We have been following a deceptively simple idea.
Possibility is not a space waiting to be explored. It arises from relations. And when something becomes actual, it may alter those relations, thereby changing what can subsequently become possible.
But this leaves an important question.
What is it about becoming that makes a difference?
After all, things happen all the time without transforming anything of significance. A stone falls, a leaf moves, a molecule collides with another molecule. Events occur and disappear.
So we should not say simply that every actualisation changes possibility.
The more interesting claim is that some actualisations alter the conditions of subsequent becoming.
When they do, becoming becomes historical.
An actuality can become a condition
Consider a new organism entering an ecosystem.
Its appearance is an actuality. But its significance does not end with its appearance.
The organism may eat another species, provide food for another, compete for resources, alter the chemistry of its environment, or enter into a symbiotic relationship. Through these relations, its existence changes what other participants can do.
The new organism has become part of the conditions under which further events can occur.
This is more than causal influence in the ordinary sense.
Causation tells us that one event produces another.
Our question is different.
We are asking whether an actuality can reconfigure the field of possibilities within which subsequent events take place.
When it does, the consequence is not merely another event.
It is a changed world of becoming.
Halliday gives us a useful clue
There is a striking parallel here in Halliday's distinction between potential and instance.
A potential is not a hidden collection of future instances waiting somewhere behind the actual. It is a system of possibilities from which instances can arise.
But the relation is not one-way.
An instance can alter the probabilities of the potential.
That is a remarkably important idea.
It means that actualisation does not simply consume potential.
The occurrence of an instance can change the organisation of the potential from which further instances arise.
We therefore have:
potential → instance → altered potential
The system carries its history forward.
What has happened changes the probabilistic organisation of what can happen next.
This is not quite the same as our broader distinction between possibility and potential. Possibility concerns what a relational field leaves open; potential concerns the organised readiness of a participant or system to take up possibilities.
But the two can meet.
A transformed potential can alter what a participant is able to take up. And when participants actualise possibilities, they can transform the relations that constitute the field itself.
We therefore obtain a larger recursion:
relation → possibility → potential → actualisation → transformed relation → new possibility
The system does not simply proceed through this sequence.
It continually re-enters its own conditions.
This is where evolution becomes interesting
This may help explain why the evolutionary model has seemed so tempting to extend beyond biology.
Darwinian evolution contains a remarkably general pattern.
There is variation.
Some variations persist while others disappear.
The surviving forms participate in further processes of reproduction and interaction.
And the resulting population changes the conditions under which subsequent variation and selection occur.
Evolution therefore does not merely select among possibilities.
It changes the population that generates subsequent possibilities.
And the changed population changes its environment.
And the changed environment changes what can subsequently survive.
There is a recursive relationship between actuality and possibility.
But this does not necessarily mean that evolution itself is the fundamental principle.
Perhaps evolution is one particularly elaborate form of a more general relational pattern:
what becomes can change what can become.
That principle can operate without genes, without organisms and perhaps even without anything resembling biological selection.
Chemical systems provide a useful boundary case
This is why the idea of chemical selection, which has appeared in various forms in discussions of the origins of life, is so interesting.
A chemical system can contain many possible reactions. Under particular conditions, some pathways become favoured. Products can alter the environment in which subsequent reactions occur. Catalytic relations can make previously unlikely reactions easier to sustain.
The important point is not whether we should call this “evolution” in the biological sense.
The more interesting question is whether we can recognise the same underlying architecture:
a field of possibilities is differentiated; an actuality emerges; the actuality changes the relations; the altered relations change subsequent possibilities.
If so, biological evolution may not be the template from which chemistry must borrow.
Biological evolution may instead be one especially powerful realisation of a more general architecture of becoming.
That is a much more modest claim.
And perhaps a more interesting one.
Semiotic systems make the recursion unmistakable
Language makes the same structure easier to see.
Suppose a new expression appears.
At first it may be unusual. Then speakers begin using it. Others understand it. Its use becomes familiar. Eventually it may become conventional.
What has happened?
Not merely that a new string of sounds has entered the language.
The potential of the language has changed.
The expression is now more readily available to speakers. It may enter into new constructions. It may acquire grammatical functions. It may allow distinctions that were previously difficult to express.
The instance has changed the potential.
And the changed potential makes further instances possible.
This is becoming with a particularly visible memory.
The history of the language is present in the possibilities it now affords.
Becoming is therefore selective—but not necessarily selectionist
This brings us back to Hazen and Wong's proposal (here).
They identify three conditions for increasing order:
a range of possible configurations;
a capacity to generate new configurations;
a means of selecting among them.
There is something important here.
A system cannot become something unless alternatives are available in some sense. Nor can anything become different unless there is some capacity for difference to emerge. And persistence requires some differentiation among the alternatives that arise.
But perhaps we don't need to turn these conditions into a new law of nature.
The word selection may be doing too much work.
Selection sounds as though a mechanism stands outside the alternatives and chooses among them.
But in many systems, what we call selection is simply what happens when relations make some possibilities more viable, persistent, accessible or reproducible than others.
There need be no selector.
The environment does not have to sit outside the organism making decisions.
The organism and its environment participate in a relation that differentiates what can continue.
Selection may therefore be a description of an outcome of relational constraint rather than an additional ontological principle.
Constraint does not merely eliminate
This is also why constraint deserves more attention.
A constraint can prevent a possibility from being actualised.
But a sufficiently structured constraint can also make other possibilities available.
A musical scale excludes most possible frequencies while making melody possible.
A grammar excludes many arrangements of words while making complex patterns of meaning available.
An ecological niche restricts the conditions under which an organism can survive while simultaneously providing a field in which particular forms of life can flourish.
Constraint therefore does not simply reduce possibility.
It differentiates possibility.
And differentiation is what allows becoming to acquire a direction.
Not the direction of an arrow through time.
A direction produced by the changing structure of the relations themselves.
The past therefore changes the future without determining it
This gives us a useful way of understanding historical dependence.
The past matters because actualisations can become conditions for subsequent possibilities.
But this does not mean that the future was contained in the past.
The fact that a new grammatical construction emerged does not determine what speakers will do with it.
The emergence of a species does not determine the future of an ecosystem.
The appearance of a chemical pathway does not determine every subsequent reaction.
What history does is alter the field of what can happen.
It changes the starting conditions for further becoming.
This is neither determinism nor randomness.
It is historically conditioned openness.
The future remains open, but it is no longer open in exactly the same way.
And this may be what we mean by evolution
Perhaps the deepest lesson is that evolution should not be defined simply as change through time, or even as variation plus selection.
Those formulations describe important biological mechanisms.
But underneath them lies something more general:
becoming changes the conditions of becoming.
Once this happens, history acquires a special kind of structure.
The present is not merely the latest point in a sequence.
It is the result of previous actualisations that have altered the relations within which new possibilities arise.
And the future is not merely what has not yet happened.
It is what can happen given the relations that have now been transformed.
This is why becoming makes a difference.
It does not merely add another actuality to the world.
Sometimes it changes the world in such a way that the next possibility could not have been exactly the same possibility before.
And here we encounter the most intriguing question of all.
If becoming can transform the conditions of possibility, then perhaps genuinely new possibilities can arise.
Not merely new instances of old possibilities.
Not merely new combinations of existing forms.
But possibilities that were not previously available in the same relational field at all.
If that is possible, then the history of the world is not simply a history of what has happened.
It is also a history of what has become possible.
And that is where our final question takes us:
What would it mean for a possibility to exist only because something else had already become?