The traditional free will/determinism debate is often framed as a contest between metaphysical pictures: on one side, the universe as a chain of causally necessitated events; on the other, the self as an autonomous source of spontaneous agency. The familiar intermediate position — compatibilism — attempts to harmonise these incompatible pictures by redefining freedom as a constrained or situational capacity.
But these positions share a deeper assumption: that actuality is the fundamental arena in which the question must be settled. In this frame, “to be free” is a property of events, and “determinism” is a property of the chain between them. The debate is thus parasitic on a representational ontology in which the world is conceptualised as a sequence of facts, each entailing the next.
Once we shift into a relational ontology, this entire problematic dissolves. The decisive step is to move from viewing potential as a vague domain of “possible events” to seeing it as structured readiness — a systemic organisation of inclination and ability.
This is the first point at which the debate collapses under its own assumptions.
1. Reformulating Potential: From “What Could Happen” to “What Is Ready-To-Happen”
In relational ontology, system = structured potential. Crucially, this potential is not inert: it is organised. Every system’s potential can be analysed along two axes:
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Inclination: the directional patterning of the system’s potential — what the system is ready towards.
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Ability: the degree and differentiation of capacity — what the system is ready to do.
These are not metaphysical attributes. They are properties of the structured potential that define the range and shape of possible actualisations.
Thus, potential is not a container of unrealised events; it is a field of readiness whose structure defines its trajectories of becoming.
The free will/determinism debate makes sense only if we ignore this structure and treat potential as a blank, undifferentiated space. Once readiness is foregrounded, the supposed paradox dissolves.
2. Determinism as a Misreading of Readiness
Determinism rests on a basic conflation:
Readiness ≠ necessity.
To say that a system is inclined toward certain trajectories is not to say that those trajectories are inevitable.
Deterministic metaphysics mistakes structured potential for a pipeline of consequences. But inclination is not logical entailment; it is patterned possibility. The fact that a system’s readiness has shape does not convert that shape into fate.
Under determinism, inclination is misconstrued as a chain; under relational ontology, it is a field. A field does not oblige an outcome; it orients it. Determinism arises only when orientation is redescribed as compulsion.
3. Libertarian Free Will as a Misreading of Ability
If determinism misinterprets inclination, libertarianism misinterprets ability.
Ability ≠ spontaneity.
Ability is a function of the system’s structured potential — what it has the capacity to actualise. Libertarian free will mistakes ability for an uncaused power standing outside the system’s inclination and constraints. This reinserts an internal metaphysical homunculus into the chain: the “agent” as an unmoved chooser.
But in a relational ontology, the “agent” is not an extra entity inside the system; it is the system’s own readiness resolved into actualisation. Agency is not the cause of action; it is the relational organisation of inclination + ability expressed as actualisation.
There is no need for spontaneity ex nihilo. No system escapes its potential. But equally, no system is forced by it.
4. Compatibilism: The Restless Middle That Solves Nothing
Compatibilism maintains that freedom and determinism are compatible if we define “freedom” as “acting in accordance with one’s desires.” But this redefinition merely shifts the debate sideways. It still treats desires as metaphysical entities and still treats potential as an undifferentiated background.
Compatibilism trades metaphysical dualism for conceptual vagueness.
Relational ontology, by contrast, reframes agency without compromise:
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There is no contradiction between structured potential and genuine choice.
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Because “choice” is not a metaphysical event, but a perspectival actualisation of readiness.
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And “freedom” is not an attribute of events but a property of how readiness resolves.
Thus the middle ground becomes unnecessary: we exit the problematic entirely.
5. The Relational Reframing: Agency as Perspectival Actualisation of Readiness
Under relational ontology, the system is structured potential; the instance is a perspectival actualisation of that potential; and construal is the first-order phenomenon in which this actualisation becomes meaningfully present.
From this triadic structure emerges a clean reframing of agency:
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Agency = the system’s readiness actualising along one trajectory rather than another.
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Freedom = the degree to which this actualisation aligns with the system’s inclination rather than external coordination pressures (biological, social, material).
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Constraint = the reconfiguration of readiness under those pressures.
Nothing here requires metaphysical freedom. Nothing here requires deterministic necessity.
Everything is perspectival; everything is relational.
6. Why the Debate Collapses
The free will/determinism problem arises only because potential has been misconstrued:
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As undifferentiated (rather than structured).
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As passive (rather than ready).
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As a container of possibilities (rather than a field of inclinations and abilities).
Once potential is understood correctly, the categories of “free” and “determined” lose their footing. The debate is neither resolved nor balanced — it is dissolved.
In its place, we get a relational model of agency:
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Not a metaphysical force (libertarianism),
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Not a chain of necessitation (determinism),
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Not a negotiated hybrid (compatibilism),
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But a systemic actualisation of readiness.
Agency becomes a relational cut across inclination + ability, yielding a perspectival event. Freedom becomes the openness of that cut. There is no question left to answer.
7. Conclusion: Freedom Without Mystery, Determination Without Compulsion
Once readiness is taken seriously, the universe ceases to be either a rigid chain or a metaphysical casino. Systems incline; abilities differentiate; constraints modulate; and actualisations emerge as perspectival events.
This is not a compromise but a reframing.
The free will/determinism debate is a dialectic built on representational assumptions that relational ontology rejects. The moment we shift from “events” to “readiness,” from “causes” to “inclinations,” from “freedom” to “perspectival actualisation,” the pseudo-problem evaporates.
Agency is not a metaphysical puzzle. It is the relational unfolding of structured potential.
Coda: Determinism as a Modulation Error
In SFL terms, we can see the free will/determinism debate in a new light:
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Readiness is the system’s structured potential, comprising inclination (directional tendency) and ability (capacity to actualise).
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Modality encodes attitudes toward propositions. Its two main strands are:
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Determinism arises when readiness (inclination + ability) is misconstrued as obligation — a mis-modulation.
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The system is inclined to actualise along certain trajectories, but this is not a necessity.
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Ability indicates capacity, not compulsion.
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Correctly construed, modulation reflects actual readiness, not imposed necessity. The “necessity” of determinism is thus a projection error in language, not a feature of the relational system itself.
Takeaway: Determinism is a misreading of modulation, treating what is structured readiness as if it were obligation. Freedom, then, is not metaphysical; it is the relational actualisation of potential without mis-modulated compulsion.