can enter into.

Its trajectory is a sequence of actualised events connected by lawful relations.

In that sense, the particle is not something underneath the relations.

It is what the relations make stable.

This does not make particles unreal.

It explains their reality differently.

A whirlpool is not less real because it is a persistent pattern in water.

A particle may likewise be a persistent pattern in a deeper physical relational structure.


The relata may emerge with the relation

This brings us to a philosophical point that initially sounds alarming.

If relations are fundamental, what are the relations between?

Perhaps the answer is:

The relata are themselves emergent.

At the fundamental level, there may not be fully formed things waiting to be connected.

There may instead be a process of differentiation.

One actualisation becomes distinguishable from another.

A relation becomes established.

Repeated patterns of relations become stable.

Stable patterns acquire identities.

The world of things then emerges from a more primitive world of distinctions and relations.

This would explain why the wavefunction can be understood as potential structure rather than as a physical substance.

The potential is not a collection of little things waiting somewhere in advance.

It is a structured field of possible distinctions and relations.

Actuality creates the determinate relata.


Relation and instantiation

This brings the SFL notion of instantiation back into the centre of the argument.

A system of potential meanings can be instantiated in particular linguistic expressions.

The expression is actual.

The system of potential meanings is not another sentence sitting somewhere behind it.

It is the structured space of possibilities from which actual expressions can be drawn.

The analogy with quantum theory is striking.

The wavefunction describes a structured field of possible physical actualisations.

A particle event is an instantiation.

Now extend the analogy one step further.

A relational geometry may similarly be a structured field of possible relations among actual events.

The geometry is not necessarily a thing.

It is a potential structure of relational organisation, capable of being instantiated in particular physical histories.

This gives us a useful three-level distinction:

potential

instantiation

pattern

The first describes what can happen.

The second is what happens.

The third is what becomes stable across many happenings.

Perhaps physics has repeatedly confused these levels because our language tends to turn descriptions into nouns.


The metric revisited

We can now return to the metric.

If the metric represents relational structure, then a metric is not necessarily a physical substance.

It is a specification of possible and actual intervals among events.

A classical metric gives determinate geometric relations.

A deeper quantum description might give a structured potential for relational configurations.

The classical metric would then emerge when the relevant relations become sufficiently stable and definite.

This suggests a possible conceptual transition:

quantum relational potential

actualised relational events

classical relational geometry

That is not yet a theory.

But it is a radically different starting point for one.


What happens to curvature?

Our earlier reinterpretation of general relativity becomes important here.

We treated gravity not as the bending of a physical spacetime substance but as the systematic variation of spatial and temporal intervals through a gravitational field.

On that interpretation, curvature is not primarily a property possessed by a cosmic object called spacetime.

It describes a pattern in the relations among events.

If those relations are themselves emergent from quantum actualisations, then gravitational curvature becomes an emergent relational pattern.

We would no longer need to imagine a fundamental thing called curved spacetime.

We would need to explain how particular patterns of quantum actualisation produce the relational regularities represented by curved geometry.

Again, the direction of explanation changes.


Quantising relations is not quantising numbers

There is another source of confusion.

A relation such as distance can be represented by a number.

That number may be measured in metres.

We might then imagine that quantising the relation means turning the number into a quantum observable.

But the number is only the mathematical representation.

The physical relation is what matters.

This is similar to the distinction between temperature and the number displayed by a thermometer.

The number is a representation of a physical relation within a measurement procedure.

Quantising the number does not by itself tell us what is physically quantum.

Likewise, assigning a quantum operator to a metric component does not by itself settle the ontology.

We need to know what physical relation the operator represents.

The mathematics cannot answer that question on its own.


The deeper meaning of superposition

This becomes particularly important when discussing superposition.

If a relation is represented quantum mechanically, we may encounter a superposition of possible relational structures.

But a superposition should not automatically be interpreted as a collection of simultaneously actual classical alternatives.

Our relational interpretation of the wavefunction already gives us a better way to think about this.

The superposition represents structured potential.

Actualisation selects an instance.

Thus a quantum relational state might represent:

possible ways in which events could stand in relation.

It does not require us to imagine a classical world in which contradictory geometries literally coexist as physical substances.

The superposition belongs to the level of potential.

The actual relation belongs to the level of instantiation.

That distinction may dissolve some of the conceptual strangeness surrounding quantum geometry.


The emergence of classicality

If this picture is correct, one of the great questions becomes:

Why does the world appear geometrically definite?

Why do we experience a stable three-dimensional space?

Why do clocks and rulers give reproducible results?

Why does general relativity work so accurately?

The relational ontology suggests an answer in principle.

Large-scale stability.

When enormous numbers of physical actualisations become organised into persistent relational patterns, fluctuations at the underlying level can become irrelevant to the macroscopic description.

The result is a stable effective geometry.

This would be analogous to the emergence of temperature.

Individual molecules undergo complicated microscopic motions.

Yet temperature becomes a remarkably stable macroscopic variable.

Perhaps spacetime is similar.

The underlying relational structure may be quantum and highly dynamic.

But the large-scale geometry can nevertheless be extraordinarily smooth and stable.


The universe as a relational process

We can now begin to see a different picture of physical reality.

Not:

objects in spacetime interacting with one another.

But:

potential actualisations generating persistent relational structures from which objects and geometry emerge.

This is not merely a change of vocabulary.

It changes what counts as fundamental.

A particle is not necessarily fundamental.

A field need not be fundamental in its classical form.

Spacetime need not be fundamental.

Even geometry may not be fundamental.

What may be fundamental is the structured possibility of physical differentiation and relation.

That is a much more austere ontology.

And perhaps a more quantum one.


But can relations really be primary?

We should not pretend that this is an easy proposal.

The ordinary mathematical language of physics is built around states, variables and structures.

Even relational theories typically specify relations between identifiable systems.

So a genuinely relational ontology faces a difficult task:

How do we formulate a theory in which relations are primary without quietly smuggling objects back in as the things that possess the relations?

That is not a problem to be solved by philosophical declaration.

It is a problem for physics and mathematics.

But it is a legitimate problem.

And it may be more fruitful than beginning by assuming the existence of quantum spacetime.


A different conception of quantum gravity

We can now return to our original project.

Perhaps “quantum gravity” should not mean:

a quantum theory of the gravitational field on fundamental spacetime.

Perhaps it should mean something more like:

an account of how quantum relational potential gives rise to the stable causal and geometric structures described by general relativity.

That is almost a different subject.

Its central concepts would not necessarily be:

quantum spacetime

gravitons

metric fluctuations

but rather:

potential

actualisation

relation

correlation

constraint

causal structure

emergence

stability

And this is precisely where our broader conceptual investigation begins to converge with physics.


The question becomes evolutionary

If relations can be understood as potential structures that become instantiated and stabilised, then physical reality begins to look less like a collection of things and more like an evolving grammar.

Potential structures constrain what can be instantiated.

Actualisations modify the relational situation.

The modified situation affords new possibilities.

Some patterns disappear.

Others persist.

Some become stable enough to appear as objects.

Some become stable enough to appear as geometry.

The universe does not merely occupy a structure.

It continually produces structure.

And that may be what we have been missing when we ask how to quantise spacetime.


From quantum gravity to relational dynamics

The question with which we began was:

Can relations be quantised?

Perhaps the most promising answer is:

We should not begin by trying to quantise relations as though they were things.

Instead, we should ask how quantum theory represents potential relations, how actual events instantiate them, and how persistent relational structures emerge.

That is a subtler question.

But it may also be the more fundamental one.

The goal would no longer be to place quantum theory inside spacetime or to make spacetime itself quantum.

The goal would be to understand how geometry, causality and physical identity emerge from a deeper relational process.

If that process is quantum, then quantum gravity may turn out to be not the quantisation of gravity at all.

It may be the discovery of the relational dynamics from which gravity emerges.


The next question

We have now moved through three questions:

What are we trying to quantise?

Is spacetime fundamental?

Can relations be quantised?

Each question has pushed us further away from an ontology of independent things.

But this has brought us to a more fundamental question still.

If the wavefunction represents potential rather than actuality, and if relations themselves may belong to the structure of that potential, then we need to understand something that we have so far taken for granted.

How does a potential become an actual?

This is not simply the question of what happens when a measurement is made.

It is more basic than that.

A physical possibility is not yet a physical event.

A possible particle detection is not an actual detection.

A possible relation is not yet an actual relation.

Somehow, within the physical process, one of the possibilities becomes instantiated.

And once it does, the world has changed.

There is now an actual event where previously there was only potential.

Our use of the word instantiation is therefore doing much more work than it might initially appear.

If the wavefunction is a theory of potential instances, and particles are actual instances of that potential, then the central ontological question is not merely what the wavefunction represents.

It is:

What is an instantiation?

What makes an actual event an instance of one possibility rather than another?

How does actuality acquire determinate form?

And how does one actualisation alter the relational possibilities available for what comes next?

These questions matter for our investigation of quantum gravity because geometry cannot simply be assumed to exist before this process has been understood.

If spacetime is emergent, then geometry must ultimately arise from something.

And if what is fundamental is a structured field of potential relations, then the first step toward understanding the emergence of geometry must be to understand how those potential relations become actual.

Perhaps the sequence is something like:

potential

instantiation

actual event

relation

persistent relational pattern

geometry

We should not yet assume that this is the correct sequence.

But it gives us a direction in which to investigate.

The crucial point is that actuality cannot simply be inserted into the theory as though it were another fundamental thing.

If potential and actual are two ontological categories, we need to understand their relationship.

And if actuality is instantiation, we need to understand what makes instantiation possible.

This takes us deeper than the question of quantum spacetime.

Indeed, it may take us deeper than the question of quantum gravity itself.

For perhaps the fundamental problem is not:

How do we quantise geometry?

Nor even:

How do quantum relations produce geometry?

Perhaps the prior question is:

How does possibility become actuality?

That is where we should go next.

Because before we can understand how actual relations might organise themselves into geometry, we first need to understand how there can be actual relations at all.

IV. From Potential to Actual will begin there.

🍷🙂

Beyond Quantum Gravity: An Ontological Investigation — II. Is Spacetime Fundamental?

We ended the previous essay with a question that may seem almost embarrassingly simple:

Is spacetime fundamental?

The question is easy to ask because we are accustomed to treating spacetime as the most obvious thing in the universe.

Everything happens somewhere.

Everything happens sometime.

Objects occupy space.

Events occur in time.

Motion takes place through spacetime.

And general relativity appears to give us a theory of spacetime itself.

So why should we hesitate?

Because there is a difference between saying that spacetime is real and saying that spacetime is fundamental.

That distinction may be crucial.

A thing can be real without being ontologically basic.

Temperature is real.

Pressure is real.

Climate is real.

None of these is fundamental in the sense of existing independently of the physical relations from which they emerge.

Perhaps spacetime belongs to the same category.

Perhaps it is real precisely because something more fundamental gives rise to it.

And if so, perhaps the problem of quantum gravity has been formulated backwards.

We have been trying to quantise spacetime before asking whether spacetime is the sort of thing that should be quantised at all.


Real does not mean fundamental

Consider a wave.

A wave is real.

It can move.

It can carry energy.

It can break against a shore.

We can measure its wavelength and frequency.

But a wave is not a fundamental object in the same sense as the individual physical processes from which it arises.

The wave is a pattern.

Its reality lies in the organisation of something else.

The same is true of a whirlpool.

A whirlpool is not unreal because it is constituted by water in motion.

Quite the opposite.

Its reality consists in the persistence of a relational pattern through changing material configurations.

The water molecules composing the whirlpool do not remain in the same places.

Yet the whirlpool remains recognisable.

The pattern is real.

The pattern is also emergent.

This gives us a useful distinction:

Emergent does not mean imaginary.

It means that the reality of a phenomenon lies in the organisation of more basic processes rather than in its existence as an independent substance.

If spacetime is emergent, therefore, we should not imagine that we have discovered that space and time are somehow unreal.

We would have discovered something much more interesting:

spacetime is a real relational structure produced by something deeper.


The temptation of the stage

Our ordinary picture of the universe begins with a stage.

Space is the arena.

Time is the succession in which events occur.

Objects then enter the arena, interact, move and disappear.

This picture is so deeply embedded in ordinary thought that it is difficult to imagine anything else.

But general relativity already undermined it.

Space and time are not passive containers.

Their geometry is dynamically related to the physical processes occurring within them.

The stage participates in the drama.

It is not simply a stage anymore.

This is one of the conceptual revolutions of Einstein's theory.

But perhaps we stopped halfway.

We abandoned the idea of spacetime as a fixed container, yet continued to think of spacetime as a fundamental thing whose geometry can change.

Perhaps the next conceptual step is to ask whether even that is too object-like.

If spacetime is relational, then it may be less like a substance and more like a pattern of possible relations among physical events.


What is space?

The question sounds trivial.

Space is where things are.

But what does “where” mean?

Suppose there are two physical events.

We can measure a spatial interval between them.

That interval is real.

But it is not an object occupying the space between them.

It is a relation between the events.

Now consider three events.

Their spatial relations can be compared.

Add more events.

A structured system of relations emerges.

With sufficiently many events and sufficiently regular relations, we can represent the structure mathematically as a geometry.

The geometry is not added to the events from outside.

It is the systematic organisation of their relations.

This suggests an inversion of the usual picture.

Instead of:

space first, things second

we might have:

physical relations first, spatial structure second.

Space would then be a way of representing a particular organisation of relations.

This is not yet a theory of emergent spacetime.

But it changes what such a theory would need to explain.


What is time?

Time presents an even more difficult problem.

We ordinarily imagine time as something that flows.

Events occur within it.

One moment becomes another.

But physics has never needed quite so simple a picture.

Relativity tells us that temporal intervals depend upon the physical circumstances of observers.

Clocks do not all measure the same elapsed time between events.

Gravitational fields affect the rate at which clocks run.

Motion affects the relation between temporal intervals.

There is therefore no single universal temporal substance flowing uniformly through the universe.

What exists physically are measurable relations among events and the readings of physical clocks.

This suggests another possibility:

time may be a relational structure rather than an independent dimension through which events move.

That does not make time unreal.

It makes time something we must explain.


The clock is not time

This distinction matters because clocks provide such a powerful temptation.

A clock ticks.

We observe a sequence of readings.

We call the difference between the readings “time”.

But the clock is a physical system undergoing change.

Its reading is a relation between successive physical states.

We infer temporal structure from such relations.

This is why different physical clocks can disagree about elapsed time without one of them being “wrong”.

They are tracing different paths through the physical relational structure.

General relativity makes this explicit.

Proper time is not something floating independently of physical systems.

It is associated with a particular worldline through spacetime.

Time is therefore already more relational than ordinary language suggests.

If that is true at the level of general relativity, perhaps we should not be surprised if time turns out to be emergent at a deeper level.


Spacetime as the organisation of events

We can now formulate a more relational conception.

Instead of imagining spacetime as a container within which events occur, imagine a network of physical events and the relations among them.

Some relations are spatial.

Some are temporal.

Some are causal.

The geometry expresses the systematic structure of those relations.

On this view:

Spacetime is not the container of physical relations. It is the structured representation of those relations.

That is a profound inversion.

The traditional picture says:

spacetime → relations among things

The relational picture suggests:

relations among events → spacetime structure

If the second direction is correct, then spacetime is not fundamental in the same way that the relations themselves are.

And that immediately changes the quantum-gravity problem.


What would it mean to quantise a relation?

Suppose Alice and Bob are separated by a distance.

If the distance is a relation, we can still ask whether that relation has quantum behaviour.

But notice what we are no longer doing.

We are not imagining a little quantum substance called “distance”.

We are asking whether the possible relations between physical events are themselves structured quantum mechanically.

That is a much more subtle question.

And perhaps it is the question we should have been asking all along.

The distinction becomes particularly important at very small scales.

If spacetime geometry is emergent, then at the Planck scale there may be no smooth geometry waiting to be quantised.

There may instead be some more primitive structure of physical possibilities and relations from which smooth geometry emerges only in an appropriate limit.

This would radically change our expectations.

We would not expect the fundamental world to look like tiny pieces of spacetime.

We would expect it to look unlike spacetime altogether.


The Planck scale may be telling us something

The Planck scale is often imagined as the scale at which spacetime itself becomes “quantum”.

That phrase is suggestive.

But it may conceal an assumption.

Perhaps the Planck scale is not where ordinary spacetime acquires strange quantum properties.

Perhaps it is where the spacetime description ceases to be fundamental.

The distinction is subtle but important.

Imagine a fluid.

At large scales, it has pressure, density and smooth velocity fields.

At sufficiently small scales, those variables cease to provide the most fundamental description.

The fluid does not suddenly become a “quantum fluid” in the sense that pressure itself becomes a microscopic object.

Rather, the continuum description stops being fundamental.

The underlying molecular structure becomes relevant.

Likewise, perhaps spacetime does not become a bizarre quantum object at the Planck scale.

Perhaps the smooth geometric description simply reaches the limit of its domain of applicability.

The question then becomes:

What lies beneath the geometry?


The danger of quantising the description

This brings us back to the problem raised in the first essay.

Suppose the metric is fundamentally a representation of relations.

We then write down a quantum theory in which the metric itself fluctuates.

That may be perfectly legitimate.

But we should ask what the fluctuating metric represents.

If the metric is not an independent physical substance, then a “superposition of metrics” may not mean what our ordinary language suggests.

It might represent a superposition of possible relational structures.

That is quite different from imagining spacetime itself as being literally in two geometries at once.

The distinction mirrors our earlier treatment of the wavefunction.

A quantum superposition describes structured potential.

It need not describe multiple incompatible actualities existing simultaneously as physical things.

Likewise, a quantum description of geometry need not imply that a physical fabric called spacetime is literally fluctuating between alternative shapes.

It may represent potential relational structures.

Once again:

potential is not actuality.


A geometry of possibilities?

This suggests a fascinating possibility.

Perhaps quantum theory and general relativity are not as far apart as they appear.

Quantum theory gives us a structured field of potential actualisations.

General relativity gives us the relational geometry of actual physical events and their causal possibilities.

Perhaps a deeper theory would describe the transition between them.

Not:

quantum matter + quantum spacetime

but:

quantum potential → actual events → relational geometry.

In this picture, geometry is not imposed on quantum events from outside.

It emerges from the organisation of their relations.

And the resulting geometry then constrains which further actualisations are possible.

This gives us a feedback structure:

potential

actualisation

relations

geometry

new constraints on potential

further actualisation

The universe would then be understood not as objects moving through spacetime, but as a process in which possibility, actualisation and relational structure continually generate one another.

That is a very different ontology.


Why general relativity looks so geometric

If spacetime is emergent, why does general relativity work so extraordinarily well?

Because an emergent description can be exact at the level at which it applies.

Temperature is not an approximation in the sense that it becomes meaningless because molecules exist.

Thermodynamics works.

Fluid mechanics works.

Elasticity works.

None requires us to know the microscopic ontology every time we calculate a macroscopic phenomenon.

Likewise, if spacetime geometry is emergent, general relativity can remain an extraordinarily accurate theory of the large-scale relational structure of physical events.

Its equations describe the emergent geometry.

They need not describe the fundamental ontology beneath it.

This distinction allows us to respect the enormous empirical success of general relativity without assuming that its fundamental variables must remain fundamental at every scale.


The geometry may be an achievement

This leads to a striking possibility.

Perhaps spacetime is not the starting point of physical reality.

Perhaps it is an achievement.

The universe does not begin with events sitting inside a pre-existing geometric arena.

Rather, physical processes generate increasingly stable patterns of relation.

At large scales, those patterns become smooth enough to be represented as geometry.

Spacetime is then what the relational structure looks like when viewed at the appropriate scale.

This would make geometry analogous to temperature.

Temperature is not imposed upon molecules.

It is what their collective behaviour looks like under a particular description.

Likewise, spacetime might be what a deeper relational dynamics looks like when its possibilities become organised into sufficiently stable causal structures.

The geometry is real.

But it is real as a pattern.


This changes what “fundamental” means

We should be careful with the word fundamental.

It does not necessarily mean:

“the only thing that is really real.”

It means something closer to:

that upon which other structures depend without itself depending upon them in the same way.

An emergent phenomenon can therefore be ontologically significant without being fundamental.

A human organism depends upon cells.

Cells depend upon molecular processes.

Molecules depend upon atoms and fields.

This does not make organisms unreal.

It gives their reality a different structure.

Perhaps spacetime is similar.

Perhaps it is a high-level physical structure whose existence depends upon deeper relational processes.

Then the question is not whether spacetime exists.

It is:

What does spacetime depend upon?


And what might lie beneath it?

Here we must resist another temptation.

Once we decide that spacetime is emergent, it is very easy to replace it with another thing.

Perhaps the universe is made of tiny loops.

Or networks.

Or strings.

Or causal sets.

Or some other fundamental object.

But this would simply reproduce the problem at another level.

We would have abandoned spacetime-as-thing only to invent a new thing underneath it.

The relational ontology demands something more radical.

It asks whether the fundamental level itself might be structural rather than object-like.

Perhaps what is fundamental is not a new kind of thing.

Perhaps it is a space of possibilities together with rules governing actualisation and transformation.

Perhaps the primitive ontology is relational all the way down.

If so, there may be no microscopic spacetime waiting underneath the macroscopic spacetime.

There may be no tiny geometric pieces at all.


Relation without relata?

This raises an obvious philosophical difficulty.

If relations are fundamental, what are they relations between?

Can there be relations without things?

We should not rush to answer.

The question itself may assume too much.

At the macroscopic level, relations are naturally described between objects and events.

But if objects themselves are emergent patterns of relations, then the fundamental level may not contain fully formed relata in the ordinary sense.

This sounds paradoxical only if we assume that relations must always be secondary to the things they relate.

A relational ontology reverses that priority.

The objects may be stable patterns within a more fundamental relational process.

A particle would then be something like a persistent node or pattern.

An event would be an actualisation.

A spacetime geometry would be a large-scale organisation of relations among such events.

The relata are not abolished.

They are derived.


The black hole gave us a clue

Our previous investigation now looks rather different.

The black-hole information paradox seemed to involve three mysterious things:

  • a quantum state;

  • spacetime;

  • information.

But each became less mysterious when treated relationally.

The wavefunction became potential structure.

Information became distinctions and correlations.

Spacetime became relational geometry.

The horizon became causal structure.

The black hole became a gravitational regime.

The apparent paradox weakened because the ontology became less crowded.

Perhaps this was not an accident.

Perhaps the black hole was giving us a glimpse of a more general principle:

The closer physics gets to its foundations, the less useful an ontology of independent things may become.

If so, the quantum-gravity problem may be another manifestation of the same difficulty.


What if spacetime is an affordance?

There is another way to describe the possibility.

We have previously used the idea of affordance to describe how a structure of possibilities makes some actualisations more available than others.

Perhaps spacetime itself is an extraordinarily rich system of affordances.

Its geometry tells physical systems what trajectories are possible.

Its causal structure determines which events can influence which others.

Its gravitational structure alters the relative possibilities of motion and measurement.

In this sense, spacetime is not merely where things happen.

It is part of the structure that determines what can happen.

That makes its relationship to quantum potential especially interesting.

Quantum theory describes potential actualisations.

Spacetime geometry constrains the relations among actualisations and the possibilities available for subsequent events.

Perhaps the deeper theory is therefore not about combining two substances.

It is about understanding how potential and affordance interact.

That may be much closer to the conceptual structure we actually need.


The possibility of a wrong question

We can now state the challenge more sharply.

The conventional programme asks:

How can spacetime be made quantum?

Our investigation asks:

Why assume spacetime is fundamental enough to require quantisation?

Perhaps the more fundamental problem is:

How does a quantum relational structure give rise to the stable geometry we call spacetime?

If that question is right, then quantum gravity is not primarily a problem of quantisation.

It is a problem of emergence.

And if it is a problem of emergence, then the appropriate mathematical tools may be very different from those suggested by the phrase “quantum gravity”.

We may need to understand:

  • how relational structures become stable;

  • how causal order emerges;

  • how metric relations arise;

  • how dimensionality becomes meaningful;

  • how smooth geometry appears from a deeper structure;

  • and how the classical limit is produced.

The problem would not be:

“How do we make spacetime quantum?”

It would be:

“How does spacetime become possible?”


We have not solved anything yet

It is important to be honest about the status of this argument.

We have not demonstrated that spacetime is emergent.

We have not shown that quantum gravity is unnecessary.

We have not derived Einstein's equations from a relational quantum ontology.

We have not identified the fundamental relational structure.

We have done something earlier and more modest.

We have shown that the assumption of fundamental spacetime is not forced merely by the success of general relativity.

And that is enough to justify asking the question.

Perhaps spacetime is fundamental.

Perhaps it is emergent.

Perhaps the distinction itself will need to be reformulated.

But now the burden is on the ontology, not merely the mathematics.

Before asking how to quantise spacetime, we should know what spacetime is.


A new direction

The first essay asked:

What are we trying to quantise?

This essay has led us to:

Is spacetime fundamental?

And the answer is not yet “yes” or “no”.

But the question has changed.

If spacetime is fundamental, we need to understand what kind of fundamental entity it is.

If spacetime is emergent, we need to understand what generates its relational structure.

Either way, we have moved one level deeper.

And this suggests the next question.

Suppose relations really are fundamental.

Suppose physical reality is not fundamentally composed of independent objects possessing intrinsic properties, but of a structured field of possibilities and actualisations in which relations are primary.

Then we must confront a much more difficult question:

Can relations themselves be quantum?

That is where the investigation must go next.

Because perhaps the real object of quantisation was never spacetime.

Perhaps it was never gravity.

Perhaps what we need to understand is the quantum structure of possibility and relation themselves.

🍷🙂

Beyond Quantum Gravity: An Ontological Investigation — I. What Are We Trying to Quantise?

There is a problem at the foundations of modern physics.

Quantum mechanics works extraordinarily well.

General relativity works extraordinarily well.

Yet when we try to bring them together, something seems to go badly wrong.

The standard response is almost automatic.

Quantum mechanics must be extended to include gravity.

Gravity must be quantised.

We need a theory of quantum gravity.

The phrase has become so familiar that it can sound almost inevitable.

But perhaps we should pause before attempting to construct the theory.

Perhaps there is a prior question.

What, exactly, are we trying to quantise?

The question sounds elementary.

It may turn out to be fundamental.


The obvious answer

The obvious answer is:

Gravity.

But what is gravity?

In Newtonian physics, gravity is a force.

That makes the question comparatively straightforward.

A force is something a physical system exerts.

We can represent it mathematically.

We can ask what happens when that interaction is subjected to the principles of quantum mechanics.

But general relativity changed the conceptual situation.

Gravity ceased to be merely a force acting within spacetime.

Instead, the gravitational field became inseparable from the geometry through which physical events are related.

The usual language says that matter curves spacetime.

Objects then move along geodesics in the resulting geometry.

This is a remarkably successful description.

But it immediately raises an ontological question.

Is gravity a thing that exists, or is it a way in which physical relations are structured?

That distinction matters.

If gravity is a thing, perhaps we should quantise it.

If gravity is a relation, the question becomes considerably less obvious.


The familiar picture

Imagine the universe as a vast arena.

There are physical objects in the arena.

There are quantum fields and particles.

And there is spacetime—the stage on which everything happens.

Gravity then modifies the stage.

Matter tells spacetime how to curve.

Spacetime tells matter how to move.

This picture is so deeply embedded in our thinking that even physicists who know perfectly well that general relativity is not literally a theory of a physical fabric can find themselves speaking as though it were.

The metaphor is useful.

But usefulness is not ontology.

The danger comes when we move silently from:

the geometry behaves mathematically as though it were curved

to:

there exists a physical thing called curved spacetime.

Once that move has been made, the next step seems obvious.

If spacetime is physical, and quantum theory describes physical things quantum mechanically, then:

we should quantise spacetime.

And there we are.

Quantum gravity.

But perhaps the first step was never justified.


What does “quantise” mean?

There is another question hiding inside the first.

What does it mean to quantise something?

In familiar cases, we begin with something that has identifiable physical degrees of freedom.

An electromagnetic field, for example, can be represented by dynamical variables.

Quantum theory then tells us how those variables behave when subjected to quantum principles.

The classical description is replaced or extended by a quantum description.

But notice what this presupposes.

There is something there to be quantised.

A field.

A system.

A degree of freedom.

A physical quantity.

Something with a determinate role in the ontology.

So when we say:

“We need to quantise gravity,”

we should be able to answer:

What is the physical entity whose classical description is to be quantised?

If the answer is “the gravitational field”, we need to know what that field is.

If the answer is “spacetime”, we need to know what kind of thing spacetime is.

And if the answer is “the metric”, we need to know whether the metric is itself a physical entity or a mathematical representation of relations among physical events.

The distinction is not pedantic.

It may determine what the problem actually is.


The relational alternative

Our investigation of the black-hole information problem suggested a different way of thinking.

We considered the possibility that spacetime is not fundamentally a substance.

Its geometry may instead express relations among spatial intervals, temporal intervals and causal possibilities.

In this view, gravity is not something that bends a pre-existing physical fabric.

It is a systematic transformation of physical relations.

Spatial intervals shorten and temporal intervals lengthen in the direction of the centre of mass.

The geometry describes these changing relations.

The geodesic then describes a structure of possible motion within those relations.

Nothing has been removed from general relativity.

But the ontology has changed.

And once that happens, the phrase quantum gravity becomes less straightforward.

If gravity is a relational structure, what would it mean to quantise the relation?


A relation is not a thing

Consider a simple example.

Suppose Alice is standing two metres from Bob.

The distance between Alice and Bob is real.

We can measure it.

We can change it.

We can calculate with it.

But is the distance a third object sitting between Alice and Bob?

No.

The relation is real without being a thing.

Now imagine that Alice and Bob move.

The distance changes.

We do not need to imagine that the “distance object” has changed shape.

The relation has changed.

This seems almost trivial.

But physics becomes much more complicated when the relation is geometrically fundamental.

A spatial interval is not merely an object with a property.

It is a relation among events.

A temporal interval is a relation among events.

A causal relation is a relation among events.

And the geometry of spacetime expresses a structured system of such relations.

If this is what spacetime fundamentally is, then asking for a quantum theory of spacetime may be rather like asking for a quantum theory of the distance between Alice and Bob.

The question is not meaningless.

But it needs reinterpretation.


The crucial distinction

We should therefore distinguish two possibilities.

Ontology 1: spacetime as thing

Spacetime exists as a physical entity.

It possesses a geometry.

Matter and fields exist within it.

Gravity corresponds to changes in its physical state.

Then it makes considerable sense to ask:

How do we quantise spacetime?

Ontology 2: spacetime as relation

Physical events stand in spatial, temporal and causal relations.

The geometry represents the structure of those relations.

Gravity is a transformation of that relational structure.

Then the question becomes:

How do quantum possibilities participate in relational geometry?

These sound similar.

They are not.

The first asks for the quantum state of a thing.

The second asks how two aspects of physical description—quantum potential and relational geometry—fit together.

The second may be the more fundamental question.


Quantum theory gives us another warning

Our relational interpretation of quantum theory provides a useful parallel.

We have been treating the wavefunction not as a physical object but as a structured field of potential instantiations.

The distinction is important.

The wavefunction tells us what actual quantum events are possible, and with what structure.

A particular particle event is an actual instantiation.

The wavefunction is not itself one of those actual events.

It is potential structure.

Now suppose someone asked:

“How do we quantise the wavefunction?”

The question would immediately sound strange.

The wavefunction is already part of the mathematical framework of quantum theory.

But the deeper reason for the strangeness is ontological.

We are asking a description of potential possibilities to become itself a physical object requiring quantisation.

Something similar may happen with spacetime.

Perhaps we are trying to quantise something whose fundamental role is not that of an independent physical object.

Perhaps we are trying to quantise a description of relational structure.

Again, the question is not necessarily meaningless.

But it may be asking for the wrong kind of thing.


The climate analogy returns

Our earlier analogy between climate and weather becomes useful here.

Weather is actual.

A particular storm occurs.

Climate is a structured description of the conditions under which possible weather patterns occur.

We would not normally think of climate as another kind of weather-object.

It is a higher-level relational description of potential actual weather.

Now imagine someone saying:

“We have a theory of weather and a theory of climate. They don't quite fit together. Therefore we need quantum climate.”

That might be a sensible project.

But before beginning, we would want to know what the problem was.

Are we trying to quantise climate itself?

Or are we trying to understand how the microscopic physical processes generating weather produce the statistical structures we call climate?

Those are very different projects.

Perhaps something analogous is happening with quantum gravity.

Perhaps the question is not:

How do we quantise spacetime?

but:

How does relational geometry arise from the more fundamental quantum dynamics?

That is a different research programme.


The direction of explanation may be wrong

This possibility is worth taking seriously.

The conventional picture tends to encourage a synthesis:

quantum theory + general relativity → quantum gravity

But perhaps the relationship is instead hierarchical.

Perhaps quantum theory describes something more fundamental:

potential physical instantiations and their transformations.

And perhaps general relativity describes an emergent relational structure among actualised events.

If so, then we should not expect to obtain quantum gravity by simply quantising general relativity.

We might instead expect to obtain general relativity as some large-scale relational consequence of quantum dynamics.

This would invert the problem.

Instead of asking:

How do we quantise spacetime?

we ask:

How does spacetime emerge?

And instead of asking:

What is the quantum state of gravity?

we ask:

What quantum relational structure gives rise to gravitational geometry?

That is a much more radical possibility.

It is also much closer to the ontology we have been developing.


But emergence is not magic

We should be careful here.

To say that spacetime might be emergent is not to say that it is unreal.

A thing can be emergent and perfectly real.

Temperature is real.

Pressure is real.

Climate is real.

None of these is fundamental in the sense of being independent of the underlying physical processes.

The same could be true of geometry.

If spacetime geometry emerges from more fundamental relational processes, then spacetime is not an illusion.

It is a real structural level of physical organisation.

The important question is therefore not:

“Is spacetime real?”

but:

What kind of reality does spacetime have?

That is an ontological question.

And it is exactly the question that can be obscured when we immediately ask how to quantise it.


What if the metric is a relation?

The metric tensor is often treated as the central object of general relativity.

It tells us how to calculate intervals.

It determines the geometry.

It participates in the field equations.

It changes dynamically.

It is therefore natural to speak of the metric as a physical field.

But there is another possibility.

Perhaps the metric is fundamentally a representation of the relational structure among events.

It tells us:

  • how spatial intervals compare;

  • how temporal intervals compare;

  • which paths are geodesic;

  • which events can be causally connected;

  • and how physical clocks and rulers relate.

On this interpretation, the metric is not a physical substance occupying spacetime.

It is the mathematical expression of how physical events stand in relation.

Then a “quantum metric” is not obviously a fluctuating piece of cosmic fabric.

It might instead represent a quantum structure of possible relations among events.

That is a very different picture.


Quantum possibilities and relational geometry

We can now see the deeper problem.

Quantum theory gives us a structured field of possibilities.

General relativity gives us a structured field of relations among events.

Perhaps the fundamental problem is to understand how these two structures are connected.

A quantum possibility is not yet an actual event.

A geometric relation, however, is typically described between events.

So there is an intriguing sequence:

potential → actualisation → relational structure

Perhaps geometry belongs downstream of actualisation.

Not necessarily in a simple temporal sense.

Rather, ontologically.

The actualisation of physical events establishes a network of relations.

At sufficiently large scales, that network may exhibit the smooth geometric structure described by general relativity.

If so, quantum gravity is not the quantisation of geometry.

It is the explanation of how geometry arises from quantum actualisation.

That would be a profound shift.


The temptation to quantise everything

There is a broader philosophical habit at work here.

When a successful classical theory encounters a domain where quantum theory matters, we naturally try to quantise its fundamental variables.

It worked for fields.

It worked for many mechanical systems.

So why not spacetime?

The reasoning is understandable.

But it contains an assumption:

Whatever appears as a fundamental variable in the classical theory must correspond to a fundamental quantum entity.

That assumption may be false.

Classical variables can sometimes be emergent descriptions.

A successful theory can be ontologically effective without being fundamental.

The temperature of a gas is a perfectly legitimate physical quantity.

But there is no single molecule whose quantum state is the temperature.

Temperature emerges from the collective relational state of many degrees of freedom.

Likewise, perhaps spacetime geometry is a legitimate physical description without being a fundamental quantum object.

If so, quantising the geometry directly could be analogous to quantising temperature.

It might be mathematically possible.

But it would not necessarily answer the fundamental question.


What would we be quantising?

We can now return to our title.

Suppose we say:

We need quantum gravity.

The next question should be:

What are we trying to quantise?

Gravity?

If so, what is gravity?

The gravitational field?

What kind of physical thing is that field?

The metric?

Is the metric a thing, or a mathematical representation of relations?

Spacetime?

Is spacetime a physical substance, or a relational structure?

The geometry?

Is geometry fundamental, or emergent?

If the answers keep taking us back to relations, then perhaps the original formulation has become unstable.

We may be asking a quantum theory to be applied to something whose ontological status is not that of an independent quantum object.


The stronger question

Perhaps, then, the foundational question is not:

How do we quantise gravity?

It is:

How do quantum possibilities become organised into the relational structures we experience as geometry and gravity?

That question does not assume that spacetime is fundamental.

It does not assume that gravity is a force.

It does not assume that the metric is a substance.

And it does not assume that the classical variables of general relativity must correspond directly to quantum objects.

It asks instead how one level of physical description gives rise to another.

That is a very different project.


This does not mean quantum gravity is impossible

We should pause here, because it would be easy to overstate the argument.

Nothing we have said establishes that a theory of quantum gravity cannot be constructed.

Perhaps some future theory will contain genuinely quantum-geometric degrees of freedom.

Perhaps spacetime itself has a quantum structure at the Planck scale.

Perhaps approaches to quantum gravity that treat geometry as fundamental will ultimately prove correct.

The point is not to rule these possibilities out.

The point is to refuse to assume them at the beginning.

Before constructing the theory, we should ask what ontology the theory requires.

That is the philosophical investigation.

And perhaps the physics will answer differently from what we expect.


The wild goose chase

There is, however, a more provocative possibility.

Perhaps the enormous effort to construct quantum gravity is partly a response to a conceptual problem that has been misidentified.

Perhaps we have assumed:

  1. general relativity describes fundamental spacetime;

  2. quantum mechanics describes fundamental matter;

  3. both are fundamentally correct;

  4. therefore spacetime itself must be quantised.

But if the first assumption is wrong, the conclusion no longer follows.

Perhaps general relativity is instead an extraordinarily successful theory of an emergent relational structure.

Then the failure to quantise it cleanly would not necessarily indicate that we have not tried hard enough.

It might indicate that we are trying to quantise the wrong thing.

This is the possibility we must investigate.

Not proclaim.

Investigate.

Because if it is true, then the search for quantum gravity could indeed be something of a wild goose chase—not because the physicists are incompetent, but because the goose was never where we thought it was.


A different research question

Our investigation therefore begins with a simple inversion.

Instead of:

How do we quantise spacetime?

we ask:

Why should spacetime be quantised?

Instead of:

What is the quantum state of gravity?

we ask:

What is the ontological status of gravity?

Instead of:

How do quantum fields live in a quantum spacetime?

we ask:

How do quantum actualisations generate the relational structure we describe geometrically?

And instead of:

How do we reconcile two incompatible fundamental things?

we ask:

What if they are not two fundamental things at all?

That is where our investigation begins.


The furrow

There is a useful image for the possibility we are exploring.

A furrow does not determine what the plough will do.

But it changes the field of possibilities.

It makes some trajectories easier than others.

It affords certain courses.

Likewise, the relational structure of physical reality may constrain and enable the actualisation of possibilities without itself being another object in the world.

The wavefunction describes potential.

Actual events instantiate possibilities.

Relations among actual events form structured patterns.

Those patterns may become what we describe as geometry.

Geometry constrains subsequent possibilities.

And those possibilities can become actual in turn.

So the sequence is not:

things → relations.

It may be:

potential → actualisation → relations → new potential.

If that is even approximately right, then spacetime is not the stage upon which becoming occurs.

It is part of what becoming produces.

And gravity is not something added to that becoming from outside.

It is a particular form of relational structure within it.


The question we carry forward

We should therefore resist the temptation to end this first essay with a solution.

We have only changed the question.

But sometimes changing the question is the beginning of the solution.

The standard programme asks:

How do we quantise gravity?

Our investigation asks:

What are we trying to quantise?

And behind that:

What is fundamental enough to be quantised?

And behind that:

What kind of reality do quantum theory and general relativity actually describe?

If the answer is relational, then the next question follows naturally:

Is spacetime fundamental at all?

That is where we should go next.

Because before we attempt to quantise the universe's geometry, perhaps we should first establish whether the universe has geometry in the ontological sense we have assumed.

Perhaps spacetime is not something waiting to be quantised.

Perhaps it is something waiting to be understood.

🍷🙂