The Becoming of Possibility: 11/16/25

Sunday, 16 November 2025

Relational Cuts — Paradox as a Lens on Meaning, Mind, and Reality: 8 The Symbol Grounding Problem: Construal Before Symbol

The Symbol Grounding Problem, famously articulated by Harnad, asks:

How can symbols acquire meaning, rather than merely being manipulated syntactically?

Traditional treatments assume a representational hierarchy: symbols exist independently, and “grounding” them in the world is necessary for true semantic content. This leads to puzzles in AI, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind: how can a purely formal system ever understand or meaningfully relate to its domain?

Relational ontology reframes the problem entirely: symbols never exist prior to construal. Meaning is first-order, and symbols are realised, not foundational.

1. Classical Assumptions and the Representational Trap

The classical problem presupposes:

Symbols are discrete, autonomous entities.
Grounding requires linking symbols to objects, properties, or events in the world.
Lack of grounding leads to emptiness or non-understanding.

These assumptions embed the representational fallacy: treating symbols as “things” to which meaning must be attached, rather than as resources for relational construal.

2. System, Instance, and Construal in Symbolic Meaning

From the relational perspective:

System: the structured potential of symbolic resources (lexical, grammatical, diagrammatic, computational).
Instance: the particular usage of symbols in context — the actualisation of symbolic potential.
Construal: the first-order phenomenon, the lived experience or interpretation that gives the symbol significance.

Symbols acquire meaning not by being “grounded” externally but by participating in relational cuts that enact construal. The symbol exists because it is actualised relationally, not the other way around.

3. Dissolving the Problem

Under relational ontology:

There is no “pre-symbolic” reality to attach meaning to.
Meaning is enacted in the instance-construal relation.
Symbols are vehicles for actualising systemic potential, not independent objects requiring anchoring.

In other words, the Symbol Grounding Problem arises only under representational assumptions. Remove those assumptions, and the problem vanishes.

4. Implications for AI and Cognition

This relational view reshapes debates in artificial intelligence:

AI systems do not need symbols to “point at” objects in a world-first sense.
Their symbolic operations can be meaningful through relational engagement with structured potential.
Understanding emerges not from grounding but from the dynamic actualisation of potential in context.

The lesson is clear: symbols are meaningful because they participate in construal, not because they attach to an independently existing reality.

5. Construal in Practice

Consider a computer or a child learning a new term:

System: all possible uses, relations, and semantic potentials of the term.
Instance: the term as used in a particular sentence, diagram, or interaction.
Construal: the interpretation or experience of that usage.

Meaning emerges in the relational enactment of the symbol, not in the symbol itself.

6. Conclusion

The Symbol Grounding Problem is dissolved, not solved:

Symbols are not objects awaiting attachment to meaning.
Meaning is first-order, relational, and perspectival.
Symbols are realisations of systemic potential, actualised in context through construal.

Once we adopt this framework, both human and machine semiotic activity can be understood without invoking external anchors, because meaning always precedes symbols.

Relational Cuts — Paradox as a Lens on Meaning, Mind, and Reality: 7 The Problem of Reference: Relational Semantics and Meaning as Potential

The problem of reference has long preoccupied philosophers of language. Thinkers from Frege to Russell to Kripke ask:

How do words “pick out” objects?
How can language connect meaning to the world reliably?

Traditional approaches assume that reference is object-pointing: that words must latch onto pre-existing entities to function correctly. This assumption generates persistent puzzles — the puzzle of empty names, the rigidity of proper names, and the seeming indeterminacy of natural-language reference.

Relational ontology offers a radically different framework: reference is not a relationship between words and objects; it is a relational distribution of meaning across systemic potential.

1. Classical Assumptions and Their Limits

Standard reference theories presuppose:

Words denote objects or properties existing independently of language.
Communication succeeds when words “pick out” the intended entities.
Failure or ambiguity occurs when objects are absent, misidentified, or indeterminate.

These assumptions embed a representational model: meaning is thought to reside “out there,” separate from the linguistic system, the instance, and the construal.

Relational ontology challenges all three points.

2. System, Instance, and Construal in Reference

Within relational semantics:

System: the structured potential of the lexicon, grammar, and semiotic resources — the paradigmatic space of meaning possibilities.
Instance: the actualised utterance, a cut across systemic potential, realised in context.
Construal: the first-order phenomenon of interpreting or experiencing the utterance.

Reference is therefore not about object-pointing, but about how instances actualise systemic potential in a given construal, distributed across speaker, hearer, and context.

3. Dissolving Classical Puzzles

Many familiar puzzles evaporate under this lens:

Empty names: “Sherlock Holmes” does not fail to refer; it activates potential in the system that can be instantiated in narrative construal.
Rigid designators (Kripke): The “rigidity” of reference is the stability of systemic potential across contexts, not a mystical link to objects.
Ambiguity and miscommunication: arise from misalignments in construal, not defects in reference itself.

Reference is thus a relational phenomenon, enacted through the interaction of system, instance, and construal, not a property of words or objects alone.

4. Implications for Meaning

This relational view has profound consequences:

Meaning is distributed, dynamic, and perspectival, not fixed in the world.
Communication is relational coordination, not mapping symbols to entities.
Reference is actualisation of potential, not a one-to-one correspondence.

In SFL terms, systemic potential (paradigmatic resources) is realised in utterances (syntagmatic structure) as first-order construal. Classical reference debates are therefore recast as errors of representational thinking.

5. Construal in Practice

Consider a simple utterance:

“The cat sat on the mat.”

System: all the grammatical, lexical, and semiotic possibilities of English and context.
Instance: this particular sentence in this conversation.
Construal: the listener’s understanding of the situation, activated by relational cuts across potential.

Reference occurs within construal, not outside it. The “cat” does not exist a priori; it is activated relationally through systemic and contextual actualisation.

6. Conclusion

The traditional problem of reference is a pseudo-problem generated by representational assumptions. Once:

Words are understood as realising systemic potential,
Utterances are cuts across that potential, and
Meaning is first-order construal,

…reference becomes a relational, perspectival phenomenon. Words do not point at objects; they participate in the relational actualisation of meaning.

Relational Cuts — Paradox as a Lens on Meaning, Mind, and Reality: 6 Free Will vs Determinism: Agency as Relational Actualisation

The debate between free will and determinism has long framed human agency as a paradox:

Determinism suggests that every action is necessitated by prior states and the laws of nature.
Free will suggests that agents can act independently of such constraints.

Classical treatments struggle because they assume that potential is inert and actualisation is representational. Relational ontology dissolves the apparent conflict by reconfiguring how we think about potential, instance, and construal.

1. The Classical Problem: Inertia vs Autonomy

Traditional formulations assume:

The universe is composed of events already “fixed” in a causal chain.
Freedom requires that some events be uncaused or exempt from these chains.
Determinism and free will appear mutually exclusive, yielding the classic paradox.

This frame presupposes:

Potential as inert: what could happen exists independently of perspective.
Actualisation as representation: action is a token drawn from pre-existing content.

The paradox arises because these assumptions are false from a relational standpoint.

2. System, Instance, and Perspectival Agency

Relational ontology reframes agency as:

System: structured potential — the field of possibilities that constitutes an agent’s context.
Instance: perspectival actualisation — the specific enactment of potential in a situation.
Construal: first-order phenomenon — the lived experience of acting within potential.

Freedom is not independence from causality; it is the capacity to actualise potential from within a structured field. Determinism is not a constraint on action; it is the relational shaping of available possibilities.

Agency emerges relationally: the cut itself is the act of freedom, not an object to measure or a law to bypass.

3. Dissolving the Dichotomy

Once agency is understood relationally:

Determinism is not a rigid constraint; it is the structure of potential.
Free will is not metaphysical exemption; it is the perspectival choice among possibilities.
The paradox disappears: freedom and constraint are co-actualised in relational cuts.

An agent never “chooses outside the laws of nature” because the laws define the space in which cuts can occur. The illusion of conflict arises only if potential is mistaken for inert matter, and actualisation for representation.

4. Implications for Ethics and Meaning

Viewing agency relationally reshapes classic assumptions:

Responsibility is not about being metaphysically unconstrained; it is about how cuts align with systemic potential.
Creativity is not “breaking rules”; it is discovering new relational paths within structured potential.
Regret and foresight are perspectival: they reflect awareness of potential configurations and relational consequences.

Thus, human action is always situated, always relational, always perspectival.

5. Construal in Practice

Consider an agent deciding whether to speak a difficult truth:

The system includes social norms, prior events, personal values.
The instance is the chosen speech act.
Construal is the experience of making that choice.

Freedom is enacted in the cut; determinism is realised in the shape of potential. Both coexist naturally in relational actualisation.

6. Conclusion

The apparent conflict between free will and determinism is an artefact of representational thinking. Once we:

Treat potential as structured but not inert,
Treat actualisation as perspectival, and
Treat construal as first-order phenomenon,

…we see that agency is relational, and the paradox dissolves.

Relational Cuts — Paradox as a Lens on Meaning, Mind, and Reality: 5 The Ship of Theseus: Identity as Relational Cut

The Ship of Theseus has puzzled philosophers for centuries:

If a ship has all its parts replaced over time, is it still the same ship?
And if the old parts are reconstructed into a new ship, which is the original?

Classical treatments struggle because they assume that identity is a fixed property of objects, and that material continuity is the ground of individuation. Relational ontology provides a radically different lens, dissolving the paradox entirely.

1. The Classical Mistake: Identity as Object Property

Traditional accounts of the Ship of Theseus assume:

Objects have intrinsic identity independent of perspective.
Material continuity is the sole or primary criterion for persistence.
Replacing parts introduces ambiguity because the “true” ship is thought to exist separately from the act of observation or use.

Under this frame, the paradox is unavoidable: two ships with overlapping parts cannot be “the same” under any strict ontological measure.

2. Relational Reframing: Identity as Perspectival Resolution

Relational ontology reconceives identity:

Individuation is perspectival, not material.
A system (e.g., the ship as a structured potential) hosts multiple possible actualisations.
An instance is a cut through that potential, resolved in perspective.

In this view:

The ship that sails today is an instance of the system of shipness.
The old parts, reconstructed, are another instance of the same system.
“Identity” is the relational alignment between perspective, system, and instance, not a property of matter.

3. System, Instance, and Construal

Let us be precise:

System: the structured potential of shipness — the form, function, and relational constraints that define “ship” in general.
Instance: the particular configuration of parts and history — the sailing ship at this moment.
Construal: the observer’s engagement — seeing the ship as “the same” or “different” is a relational phenomenon, a first-order construal.

The paradox arises only when one treats identity as independent of relational perspective, rather than recognising it as a cut across potential actualised in context.

4. Why the Paradox Disappears

Once identity is viewed relationally:

There is no “true” ship outside of actualisation.
Multiple actualisations can coexist, each legitimate within its relational context.
Material replacement or reconstruction does not threaten identity; it merely shifts the instance actualised from system potential.

In other words, identity is perspectival, not inherent.

5. The Ship of Theseus as a Guide to Relational Thinking

This example teaches a fundamental lesson:

Paradoxes often arise from reifying potential as object, and confusing actualisation with intrinsic identity.
The Ship of Theseus is not a riddle to be solved; it is a lens to see how systems and instances relate.
Meaning, individuation, and identity emerge from relational cuts, not from material continuity alone.

6. Construal in Practice

Imagine observing the ship over time:

From your vantage, the ship remains “the same” — construal stabilises identity.
Another observer may see the reconstructed ship as “the original” — a different cut.
Both perspectives are valid, because identity is a relational phenomenon, enacted rather than discovered.

The Ship of Theseus, reframed relationally, is no longer a paradox but a lesson in the perspectival nature of reality.

Relational Cuts — Paradox as a Lens on Meaning, Mind, and Reality: 4 The Hard Problem of Consciousness: Relational Cuts in Mind and Meaning

The Hard Problem of Consciousness, famously articulated by David Chalmers, asks:

Why and how do physical processes give rise to subjective experience?

Classical philosophy and neuroscience frame the problem as if consciousness were something produced by matter, a property that exists over and above neural activity. This framing generates the “hard” intractability: if consciousness is an inner object, then its relation to physical processes appears mysterious, a chasm between mind and world.

Relational ontology dissolves the problem at its source.

1. Experience as First-Order Phenomenon

From the relational perspective:

Experience is not an object produced by matter.
Consciousness is a first-order phenomenon, a construal arising from relational cuts across potential.
Phenomenal “what it is like” is not a thing to be explained; it is the actualisation of systemic potential within perspective.

In other words, consciousness does not emerge from matter; it is the relational enactment of matter-in-potential actualised as construal.

2. System, Instance, and Construal

To articulate this precisely:

System: the structured potential of neural, semiotic, environmental, and bodily processes.
Instance: the perspectival actualisation — the particular configuration of potential at a moment.
Construal: the experienced phenomenon — the first-order lived meaning.

The Hard Problem arises only if one assumes that construal is separate from system and instance. Remove that assumption, and the paradox evaporates: consciousness is the ongoing relational cut itself.

3. Why Representationalism Creates a “Hard” Problem

Classical approaches create intractability by:

Treating potential as inert (a physical substrate to be explained).
Treating experience as an object over and above that substrate.
Treating knowledge of experience as if it were “access” to that object rather than the relational actualisation of potential.

Once these assumptions are corrected:

Matter is not inert; it participates in potential.
Experience is not objectified; it is first-order.
Consciousness is not “hard”; it is relationally necessary.

4. Consciousness as Relational Event

Consider a moment of seeing the morning light:

Traditional framing: neurons fire → light is experienced → mystery arises.
Relational framing: morning light activates systemic potential (visual system + neural configuration + social-environmental context) → relational cut occurs → consciousness is the lived phenomenon of that cut.

There is no explanatory chasm: experience is the relational instantiation of potential, not a product to be bridged.

5. Implications for Philosophy of Mind

Relational ontology recasts the Hard Problem as a pseudo-problem:

Consciousness is neither emergent property nor hidden object.
Phenomena are system-instance-construal relations actualised perspectivally.
What appeared intractable is simply the result of representational thinking.

All first-order phenomena — perception, feeling, thought — are relational enactments, cuts in the structured potential of reality, not objects awaiting explanation.

6. Relational Cuts as the Key to Consciousness

The Hard Problem vanishes once we recognise that:

Experience is real, not illusory.
It is first-order, not object-like.
It arises through relational cuts between system (structured potential) and instance (actualisation).

Consciousness is not “hard” because there is nothing missing: it is the act of relational actualisation itself.