Sunday, 23 August 2026

The Natural History of Mattering: From Value to Mattering — The Natural History

We began with a deceptively simple question:

What can matter before there is society?

The answer led us downward.

A bacterium can be value-sensitive without having a social world.

Organisms can then become significant to one another.

Signals can couple their activities.

Formerly independent organisms can become integrated into larger individuals.

Distributed processes can produce collective organisation.

Cells can differentiate into components of a new organism.

Organisms can become embedded in extensive ecological networks.

And eventually, in some lineages, recurrent relations among distinct participants become socially organised.

The result is not a single ladder.

It is a branching natural history.

1. Biological value comes first

At the beginning is the organism.

Its organisation differentiates among conditions according to their consequences.

Some states support its continuation.

Others undermine it.

This is biological value.

It does not require:

consciousness;

language;

representation;

or society.

It requires only that the organisation of the living system makes some differences consequential for itself.

That gives us our starting point:

value without relationship.

2. Relational significance comes next

Once organisms encounter one another, something new becomes possible.

An organism can alter another organism's conditions.

Its signals can engage another value system.

Its activities can support, threaten or modify another's possibilities.

At this point, another organism has become relationally significant.

This is not yet social mattering.

The distinction is important.

Biological value: what matters within an organism's own organisation.

Relational significance: how another organised system becomes consequential to that organisation.

Social mattering: recurrent relational significance organised into a social system.

These are different levels.

3. Signalling creates coupling

Signals provide one of the simplest mechanisms.

One organism produces a difference.

Another detects it.

Its organisation changes.

That change alters the conditions again.

We therefore have:

value → signal → response → altered conditions

A signal need not be a sign.

No symbolic interpretation is necessary.

The relation remains biological.

This gives us an important boundary:

significance can travel between organisms before meaning exists.

4. Collective coordination can emerge

Once signals and responses become coupled, collective patterns can appear.

Many organisms can coordinate without a central controller.

A group can alter direction.

A population can change its activity.

A network can reorganise.

The whole can therefore exhibit patterns that are not possessed by any individual member.

But collective coordination is not yet sociality.

A collective pattern can emerge from local value-sensitive interactions without the participants inhabiting a persistent social structure.

This is why we need the distinction:

collective coordination ≠ social mattering.

5. Relationship can become constitutive

Endosymbiosis revealed another possibility.

An organism need not merely interact with another.

It can become integrated with it.

A former independent lineage can become a component of a larger organismic organisation.

The result is not merely cooperation.

It is a new level of individuation.

This gave us a deeper principle:

relationships can become constitutive of individuality.

A new whole can emerge from the integration of previously distinct value-organised systems.

6. Individuation can proceed through interdependence

Multicellularity revealed a related principle.

Cells can become differentiated.

Some lose capacities.

Others specialise.

The larger organism gains possibilities that no individual cell possesses.

The result is paradoxical:

the whole becomes more capable partly because its components become less independently capable.

Individuation is therefore not simply separation from others.

It can emerge through increasing interdependence.

7. The topology can become nested

At this point, relational organisation exists at multiple scales.

A cell can be an individual at one level and a component at another.

An organism can be a whole within itself and a participant in an ecological network.

The same system can therefore occupy different positions in different relational structures.

We no longer have one topology.

We have nested topologies of biological consequence.

This is why the question "What is the individual?" has no simple answer once biological organisation becomes sufficiently complex.

8. Ecological networks are relational without necessarily being social

Trees brought this into particularly sharp focus.

A tree does not live in isolation.

Other plants, fungi, microorganisms, herbivores, soil and climate all affect its possibilities.

Its life is embedded in a changing network.

Yet we do not need to call the network a society.

This gives us another important distinction:

ecological relationality is not necessarily sociality.

A relation can be persistent, reciprocal and consequential without becoming social mattering in the stronger sense.

9. Social mattering requires organised participation

The social threshold therefore lies somewhere beyond interaction.

A participant must become consequential to another participant in recurrent ways.

Those relations become stable.

Roles or patterns emerge.

Expectations can develop.

The participants' repertoires become adapted to the relational environment.

The relationship itself becomes part of the organisation.

We can then speak of:

social mattering.

The important transition is not simply:

one organism affects another.

It is:

relations among value-organised participants become organised as a persistent field of participation.

10. Mattering is therefore not synonymous with interaction

This may be the most important conceptual correction to preserve.

Everything alive interacts with something.

But not everything is social.

Everything biological is value-sensitive.

But not everything is relationally organised.

Everything relational is not necessarily social.

So our sequence is not:

value = mattering = sociality.

It is:

value → relational significance → social mattering.

The distinctions are what make the natural history intelligible.

11. Repertoire emerges from history

A participant in a persistent relational system does not respond afresh to every situation.

Its history changes what it can do.

Some responses become more available.

Some relationships become more familiar.

Some pathways become easier.

Others more difficult.

This is the beginning of what we have called repertoire.

At the human level, repertoire becomes richly social and semiotic.

But its deeper principle is biological:

history becomes organised as future possibility.

That principle can appear long before language.

12. The topology becomes historical

Once history shapes repertoire, the topology itself becomes historical.

Past relations affect present possibilities.

Old pathways may persist.

New ones may open.

Some connections disappear.

Some become stronger.

The system is no longer merely located within a topology.

It participates in continually making and remaking the topology.

This is true at different scales, from physiological organisation to ecological networks to social systems.

13. Social mattering is a special form of biological organisation

We can now reinterpret Halliday's taxonomy.

The social is not an entirely new substance added to biology.

It is a new organisation of biological value.

Biological value becomes socially organised when the activities of value-sensitive organisms become recurrently consequential to one another through persistent relations.

This gives us a possible reading of Halliday's "added component of value".

The value was already present.

What is added is its social organisation.

14. And meaning comes later

This finally clarifies the relationship with semiosis.

A semiotic system does not begin with symbols floating free of life.

Meaning is a further transformation of value already organised socially.

The broad sequence becomes:

biological value

↓

relational significance

↓

social mattering

↓

symbolic meaning

This is not a single evolutionary ladder.

But it is a useful organisational genealogy.

15. The signal/sign distinction returns

The entire series also sharpens our earlier distinction.

A signal is a difference that engages another value-sensitive system.

A sign is a resource within a symbolic system.

Signals can therefore exist without signs.

Relational significance can exist without meaning.

Social mattering can exist before language becomes symbolic.

This gives us a principled reason to resist the tendency to describe every form of animal, plant or microbial communication as language.

16. The individual and the collective co-evolve

Another lesson has emerged.

The individual and collective are not necessarily competing explanations.

They can constitute one another.

Individual value makes coordination possible.

Coordination creates collective organisation.

Collective organisation changes the possibilities available to individuals.

Those changed possibilities reshape individual organisation.

So we have:

individual → collective → individual

This recursive relation appears at many biological scales.

17. There is no single route to sociality

The natural history we have followed is therefore branching.

Some systems move toward:

integration;

others toward:

cooperation;

others toward:

symbiosis;

others toward:

ecological interdependence;

and some toward:

social organisation.

None is simply a primitive version of the others.

They are different solutions to the general problem of organising living processes in relation to other living processes.

This is why the examples in this series belong together.

They illuminate different branches of the same problem.

18. The deeper question is organisation

We began by asking where social mattering begins.

We now have a better question:

What kind of organisation turns biological value into a persistent relational field?

That question is more useful than looking for a single biological marker.

There is no magic ingredient called "sociality".

There are changes in:

coupling;

recurrence;

dependence;

differentiation;

integration;

repertoire;

topology.

Together they can produce a new level of organisation.

19. What the natural history tells us

The natural history of mattering is therefore not a history of consciousness slowly awakening.

It is a history of organisation becoming relationally richer.

First, a living system matters to itself.

Then other systems become consequential.

Relations recur.

Collective patterns emerge.

Some relationships become constitutive.

Higher-level individuals appear.

Ecological networks develop.

In some cases, social participation becomes organised.

And eventually, in humans, these relations become symbolically construed.

Meaning arrives.

20. The larger arc

We can now place the three projects we have developed into one larger trajectory.

The first question was:

How does meaning emerge from mattering?

The answer led us downward into biological value and social organisation.

The second question was:

What happens when meaning is technologically detached from the biological and social systems that generated it?

That led us to LLMs.

And then:

What would happen if human beings eventually created machines for which mattering itself became organised?

That led us to our second LLM series.

The natural history beneath all three is:

value → relation → social organisation → meaning → technological re-instantiation → possible new value systems.

21. A caution about the word "mattering"

We began this series by restricting mattering to the social level.

That distinction has proved useful.

A bacterium does not need to participate socially for its environment to matter in the broader ordinary sense.

But our technical vocabulary distinguishes:

value at the organismic level,

relational significance between organisms,

social mattering within organised participation.

Keeping those distinctions is what allows us to move from bacteria to trees without calling every biological interaction a social relation.

The language may be slightly less familiar.

The conceptual gain is considerable.

22. What comes before society?

So we can now answer the question with which we began.

Before society there is not nothing.

There is already:

sensitivity;

regulation;

value;

signalling;

relational significance;

coordination;

integration;

interdependence.

Society is not the beginning of organised significance.

It is one further transformation of it.

23. And what comes after society?

For humans, social mattering becomes symbolically available.

We name.

Classify.

Narrate.

Remember.

Imagine.

Meaning allows the topology of mattering to become reflexively available to participants.

This is the step that turns a social world into a semiotic world.

But it depends upon everything beneath it.

Meaning is not floating above mattering.

It is mattering further transformed.

24. The natural history in one sequence

Perhaps the whole series can finally be compressed to:

Organismic value

↓

Relational significance

↓

Signalling and coupling

↓

Collective coordination

↓

Integration and nested individuality

↓

Persistent relational organisation

↓

Social mattering

↓

Semiotic meaning

The arrows are not inevitable steps.

They are possible organisational transformations.

Life explores many of them, in many combinations, at many scales.

25. The final thought

Perhaps the most important lesson is that society did not invent mattering.

Life already mattered before there were societies.

Society reorganised that mattering.

Meaning reorganised it again.

And technology may now be beginning to reorganise the resulting meaning.

The natural history therefore does not end with humans.

It gives us a way of asking what kinds of organisation might come next.

We began with the humble bacterium.

We end with a much larger question:

What happens when living systems become increasingly capable of organising the consequences of one another's existence?

The answer, so far, is not a ladder.

It is a topology.

And perhaps that is the deepest continuity running through everything we have explored:

Life begins by making differences matter.

Relations begin when living systems make differences matter to one another.

Society begins when those relations become organised.

Meaning begins when that organisation becomes symbolically available.

That is the natural history of mattering.

The Natural History of Mattering: IX. Trees and the Extended Topology

Plants have already shown us that relational significance does not require a nervous system.

Trees take the idea further.

A tree is not simply a large plant.

It is a long-lived, modular organism whose growth, physiology and relationships extend across space and time.

Its world is therefore distributed.

The question becomes:

What does a topology of relational significance look like when its participants live on the scale of decades or centuries?

A tree is a process spread through space

A tree does not have a single obvious centre from which everything is controlled.

Its roots, trunk, branches and leaves are physically connected, but different regions experience different conditions.

Water availability varies.

Light varies.

Damage may occur in one part while the rest remains intact.

Plants coordinate local events with systemic responses through hydraulic, chemical and electrical signalling pathways. Long-distance electrical signals, for example, can propagate information about local stress and contribute to coordinated responses elsewhere in the plant. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

The tree therefore maintains its organisation through distributed coordination.

The tree has a history

Trees also make time visible.

A plant can respond differently to a later stress because of earlier experience. Plant environmental "memory" is understood in terms of persistent physiological, molecular and developmental changes that alter subsequent responses. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

This need not mean remembering in the psychological sense.

It means that:

what happened before can alter what the organism can do next.

History has therefore become part of biological organisation.

That is already important for our concept of relational significance.

The forest is not merely background

A tree also grows among other living organisms.

Other plants alter available light.

Roots occupy shared soil.

Fungi colonise roots.

Herbivores damage leaves.

Microorganisms alter nutrient availability.

These are not merely "environmental factors" in an undifferentiated sense.

They are other organised systems whose activities can alter the tree's own possibilities.

The ecological environment is therefore already a field of relational significance.

Trees and other plants

Plants can respond to cues associated with neighbouring plants, including changes in light and chemical signals, with consequences for growth and defence. Such signalling is context-dependent rather than a simple universal language. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

A tree can therefore occupy a relational environment containing other plants without any need to imagine symbolic communication.

Again:

signal is not sign.

The relation remains biological.

The fungal topology

The relationship between trees and fungi takes us somewhere more interesting.

Mycorrhizal fungi form persistent associations with plant roots and participate in exchanges involving nutrients and other resources. These relationships can extend through fungal networks connecting plants with microbial communities in the surrounding soil. (nature.com)

The resulting system is not easily represented as:

tree → environment.

It looks more like:

tree ↔ fungus ↔ soil ↔ microorganisms ↔ other plants

The tree participates in a network of relationships that crosses biological boundaries.

A topology larger than the organism

Our earlier topology of mattering was mainly social.

Here the topology is ecological.

Different organisms remain distinct, yet their possibilities are linked.

A tree may depend upon fungal partners for access to resources.

The fungi depend upon plants for carbon.

Microorganisms influence both.

The interactions can be reciprocal, asymmetric and persistent.

This is relational organisation without necessarily being social mattering.

That distinction is now one of the central achievements of the series.

The topology also changes

The tree is not simply situated within a fixed ecological network.

It grows.

Roots extend.

Branches spread.

Shade changes.

Resources are redistributed.

Organisms enter and leave.

The topology therefore changes as the organism develops.

Growth is simultaneously:

growth of the organism

and:

reconfiguration of its relations.

The tree changes its topology by growing into it.

Time enlarges the topology

This may be the most distinctive feature of trees.

A rapid animal interaction can unfold in seconds.

A tree's important relationships may unfold over years.

A root can encounter a fungal partner.

A branch can alter the light available to neighbouring plants.

A damaged tree can change its physiology long after the original event.

A previous drought can affect later responses through persistent physiological and molecular changes. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

The topology is therefore extended in time as well as space.

Memory without a nervous system

This makes trees especially useful for our earlier distinction between information and value.

A prior environmental event can alter later behaviour.

But we need not call this memory in the psychological sense.

The relevant fact is:

the organism's present organisation contains consequences of its past.

The tree has become historically organised.

Its future possibilities partly depend upon its history.

That gives us another possible bridge between biological value and repertoire.

A plant repertoire?

We should be cautious here.

A tree does not have a repertoire in the human sense.

But its developmental history can alter the range and likelihood of future responses.

Different environmental histories can produce different response capacities.

In that weak structural sense, we might say that the organism acquires a history-shaped repertoire of physiological possibilities.

The phrase is metaphorical.

But it connects plant biology with a broader principle:

history can become organised as future capacity.

The extended topology is not a social topology

This is important enough to state explicitly.

A forest can contain:

signalling;

competition;

facilitation;

symbiosis;

resource exchange;

persistent dependencies.

None of these automatically establishes a society.

The topology is ecological before it is social.

The organisms are relationally significant to one another without necessarily constituting social participants in our stronger sense.

This distinction prevents us from making the same anthropomorphic leap we resisted with plants and LLMs.

But something has changed

At the beginning of the series, biological value was largely a property of an individual organism.

Now we have reached a much richer picture.

A tree's possibilities are shaped by a web of persistent relations with:

other plants;

fungi;

microbes;

herbivores;

climate;

soil;

water.

Its value-sensitive organisation is therefore ecologically embedded.

The organism remains an individual.

But its life cannot be understood without the topology in which it participates.

The natural history is becoming recursive

We can now see the larger trajectory.

biological value

became:

relational significance

which became:

collective coordination

which sometimes became:

integration

and sometimes:

higher-level individuality

while in other cases producing:

persistent ecological networks.

Only one route leads specifically toward social mattering.

There is no single ladder.

There is a branching natural history.

And this brings us back to the original question

We began by asking how biological value might become social mattering.

The answer now seems more complicated — and more interesting.

There is no direct jump.

Between them lie multiple organisational possibilities:

signalling;

relational dependence;

symbiosis;

collective coordination;

integration;

multicellularity;

ecological networks;

social organisation.

Social mattering is one particular way of organising the relational significance that biological value makes possible.

The next question

We have now followed biological value from the isolated cell to organisms embedded in extraordinarily extended relational networks.

The final task is to gather the distinctions.

What exactly have we learned about the path from:

value

to:

relational significance

to:

social mattering

and eventually, in the human case:

meaning?

That is where the series comes together.

From Value to Mattering — The Natural History

The Natural History of Mattering: VIII. Plants Without Nervous Systems

We have now reached the social threshold from below.

Animals provide familiar examples of social organisation.

But if social mattering begins with biological value becoming relationally organised, then nervous systems should not be a prerequisite.

Plants give us a useful test.

They have no brains.

No nervous system.

No obvious centre of control.

Yet they continuously regulate their own organisation and respond to an extraordinarily varied environment.

So the question is:

What does relational significance look like in a form of life without a nervous system?

A plant begins with its own value

Consider phototropism.

A plant detects an uneven distribution of light and alters its growth so that the shoot bends towards a light source.

There is no need to imagine a plant "wanting" the light.

The point is simpler.

A difference in the environment produces a differential effect on the organisation of the plant, which changes its growth accordingly.

This is biological value in the sense with which we began.

The plant is value-sensitive without being social.

The plant lives through gradients

Plants are particularly useful because they cannot simply move away from their environment.

Their response must often be organisational rather than locomotory.

Roots grow through heterogeneous soils.

Shoots encounter changing light.

Water availability varies.

Temperature changes.

Other organisms appear nearby.

The plant alters growth, allocation and physiology in response.

Its world is therefore a field of gradients and constraints through which its organisation continually develops.

Other plants become significant

Now the interesting transition occurs.

A neighbouring plant can alter light availability.

It can compete for water and nutrients.

It can release chemicals into the soil or atmosphere.

Plants can detect a range of cues associated with neighbouring plants, including changes in light quality, root-derived chemicals and volatile organic compounds. Responses can alter growth, physiology and resource allocation.

Another organism has therefore become more than background environment.

It can become relationally significant.

The neighbour can be detected before the threat arrives

Some plant responses are especially revealing because they can occur before direct competition or damage takes place.

Volatile compounds released by plants can influence neighbouring plants, priming defensive responses or altering growth and resource allocation.

The receiver does not need to experience the original stress.

A signal from another plant can alter its own physiological organisation.

This is remarkably close to the signal-and-response pattern we saw in bacteria.

But now the organisms have much more elaborate, spatially extended organisations.

Signal is still not sign

It is tempting to call such processes communication.

That can be useful shorthand.

But our earlier distinction remains important.

A volatile molecule can engage the regulatory organisation of another plant without functioning as a symbolic sign.

The plant need not represent:

"My neighbour is under attack."

A chemical difference can simply trigger a physiological programme.

So again:

signal does not imply sign.

Meaning has not yet entered the story.

Plant relationships are context-dependent

The same signal does not necessarily produce the same response in every circumstance.

Plant responses to neighbours can depend upon species, developmental state and environmental conditions.

This matters for our concept of relational significance.

The other plant is not simply a fixed stimulus.

Its significance depends upon the relation between:

plant;

neighbour;

environment;

developmental state;

available resources.

Relational significance is therefore already contextual.

Plants also signal to organisms of other kinds

Plant signalling is not limited to plant–plant interactions.

Plants recognise signals from symbiotic microorganisms and can actively establish beneficial associations with bacteria and fungi. Root–microbe interactions involve specialised molecular signalling pathways, including signals exchanged between plants and mycorrhizal fungi or rhizobia.

This complicates the idea of the plant's "environment" still further.

The relevant world is not merely physical.

It contains other living systems whose activities can become consequential to the plant's own organisation.

The plant inhabits a relational field

We can now extend our earlier formulation.

The plant has:

biological value — its own organisation differentiates among conditions.

It encounters:

relational significance — other organisms alter those conditions in recurrent ways.

And through these interactions, it becomes embedded in a larger ecological network.

That network is not necessarily social.

But it is already a topology of biological consequence.

The root–fungus relationship is especially revealing

Mycorrhizal associations are particularly interesting because the relationship can become structurally important to both organisms.

Plants exchange signals with fungi, and the resulting association can facilitate nutrient acquisition.

The fungus is therefore neither simply "part of the environment" nor simply an independent organism encountered occasionally.

It becomes part of a persistent relationship through which each organism's possibilities are altered.

This is relational significance becoming symbiotic organisation.

Yet we should not call the plant a social organism

That distinction remains important.

Plant–plant signalling, plant–fungus symbiosis and ecological networks all involve recurrent relations.

But social mattering, as we are using the term, requires something further:

a persistent organisation of relations among distinct participants as participants.

We have not established that for plants.

And we do not need to.

The more interesting discovery is that a rich relational topology can exist without anything resembling animal society.

A different route to collective organisation

Plants therefore remind us that there is no single route from organism to collective.

Animals can coordinate through rapid nervous and behavioural responses.

Bacteria can coordinate chemically.

Plants coordinate through growth, transport, hormones and chemical signalling.

The organisation is different.

The underlying problem is similar:

How does an organism remain organised while responding to other organised systems?

Time changes the topology

Plants also introduce a different timescale.

A movement in an animal can occur in seconds.

Plant growth may unfold over hours, days or seasons.

A tree may remain in place for decades or centuries.

A relational topology need not therefore be fast to be real.

A relation can be expressed through developmental time rather than rapid behaviour.

This will become important when we turn specifically to trees.

What plants teach us

Plants give us a useful corrective.

The absence of a nervous system does not imply the absence of:

sensitivity;

regulation;

signalling;

learning-like plasticity;

relational organisation.

Nor does the presence of these capacities imply consciousness or sociality.

The categories remain distinct.

A plant can be deeply responsive to another organism without being a social participant in the human or eusocial sense.

The emerging natural history

Our sequence now looks increasingly rich:

biological value

↓

relational significance

↓

signalling

↓

recurrent interaction

↓

ecological organisation

↓

social mattering — where a stronger form of social organisation exists

The same broad organisational problem can therefore be solved in radically different biological ways.

And then there are trees

Trees make the problem still stranger.

Their bodies are modular.

Their lives are extended across enormous timescales.

Their roots interact with fungi and neighbouring organisms.

Their chemical signals can influence other plants.

Their growth records environmental history.

They participate in ecosystems that change continuously around them.

A tree therefore gives us a chance to ask not whether plants are "intelligent", but something more interesting:

What does a topology of relational significance look like when its participant grows, remembers and responds on the scale of decades or centuries?

That is where we turn next.

Trees and the Extended Topology

The Natural History of Mattering: VII. The Social Threshold

We have followed biological organisation downward and then upward again.

A bacterium can possess biological value without relationship.

Organisms can become significant to one another through signalling.

Formerly independent organisms can become integrated into larger individuals.

Distributed processes can produce collective form.

Cells can differentiate into components of a new organism.

Colonial organisms can become so interdependent that individuality itself becomes difficult to locate.

Yet none of these transitions necessarily gives us social mattering.

So where is the threshold?

When does biological value become socially organised?

Interaction is not enough

Organisms affect one another everywhere.

One eats another.

One shades another.

One releases a chemical.

One competes for a resource.

These relations can be consequential without being social.

The crucial question is whether the relationship itself becomes part of a persistent organisation of participation.

Another organism is no longer merely something that affects me.

It becomes someone whose behaviour forms part of the conditions under which I participate.

That is a stronger relation.

Eusocial insects give us the clearer case

Ants, bees and termites provide especially striking examples because their colonies exhibit differentiated roles, persistent coordination and extensive interdependence among members.

An ant responding to a pheromone is still responding through its own value system.

But the pheromone is produced by another organism.

Its effect alters the receiving ant's activity.

That activity affects other ants.

The pattern recurs.

The colony therefore develops stable pathways through which the activities of individuals become mutually consequential.

We have moved beyond isolated signalling.

The relation itself has become organised.

From signal to social structure

Our sequence can now be sharpened:

value → signal → coupled response → recurrent relation → social structure

The pheromone remains a signal, not a sign.

The ant need not symbolically construe what another ant is doing.

But the colony has acquired an organisation in which individual behaviour is continually shaped by the behaviour of other participants.

That is the beginning of social mattering.

The individual still matters

This is important.

We should not say that the colony has somehow replaced the individual value systems of its members.

Each ant remains an organism.

Its own organisation still matters to it.

Social mattering is built from those individual value systems.

The novelty lies in their recurrent coupling.

A participant becomes consequential to another participant.

The relation becomes part of the organisation.

From collective coordination to social organisation

We can now distinguish two things that are easy to conflate.

A flock can form through local interactions.

A bait ball can arise through coordinated responses.

A swarm can change direction without a leader.

These are examples of collective coordination.

A social system adds something further:

persistent relations among differentiated participants.

The participants do not merely respond together.

Their relationships become part of the structure they inhabit.

Repertoire begins here

This is also where our earlier concept of repertoire becomes especially useful.

An ant's repertoire is not simply a list of possible movements.

It includes ways of participating in the colony's organisation.

Different circumstances elicit different patterns.

Repeated interactions stabilise expectations.

The participant becomes adapted not only to its physical environment but to the relational environment constituted by other participants.

The repertoire is therefore beginning to acquire a social dimension.

The colony becomes a topology

Now our language of topology becomes more than metaphor.

Some participants occupy central positions.

Some interactions connect distant regions.

Some pathways are densely populated.

Others are sparse.

Some relations are stable.

Others temporary.

The colony acquires a relational shape.

Its topology is generated by the ways in which individual mattering becomes organised through participation.

But social mattering is not just mutual usefulness

Two organisms can be useful to one another without forming a social system.

The stronger criterion is recurrence.

The same kinds of relationships are reproduced.

Roles stabilise.

Expectations emerge.

Patterns persist beyond individual encounters.

The organisation therefore acquires a history.

Social structure is not simply interaction repeated.

It is recurrent interaction becoming organised.

The human case is an elaboration, not a new beginning

Once we see the threshold this way, human sociality becomes easier to place.

Human societies add enormous complexity:

language;

institutions;

norms;

identities;

symbolic categories.

But they do not invent social mattering from nothing.

They elaborate a much older biological possibility:

other participants can become consequential to the organisation of my own life.

Meaning comes later.

Social mattering comes first.

From mattering to meaning

We can now see more clearly what Halliday's formulation implies.

A social system is a biological system in which value has become socially organised.

A semiotic system then further transforms that value into meaning.

The sequence becomes:

biological value

↓

relational significance

↓

social mattering

↓

meaning

This is not a ladder in which one level abolishes the previous one.

Each new level reorganises the possibilities of the one beneath it.

The threshold is gradual

We should not expect a single moment at which biology suddenly becomes society.

Different organisms will occupy different points along a continuum of organisation.

Some have transient coordination.

Some have persistent associations.

Some have differentiated roles.

Some have complex interdependence.

The useful question is therefore not:

"Is this organism social?"

but:

"What degree and kind of relational organisation does this organism instantiate?"

That question lets biology remain more interesting than our categories.

What the social threshold gives us

We can now return to the title of the series.

The natural history of mattering is not simply the history of things becoming more intelligent.

It is the history of value becoming organised at increasingly complex levels.

At first, what matters is internal to an organism.

Then another organism becomes significant.

Then relations become recurrent.

Then a social topology emerges.

Eventually, those relations can become symbolically construed as meaning.

The path is therefore:

value → relation → organisation → social mattering → meaning

And now the plants become interesting

We have reached the threshold from another direction.

We know what social mattering looks like in animals with elaborate collective organisation.

But what happens in organisms that do not have nervous systems, brains or anything resembling animal sociality?

Plants can respond to their environments.

They can alter growth.

They can exchange chemical signals.

They can form intimate associations with other organisms.

Trees can persist for decades or centuries, participating in ecological networks whose timescales are radically different from ours.

So the next question is not whether plants are secretly animals without brains.

It is:

What does relational significance look like in a form of life whose organisation is radically different from ours?

That takes us to plants.

Plants Without Nervous Systems

The Natural History of Mattering: VI. Many Bodies, One Life?

Volvox showed us something remarkable.

Cells can become differentiated components of a larger organism.

But that is not the only route to biological individuality.

There are organisms in which many bodies remain visibly distinct while becoming so tightly integrated that it becomes difficult to say where one organism ends and another begins.

This raises a more difficult question:

How many bodies can a single life contain?

The problem of the colony

A colony is not necessarily an individual.

Bacteria can form dense populations.

Cells can aggregate.

Organisms can cooperate.

None of this by itself means that a new individual has emerged.

The interesting question is what happens when the members of a collective become functionally dependent upon one another.

At some point, the distinction between:

many organisms

and:

one organised whole

becomes difficult to maintain.

Sponges at the boundary

Sponges provide a useful early example in animal evolution.

They contain several specialised cell types, and their bodies integrate activities involving feeding, internal transport, reproduction and environmental interaction. They are also especially informative for understanding the transition from unicellular relatives to multicellular animals.

Yet a sponge does not look much like the kind of individual we instinctively imagine.

There is no nervous system coordinating its activities.

Its organisation is distributed among cells embedded in a common structure.

The whole nevertheless has properties that cannot be understood simply by considering each cell separately.

Integration without centralisation

This gives us a recurring pattern.

We have already encountered distributed organisation in slime moulds.

We encountered differentiated organisation in Volvox.

Now we see those principles becoming more elaborate.

The body can be:

integrated without being centrally controlled.

The organism's organisation is distributed across many interacting processes.

There is no little executive sitting somewhere inside it.

The unity lies in the organisation of the relations.

Colonial organisms complicate things further

Siphonophores are an especially striking case.

They are colonial hydrozoans made up of specialised zooids attached to a common stem and connected by shared internal structures. Different zooids perform different functions, including feeding, locomotion and reproduction.

They can therefore look like collections of animals.

Yet the colony functions as an integrated whole.

A zooid is not simply an independent animal living beside another.

Its possibilities are defined partly by its role within the colony.

Many bodies, specialised roles

This takes us back to Volvox, but at a different level.

There, cells differentiated into somatic and reproductive roles.

In siphonophores, specialised zooids perform distinct functions within a larger colonial organisation.

The pattern is:

differentiation → interdependence → integration

The parts become more specialised.

The whole becomes more capable.

And the independence of the parts becomes correspondingly reduced.

The loss of independence creates the individual

This is one of the most interesting themes emerging from multicellular evolution.

An individual is not necessarily produced by adding things together.

It can be produced by making separation progressively less viable.

As functions become specialised, the lower-level units may lose the capacity to maintain an independent life.

Their fitness becomes increasingly tied to the success of the collective. Evolutionary studies of multicellularity describe this as a shift in individuality from lower-level units toward a higher-level individual.

In that sense:

individuation can emerge through interdependence.

What happens to biological value?

Now our original question returns.

A cell has its own organisation.

But its possibilities are altered when it becomes part of a larger whole.

Its immediate functioning contributes to the organism.

Its own fate becomes linked to the fate of the collective.

We therefore have nested forms of value:

cellular value

within:

organismic value.

The lower level has not necessarily ceased to matter.

But its organisation has become part of something larger.

Component or participant?

This raises an important distinction.

A component is something whose activity contributes to a larger system.

A participant is something that remains, in some meaningful sense, an independent locus of organisation while entering relations with others.

At the multicellular boundary, these categories become difficult to separate.

A cell may be a component of an organism while still retaining considerable autonomy.

A zooid may be highly specialised yet retain some distinct organisation.

Where the boundary lies is therefore not obvious.

Perhaps individuality is not a binary property.

Perhaps it is an organisational achievement that comes in degrees.

The same organism at different scales

Our topology now acquires another dimension.

At one scale:

cells matter to one another.

At another:

cells constitute tissues.

At another:

tissues constitute organisms.

At another:

organisms participate in populations and ecosystems.

A living system can therefore be simultaneously:

a whole at one level, and a participant or component at another.

There is no single privileged scale at which "the real organism" must exist.

This complicates our notion of sociality

It also warns us against calling every integrated collective social.

A human community is made of individuals who remain individuals.

A siphonophore colony contains specialised units whose individuality is profoundly altered by integration.

These are not the same kind of organisation.

So our distinction becomes increasingly useful:

integration is not sociality.

A new individual can emerge from the integration of lower-level individuals without those lower-level units becoming social participants.

And yet integration creates relations

Even where sociality has not appeared, relational significance has become much richer.

A component's condition affects the whole.

The whole affects the component.

The resulting feedback can be profound.

The organism therefore contains an internal topology of significance.

This topology is not social in the human sense.

But it demonstrates something important:

relational organisation can become constitutive of individuality without becoming social mattering.

The evolutionary threshold

This gives us a more nuanced sequence than the simple progression we began with:

individual value

↓

relational significance

↓

collective coordination

↓

integration

↓

differentiation

↓

higher-level individuality

And only after this do we need to ask about the emergence of something recognisably social.

That is exactly the question waiting for us.

The animal body was not inevitable

Multicellularity has evolved repeatedly in different lineages, and evolutionary transitions to multicellular individuality involve changes in adhesion, communication, differentiation and genetic regulation. The origins of animal multicellularity were particularly consequential because new cell types and coordinated developmental organisation had to arise.

There was therefore no single obvious route from cell to animal.

Different lineages explored different organisational possibilities.

That is important for our project.

We should think in terms of solutions to problems of organisation, not a ladder with humanity waiting at the top.

What multicellularity teaches us

Perhaps the deepest lesson is this:

A new level of individuality can emerge when the possibilities of lower-level participants become sufficiently interdependent that the collective acquires its own organisation.

The new whole is not simply the sum of its parts.

Nor does it replace them.

It reorganises them.

Their constraints become part of the conditions under which the new individual can exist.

The next question

We have now seen several ways of getting from many living units to a larger organised whole.

But none of these cases yet gives us the kind of social organisation we have been looking for.

For that, participants must remain distinct enough that their relations with one another become significant as relations among participants, rather than merely as parts of a single organism.

So we finally arrive at the threshold we have been approaching from the beginning:

When does biological value become social mattering?

The Natural History of Mattering: V. When Cells Become Participants

We have now seen several ways in which biological organisation can become more than the sum of its parts.

Organisms can signal to one another.

Formerly independent organisms can become integrated into a new individual.

Distributed processes can coordinate without a centre.

But multicellularity introduces another possibility.

What happens when living cells become differentiated components of a larger organised body?

Volvox gives us a remarkably clear case.

From colony to organism

Volvox carteri belongs to a group of green algae containing unicellular, colonial and multicellular forms, making the group particularly useful for studying the transition to multicellularity.

An adult Volvox spheroid contains thousands of small somatic cells and a much smaller number of larger reproductive cells called gonidia. The somatic cells occupy the surface and provide coordinated motility; the gonidia reproduce.

The cells have therefore become differentiated.

They no longer all do the same thing.

Their differences are part of the organisation of the whole.

Division of labour

The somatic cells have flagella and contribute to the movement of the spheroid.

The gonidia are specialised for reproduction.

Somatic cells are terminally differentiated and do not reproduce; the gonidia generate the next generation.

This creates something very different from a loose collection of cells.

The capabilities of the whole depend upon different kinds of cells performing complementary functions.

The organisation has become differentiated.

But what is the participant?

This raises a question that is particularly important for our project.

The individual cells remain living systems.

They have their own metabolic organisation.

But the Volvox individual's possibilities depend upon the coordinated organisation of all its cells.

The somatic cell contributes to the life of the spheroid.

The gonidium contributes to its continuation across generations.

So who is the participant?

The cell, the colony, or both?

Perhaps the answer is that we have encountered a new level of organisation in which the cell remains a biological individual while also becoming a component of another individual.

Value becomes nested

This recalls the lesson of endosymbiosis.

There too, one living system became part of a larger organisation.

But Volvox adds something new.

The constituent cells are not merely incorporated.

They become differentiated according to roles within the larger system.

Their own organisation is nested within another organisation.

We might therefore say:

biological value has become hierarchically organised.

What matters for one cell's immediate activity is now connected to what the larger body requires.

Sacrifice is not necessarily suffering

The somatic cells provide motility but are terminally differentiated and ultimately die without reproducing themselves.

It would be tempting to describe this as sacrifice.

But that would import human moral and psychological categories too quickly.

The more interesting fact is structural.

A component's reproductive possibilities have become subordinated to the organisation of the larger life cycle.

The transition to multicellularity therefore involves not merely cooperation, but reorganisation of what the parts can do.

From collective to individual

This complicates our earlier distinction between collective and individual.

A collection of bacteria can coordinate while remaining a population.

A Volvox spheroid has a much stronger claim to being an individual organism because its differentiated cells are integrated into a common developmental and functional organisation.

Its cells are not simply collaborating.

They are constituting the body.

This suggests another distinction:

collective coordination → integrated individuality

The transition is not simply a matter of greater complexity.

It changes what counts as the relevant unit of organisation.

The cells become participants in another level

This is why "participant" is useful, even if we use it carefully.

The cells are not social participants in our sense.

But their activity has become organised within the possibilities of a larger participant.

The cell's role cannot be fully understood without the spheroid.

And the spheroid cannot exist without the differentiated cells.

We therefore have a reciprocal dependence between levels:

cellular organisation ↔ organismic organisation

Each level constrains and enables the other.

The topology has acquired layers

Our topology can now become hierarchical.

At one level:

cells interact with their immediate environment.

At another:

cells participate in the organisation of the spheroid.

At another:

the spheroid interacts with its environment.

The same cell can therefore occupy different relational positions at different scales.

This is important because it suggests that biological organisation is not one topology placed upon another.

It is a set of nested relational organisations.

The repertoire changes too

A cell in a multicellular organism does not have the same repertoire as its unicellular ancestor.

Its possibilities have changed.

Some have been lost.

Others have become specialised.

A somatic cell can contribute to motility but no longer reproduce.

A gonidium can reproduce but does not provide motility.

The larger organism therefore creates differentiated repertoires by restricting and redistributing possibilities.

This is a powerful form of organisation.

Individuation through limitation

There is a paradox here.

Multicellularity gives the larger organism more possibilities.

But it does so partly by giving individual cells fewer possibilities.

Specialisation requires constraint.

The cell becomes less generally capable while the organism becomes more capable as a whole.

So biological individuation can proceed through:

differentiation → restriction → integration → expanded collective possibility.

That principle will become increasingly important as we approach more complex organisms.

The emerging pattern

Our sequence has now become richer:

biological value

↓

relational significance

↓

collective coordination

↓

integration

↓

differentiation

↓

nested individuality

We are still below social mattering.

But we are getting closer to a world in which the activities of distinct living units are organised into persistent relations that cannot be understood adequately at the level of the units alone.

What Volvox teaches us

The importance of Volvox is not simply that it is "a simple multicellular organism".

It shows us that becoming multicellular can involve a profound reorganisation of who does what, what remains possible, and at what level biological value is organised.

The larger organism becomes a new unit of organisation without erasing the living organisation of its cells.

That is a remarkable solution to the problem of individuation.

The next question

But Volvox is still a relatively simple case.

What happens when multicellularity becomes more elaborate?

When organisms consist of many differentiated cell types, tissues and organs?

When some organisms live in permanent colonies without becoming fully integrated individuals?

And when the boundary between one organism and many organisms becomes genuinely difficult to draw?

Many Bodies, One Life?