Friday, 21 November 2025

Languages as Ontologies II: Meta-Conclusion: Construal as the Architecture of Possibility

Across this series, we have moved deliberately: from processes to participants, from space to causation, from temporality to the internal–external cut. Each domain revealed how languages do not represent a pre-existing world but pattern the horizon of what can become a phenomenon.

This final post consolidates the architecture we have built.


1. The Six Cuts as a System

Each domain is a different kind of ontological cut — a way of partitioning the potential of experience into intelligible phenomena.

  • Process construal patterns how becoming unfolds.

  • Participant construal patterns what may count as a being.

  • Spatial construal patterns where phenomena can be located.

  • Agency and causation construal patterns how force and influence flow.

  • Temporal construal patterns how unfolding is rendered meaningful.

  • Internal/external construal patterns what counts as access, evidence, and experience itself.

None of these construals describe reality.
They actualise different possible realities — different ways of cutting the continuum of experience into phenomena, relations, and horizons.

In relational ontology, this is the central point:
construal is world-making, not world-mapping.


2. Construal is systemic, not additive

These six domains are not separate “features” of language.
They mutually condition each other.

A language with geocentric spatial anchoring tends also to pattern agency relationally.
A language with aspect-first temporality often foregrounds event structure over agentive control.
A language with strong evidentiality tends to reshape the internal/external cut itself.

Each system is a coherent orientation toward experience, a patterned potential.

Thus the ontology expressed by a language is not produced by single categories but by the whole configuration of construal strategies.

Languages are not bundles of features.
They are co-individuated systems of experience.


3. What typology becomes under relational ontology

Traditional typology asks:
How do languages encode X?
Which assumes there is a single X “out there” being encoded.

Our series reframes the question:
How do languages constitute X as a phenomenon at all?
Different languages do not “encode” different versions of time, space, agency, or entities.
They enact different cuts that make different kinds of time, space, agency, and entities possible.

Typology thus becomes the comparative study of:
how languages actualise different ontological potentials.

This is not relativism — because all cuts are perspectival on the same underlying potential —
nor universalism — because no cut is privileged or foundational.

It is systemic perspectivism grounded in relational ontology.


4. The narrative payoff: worlds made possible

Because language patterns construal, it patterns narrative.
Different languages open different narrative universes:

  • Event-centred worlds

  • Agent-centred worlds

  • Geocentric worlds

  • Cyclic worlds

  • Worlds where emotion is distributed

  • Worlds where evidence is structural

  • Worlds where being is stable

  • Worlds where being is emergent

These are not stylistic accents; they are ontological dramaturgies built into the meaning potential of each language.

A language shapes not merely how stories are told but what can be storied.


5. Where this series leaves us

We end with a new sense of what linguistic diversity is:
not variation in coding, but variation in ontological patterning.

Every language:

  • construes a different grammar of becoming,

  • enacts a different architecture of experience,

  • opens a different horizon of meaningfulness.

Languages differ not in what they “say,” but in the worlds they make inhabitable.

This is the core thesis the series has established.

Languages as Ontologies II: 6 Construal of Internal vs. External Phenomena

In many philosophical traditions, experience is divided cleanly into “inner” and “outer” domains: thoughts here, world out there.

Relational ontology rejects that dichotomy. There is no pre-given “inner world” waiting to be expressed, nor an “external world” waiting to be represented. There are only cuts in experience — perspectival partitions enacted through construal.

Languages make these cuts differently. They pattern how experience becomes knowable, how evidence is tracked, how perception is distinguished from inference. This domain is crucial because it shows most clearly that languages are not representational devices; they are theories of access to phenomena.


1. How experience is cut

Languages vary dramatically in how they distinguish firsthand experience, report, inference, and internal states:

  • Evidentiality systems (Tibetan, Quechua, Turkish)
    These languages grammaticise whether the speaker saw the event, heard it, inferred it, or was told about it.
    The source of construal becomes part of the event structure itself.
    “It rained” is not complete without specifying how the rain became a phenomenon for the speaker.

  • Internal vs. external mental events (Japanese, Korean)
    These languages often encode mental and emotional experience as relationally distributed, not internal possessions.
    Feelings “come over” or “happen to” a participant; they are emergent relational states, not interior substances.

  • Accessibility and experiential reach (Dyirbal, Kalaallisut)
    Some languages distinguish visible vs. non-visible, proximal vs. distal, witnessed vs. unreachable phenomena.
    Knowledge is patterned as situated access, not as neutral representation.

  • Inferential vs. experiential constructions (Classical Chinese, Newar)
    Certain languages foreground inference, making explicit whether a phenomenon is construed from signs rather than directly perceived.
    The language treats inference as a mode of experiencing, not a second-class substitute.


2. Construal of evidence as ontology

These linguistic systems enact distinct ontological stances toward the relation between experiencer and phenomenon:

  • Perceptually anchored ontologies
    A world where phenomena “count” only insofar as one has direct perceptual access (Tibetan, Quechua).
    Existence is contact-dependent: the phenomenon is defined through its experiential pathway.

  • Relationally emergent ontologies
    Mental states do not live “inside” individuals but arise through interactions, situations, and affective fields (Japanese, Korean).
    The cut between “inner” and “outer” softens into situated emergence.

  • Distributed access ontologies
    Some languages allocate epistemic rights and evidential access across participants or social roles, making knowledge a socially patterned phenomenon rather than an individual one.

None of these systems “encode reality”; each patterns what it is possible to regard as known, felt, or experienced.


3. Implications for narrative and cognition

  • Storytelling:
    Languages with rich evidential marking produce narratives that foreground perspective, source, and legitimacy of knowledge.
    Narrators in Japanese may downplay interiority, producing stories where emotion arises from context and relation rather than introspective declaration.
    Inference-heavy languages create narratives that hinge on clues, signs, and the co-arising of meaning.

  • Cognition:
    Speakers learn to anticipate whether a phenomenon must be witnessed, inferred, or socially validated.
    They track access as part of the experience itself.
    This shapes how memory is structured, how testimony is trusted, and how emotion is understood.


4. Closing reflection

This final domain shows the deepest point of the series:
Languages are not representational systems mapping a pre-made world.
They are ontological operators — patterned resources for carving experience into phenomena, relations, and perspectives.

Across these six domains — process, participant, space, agency, temporality, and experiential access — we see that each language enacts a distinct local ontology of the possible.

Languages differ not in what they “say about the world,” but in the worlds they make inhabitable.
Every construal is a relational cut; every cut is an opening into a lived reality.

Languages as Ontologies II: 5 Construal of Time and Temporality

Processes unfold, participants exist, space situates them, and causality governs their interactions. But how events are ordered, patterned, and experienced in time is another domain where languages enact profoundly different ontologies. Relational ontology reminds us: languages do not simply “mark clock time”; they pattern the experience of becoming itself.

1. How unfolding is patterned

Languages vary in how they construe temporality:

  • Tenseless languages vs. heavily tensed systems: Some languages, such as Yucatec Maya or Pirahã, do not obligatorily encode tense. Temporal relations are inferred from context, aspect, or evidential markers, foregrounding the relational and emergent nature of events. In contrast, English and Romance languages grammaticise past, present, and future, giving time a linear, segmentable structure.

  • Aspect-first languages vs. event-structure-first languages: In Slavic languages, aspect (completed vs. ongoing) dominates, shaping how the event’s internal unfolding is perceived. Aspect is not optional; it structures how participants experience the event’s temporal profile.

  • Cyclic, spatial, or phase-based temporal systems: Some African and Oceanic languages encode time as spatial, circular, or experiential cycles, such as Amharic, where temporal relations often reference habitual or cyclical patterns rather than linear sequencing.

The key insight: what counts as “before,” “after,” or “during” is patterned by linguistic possibility, not universally given.

2. Temporality construal as ontology

Through these systems, languages enact different default ontologies of becoming:

  • Linear, segmentable time (English, French) — events are sequential, with explicit markers; unfolding is predictable and narratively structurable.

  • Aspectual or phase-oriented time (Slavic, Japanese) — the quality of the event’s internal structure matters more than its chronological location.

  • Relational or cyclic time (Pirahã, Amharic) — temporal experience is contextual, emergent, and tied to patterns of recurrence rather than discrete points.

This demonstrates that temporality is not an external metric, but a relational field within which processes, participants, and causality are actualised.

3. Implications for narrative and cognition

  • Storytelling: Linear-time languages favor plot-driven narratives with clear beginnings, middles, and ends. Aspect-focused or cyclic-time languages foreground processes, repetition, and relational patterns, creating narratives that feel emergent, reflective, or cyclical.

  • Cognition: Habitual temporal construal affects prediction, memory, and planning. Speakers internalise not just sequences, but the rhythm and salience of events, their completion, and their relational positioning.

4. Closing reflection

Temporal construal is a cut into experience itself. Languages pattern how becoming can be perceived, remembered, and narrated, shaping both thought and story. Time is not a universal backdrop; it is enacted through language, a medium through which events, agents, and relations are made intelligible.

Languages as Ontologies II: 4 Construal of Agency and Causation

Processes unfold and participants exist, but how events happen — who acts, who influences, and how change occurs — is patterned differently across languages. Relational ontology asks: languages do not merely “mark who did what”; they pattern the distribution of force, responsibility, and potentiality.

1. How events unfold

Languages encode causation and agency in diverse, revealing ways:

  • Ergativity vs. accusativity: Languages like Dyirbal or Basque mark agents and patients differently, creating a construal where agency is not the default; focus falls on the participant experiencing change. In contrast, English foregrounds the agent, creating a default of active causation.

  • Causative morphology vs. analytic causation: In Turkish, causative affixes can transform a verb to signal intentional influence (“The chef boiled the water” vs. “The chef made the water boil”), embedding degrees of control and participation directly into the verb.

  • Grammaticalised control, intention, and evidentiality: Languages like Tibetan integrate evidential markers with agency, signaling whether an event is observed, inferred, or reported — a subtle ontological statement about the speaker’s relation to the causal chain.

  • Downplayed vs. foregrounded agency: Some languages, such as Japanese, often leave the agent implicit, shifting focus to the event itself or the relational network in which it occurs.

2. Agency construal as ontology

By examining how languages encode causation, we see contrasting ontological defaults:

  • Agent-centred (English, many Indo-European languages) — the world unfolds around doers and their intentionality.

  • Event-centred (Dyirbal, Salishan) — processes are primary; agents are sometimes peripheral or backgrounded.

  • Relationally distributed (Tibetan, Japanese) — causality is mediated across participants, evidential access, and situational salience.

Language here does not “represent” causation neutrally; it structures how force, change, and responsibility are perceptible and narratable.

3. Implications for narrative and cognition

  • Storytelling: Agent-focused languages favor heroes, villains, and deliberate action; event-focused or relationally distributed languages foreground unfolding situations, context, and emergent consequences.

  • Cognition: Speakers learn to track causal chains differently — predicting, attributing, and experiencing agency in ways that align with their language’s patterns. These patterns shape moral reasoning, narrative expectation, and attention to force.

4. Closing reflection

Languages carve causality and agency in distinct ways. They are ontological instruments, not mirrors: each construal makes certain relationships salient while backgrounding others. The distribution of force, intentionality, and consequence is as much a product of linguistic patterning as of the “world itself.”

With processes, participants, spatial positioning, and agency outlined, we are now poised to explore time and temporality — how languages pattern unfolding not just in space and causation, but in becoming itself.

Languages as Ontologies II: 3 Construal of Space and Perspective

If processes shape becoming and participants shape being, spatial construal shapes position and relation — how phenomena are anchored, located, and made intelligible in experience. Again, languages do not “map physical space”; they pattern the horizon within which phenomena may be situated.

1. How experience is anchored

Languages differ in how they allow speakers to locate themselves and others, both physically and cognitively:

  • Egocentric vs. geocentric frames: English and most European languages default to egocentric coordinates: “left,” “behind,” “in front.” In contrast, Guugu Yimithirr (an Australian Aboriginal language) requires geocentric reference: cardinal directions (“north,” “south”) govern all spatial description. The world is not merely “relative to me”; it is always anchored in the environment itself.

  • Directional and topological richness: Some languages, like Tzeltal (Mayan), grammaticise uphill/downhill and uphill-facing orientation, encoding not just position but preferred movement vectors. Spatial construal is inseparable from processual flow.

  • Visibility and accessibility: In Japanese, distinctions such as in/view verbs or the use of demonstratives encode not only position but perceptual and social accessibility — whether a phenomenon is directly observable, known, or socially salient.

The key insight: spatial language is a lens on how phenomena enter into the speaker’s horizon, not a “translation” of metric coordinates.

2. Spatial construal as ontology

Through these systems, languages enact a default ontology of location and perspective:

  • Egocentric orientation (English, French) — the speaker is the primary anchor; space is relational but centred on the self.

  • Geocentric orientation (Guugu Yimithirr, Tzeltal) — phenomena are located in a landscape of intrinsic coordinates; relationality is ecological, not self-centred.

  • Perceptual and social anchoring (Japanese, Korean) — entities exist within the horizon of attention, visibility, or social relevance, foregrounding relational access over absolute placement.

This demonstrates that what counts as “here” or “there” is patterned by language, not given in a universal space.

3. Implications for narrative and cognition

  • Storytelling: An egocentric language produces narratives anchored to the narrator’s journey and perspective; a geocentric language produces stories that unfold across the landscape itself, often emphasizing continuity and environmental interaction.

  • Cognition: Spatial reasoning, memory, and planning are shaped by habitual construal: how one encodes directions, relations, and relative salience is mediated by the patterns the language offers.

4. Closing reflection

Languages do not merely “label locations.” They construct the horizon within which experience occurs, determining what can be salient, accessible, or relationally foregrounded. Spatial construal is an ontological cut: it structures not only perception but the lived, narratable world.

With processes, participants, and spatial construal in place, we now have a rich foundation for exploring agency, causation, and temporality, completing the core triad of experience in relational ontology.

Languages as Ontologies II: 2 Construal of Participants

If processes are the grammar of becoming, participants are the grammar of being. But again, relational ontology asks us to suspend the naïve assumption that entities exist as fixed “things” independent of our construal. Languages do not label objects; they pattern what it is possible to treat as a participant in experience.

1. What counts as an entity?

Languages vary dramatically in what they allow, require, or foreground as participants:

  • Animacy hierarchies: In many Australian Aboriginal languages, grammatical marking distinguishes entities by relative animacy. Humans, animals, plants, and inanimates occupy different slots in the syntax — constraining how participants can act, be acted upon, or co-occur.

  • Fluidity of noun–verb distinction: Yucatec Maya allows the same root to appear as a noun or a verb depending on context. “The tree” and “treeing” are not separate conceptual domains; they are perspectival cuts on the same phenomenon, highlighting relational flexibility rather than ontological fixity.

  • Classificatory systems: Bantu noun class systems do not merely categorise; they pattern the participant’s role, agency, and relation to other entities. A “liquid” noun class signals relational affordances in ways that reshape how events and participants interlock.

  • Definiteness, possession, number: In languages like Pirahã, number is optional and possession is encoded pragmatically rather than grammatically. A participant may exist as a relationally situated node, not as a discrete, countable object.

2. Participant construal as ontology

By observing participant marking and classificatory strategies, we see each language enact a default stance toward being:

  • Stable entities (English, many Indo-European languages) — participants are discrete, countable, and manipulable; relationality is secondary.

  • Emergent participants (Pirahã, some Mayan languages) — entities come into view through interaction; their “existence” is contingent on context and relational salience.

  • Relational nodes (Bantu noun-class languages, Dyirbal) — participants are defined primarily by networked roles and interactions, rather than intrinsic properties.

These patterns shape how speakers experience causality, responsibility, and even empathy — all grounded in the way their language allows participants to exist and interact.

3. Implications for narrative and cognition

  • Storytelling: A language that foregrounds stable participants creates narratives of possession, inheritance, and individual agency. A language treating participants as emergent fosters narratives of situational flux, co-arising roles, and relational contingency.

  • Cognition: The habitual construal of entities shapes attention, memory, and prediction. Speakers learn to track what counts as a participant, who may act, and which relationships are central. This is not deterministic but pattern-shaping.

4. Closing reflection

Every language cuts reality along different axes of being. Construal of participants is not about mapping “objects” onto words but about making experience legible: defining what can be counted, related, possessed, or acted upon.

Together with process construal, this shows how languages pattern both action and being — the two pillars of lived experience. The next posts will explore space, agency, and temporality, revealing even more ways in which languages enable different worlds to be inhabited and narrated.

Languages as Ontologies II: 1 Construal of Processes

When we say a language “describes” an event, we risk thinking it merely labels reality. Relational ontology asks us to suspend that assumption: languages do not mirror the world — they pattern what it is possible to experience and enact. In this sense, every language is a local theory of processes: a set of possibilities for how beings and phenomena may unfold, persist, or relate.

1. What counts as “doing” or “being”?

Different languages carve up the realm of action and existence in radically divergent ways:

  • Aspectual structuring: Some languages, like Japanese, distinguish finely between completed, ongoing, and habitual processes through auxiliary constructions rather than simple tense. A single “verb” can encode nuances of unfolding experience that English spreads across multiple expressions.

  • Event nominalisation: In some Salishan languages, what English treats as verbs are largely noun-like events. The act of “running” or “falling” is construed as a bounded phenomenon, an entity that participates in relational networks rather than a dynamic action carried out by an agent.

  • Gestural / visual languages: American Sign Language (ASL) often allows a fluid shift between stative and eventive construal in the same predicate space; movement and space instantiate the process itself, not just the fact that it occurs.

The upshot: what counts as “process” is not universal. Some languages foreground unfolding and change, some relational configurations, others the intersection of participants and their affordances.

2. Process construal as ontology

By examining how languages grammaticalise or lexicalise processes, we see each patterning a default ontology of becoming:

  • Dynamic unfolding (English, Japanese) — events are temporally structured, with attention to initiation, continuation, and completion.

  • Event as bounded entity (Salishan) — processes are objects of attention; agency is distributed across relational nodes.

  • Embodied enactment (ASL) — processes are co-actualised in space; the distinction between doing and being blurs into the movement itself.

This demonstrates a profound insight: the syntax, morphology, and semantics of verbs are not incidental. They are the linguistic crystallisation of what a speaker can experience as processual, shaping thought, narrative, and the very sense of causality.

3. Implications for narrative and cognition

  • Storytelling: A language that foregrounds unfolding actions creates narratives attuned to change, suspense, and temporal sequencing. A language that treats processes as bounded entities frames experience around events as relational “happenings,” giving stories a contemplative, distributed quality.

  • Cognition: Speakers internalise the patterns their language offers. The habitual focus on initiation, completion, or relational boundedness tunes attention differently, without determining it.

4. Closing reflection

In the relational-ontology view, process construal is not a matter of “correctly representing reality” — it is the patterned opening of possible worlds. English, Japanese, Salishan, and ASL do not describe the same universe differently; they enable different ways of inhabiting experience itself.

As we continue this series, we will see that participant construal, spatial anchoring, agency, and temporality follow a similar logic: every language is a lens through which existence is made legible, inhabitable, and narratable.

The Fear of Determinism: A Tragicomedy in One Metafunction

There is a curious anxiety that has haunted linguistics for nearly a century — a shapeless dread that if language does anything more than label pre-existing chunks of the world, then we are all somehow prisoners of our grammar. It is the fear that if linguistic construal matters, then linguistic determinism must be lurking in the shadows, ready to enslave the mind.

This fear has produced a remarkable amount of intellectual noise. Entire careers have been built on reassuring readers that grammar does not, under any circumstances, affect thought — that humans are universally equipped with a kind of Platonic cognitive Esperanto that remains blissfully unruffled by the semiotic turbulence of actual languages.

But when we examine this fear closely, something peculiar comes into view:
the panic about determinism is itself… deterministic.

The Fear as Theory

Let us be charitable and call it a theory.
The determinism-panic school begins with a simple premise: if linguistic construal patterns experience, then it must also control it. Patterning, they assume, cannot exist without tyranny.

It’s a bit like assuming that if a map has contours, it must be forcing you to walk only along the contour lines.

This conflation produces a defensive reflex so strong that entire arguments end up shaped by it. They look something like this:

  1. Language shapes experience.
    → “Oh god, that means language determines experience!”

  2. No, no, cannot allow that.
    → “Therefore: language does nothing but label.”

  3. But languages demonstrably cut experience differently.
    → “Yes, but those differences don’t actually mean anything! They’re just… harmless variations in surface form!”

  4. But grammars encode different construals of processes, agency, space, perspective…
    → “Stop! Thought is universal! Nothing is patterned! Patterning is dangerous!”

And just like that, we are back where we started — trapped in a universalist metaphysics that insists that cognition must be identical everywhere, lest difference itself become oppressive.

The fear has become the worldview.

Determinism by Negation

The irony, of course, is exquisite.
In order to prevent linguistic determinism, these arguments install a deeper, more rigid determinism: the belief that human cognition is universally the same, regardless of semiotic history, cultural practices, or the patterned possibilities of a particular language.

This is determinism wearing a cheerful mask.

The panic about language determining thought results in the conviction that nothing shapes anything. Construal, on this view, is merely decorative — an aesthetic flourish pasted onto an otherwise uniform cognitive substrate.

But once you see language as a system of potential, not a causal mechanism — once you adopt the relational stance where meaning is reality as construed — the entire fear collapses into incoherence.

Patterning ≠ constraint.
Construe ≠ coerce.
Possibility ≠ prescription.

Systems are not engines; they are landscapes of potential.
Instantiations are not consequences; they are perspectival cuts.

Determinism simply does not enter.

The Relational Escape Hatch

In a relational ontology, everything turns:

  • not on what language forces,

  • but on what language makes possible.

Languages differ because they take different cuts through the potential of experience. They differ because they pattern what counts as a figure, what counts as a field, what counts as unfolding, stative, bounded, unbounded, intrinsic, relational, perspectival.

These are not restrictions on thought.
They are invitations to different worlds.

To fear this is to fear that possibility itself is dangerous.

A Tragicomedy Resolved

And so the determinism panic reveals itself as a kind of intellectual slapstick: scholars running from a shadow of their own making, loudly defending universal cognition while tripping over the empirical facts of grammar.

The tragedy is that the fear has distracted the field for decades.

The comedy is that it was never necessary.

Because once we stop treating grammar as a cage and start treating it as a repertoire of potential — once we stop imagining cognition as a universal monolith and recognise it as distributed, historical, semiotically inflected practice — we can finally study languages as ontologies without dread.

And then the real work begins.

What Whorf Got Right — and What Everyone Got Wrong: A Relational-Ontology Re-Reading of the Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis

Introduction

It is impossible to discuss language and experience without confronting the spectre of the Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis, a cluster of ideas that has been praised as visionary, dismissed as mystical, and misrepresented with equal enthusiasm from every side.

The reason for this confusion is simple:

Whorf lacked a theory of meaning. His critics lacked a theory of reality.

This post offers a corrective.
Drawing on Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics and relational ontology, we can reclaim what Whorf saw — and replace the metaphysics that trapped him (and everyone after him) in a false debate.

This is not a revision.
It is a reframing.
A new ontology, in which Whorf finally lands where he belongs.


1. What Whorf Actually Saw (Before Anyone Buried It)

Whorf’s core observation was neither exotic nor mystical:

Different languages pattern experience differently, and those patterns matter.

Not because they distort a pre-given world.
Not because they imprison thought.
But because they shape the ways experience is brought into being as experience.

Whorf never had the metalanguage to articulate this cleanly.
He gestured toward “habitual thought” and “the background phenomena of linguistic systems,” but lacked:

  • a stratified model of meaning

  • a functional theory of grammar

  • a non-representational ontology

  • a semiotics of actualisation

In short, he saw the phenomenon but lacked the theory.

What he noticed is exactly what our lattice model predicts:

  • different process typologies → different event ontologies

  • different participant systems → different individuation logics

  • different circumstantial grammars → different temporal/spatial embeddings

  • different relational grammars → different theories of interdependence

  • different modal/evidential systems → different epistemic stances

Whorf felt this.
We can formalise it.


2. What Everyone Got Wrong (A Polemic in Three Moves)

(a) Determinism: a phantom nobody needed

Whorf’s readers accused him of saying language determines thought.
He didn’t.
He said languages pattern possible construals of experience.

But because they assumed a pre-linguistic world, they imagined language as a filter.
This is empirically false and metaphysically incoherent.

(b) Filtering metaphysics: the fatal assumption

Both Whorf’s fans and critics held the same mistaken belief:

There is a reality “over there” and language “labels” or “organises” it.

Once you assume this, the only debate is:

  • Does language distort reality?

  • Or merely influence cognition?

From a relational ontology:
Wrong question. Wrong metaphysics. Wrong debate.

Language does not filter.
Language actualises.

(c) Exoticising Indigenous languages

Whorf’s examples (Hopi, Nahuatl) were treated as curiosities, reinforcing a colonial habit:
non-European languages as anomalies rather than coherent semiotic systems.

This error dissolves when we use Halliday’s canonical model:

  • every language is a complete theory of experience

  • every grammar is a functional ontology

  • no language is “primitive” or “mystical”

  • all languages actualise potential along the same ideational dimensions

Whorf was trying to say this — with 1930s tools.

We can finally say it properly.


3. The Relational-Ontology Re-Reading: Why Whorf Was Basically Right

3.1 Meaning = Reality

From our stance:

  • there is no pre-linguistic, unconstrued reality

  • phenomena exist only as semiotically actualised construals

  • different languages enact different cuts across potential

Thus:

Whorf’s “linguistic relativity” is simply ontology-specific actualisation.

Not mental categories.
Not filters.
Not constraints.
Cuts.
Perspective actualisations.

3.2 Languages as Semiotic Lattices

SFL gives Whorf the metalanguage he lacked:

  • process types = event ontology

  • participant roles = individuation ontology

  • circumstances = spatiotemporal ontology

  • relations = interdependence ontology

  • modality/evidentiality = epistemic ontology

Each language makes different distinctions along these clines.

Whorf intuited this.
We can map it.

3.3 Pluralism Without Relativism

Unlike classic Whorfianism:

  • We do not say languages distort reality.

  • We do not say languages determine cognition.

  • We do not say languages are incommensurable worlds.

We say:

Languages are systematic ways of actualising potential experience.
There is no neutral, unconstrued ontology beneath them.

Therefore:

Difference ≠ distortion.
Difference = ontological productivity.

Whorf was right to insist on difference;
he lacked the ontology to avoid relativism.

We provide that ontology.


4. A Clean Formulation: Whorf 2.0 via Relational Ontology + SFL

Here is the formulation Whorf needed:

Every language is a semiotic ontology: a lattice of distinctions that actualises potential experience along patterned dimensions of process, participant, circumstance, relation, and modality.

These patterned construals shape how phenomena become phenomena.
Not because languages filter reality, but because reality is only ever actualised through meaning.

Therefore:

  • No more determinism.

  • No more relativism.

  • No more exoticisation.

  • No more “linguistic categories” as mental modules.

Just semiotic systems doing what semiotic systems do:
actualising the field of potential in different, coherent ways.


5. Conclusion: Whorf’s Insight, Our Ontology

Whorf saw that:

  • languages differ systematically

  • those differences matter

  • they shape how experience is brought forth

He lacked:

  • a theory of meaning

  • a relational ontology

  • a functional grammar

  • a stratified semiotic model

We give him all four.

Thus:

What Whorf got right:
Languages shape the actualisation of experience.

What everyone got wrong:
Everything else.

Languages as Ontologies I: 7 Afterword: Languages as Lenses on Reality

Languages are not neutral tools for labeling the world—they are ontologies of construal. Each language provides a structured lattice of distinctions—processes, participants, circumstances, relations, and modality—through which potential experience is actualised.

This means that the way we perceive, think, and tell stories is shaped by the semiotic patterns of our language:

  • English foregrounds discrete events, agentive actions, and clear causal chains.

  • Hopi and Warlpiri emphasise relational processes, cyclical time, and environmental embedding.

  • Japanese highlights topicality, social perspective, and evidentiality.

In every case, language does not mirror a pre-given reality. Instead, it structures what can be experienced and how it is experienced. Meaning is reality: our world is what is actualised through the semiotic lattice of language.

Put simply: by studying languages as ontologies, we see the richness of human experience itself, and the multiple ways it can be realised, understood, and shared through stories, cognition, and culture.


Quick-Reference Lattice Summary


Key Insight: Each language is a semiotic lattice, actualising potential experience differently. This shapes perception, sociality, and storytelling, showing that meaning is reality: the world is what is construed through language.

Languages as Ontologies I: 6 Construal, Cognition, and Storytelling

Introduction

Throughout this series, we have explored a radical idea: languages are not neutral tools, but ontologies of construal. Each language provides a lattice of distinctions—processes, participants, circumstances, relations, and modality—through which potential experience is actualised. This capstone post brings together the theoretical framework, comparative examples, and narrative implications, showing how linguistic ontology shapes cognition, culture, and storytelling.


1. Language and the Actualisation of Experience

From a relational-ontology perspective:

  • Reality exists only as it is construed. Phenomena are actualised through semiotic systems.

  • Languages structure potential experience, foregrounding some distinctions and backgrounding others.

  • Variation across languages demonstrates the multiplicity of ways human experience can be patterned.

In short, meaning = reality, but reality is always semiotically mediated. Each language offers a distinct “lens” through which the world is actualised.


2. Lattices of Linguistic Ontology

The ideational metafunction provides five interrelated axes for understanding linguistic ontologies:

  1. Process Type – How events, actions, and states are categorised and foregrounded.

  2. Participant – How entities are individuated and related to processes.

  3. Circumstance – How time, place, manner, cause, and accompaniment are encoded.

  4. Relations – How entities and processes are connected (possession, part-whole, spatial, temporal, topological).

  5. Modality/Epistemic Status – How possibility, necessity, certainty, and evidentiality are expressed.

These axes form a semiotic lattice for each language, shaping the ways in which experience is actualised.


3. Comparative Ontology

A textual matrix illustrates how English, Japanese, Warlpiri, and Hopi construe experience differently:

This matrix shows that languages selectively actualise aspects of experience, shaping perception, cognition, and narrative.


4. Cognition and Culture

Language-specific ontologies shape how we think and interact:

  • Cognition: Temporal, relational, and aspectual patterns orient perception and memory.

  • Culture: Relational individuation, spatial encoding, and evidentiality influence social norms, rituals, and collective practices.

  • Perspective: Languages that grammaticalise evidentiality or speaker stance cultivate sensitivity to knowledge source and certainty.

Thus, linguistic ontology is both cognitive and cultural, guiding how humans inhabit reality.


5. Narrative Construal

The lattice shapes storytelling:

  • English: Agent-focused, linear narratives with clear event segmentation.

  • Hopi/Warlpiri: Relational, cyclical narratives rooted in place and environmental context.

  • Japanese: Topically structured, socially and contextually nuanced narratives, integrating perspective and evidentiality.

The semiotic lattice of a language determines how stories unfold, how events are related, and how readers/listeners interpret them.


6. Synthesis: Lattice, Life, and Meaning

Bringing it all together:

  • Languages are semiotic lattices of potential.

  • Each lattice structures experience along processes, participants, circumstances, relations, and modality.

  • Cognition, culture, and storytelling are extensions of these lattices, showing how construal becomes lived reality.

  • Meaning = Reality: The actualisation of experience through language is the enactment of reality itself, filtered through the semiotic possibilities of each language.

In essence, linguistic diversity is ontologically productive. It reveals the multiplicity of ways human experience can be structured and brought into being.


Conclusion

This series has traced the path from ideational theory to comparative ontology to narrative practice, demonstrating how languages actualise potential experience differently. By understanding languages as ontologies, we see that:

  • Human experience is semiotically mediated.

  • Linguistic lattices shape perception, sociality, and storytelling.

  • The diversity of language is a manifestation of the multiplicity of reality itself, as construed through meaning.

Languages as Ontologies I: 5 Storying Across Ontologies: How Language Shapes Narrative Experience

Introduction

Languages do not merely encode stories—they shape how stories are experienced, structured, and told. The semiotic lattices we’ve mapped—processes, participants, circumstances, relations, and modality—manifest directly in narrative practice. In this post, we compare how stories might unfold in English, Japanese, and Warlpiri/Hopi, highlighting how ontological differences produce distinct narrative textures.


1. Event Segmentation and Process Type

  • English: Events are often segmented into discrete, agent-driven actions. A story might foreground “who did what to whom” with clear causal chains.

    • Example: “The girl picked up the basket. She walked to the river. She dropped the basket into the water.”

    • Processes: material (picked, walked, dropped) dominate, relational and mental processes provide background.

  • Hopi/Warlpiri: Events may be expressed relationally or aspectually, with focus on process flow rather than discrete agents.

    • Example: “The basket moved with her steps, flowing toward the river, the water welcoming its arrival.”

    • Processes: blending material and state; temporal/aspectual patterns emphasised; agentive causation backgrounded.

  • Japanese: Events are often topically structured, with attention to animate/inanimate distinctions and perspective, often integrating mental and relational processes with stative aspects.

    • Example: “The basket, carried along by the girl, approached the river, as everyone watched with anticipation.”

    • Processes: material and relational, stative aspect foregrounded, perspective and evidentiality encoded.


2. Participant Ontology and Focalisation

  • English: Participants are discrete; the protagonist is foregrounded, others backgrounded.

  • Warlpiri/Hopi: Participants are encoded relationally, often in relation to kinship, place, or temporal cycles. Focus is on how entities interact within their environment.

  • Japanese: Animacy and topicality shape prominence; the narrative may shift focus depending on what is culturally or contextually relevant.

Effect: English stories often feel linear and hero-focused; Hopi/Warlpiri narratives feel distributed, interconnected, and cyclical; Japanese stories foreground relational or socially contextual prominence.


3. Circumstance and Spatial Embedding

  • English: Place and time are usually adjuncts; optional but often used to situate events.

  • Warlpiri: Absolute spatial reference is obligatory; the landscape is an active participant in narrative.

  • Hopi: Circumstances are morphologically encoded, tightly linking events to temporal and situational context.

Effect: English narratives are “portable”—anywhere can serve as setting. Warlpiri/Hopi narratives are rooted in a particular place and moment, making geography and environmental relations narratively central.


4. Relations and Interconnectedness

  • English: Relations such as possession or part-whole are usually explicit; events often isolated.

  • Hopi/Warlpiri: Relations are integrated in verbs; actions and participants are interdependent, emphasizing relational dynamics over individual agency.

  • Japanese: Relational verbs and particles allow nuanced connections, often signalling subtle social or hierarchical dynamics.

Effect: English narratives highlight discrete actions and objects, Hopi/Warlpiri emphasize interconnected processes, Japanese foregrounds socially and contextually mediated interactions.


5. Modality and Epistemic Framing

  • English: Modal verbs indicate possibility or necessity; certainty is lexically expressed.

  • Hopi/Japanese: Evidentiality is grammaticalised; narratives encode source, certainty, and perspective directly.

  • Warlpiri: Contextual inference guides interpretation; speaker stance may be subtly embedded.

Effect: English allows for narrator commentary but is less constrained by grammatical modality. Hopi/Japanese stories signal certainty, perspective, and source within the grammar, influencing how events are interpreted by listeners.


Conclusion

By tracing narrative construal across languages, we see how linguistic ontologies shape the texture of experience itself:

  • English narratives foreground discrete events, agency, and causal chains.

  • Hopi and Warlpiri narratives foreground relationality, temporal/aspectual flow, and environmental embedding.

  • Japanese narratives foreground topicality, perspective, and relational nuance, integrating social and epistemic information.

In other words, the lattice of a language’s semiotic distinctions extends into lived experience, guiding cognition, culture, and storytelling. The same potential field of phenomena can produce profoundly different narrative realities, all equally actualised through language.