Relational Cuts — Paradox as a Lens on Meaning, Mind, and Reality: 6 Free Will vs Determinism: Agency as Relational Actualisation

The debate between free will and determinism has long framed human agency as a paradox:

• Determinism suggests that every action is necessitated by prior states and the laws of nature.

• Free will suggests that agents can act independently of such constraints.

Classical treatments struggle because they assume that potential is inert and actualisation is representational. Relational ontology dissolves the apparent conflict by reconfiguring how we think about potential, instance, and construal.

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1. The Classical Problem: Inertia vs Autonomy

Traditional formulations assume:

1. The universe is composed of events already “fixed” in a causal chain.

2. Freedom requires that some events be uncaused or exempt from these chains.

3. Determinism and free will appear mutually exclusive, yielding the classic paradox.

This frame presupposes:

• Potential as inert: what could happen exists independently of perspective.

• Actualisation as representation: action is a token drawn from pre-existing content.

The paradox arises because these assumptions are false from a relational standpoint.

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2. System, Instance, and Perspectival Agency

Relational ontology reframes agency as:

• System: structured potential — the field of possibilities that constitutes an agent’s context.

• Instance: perspectival actualisation — the specific enactment of potential in a situation.

• Construal: first-order phenomenon — the lived experience of acting within potential.

Freedom is not independence from causality; it is the capacity to actualise potential from within a structured field. Determinism is not a constraint on action; it is the relational shaping of available possibilities.

Agency emerges relationally: the cut itself is the act of freedom, not an object to measure or a law to bypass.

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3. Dissolving the Dichotomy

Once agency is understood relationally:

1. Determinism is not a rigid constraint; it is the structure of potential.

2. Free will is not metaphysical exemption; it is the perspectival choice among possibilities.

3. The paradox disappears: freedom and constraint are co-actualised in relational cuts.

An agent never “chooses outside the laws of nature” because the laws define the space in which cuts can occur. The illusion of conflict arises only if potential is mistaken for inert matter, and actualisation for representation.

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4. Implications for Ethics and Meaning

Viewing agency relationally reshapes classic assumptions:

• Responsibility is not about being metaphysically unconstrained; it is about how cuts align with systemic potential.

• Creativity is not “breaking rules”; it is discovering new relational paths within structured potential.

• Regret and foresight are perspectival: they reflect awareness of potential configurations and relational consequences.

Thus, human action is always situated, always relational, always perspectival.

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5. Construal in Practice

Consider an agent deciding whether to speak a difficult truth:

• The system includes social norms, prior events, personal values.

• The instance is the chosen speech act.

• Construal is the experience of making that choice.

Freedom is enacted in the cut; determinism is realised in the shape of potential. Both coexist naturally in relational actualisation.

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6. Conclusion

The apparent conflict between free will and determinism is an artefact of representational thinking. Once we:

• Treat potential as structured but not inert,

• Treat actualisation as perspectival, and

• Treat construal as first-order phenomenon,

…we see that agency is relational, and the paradox dissolves.