Explanations are slippery. We ask “Why does X happen?” and are told “Because Y,” and at first, everything seems clear. The answer may be perfectly correct. The phenomenon is intelligible. Yet, without noticing it, we often hear this explanation as an ontological declaration: that reality itself has been laid bare.
This post examines the delicate distinction between theory-internal explanation and ontological explanation, showing how “because” can be both illuminating and misleading.
Two Kinds of Explanation
When we ask why, we can mean at least two very different things:
Theory-internal explanation: Why does X follow from Y within a given theoretical framework? This is about dependence, necessity, and intelligibility inside a system of constraints. It tells us what is required by the assumptions we have made.
Ontological explanation: Why does X exist at all? This is about the existence of reality itself, independent of any theoretical frame. It seeks ultimate grounding, a metaphysical answer to why something is rather than not.
The problem arises when an answer of the first kind is heard as if it were the second. Suddenly, we mistake structured potential for reality, theoretical necessity for metaphysical necessity.
Why “Because Y” Works
Physics, biology, social science, and mathematics all provide examples where “because Y” is perfectly appropriate. Consider a few cases:
In physics: Light behaves in certain ways because charged fields and gauge symmetries are present. Within quantum electrodynamics, the behavior follows necessarily from the constraints imposed by the theory.
In biology: A species flourishes in a given environment because its traits confer reproductive advantage. Natural selection explains observed outcomes within the evolutionary framework, without answering why life exists at all.
In society: Laws and norms shape behavior because they structure possible actions and expectations. Within the social system, certain behaviors are unavoidable, given the constraints.
In each case, “because” articulates dependence within a construal. It makes sense of phenomena, rendering them intelligible without invoking ultimate causes.
Where It Fails: Ontological Overreach
Hearing these answers as ontological claims produces what we might call misread “why”:
A physicist might say, “Light exists because electric charges exist,” and a listener might think reality has been fully explained. But what has been explained is only the pattern of dependence once certain theoretical assumptions are adopted.
A biologist might say, “This trait exists because it confers a reproductive advantage,” and the claim can be misread as accounting for the existence of life itself.
A social scientist might explain a norm in terms of structural necessity, and the explanation can be misheard as revealing a metaphysical law of social reality.
In all these cases, the explanation is correct conditionally, but it does not answer the ultimate ontological “why.” Confusing these levels leads to a quiet overreach: the theory claims more than it can bear, often without anyone noticing.
Recognising the Levels
The disciplined move is to notice the level at which explanation is offered. Every “because Y” is situated:
Within a theoretical framework
Under a set of constraints
Relative to a particular system of structured possibilities
Taking the explanation at face value as a metaphysical claim is a category mistake. It substitutes a powerful, intelligible account for an answer it cannot provide.
Once we are aware of this, the apparent mystery dissolves. There is no error in the theory; only a misreading by those who conflate dependency with existence.
Why This Matters
This distinction is not pedantic. Misread “why” has consequences:
It encourages metaphysical overreach and unwarranted certainty.
It obscures the responsibilities inherent in actualisation — the cuts made when phenomena are constrained and rendered intelligible.
It makes interdisciplinary dialogue more difficult, because different fields interpret “because” differently.
Recognising the misread “why” restores lucidity. It allows us to appreciate the explanatory power of a theory while keeping our ontological humility intact.
Looking Forward
In the posts that follow, we will explore case studies across physics, biology, social systems, and symbolic systems. Each will show how theory-internal explanations operate, how they are often misheard, and how relational attention allows us to avoid ontological overreach.
By the end of the series, we will see a clear pattern: “because” works beautifully, but only when we keep track of its level. Understanding this distinction is the first step toward responsible explanation, and toward seeing where responsibility truly lies in the making of knowledge.
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