Saturday, 24 January 2026

4 Explanation Without Causation, Necessity Without Governance

1. Two habits that quietly survive every revolution

Even after abandoning substance metaphysics, even after releasing the image of laws as commands, two habits tend to linger:

  • that explanation must ultimately be causal

  • that necessity must ultimately imply governance

These habits feel almost irresistible. They give explanation its sense of depth and necessity its sense of force. But from the standpoint of relational ontology, both habits represent a final overreach — a reintroduction of metaphysical machinery where structural coherence already suffices.

What follows is an attempt to loosen both habits at once.


2. Why explanation is so easily confused with causation

In everyday reasoning, explanation and causation are entangled. To explain why something happened is usually to identify what produced it.

Physics inherits this intuition, then refines it — but rarely abandons it. Causes become interactions, fields, mechanisms, or dynamical laws. Yet the underlying picture remains: events occur because something makes them occur.

From a relational perspective, this picture is already misaligned with how theories actually function.


3. Explanation as structural articulation

Relational ontology proposes a different account. To explain a phenomenon is not to locate its causal origin, but to articulate the system of relations under which it becomes intelligible at all.

An explanation succeeds when it shows:

  • what distinctions must be in place

  • what relations must hold

  • what constraints must remain fixed

so that the phenomenon can be recognised as an instantiation of a structured potential.

Nothing needs to be produced by anything else. What matters is that the phenomenon can be situated.


4. Physics already works this way

Consider once again the role of invariants. When relativity explains why no signal exceeds c, it does not point to a causal process that slows signals down. It shows that allowing such variation would destroy the coherence of the spacetime system itself.

The explanation is not dynamical. It is architectural.

Likewise, conservation laws do not explain events by causing quantities to be conserved. They articulate the relational structure within which certain quantities retain identity across transformations.

Physics has long relied on explanation without causation — while continuing to speak as if causes were doing the work.


5. From explanation to necessity

Once explanation is released from causation, necessity must also be rethought.

Necessity is often taken to mean that the world has no choice. From this view, laws compel behaviour and violations are metaphysically impossible.

But this imports governance through the back door.


6. Necessity as internal non-negotiability

From a relational standpoint, necessity arises within systems, not over them.

A relation is necessary not because it is enforced, but because removing it would dissolve the system that makes the relation intelligible in the first place.

There is no external prohibition. There is simply nothing left to describe.

This is why invariants feel unavoidable. They are not rules the universe must obey; they are conditions without which the system ceases to be a system.


7. Why governance feels tempting

Governance provides a comforting picture:

  • necessity appears absolute rather than conditional

  • explanation appears final rather than situated

  • structure appears to reside in the world rather than in our systems of construal

But this comfort comes at a price. It obscures the distinction between structured potential and actualised phenomenon, and reintroduces metaphysical force where only relational coherence is required.


8. What remains once both habits are released

When explanation no longer depends on causation, and necessity no longer implies governance, something important becomes visible.

Physics does not tell us why the world behaves. It tells us under what relational conditions behaviour can be described coherently at all.

This does not weaken explanation. It clarifies its scope.


9. A final orientation

Explanation without causation is not emptier explanation.

Necessity without governance is not weaker necessity.

Both are sharper.

They mark the point at which physics ceases to be mythology about how the universe is compelled to behave, and becomes what it has quietly been all along: a disciplined practice of articulating the constraints under which meaning can remain stable across perspectives.

3 Constraint, Not Command: Why Physical Laws Do Not Govern the World

1. Why this distinction matters

Physics is habitually described in juridical language. We speak of laws that are obeyed, of nature as being governed, of systems that must behave in certain ways. This idiom is so entrenched that it often goes unnoticed — and with it, a powerful metaphysical presupposition.

The presupposition is simple: that physical laws are commands issued to the world, and that phenomena occur because those commands are followed.

From the perspective developed in the previous two posts, this way of speaking is not merely metaphorical. It is actively misleading.


2. The law-as-command picture

On the law-as-command picture:

  • laws exist independently of particular phenomena

  • they determine how systems must behave

  • deviations are either impossible or treated as failures of compliance

This picture encourages a familiar metaphysics: laws as external governors, nature as a rule-following subject, and explanation as the tracing of obedience back to first principles.

Even when physicists reject this picture explicitly, it often survives implicitly in how results are framed — especially when invariants are described as deep features “written into the fabric of reality”.


3. Invariants are not instructions

Relational ontology invites a different starting point. Systems are not passive recipients of laws; they are structured potentials. Phenomena are not produced by obedience; they are instantiations under particular cuts.

Within this frame, invariants such as c do not instruct systems how to behave. They constrain the space of coherent description. They mark what must remain fixed if multiple perspectives are to be treated as perspectives on the same system.

An invariant does not say what happens. It says what cannot vary without the system dissolving into incoherence.


4. Constraint without governance

This is a subtle but decisive shift.

A command requires:

  • an issuer

  • a subject

  • a notion of compliance

A constraint requires none of these. It is internal rather than external. It does not act on phenomena; it conditions the intelligibility of phenomena.

To say that no signal can propagate faster than c is not to say that the universe enforces a speed limit. It is to say that descriptions violating this constraint cannot be integrated into a single coherent spacetime system.

Nothing is stopped. Something is rendered indescribable within that system.


5. Laws as summaries of stable constraints

From this perspective, what we call physical laws are best understood as compressed descriptions of stable constraints within particular theoretical systems.

They are not causes. They do not produce events. They summarise regularities that persist because the underlying system remains intact under repeated instantiation.

When the system changes — as it did between Newtonian and relativistic mechanics — the laws change not because nature revised its commandments, but because the constraints defining intelligibility were reconfigured.


6. Why the command metaphor persists

The command metaphor survives because it flatters human intuitions:

  • it mirrors social order and authority

  • it offers explanatory closure

  • it promises necessity rather than contingency

But it comes at a cost. It encourages us to mistake formal success for ontological insight, and to treat mathematical invariants as metaphysical machinery.

Relational ontology does not deny the power of physics. It denies only that power requires governance.


7. Re-reading necessity

Invariants often feel necessary. From a law-as-command perspective, this necessity is read as metaphysical force. From a constraint perspective, it is read as structural non-negotiability.

Once a system is defined, certain relations cannot be altered without destroying the system itself. That is not because the universe forbids them, but because there is no longer anything left to describe.

Necessity here is internal, not imposed.


8. A final cut

Physical laws do not govern the world.

They do not issue commands, enforce obedience, or compel behaviour. They articulate the constraints under which a particular system of meaning remains coherent across perspectives.

To mistake constraint for command is to reintroduce metaphysics where only structure is required.

And once that mistake is released, the world does not become less intelligible — only less mythologised.

2 Invariant Without Substance: c Revisited Through Relational Ontology

1. Why return to c?

The previous post treated c — the so‑called speed of light — as a structural constraint: an invariant that holds spacetime, mass, and energy together by forbidding incoherent descriptions. That framing already resists many familiar metaphysical excesses. But it still leaves one temptation intact: the sense that c names a deep feature of the universe, even if not a substance or signal.

From the perspective of relational ontology, that temptation also needs to be cut.

What follows is not a revision of the physics, but a re‑siting of its meaning. The question is no longer what does c correspond to in reality? but what kind of thing is an invariant, once meaning itself is understood as relational and construed?


2. Systems, not substances

Relational ontology begins from a simple refusal: there are no self‑standing entities whose properties are merely revealed by description. There are only systems — structured potentials — and their instantiations under particular perspectives.

Within this frame, spacetime itself is not a container in which events occur. It is a system of possible relations whose internal coherence depends on how distinctions are drawn. The introduction of an invariant speed does not uncover a hidden feature of this system; it defines the conditions under which the system can be coherently instantiated at all.

c is therefore not a fact about the universe. It is a constraint internal to a particular theoretical system — a rule governing how that system may be cut into phenomena.


3. Invariance as a condition of perspectival stability

In the earlier post, c was described as the factor that allows different descriptions to agree. Relational ontology sharpens this claim:

Agreement is not a correspondence between descriptions and an independent reality. It is a stability across perspectives within a shared system of meaning.

An invariant is not something that stays the same in the world. It is something that must stay the same for the system to remain intelligible under variation of perspective.

From this point of view, Lorentz invariance is not a discovery about spacetime “out there”. It is a coherence condition for a system that allows multiple inertial perspectives to be related without contradiction.

c functions precisely here: as the fixed relation that prevents the system from tearing when perspectives shift.


4. Mass–energy equivalence as a relational cut

Seen relationally, the equation E=mc² loses its air of ontological revelation. It does not tell us what mass really is. It articulates how two different construals of the same system — one privileging rest, the other motion — must be related if they are to be treated as instantiations of a single underlying potential.

Mass and energy are not substances awaiting unification. They are perspectives on the same system under different cuts. The factor of is not a magical conversion rate; it is the invariant that preserves identity across those cuts.

What is conserved here is not matter or energy as things, but co‑individuation across perspectives.


5. The mistake of ontological inflation (again)

From within a relational ontology, the familiar metaphysical moves appear in a new light. To say that spacetime “really is” four‑dimensional, or that mass “really is” energy, is not merely to overinterpret the physics. It is to misidentify the level at which the theory is operating.

Invariants belong to the theory of the system, not to the phenomena instantiated within it. Treating them as features of reality in itself collapses the distinction between structured potential and actualised event — precisely the collapse relational ontology is designed to resist.

c does not inhabit the world. It inhabits the conditions under which the world can be meaningfully described.


6. Why this matters

This shift may seem subtle, but its consequences are not. Once invariants are understood relationally:

  • the quantum–classical “transition” ceases to be an ontological puzzle

  • debates over collapse versus decoherence lose their metaphysical urgency

  • the fetishisation of mathematical formalisms is deflated without being dismissed

Physics remains exacting and difficult. What changes is the story we tell about what it has shown.


7. A closing cut

c is often treated as a cosmic speed limit, a deep constant written into the fabric of reality. From a relational ontological perspective, it is something quieter and more precise: a condition that allows a particular system of meaning to hold together under variation of perspective.

It is not what the universe is made of.

It is what we are not allowed to change if we want our descriptions to remain coherent.

And that, perhaps, is its real significance.