Friday, 16 January 2026

One Phenomenon, Many Scales

One of the quiet consequences of the previous series is easy to miss.

Once representation is no longer treated as the default explanatory currency, a striking pattern becomes visible: many phenomena that are usually treated as fundamentally different turn out to be ontologically continuous.

Embryogenesis.
Colonial organisms.
Eusocial insects.
Animal behaviour.
Herding, flocking, schooling.

These are not analogies.
They are not metaphors.
And they are not cases of one level being “explained by” another.

They are the same phenomenon, actualised at different scales.


The illusion of difference

Biology and the behavioural sciences tend to partition their subject matter by scale.

Developmental biology, ethology, ecology, and social behaviour are treated as distinct explanatory domains, each with their own preferred mechanisms and vocabularies.

This fragmentation is not accidental.

It is driven by an unexamined assumption: that organisation must be located somewhere — in genes, brains, individuals, or groups — and that different scales therefore require different organising principles.

Once that assumption is relaxed, the differences begin to look superficial.


The shared structure

Across all of these phenomena, the same ontological features recur:

  • a system understood as structured potential, not as a mechanism executing instructions;

  • value-driven constraints that shape viability without meaning or representation;

  • actualisation as a cut, selecting a trajectory from a space of possibilities;

  • and learning or development as the reshaping of constraint, not the accumulation of knowledge.

What varies is not the kind of organisation involved, but the density, persistence, and location of constraint.


Embryogenesis

In embryogenesis, organisation is often described as if a plan were being executed.

But development proceeds without foresight, representation, or global control.

Cells respond locally, under value-laden constraints tied to viability, and stable forms emerge through successive cuts in a space of possible morphologies.

Nothing is being represented.
Something is being actualised.


Colonial and eusocial systems

Colonial organisms and eusocial insects are routinely credited with “collective intelligence.”

This language is a confession of explanatory discomfort.

What we observe instead are:

  • tightly constrained interaction rules,

  • value systems embedded in survival and reproduction,

  • and robust coordination emerging without any shared model of the whole.

Again, competence without meaning.


Individual animal behaviour

At the level of the individual animal, the temptation to invoke cognition is strongest.

But the same pattern holds.

Behaviour is not executed from internal representations.

It is the ongoing actualisation of viable possibilities within a dynamically constrained ecology.

Learning reshapes the space of what can happen next; it does not install new inner descriptions.


Herds, flocks, and schools

At larger scales, explanation often retreats to the language of emergence.

But nothing fundamentally new appears here.

Coordination arises because:

  • constraints propagate across bodies,

  • local interactions reshape global possibility,

  • and cuts at one point alter viability elsewhere.

The system remains one of organised potential, not distributed cognition.


Scale without reduction

To say that these are the same phenomenon at different scales is not to reduce one to another.

Embryos are not herds.
Herds are not embryos.

What is shared is the ontological logic by which competence is produced.

Scale changes where constraints operate, how long they persist, and how tightly they are coupled — not the basic form of explanation.


Why this matters

Recognising this continuity does two important things.

First, it removes the pressure to invent new kinds of hidden intelligence every time coordination becomes impressive.

Second, it allows genuinely different phenomena — symbolic meaning, deliberate planning, ethical reasoning — to stand out as what they are: specialised additions, not universal foundations.


A single explanatory stance

The payoff of this reframing is not a grand unifying theory.

It is something more modest and more useful: a single explanatory stance that travels across scales without distortion.

Where there is competence without meaning, the same questions apply:

  • What possibilities are available?

  • What constrains them?

  • Where is the cut made?

Often, that is enough.


Closing

What initially looks like bewildering diversity turns out to be repetition with variation.

Life does not reinvent its ontology at every scale.

It reuses it.

Once we see that, many long-standing puzzles lose their drama — not because they are trivial, but because they are finally placed where they belong.

Competence Without Meaning: 8 What This Changes (and What It Doesn’t)

This series has argued for a reframing of animal behaviour.

Not a new mechanism.
Not a hidden intelligence.

A different ontological starting point.

In this final post, I want to be explicit about what follows from that shift — and what emphatically does not.


What this changes for biology

First, it changes where explanation should be sought.

Behaviour need not be explained by:

  • inner representations,

  • stored plans,

  • symbolic models of the world.

Instead, explanation can remain at the level of:

  • value systems,

  • organism–environment coupling,

  • constraint dynamics,

  • actualisation of possibility.

This does not impoverish biological explanation.

It simplifies it.


What this changes for cognition studies

Cognition is often treated as the default explanatory layer.

This series suggests that much of what is called cognition in animals is better understood as:

  • coordinated responsiveness,

  • learned constraint shaping,

  • stabilised patterns of viable action.

This does not deny cognition.

It localises it.

Meaningful cognition becomes a specific phenomenon, not a universal assumption.


What this changes for AI

The temptation here is immediate and dangerous.

If animals exhibit competence without meaning, perhaps machines can too — or already do.

There is something right in this thought.

And something deeply wrong.


The legitimate lesson for AI

The legitimate lesson is that effective behaviour does not require representation.

Systems can:

  • adapt,

  • coordinate,

  • explore,

  • and stabilise success

without understanding what they are doing.

This supports non-representational approaches in robotics and machine learning.


The firm brake

But here is the brake.

Value in biological systems is not arbitrary.

It is:

  • embodied,

  • historically sedimented,

  • inseparable from survival and viability.

Artificial systems do not have this kind of value structure.

They inherit goals.

They do not live them.

To slide from animal competence to machine meaning is a category error.


What this does not change about humans

Nothing in this series diminishes human meaning-making.

On the contrary.

By refusing to project meaning everywhere, we preserve its specificity.

Human symbolic coordination remains:

  • exceptional,

  • fragile,

  • and historically contingent.

It is not the baseline of life.

It is a remarkable deviation.


The ethical non-conclusion

This framework does not tell us how to treat animals.

It does not deliver moral prescriptions.

Confusing explanation with ethics is another form of projection.

Understanding competence without meaning neither licenses exploitation nor mandates sentimentality.

Those questions lie elsewhere.


What remains mysterious

One thing should now be clear.

Animal behaviour is no longer mysterious because it lacks minds like ours.

It is mysterious because life organises possibility in ways we are only beginning to understand.

That mystery does not require meaning to sustain it.


Closing the arc

Animals survive through competence.

That competence is:

  • complex,

  • contingent,

  • flexible,

  • and relentlessly situated.

It does not depend on representation.

It does not depend on creativity.

And it does not depend on meaning.

Once we accept that, we can finally stop asking animals to be like us — and start understanding them on their own terms.

Competence Without Meaning: 7 Why Humans Get Confused

At this point in the series, a different kind of pressure usually appears.

Readers begin to say things like:

  • Surely animals must represent something.

  • Surely this smuggles intelligence in through the back door.

  • Surely this is just semantics.

These reactions are revealing.

They tell us less about animal behaviour than about our own semiotic predicament.


The human default: meaning everywhere

Humans are not merely sensitive to meaning.

We are organised by it.

Our behaviour is routinely coordinated through:

  • symbols,

  • narratives,

  • explicit commitments,

  • articulated reasons.

As a result, we are deeply inclined to assume that competent behaviour must involve something like understanding.

This inclination is not a philosophical mistake.

It is a structural feature of human life.


Semiotic competence as a special case

Human meaning-making is extraordinarily powerful.

It allows us to:

  • detach action from immediate context,

  • coordinate across time and distance,

  • stabilise institutions,

  • argue about what ought to count.

But precisely because this capacity is so central for us, we tend to treat it as the default explanation for competence as such.

This is the first confusion.


Projection as explanation

When we encounter complex animal behaviour, we instinctively project inward:

  • intentions,

  • representations,

  • plans,

  • beliefs.

This projection feels explanatory because it mirrors how we would have to operate to behave that way.

But mirroring is not explanation.

It is anthropomorphic substitution.


Why the projection persists

The projection is hard to relinquish for three reasons.

First, animal behaviour is genuinely impressive.
Second, representational accounts sound familiar and reassuring.
Third, non-representational explanations initially feel thin.

They do not offer inner drama.

They offer structure.


Structure without interior theatre

What this series has argued is not that animals lack complexity.

It is that their complexity is organised differently.

Competence arises from:

  • richly structured value systems,

  • tight organism–environment coupling,

  • dynamic constraint landscapes,

  • ongoing actualisation of possibility.

None of this requires an inner stage on which meanings are consulted.


Meaning as an evolutionary addition, not a prerequisite

This reframing also helps to place human semiotic capacity correctly.

Meaning is not the foundation of biological competence.

It is a late and specialised addition that enables a different order of coordination.

Confusion arises when we reverse this order and treat meaning as basic.


Why intelligence talk muddies the water

Terms like intelligence, problem-solving, and cognition often function as placeholders.

They mark our sense that something sophisticated is happening without specifying how.

In animal contexts, these terms frequently smuggle representation back in under a looser name.

This is not illumination.

It is evasion.


The cost of confusion

When we over-intellectualise animal competence, two things happen.

We misunderstand animals.

And we misunderstand ourselves.

We lose sight of the distinctiveness of human meaning-making by treating it as ubiquitous.


Clearing the ground

The aim of this series has not been to diminish animals.

It has been to clear conceptual space.

Once we stop asking what animals think, we can finally ask how their behaviour is so reliably, flexibly, and robustly organised.

That question no longer requires mystery.


Looking ahead

With this confusion addressed, we are finally in a position to be precise.

In the final post, we will ask what this framework actually changes — for biology, for AI, for cognition studies — and just as importantly, what it does not license us to conclude.

Competence Without Meaning: 6 Novelty Without Creativity

At this point, a familiar objection usually appears.

If behaviour is constrained by value, shaped by ecology, and actualised from an already-structured space of possibilities, then how can anything genuinely new ever occur?

Isn’t novelty the signature of creativity, insight, or imagination?

This post answers no.

Novelty does not require creativity.


The intuition we need to resist

We are strongly inclined to think that new behaviour must be invented.

In human life, novelty often is:

  • imagined,

  • planned,

  • deliberately produced.

This makes it tempting to project the same structure onto animals.

But once again, this intuition mistakes a human mode of novelty for novelty as such.


What novelty actually consists in

Novelty is not the appearance of something uncaused or unconstrained.

It is the actualisation of a possibility that has not previously been taken.

Nothing about this requires foresight or invention.

It requires only that:

  • the space of possibilities be rich,

  • the constraints be dynamic,

  • and the system be sensitive to perturbation.


Why constraint enables novelty

Constraint is often thought to limit behaviour.

In fact, constraint differentiates behaviour.

By ruling out vast regions of possibility, constraints:

  • sharpen viable trajectories,

  • stabilise some coordinations,

  • and make others newly accessible when conditions shift.

Novelty appears when the constraint landscape changes.


Perturbation as opportunity

Animals live in worlds that are constantly perturbed:

  • weather shifts,

  • surfaces deform,

  • conspecifics behave unexpectedly,

  • bodies age and tire.

These perturbations do not require interpretation.

They reshape the space of what can happen next.

When a new trajectory becomes viable and is actualised, novelty occurs.


Exploration without insight

Many animals exhibit exploratory behaviour.

This is often misdescribed as curiosity or problem-solving.

But exploration need not involve goals or hypotheses.

It can be understood as:

  • movement through a space of possibilities,

  • under value-driven constraints,

  • with feedback stabilising what works.

New behaviour need not be sought.

It can simply be selected into actuality.


Learning revisited

Learning is where novelty accumulates.

But what accumulates is not knowledge.

What accumulates is:

  • reshaped constraint structure,

  • altered sensitivity to perturbation,

  • stabilised new coordinations.

Once again, novelty is conserved without creativity.


Why this feels unsatisfying

For human readers, this account can feel deflationary.

Where is the spark?
Where is the ingenuity?

The discomfort arises because we are accustomed to equating novelty with meaning.

Biological systems do not share that equation.

They do not need to understand novelty in order to enact it.


Novelty as consequence, not achievement

From this perspective, novelty is not an accomplishment.

It is a consequence of:

  • rich coupling,

  • dynamic constraint,

  • and ongoing actualisation.

Animals do not create novelty.

They participate in systems where novelty is unavoidable.


The next turn

We are now in a position to see why animal behaviour so persistently confounds us.

We keep looking for intelligence, creativity, or meaning.

What we find instead is something quieter and more powerful:

competence without meaning.