The problem of reference has long preoccupied philosophers of language. Thinkers from Frege to Russell to Kripke ask:
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How do words “pick out” objects?
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How can language connect meaning to the world reliably?
Traditional approaches assume that reference is object-pointing: that words must latch onto pre-existing entities to function correctly. This assumption generates persistent puzzles — the puzzle of empty names, the rigidity of proper names, and the seeming indeterminacy of natural-language reference.
Relational ontology offers a radically different framework: reference is not a relationship between words and objects; it is a relational distribution of meaning across systemic potential.
1. Classical Assumptions and Their Limits
Standard reference theories presuppose:
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Words denote objects or properties existing independently of language.
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Communication succeeds when words “pick out” the intended entities.
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Failure or ambiguity occurs when objects are absent, misidentified, or indeterminate.
These assumptions embed a representational model: meaning is thought to reside “out there,” separate from the linguistic system, the instance, and the construal.
Relational ontology challenges all three points.
2. System, Instance, and Construal in Reference
Within relational semantics:
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System: the structured potential of the lexicon, grammar, and semiotic resources — the paradigmatic space of meaning possibilities.
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Instance: the actualised utterance, a cut across systemic potential, realised in context.
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Construal: the first-order phenomenon of interpreting or experiencing the utterance.
Reference is therefore not about object-pointing, but about how instances actualise systemic potential in a given construal, distributed across speaker, hearer, and context.
3. Dissolving Classical Puzzles
Many familiar puzzles evaporate under this lens:
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Empty names: “Sherlock Holmes” does not fail to refer; it activates potential in the system that can be instantiated in narrative construal.
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Rigid designators (Kripke): The “rigidity” of reference is the stability of systemic potential across contexts, not a mystical link to objects.
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Ambiguity and miscommunication: arise from misalignments in construal, not defects in reference itself.
Reference is thus a relational phenomenon, enacted through the interaction of system, instance, and construal, not a property of words or objects alone.
4. Implications for Meaning
This relational view has profound consequences:
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Meaning is distributed, dynamic, and perspectival, not fixed in the world.
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Communication is relational coordination, not mapping symbols to entities.
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Reference is actualisation of potential, not a one-to-one correspondence.
In SFL terms, systemic potential (paradigmatic resources) is realised in utterances (syntagmatic structure) as first-order construal. Classical reference debates are therefore recast as errors of representational thinking.
5. Construal in Practice
Consider a simple utterance:
“The cat sat on the mat.”
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System: all the grammatical, lexical, and semiotic possibilities of English and context.
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Instance: this particular sentence in this conversation.
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Construal: the listener’s understanding of the situation, activated by relational cuts across potential.
Reference occurs within construal, not outside it. The “cat” does not exist a priori; it is activated relationally through systemic and contextual actualisation.
6. Conclusion
The traditional problem of reference is a pseudo-problem generated by representational assumptions. Once:
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Words are understood as realising systemic potential,
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Utterances are cuts across that potential, and
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Meaning is first-order construal,
…reference becomes a relational, perspectival phenomenon. Words do not point at objects; they participate in the relational actualisation of meaning.
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