Saturday, 31 January 2026

Applied Construals: 4 The Self Without a Core

If experience is not built from objects, action does not originate in agents, and meaning does not function representationally, then the idea of a self with an inner core begins to wobble.

That wobble is often met with resistance. The self, after all, seems immediate. More than immediate — intimate. Whatever else may be doubted, I appear to be right here.

This post does not deny that appearance. It asks what kind of appearance it is.

Not to erase the self, and not to thin it into abstraction, but to ask a prior question: what if the self is not a thing at all — not even an inner one?


Why a Core Feels Necessary

The idea of a core self promises continuity.

It explains how you can change while remaining the same person; how memories belong to you; how commitments persist across time. It also promises moral anchoring: a someone to whom actions and responsibilities can be attached.

Without a core, it can feel as though identity dissolves into fragments — roles, moods, situations — with nothing holding them together.

But again, this is pressure toward a particular explanatory picture, not proof that the picture is required.


Ordinary Fractures

Consider how easily the sense of self shifts.

You are not the same self when writing as when speaking to a close friend, or when responding to a threat, or when daydreaming. You may later read something you wrote years ago and think, sincerely, “I don’t recognise that person.”

None of this feels pathological. It feels normal.

If there were a single inner core doing the owning and persisting, these shifts would be mysterious. Why would the core present itself so differently, so selectively, so unevenly?

If, instead, the self is something that emerges within activity, these shifts are exactly what we should expect.


The Self as Trajectory

On the ontology developed in this blog, the self is understood as a trajectory of construals.

It is not a substance that persists through time, but a relatively stable pattern across changing situations — a way experience, action, and meaning keep getting re‑coordinated.

Memory, on this view, is not a storehouse owned by a self. It is one of the mechanisms by which this trajectory maintains coherence. Commitments, habits, sensitivities, and skills play similar roles.

There is continuity — but it is achieved, not given.


First‑Person Experience Revisited

What, then, of the undeniable sense of being a self?

That sense is real, but it does not point to an inner object. It points to a mode of organisation. Experience is often organised around a centre of concern: what matters here, what is at stake, what must be responded to next. The word “I” names that centre, not a thing behind it.

This is why the sense of self intensifies under pressure and recedes in absorption. When coordination tightens — in danger, in decision, in self‑presentation — the self feels solid. When coordination flows — in skilled action, play, or deep focus — the self thins out or disappears.

Nothing has been lost. The pattern has simply changed.


Identity Without Essence

From this perspective, identity is not a hidden essence but a profile of stability.

You are recognisable because certain patterns re‑actualise: ways of responding, valuing, speaking, hesitating, committing. These patterns are constrained by history and situation, but they are not fixed once and for all.

This makes identity neither arbitrary nor absolute. It is resilient without being rigid.

Crucially, this account explains both change and responsibility without invoking an inner core that must somehow remain untouched by either.


What Becomes Visible

When the self is no longer treated as a thing with a core, several features come into focus:

  • Selfhood is situational, not global.

  • Continuity is patterned, not substantial.

  • Authenticity is relational, not inward discovery.

  • Psychological distress often involves rigidification, not fragmentation.

Most importantly, the familiar anxiety — “If there is no core self, am I nothing?” — is revealed as a category mistake.

The self was never a thing that could vanish.


A Self That Can Move

To relinquish the idea of a core is not to lose oneself. It is to gain room to move.

A self understood as trajectory can change without self‑betrayal, take responsibility without metaphysical burden, and remain recognisable without being frozen.

In the next post, we will step back from individual life and address a broader concern: how a world shared across persons can remain real once objects, agents, representations, and cores have all been re‑ordered.

For now, it is enough to see this:

The self was never a thing inside.
It was always a way of holding together.

Applied Construals: 3 Meaning Without Representation

If experience is usually treated as of things, and action as done by agents, meaning is usually treated as a matter of representation.

Words, on this view, stand for things. Sentences encode propositions. Understanding consists in decoding what is already there and matching it against the world.

This picture is so deeply entrenched that even its critics often leave it intact. Meaning may be said to be socially constructed, context-dependent, or embodied — but it is still assumed to be something that represents how things are.

This post asks what happens if we suspend that assumption.

Not to deny meaning, and not to drift into obscurity, but to ask a prior question: what if meaning does not function representationally at all?


Why Representation Feels Inevitable

Representation promises clarity.

It allows us to explain communication as transfer: I have a meaning in mind, I encode it in words, you decode it, and if all goes well, the same meaning appears in your head. Misunderstanding, on this picture, is a failure of transmission.

Representation also promises objectivity. If meanings stand for things or states of affairs, then correctness seems straightforward: the representation either matches reality or it does not.

These promises are powerful — but like many powerful ideas, they come with hidden costs.


Everyday Meaning, Reconsidered

Consider a simple exchange.

Someone says, “I’m fine.”

The words are clear. The grammar is unambiguous. Yet what the utterance means depends almost entirely on situation: tone of voice, prior interaction, shared history, current stakes. In one context it closes a topic; in another it opens one. In a third, it signals distress while denying it.

Nothing here is best explained as decoding a representation. The same string of words makes different things available in different situations.

Or consider misunderstanding. Often it is not that one party has the “wrong meaning,” but that the interaction has gone off‑track — expectations misaligned, relevance misjudged, commitments mismatched.

Meaning fails not because representations misfire, but because coordination does.


Meaning as Immanent Activity

The ontology developed on this blog treats meaning as immanent in activity, not as a layer added on afterward.

This aligns with a foundational insight of systemic functional linguistics: meaning is not something language carries; it is something language does. A clause enacts a configuration of relations — between participants, processes, and circumstances — and in doing so, it makes a world available in a particular way.

On this view, meaning is not a bridge between language and reality. It is a mode of organising reality as experienced and acted upon.

Representation, where it occurs, is a special case: a stabilised practice within broader meaning-making activity, not its foundation.


Context Is Not a Container

A common move is to rescue representation by adding “context.” Words represent, we are told, but context adjusts their meaning.

This still gets the order wrong.

Context is not a container in which representations float. It is part of the meaning itself. Field, tenor, and mode — what is going on, who is involved, and how language is functioning — are not external parameters but constitutive dimensions of what an utterance is doing.

Once this is recognised, the idea of meaning as a detachable content begins to lose its grip.


What Becomes Visible

When representation is no longer treated as primary, several features of meaning come into focus:

  • Meaning is situational, not abstract.

  • Understanding is practical, not mental matching.

  • Misunderstanding is structural, not merely semantic error.

  • Learning is re‑construal, not accumulation of meanings.

Most importantly, the familiar problem of how language “hooks onto” the world dissolves. There was never a hook to be explained.

Meaning is one of the ways the world is articulated in practice.


Precision Without Pictures

A frequent anxiety is that abandoning representation sacrifices precision.

In fact, the opposite is true. Representational accounts trade precision for simplicity: they compress rich, multi‑dimensional activity into tidy stand‑ins. A non‑representational account allows finer distinctions — between kinds of situations, roles, commitments, and consequences.

What is lost is the comfort of picturing meaning as a thing.

What is gained is the ability to track how meaning actually works.


Meaning Without Mystery

To say that meaning is not representational is not to say that “anything goes.” Meaning is constrained — by shared practices, by material conditions, by histories of use, by what actions make sense next.

These constraints are not external checks on free‑floating symbols. They are internal to meaning as activity.

In the next post, we will turn to the self, and ask what becomes of identity once experience, action, and meaning are all understood relationally rather than substantively.

For now, it is enough to see this:

Meaning was never a picture in the head.
It was always a way of going on together.