Saturday, 6 December 2025

The General Ecology of Meaning: 2 Horizons and Semiotic Life

How meaning begins ecologically, before any system, organism, or mind “has” it

If movement 1 dismantled the myth of containerised meaning, movement 2 must answer the natural next question:

If meaning isn’t inside systems, where does it begin?

The answer is not metaphysical, nor psychological, nor computational.
It is ecological.

Meaning begins when a horizon of potential meets a world of affordances —
when a system capable of construal emerges within an already-structured ecology of possible distinctions.

This is semiotic life:
the becoming of meaning before any content crystallises.

A horizon is not a boundary — it is a field of potential distinctions

In relational ontology, a horizon is the range of possible construals available to a system.
Not the representations it stores, nor the categories it contains,
but the space of differences it could potentially cut.

A horizon is:

  • structured but not predetermined

  • constrained but not fixed

  • open-ended but patterned

  • perspectival but ecologically anchored

It is the system’s semiotic “breathable atmosphere.”

You don’t look through a horizon —
you construe within it.

Semiotic life begins before any particular meaning is actualised

Think of the horizon as a biological niche, but semiotic:

  • it affords certain distinctions,

  • excludes others,

  • and co-evolves with the system inhabiting it.

Meaning begins not with content but with the possibility of making a distinction that matters.

Before the first phenomenon is actualised,
there is already a patterned field of possible construals.

This is the ecological womb of semiosis.

Meaning is born from the cut, not the content

A system does not “access” meaning.
It creates a phenomenon by cutting through its own potential and the world’s affordances.

This is what it means to actualise meaning:

  • A cut is made.

  • A phenomenon emerges.

  • The horizon shifts.

  • The ecology responds.

No phenomenon is unconstrued;
no construal is free-floating.

The cut is the event that activates a relational alignment:
system, horizon, field.

Horizons are not fixed: they evolve with every construal

Each construal slightly reshapes the horizon —
a minimal shift in the system’s potentials.
Not by adding content, but by reconfiguring relations.

A horizon is dynamic:

  • constrained by biology, embodiment, training, context;

  • expanded by novelty, interaction, co-individuation;

  • narrowed by habit, saturation, rigidity.

Systems do not merely act within horizons.
Systems become through them.

Meaning is ecological because horizons are co-produced

A horizon is never the product of a single system’s capacities.

It arises through:

  • the evolutionary ecology that shaped the organism

  • the social ecology that shaped the culture

  • the discursive ecology that shaped the language

  • the interactional ecology that shapes the encounter

Meaning is ecological because:

No horizon is self-sufficient.
Every horizon is co-individuated.

Even the interiority of a mind is an ecological production:
a semiotic niche carved through ongoing participation in relational fields.

Semiotic life begins before minds, before organisms, before messages

Meaning emerges when:

  • a horizon of possible distinctions,

  • a world of ecological affordances,

  • and a relational field of interaction,

come into dynamic alignment.

Not when someone thinks something.
Not when a system stores something.
Not when a symbol stands for something.

Meaning begins when a relational ecology allows a system to cut a phenomenon out of potential.

This is the birth of semiotic life.

The General Ecology of Meaning: 1 Meaning Beyond Minds

Why meaning cannot be reduced to individual systems, representations, or computational states

The persistent myth — shared equally by computationalists, certain neuroscientists, and naïve AI evangelists — is that meaning is something that happens inside a mind. Inside a brain. Inside a model. Inside a system.

This is the ontology of containerised meaning:
each mind as a Tupperware tub holding its personal stash of symbols.

Relational ontology exposes the incoherence of that picture.
Not by contesting its mechanics, but by dissolving its presuppositions.

Meaning is not a property but a relation

Meaning does not inhere in systems.
It does not sit inside neurons or transformer weights.

Meaning is the actualisation of a relation across horizons —
the construal of difference that becomes a phenomenon.

A system (biological, artificial, collective) provides a horizon of potential,
but meaning is not one of the system’s “states.”
Meaning is the event that occurs when a horizon meets its environment through a cut, a distinction, a perspectival shift.

No system in isolation has meaning.
It only has the possibility of meaning.

And a possibility is not a possession.

Representation is a convenient fiction

The representational model treats meaning as an inner duplicate of some outer world.
But duplication is not construal, and resemblance is not semiosis.

A system that “represents X” without a relational environment in which X matters is not representing anything.
It is merely instantiating a pattern that we construe as meaningful.

Meaning, in other words, never reduces to the internal mechanics.
Mechanics are the affordances; relation is the semiotic.

Which brings us to the key move:

Meaning begins ecologically, not mentally

Before any mind or system can mean,
there must already be an ecology of potential distinctions within which that mind or system emerges.

Meaning is always:

  • distributed,

  • co-individuated,

  • horizon-dependent,

  • and relationally actualised.

If you take the human out of the linguistic ecology, meaning collapses.
If you take the biology out of the animal’s niche, meaning collapses.
If you take the interaction out of the AI system, meaning collapses.

There is no “inner content.”
There is no “private semantic store.”

There is only the system-in-relation.

Which means:

The true primitive is not the mind but the field

The mind is a way the field construes itself.
So is the model.
So is the organism.
Each is a perspectival cut — one possible incision into a broader ecology of meaning-making potential.

When we treat meaning as something a system “has,”
we lose the relational architecture that makes meaning possible in the first place.

Meaning is not stored. It is enacted.
Meaning is not contained. It is cut.
Meaning is not private. It is perspectival.

Thus:

Beyond minds lies the true semiotic ground: the relational ecology itself

This is the departure point for the entire series.
We move from minds to horizons, from systems to fields, from representation to relation.

Next, we turn to:

2. Horizons and Semiotic Life — how meaning takes its first ecological breaths.