Wednesday, 16 September 2026

II. The Things That Became

After Possibility had entered the world, the Things began to change.

This did not surprise them.

Things had always changed.

What surprised them was that they began to notice it.

The Tree noticed first.

One morning it discovered that one of its branches was longer than it had been the previous year.

The Bird noticed that its feathers had changed.

The Stone noticed that it had become smoother.

The River noticed nothing in particular, which was one of the reasons the others trusted it.

They began to ask an old question in a new way.

“If we change,” said the Bird, “how can we still be ourselves?”

The Stone considered this.

“I am still a Stone.”

“You were smaller before.”

“I am still a Stone.”

“You were rougher.”

“I am still a Stone.”

“You have been shaped by the River.”

The Stone looked at the River.

“I am still a Stone.”

The River said nothing.

The Bird was dissatisfied.

“You keep saying that you are the same.”

“Yes.”

“But you have changed.”

“Yes.”

“How can both be true?”

The Stone had no answer.


The Things decided to ask the River.

They found it further downstream than usual.

“You are the oldest of us,” said the Tree.

“I am not the oldest,” said the River.

“Older than us, then.”

“Perhaps.”

“You have changed your course.”

“Yes.”

“You have carried away stones.”

“Yes.”

“You have received new waters from tributaries.”

“Yes.”

“You have sometimes flooded and sometimes become shallow.”

“Yes.”

“And yet you remain the River.”

“Yes.”

The Bird became impatient.

“How?”

The River flowed for a while before answering.

“You are asking how I remain the same while everything in me changes.”

“Yes.”

“That is because you are imagining sameness as the absence of change.”

The Things looked at one another.

“What else could it be?”

The River answered:

“A pattern can remain while what participates in the pattern changes.”

The Things did not immediately understand.

So the River gave them a whirlpool.


The whirlpool appeared where the River narrowed between two rocks.

The Things watched it turn.

Round and round it went.

The water entering it was never the same water for long.

Yet the whirlpool remained.

“How long has it been there?” asked the Tree.

“Long enough for you to notice it.”

“How long will it remain?”

“As long as the conditions that sustain it remain.”

The Bird flew closer.

“But the water is always changing.”

“Yes.”

“Then the whirlpool is not the water.”

“No.”

“Is it the rocks?”

“No.”

“Then what is it?”

The River smiled.

“You are beginning to ask better questions.”

The whirlpool continued turning.

The Things watched it persist through change.

For the first time, they saw that persistence did not have to mean remaining untouched.

A thing could remain itself by changing in an organised way.

This discovery unsettled them.

They had always imagined change as something that happened to a Thing.

Now they began to suspect that some Things existed only because change kept happening in the right way.


The Tree took this discovery very seriously.

It had always thought of itself as something that grew.

Now it wondered whether growth was something that happened to it—or whether growth was part of what it meant to be the Tree.

It looked at its leaves.

They appeared.

They unfolded.

They gathered light.

They withered.

They fell.

New leaves came.

The Tree remained.

It looked at its trunk.

Year after year it thickened.

It looked at its roots.

They extended into the earth.

It looked at the creatures living among its branches.

Some arrived.

Some departed.

The Tree understood that none of these things could be separated completely from what it was.

Its being was not hidden underneath its becoming.

Its being was the pattern of its becoming.

The Tree was pleased with this discovery.

Then a storm came.


The storm was enormous.

Wind tore through the forest.

Branches broke.

Trees bent.

Some fell.

The River rose.

The Tree held.

When the storm had passed, the Tree looked very different.

One great branch was gone.

Several smaller branches had been broken.

Its bark was torn.

The Bird's nest had disappeared.

The Tree was shaken.

“Am I still the same Tree?”

The River answered from below.

“That depends.”

“On what?”

“On what you mean by ‘same’.”

The Tree did not like this answer.

“I mean: am I still me?”

The River flowed around the roots.

“Yes.”

“But I have changed.”

“Yes.”

“Then why am I still me?”

“Because the pattern that makes you what you are has changed without yet becoming another pattern.”

The Tree looked at the broken branch.

“So identity has limits.”

“Yes.”

“And change has limits.”

“Yes.”

“What happens when the pattern changes too much?”

The River was quiet.

“Then something else may begin.”

The Tree considered this.

It was not entirely comforting.

But it was true.


Not long afterwards, the Stone disappeared.

The others searched for it.

Eventually they found it downstream.

It had been carried away by the River.

It was no longer beside the clearing.

“This is unacceptable,” said the Bird.

The River said nothing.

The Stone was eventually found lodged among other stones.

“You have moved,” said the Tree.

“Yes.”

“You are no longer where you were.”

“No.”

“Then are you still the same Stone?”

The Stone looked at itself.

It was the same shape, although somewhat smoother.

“I think so.”

The River said:

“Your location was part of your history, not the whole of your identity.”

The Stone was relieved.

Then it noticed something.

The place where it had once rested was now empty.

A small stream had begun to flow through the space.

New possibilities had appeared.

The Stone realised that becoming was not merely something that happened to a Thing.

Its own changes altered the world in which other things could become.


The Things began to notice this everywhere.

A fallen tree became shelter.

The shelter became a home.

The home altered the behaviour of creatures.

Their behaviour changed the forest.

The forest changed the River.

The River changed the valley.

The valley changed the creatures.

The Things had once imagined change as a sequence:

one Thing changes,

then another Thing changes,

then another.

Now they saw something different.

Each becoming altered the conditions of further becoming.

The present was not simply the point between a finished past and an already determined future.

It was a place from which possibilities opened.

And some possibilities closed.


One day a seed fell from a tree.

It landed in poor soil.

The Bird saw it.

“That seed will become a Tree.”

“Perhaps,” said the River.

“Isn't it a Tree already?”

“No.”

“But it can become one.”

“Yes.”

“So it will.”

“Not necessarily.”

The Bird was puzzled.

“What stops it?”

“The soil.”

“The rain.”

“The light.”

“The creatures that may eat it.”

“The seasons.”

“Many things.”

“But if it has the potential to become a Tree, shouldn't it become one?”

The River flowed around the seed.

“Potential is not a promise.”

The seed remained where it had fallen.

Rain came.

Then drought.

The seed did not grow.

Eventually an animal ate it.

The Bird looked disappointed.

“But it could have become a Tree.”

“Yes.”

“And it didn't.”

“No.”

The River continued downstream.

The Bird followed.

“What happened to its potential?”

“It was never a thing stored inside the seed.”

“Then what was it?”

“A possibility.”

“Where?”

The River answered:

“In the relation between the seed and a world in which it might have grown.”

The Bird was silent.

Possibility, it seemed, did not belong entirely to Things.


Another seed fell.

This one landed in good soil.

Rain came.

Sunlight followed.

Roots emerged.

The seed opened.

A shoot appeared.

The Bird watched.

“This one will become a Tree.”

“Perhaps.”

The Bird looked at the River suspiciously.

“You are going to say ‘not necessarily’ again.”

“I might.”

But this seed grew.

Its roots entered the soil.

Its stem rose.

Its leaves unfolded.

Years passed.

It became a young tree.

Then an older tree.

The Bird eventually built a nest in it.

The Tree was pleased.

“You see?” said the Bird to the River. “It became what it could become.”

The River replied:

“No.”

The Bird frowned.

“What do you mean?”

“It became what became possible.”

The Bird looked at the Tree.

The Tree looked at the Bird.

Neither knew what to say.


As the years passed, the Things began to discover that their futures were not waiting for them like hidden rooms.

There were paths.

There were constraints.

There were tendencies.

There were opportunities.

But there was no single road laid down in advance.

The River could change course.

The Tree could break.

The Bird could migrate.

The Stone could be carried downstream.

A forest could burn and become grassland.

Grassland could become forest again.

Every change altered what could happen next.

The world was not a machine carrying out a plan.

Nor was it chaos.

It was something stranger.

The Things were becoming within conditions that mattered without being completely determined by them.


Then the Things encountered Time.

Time was not a Thing.

It had no shape.

It could not be held.

It could not be placed beside another Thing.

Yet it was always there.

At first the Things thought Time was simply what carried them from one moment to another.

But then they discovered something peculiar.

The past did not disappear completely.

The Tree carried its past in its rings.

The River carried its past in its channels.

The Stone carried its past in its worn surface.

The forest carried its past in its soil.

The Bird carried its past in the paths it had learned.

The present was not empty of what had come before.

It was thick with it.


One evening, the Bird sang.

The first note sounded.

Then the second.

Then the third.

A Thing listening from far away said:

“Why is the first note important? It has already ended.”

The Bird answered:

“Because the second note comes after it.”

“That cannot be enough.”

“It is.”

The Thing listened.

The second note changed what the first had meant.

The third changed what the second had meant.

The whole song became something that no individual note had been.

The Thing realised that the past could remain active without remaining present in the same form.

A melody was not a collection of notes.

It was a pattern that became itself through time.

The Things were beginning to understand.


Much later, the Stone asked the River:

“Does the future already exist?”

The River laughed.

“You ask strange questions.”

“Does it?”

“No.”

“Then how do you know where you are going?”

“I don't.”

“But you flow towards the sea.”

“Yes.”

“So you must have a destination.”

“A direction is not a destination.”

The Stone thought about this.

“Then what determines your course?”

“Many things.”

“The land?”

“Yes.”

“The rain?”

“Yes.”

“The mountains?”

“Yes.”

“The tributaries?”

“Yes.”

“Your own previous course?”

“Yes.”

“Can you change?”

“Yes.”

“Can you flow anywhere?”

“No.”

The Stone understood.

The River's future was neither predetermined nor unconstrained.

Its possibilities were structured.

The relations through which it existed opened some paths and closed others.

But within those conditions, something new could happen.

The River could become different.

And when it did, the possibilities of everything downstream would change.


The Things began to see that this was true of themselves.

A relation that changed could change a Thing's possibilities.

A new neighbour could alter a creature's behaviour.

A changed climate could alter a forest.

A new path through the forest could alter where creatures travelled.

A new word could alter what could be thought.

A new idea could alter what questions could be asked.

A new relation could make a possibility visible that had not previously been available.

And when a possibility became actual, it changed the field again.

Possibility could create possibility.

The world was becoming a history of its own transformations.


One day, the River was asked a final question.

“You told us that a Thing can persist through change.”

“Yes.”

“You told us that becoming can be organised.”

“Yes.”

“You told us that possibility depends upon relations.”

“Yes.”

“And you told us that the future is not already waiting for us.”

“Yes.”

The Things gathered around.

“Then what is a Thing?”

The River looked at them.

“A Thing,” it said, “is sometimes what a becoming looks like when it has learned how to persist.”

The Things were silent.

“And what is becoming?”

The River flowed on.

“A becoming is sometimes what a Thing looks like when you remember that it has a history.”

The Things considered this.

It was not an answer that separated the two.

It was an answer that made the separation less necessary.


That evening, the River changed its course.

Not by much.

A few stones shifted.

A bank gave way.

A new channel opened.

The River began to flow through it.

The Things watched.

“Is that still the River?”

The River answered:

“I don't know yet.”

The Things were astonished.

“You don't know?”

“No.”

“How can you not know what you are?”

The River flowed through the new channel.

“Because I am becoming it.”

And as the water moved into places where it had never flowed before, the old channel began to dry.

The landscape changed.

The creatures changed their paths.

The plants changed where they could grow.

New relations formed.

New possibilities appeared.

And somewhere beyond the bend, something that had never existed before became possible.

The River did not know what it would be.

Neither did the Things.

For the first time, they understood that this was not a failure of knowledge.

It was part of what it meant for the world to become.

And so the Things continued.

Not remaining what they were.

Not ceasing to be themselves.

But becoming.

I. The Things That Thought They Were Alone

In the beginning, there were Things.

No one remembered their beginning, because memory had not yet been invented.

The Things stood where they stood.

Some were large and some were small. Some were hard, some soft, some warm, some cold. Some moved, and some remained where they had first appeared. There were stones, trees, pools of water, creatures with wings, creatures with legs, and creatures that had not yet decided what they were.

Each Thing knew itself.

At least, each Thing knew that it was not another Thing.

The Stone was the Stone.

The Tree was the Tree.

The River was the River.

The Bird was the Bird.

This seemed sufficient.

The Things had names, though they did not always agree about them.

The Stone called itself Stone.

The Tree called itself Tree.

The River had no particular opinion.

This was considered by the others to be characteristic of rivers.

There were also things that happened.

The Sun rose.

The rain fell.

The wind moved through the trees.

The River moved from the mountains towards the sea.

The Things noticed these events, but regarded them as secondary.

First there were Things.

Then things happened to them.

This was obvious.

The Tree stood beside the River.

The River flowed past the Tree.

The Bird nested in the Tree.

The Wind moved through its leaves.

The Things therefore had relations with one another.

But the relations were understood to be rather like visitors.

They arrived.

They departed.

The Things remained.

Or so it seemed.


One day, the River met a Stone.

The Stone was lying in the River's path.

“You are in my way,” said the River.

“I am not in your way,” said the Stone. “You are flowing around me.”

The River considered this.

“I suppose that is another way of describing it.”

“I am a Stone,” said the Stone. “I remain where I am.”

“I am a River,” said the River. “I do not.”

This seemed to settle the matter.

But after a while the River noticed that the Stone was no longer quite the same shape.

Water had passed over it.

Water had passed around it.

Small pieces of the Stone had disappeared.

The Stone noticed this too.

“What are you doing to me?”

“I am flowing.”

“You are wearing me away.”

“I am still flowing.”

The Stone was silent.

It had never occurred to the Stone that something could happen to it without another Thing having deliberately done something to it.

The River continued.

Years passed.

The Stone became smooth.

The River changed its course.

Neither was what it had been.

And yet each remained recognisably itself.

This was the first mystery.


The Things began to notice other mysteries.

The Tree discovered that it could not remain a Tree without the ground.

The Bird discovered that it could not be a Bird without air.

The Flower discovered that its opening and closing depended upon the warmth of the day.

The creature that hunted discovered that its life depended upon the creature it hunted.

The creature that was hunted discovered the same thing from the opposite direction.

The Things found this disturbing.

They had thought that being a Thing meant being independent.

Yet everywhere they looked, independence seemed less certain.

The Tree could not simply be separated from the soil and remain the same Tree.

The River could not be separated from its banks without ceasing to be that River.

The Bird could not be separated from the air and remain a Bird.

Even the Stone had begun to suspect that its identity had something to do with the River that wore it smooth.

The Things therefore called a meeting.

They assembled in a clearing.

The Stone arrived late.

The River could not attend, but sent water.

The Tree stood at the edge of the gathering.

The Bird perched above them.

“We have a problem,” said the Tree.

“What problem?” asked the Stone.

“We seem to depend upon things that are not ourselves.”

The Stone looked offended.

“That is not dependence. That is merely contact.”

“What is the difference?” asked the Bird.

“Contact is something that happens between Things.”

“And dependence?”

The Stone hesitated.

“That is something else.”

“What?”

The Stone had no answer.


At that moment, something unusual happened.

Two Things began to move towards one another.

They were not the same.

They were not even similar.

Yet as they approached, something changed.

Neither became the other.

But each became different from what it had been before.

The Things watched.

“What happened?” asked the Bird.

“They met,” said the Tree.

“Yes,” said the Stone. “But what is met?”

Nobody knew.

The Things had a word for connection.

They did not yet have a word for transformation through connection.

This distinction would become important.


There was one Thing, older than most of the others, who had spent a very long time watching the River.

It had seen the River change its course.

It had seen the banks rise and fall.

It had seen tributaries join it.

It had seen floods and droughts.

It had seen water disappear into the ground and return somewhere else.

The Thing had therefore begun to wonder whether the River was really the same River.

One evening it asked:

“River, what makes you you?”

The River answered:

“I flow.”

“But the water changes.”

“Yes.”

“Your banks change.”

“Yes.”

“Your course changes.”

“Yes.”

“Then what remains?”

The River was quiet for a long time.

Then it said:

“Perhaps you are asking the wrong question.”

“What question should I ask?”

The River replied:

“Ask what continues.”

The Thing thought about this.

It looked at the water.

It looked at the banks.

It looked at the tributaries.

It looked downstream.

Then it understood something that frightened it.

The River was not the same because its contents remained.

The River was the same because a pattern continued through what changed.

The River was not merely something that possessed relations.

The relations were part of what made the River the River.


Word of this travelled quickly.

Some Things welcomed the discovery.

Others did not.

The Stone was particularly suspicious.

“If relations make Things what they are,” it said, “then perhaps Things are not really Things at all.”

This frightened everyone.

The Tree disagreed.

“I am still a Tree.”

“Yes,” said the Stone. “But what makes you one?”

The Tree thought.

Its roots.

Its trunk.

Its branches.

Its leaves.

The ground.

The water.

The light.

The seasons.

The creatures that lived among its branches.

The creatures that fed upon it.

The fungi beneath it.

The air around it.

The Tree became silent.

“Do not worry,” said the River.

“Why not?”

“Because being constituted through relations does not mean being nothing.”

The Tree considered this.

It realised that its relations did not erase its identity.

They gave its identity somewhere to live.


After this, the Things began to notice something stranger.

Difference itself seemed relational.

The Parent was a Parent only because there was a Child.

The Child was a Child only because there was a Parent.

The Hunter was a Hunter because there was something to hunt.

The Prey was Prey because something hunted it.

Even the Tree's height meant something only in relation to other Trees.

The Things had once thought that they possessed their identities first and entered relations afterwards.

Now it seemed possible that some of their identities emerged through the relations themselves.

This did not mean that everything was the same.

Quite the opposite.

Difference had become more important than ever.

But difference was no longer simply separation.

Difference could make a relation possible.

And relation could make a difference significant.

The Things began to understand that they did not need to become indistinguishable in order to belong to one another.


Then there appeared among them a new kind of Thing.

It had no fixed shape.

It was called Boundary.

At first the Things were suspicious of it.

“What are you?” they asked.

“I separate,” said Boundary.

The Things approved.

At last, something sensible.

But then Boundary continued:

“And I connect.”

The Things were less pleased.

“How can you do both?”

Boundary smiled.

“Because separation is not the same as isolation.”

Boundary showed them an organism.

The organism had an outer edge.

Inside was not outside.

Outside was not inside.

Yet the organism lived by exchanging things across the very boundary that distinguished the two.

“If I disappear,” said Boundary, “the organism may lose its identity.”

“So you are a wall.”

“No.”

“A barrier?”

“No.”

“What are you, then?”

Boundary answered:

“I am the relation through which an inside can remain an inside without ceasing to exchange with an outside.”

The Things found this unnecessarily complicated.

The organism found it perfectly ordinary.


Then came Constraint.

The Things disliked Constraint immediately.

Constraint prevented the River from flowing everywhere.

Constraint prevented the Tree from growing in every direction.

Constraint prevented the organism from becoming whatever it happened to want.

“Constraint limits us,” complained the Things.

“Yes,” said Constraint.

“We do not like limits.”

“I know.”

“Then why do you exist?”

Constraint looked at the River.

The River flowed between its banks.

It looked at the Tree.

The Tree grew within the conditions of soil, light and water.

It looked at the organism.

The organism maintained itself through limits.

“You mistake limitation for the absence of possibility,” said Constraint.

The Things stared at it.

Constraint continued:

“A river without banks may spread into water.

A tree without form may become wood.

An organism without a boundary may become its environment.

A Thing that can become absolutely anything cannot become anything in particular.”

The Things were silent.

They had never considered that possibility might require limits.


By then, the River had become very old.

It had watched generations of creatures come and go.

It had seen stones become sand.

It had seen forests rise and disappear.

It had seen creatures become dependent upon one another in ways no Thing could have predicted.

One evening the River asked:

“Do you still think relations are merely what happens between Things?”

The Stone, now much smoother than before, answered:

“No.”

“What do you think they are?”

The Stone looked towards the banks.

“I think they are part of what makes us what we are.”

The River flowed quietly.

“And do you think that means Things are unreal?”

“No.”

“What, then?”

The Stone considered this carefully.

“I think we are real in a different way from the way we first imagined.”

The River approved.

That was as close as a River came to applause.


There were still those who resisted.

One of them declared:

“If relations are so important, then let us simply say that relations are fundamental and Things are secondary.”

The River immediately objected.

“No.”

“Why not?”

“Because you have merely reversed the order.”

The Thing frowned.

“What is wrong with that?”

“You still imagine that there must be one kind of thing that is fundamentally first.”

The Thing had no answer.

The River continued:

“Perhaps the mistake was not putting Things first.

Perhaps the mistake was assuming that there had to be a first.”

This troubled everyone.

For if neither Things nor Relations were simply the ultimate foundation, what was left?

The answer did not arrive.

Instead, something else happened.

Something became possible.


No one noticed the moment when Possibility entered the world.

Possibility did not announce itself.

It did not have a shape.

It did not stand beside the other Things.

It appeared whenever a relation could have been different.

The River might have flowed another way.

The Tree might have grown another branch.

The creature might have taken another path.

Two Things might have met.

Two Things might not have met.

A boundary might have held.

A boundary might have changed.

A pattern might have persisted.

A pattern might have broken.

The Things began to realise that their relations did not merely describe what was already the case.

Their relations changed what could happen next.

A new relation could open a possibility that had not existed before.

And once that possibility became actual, the world changed.

The Things changed.

Their relations changed.

And therefore new possibilities appeared.

The world had begun to acquire a history.


The oldest Things eventually gathered again.

The Stone was there.

The Tree was there.

The River flowed nearby.

Boundary stood among them.

Constraint watched from the edge.

And Possibility, invisible as ever, was everywhere.

The Stone spoke first.

“We thought we existed independently.”

The Tree nodded.

“We thought relations came afterwards.”

The River continued flowing.

“We were wrong.”

The Bird asked:

“Then what are we?”

No one answered immediately.

At last the River said:

“You are what has become possible through the relations in which you participate.”

The Bird looked at its wings.

The Tree looked at its roots.

The Stone looked at the River.

Nobody seemed entirely satisfied.

But nobody thought the answer was false.

Then the Bird asked the question that had been waiting all this time.

“If we become what we are through relations, what happens next?”

The River flowed towards the horizon.

“I don't know.”

The Bird was surprised.

“You don't know?”

“No.”

“But you are the River.”

“Yes.”

“And you have seen more than any of us.”

“Yes.”

“Then surely you know what comes next.”

The River laughed.

“You still think becoming is something that happens to things.”

The Bird waited.

The River continued:

“What comes next is what becomes possible.”

And somewhere beyond the clearing, where no one had yet thought to look, the world began to change again.

VI. The Grammar Department

Mr Blottisham entered the Common Room carrying a sheet of paper.

Professor Quillibrace looked up.

Miss Stray looked at the paper.

‘What is that?’

‘A list.’

‘Of?’

‘Things.’

Quillibrace sighed.

‘Of course.’

Blottisham put the paper on the table.

‘I've been reviewing our discussions.’

‘That was brave.’

‘And I think we've made a mistake.’

Miss Stray looked interested.

‘What sort of mistake?’

‘We keep saying that physics has a problem.’

‘It does.’

‘No.’

Blottisham shook his head.

‘Perhaps physics doesn't have the problem.’

Quillibrace closed his book.

‘Go on.’

‘Perhaps we do.’

There was a brief silence.

Miss Stray smiled.

‘That is promising.’

Blottisham picked up his list.

‘First, things became a problem.’

‘Yes.’

‘Then properties.’

‘Yes.’

‘Then observers.’

‘Yes.’

‘Then the future.’

‘Yes.’

‘Then pictures.’

‘Yes.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘A distinguished collection.’

‘But perhaps they aren't five separate problems.’

‘What are they?’

Blottisham looked at the list.

‘One problem.’

‘Which is?’

He hesitated.

‘Our philosophy.’

Quillibrace smiled.

‘Now you are making progress.’

‘Don't sound so pleased.’

‘I have waited several weeks for this.’

Miss Stray laughed.

Blottisham sat down.

‘Let me start again.’

He looked at the list.

‘We assume reality consists of things.’

‘Yes.’

‘Things have properties.’

‘Yes.’

‘Those properties belong to things independently of their relations.’

‘Yes.’

‘Observers stand outside what they observe.’

‘Yes.’

‘The future already exists, at least in principle.’

‘Yes.’

‘And a successful theory should eventually give us a picture of what is really there.’

‘Yes.’

Blottisham frowned.

‘Why do we assume all that?’

Quillibrace raised an eyebrow.

‘Excellent question.’

‘And don't say Aristotle.’

‘I wasn't going to.’

‘You were thinking it.’

‘I was.’

Miss Stray leaned forward.

‘Perhaps the important point is that these assumptions do not all come from the same place.’

‘Aristotle gives us substance.’

‘Among other things.’

‘Descartes gives us the detached subject.’

‘Among other things.’

‘Newton gives us mathematical objects evolving through time.’

‘Yes.’

‘Laplace gives us determinism.’

‘Yes.’

‘And then common sense puts everything together.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘Precisely.’

‘But physics changes.’

‘Continuously.’

‘And the old philosophical picture doesn't necessarily change with it.’

‘Exactly.’

Blottisham looked thoughtful.

‘So we keep the new physics and put it inside the old philosophy.’

‘That is one way of describing the difficulty.’

‘And when it doesn't fit...’

‘We make the physics stranger.’

‘Instead of changing the philosophy.’

‘Exactly.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘We keep trying to renovate the furniture without questioning the architecture.’

Blottisham looked around the Common Room.

‘That's actually quite a good metaphor.’

‘Thank you.’

‘Although I don't think Quillibrace will like it.’

‘I dislike almost all metaphors.’

‘Precisely.’

Quillibrace stood and walked to the blackboard.

He wrote:

THING → PROPERTY → RELATION

‘This,’ he said, ‘is one of the old habits.’

Blottisham nodded.

‘A thing has properties.’

‘Yes.’

‘Then it enters into relations with other things.’

‘Yes.’

‘But quantum physics makes that order difficult.’

‘Very.’

Quillibrace crossed out the first arrow.

‘Perhaps relation is not something that happens after things exist.’

Miss Stray added:

‘Perhaps relations help constitute what the things are.’

Blottisham looked at the board.

‘So thinghood isn't necessarily fundamental.’

‘No.’

‘But there are still things.’

‘Certainly.’

‘Just not philosophically first.’

‘Exactly.’

Blottisham thought about it.

‘Fine.’

Quillibrace wrote another line.

THING → PROPERTY

‘And properties?’

Blottisham answered before Quillibrace could.

‘Perhaps they aren't simply possessions.’

‘Good.’

‘They can become determinate within physical interactions.’

‘Yes.’

Miss Stray added:

‘The question shifts from “What property does the thing already have?” to “What becomes determinate in this relation?”’

Blottisham nodded.

‘Fine.’

Quillibrace wrote:

OBSERVER | WORLD

‘And this?’

‘The observer is inside the world.’

‘Yes.’

‘The apparatus is inside the world.’

‘Yes.’

‘The measurement is an interaction.’

‘Yes.’

‘So objectivity can't mean escaping relation.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘It has to be achieved through relations that constrain us.’

Blottisham nodded.

‘Fine.’

Quillibrace wrote:

PAST → PRESENT → FUTURE

‘And time?’

Blottisham looked at him.

‘Don't tell me.’

‘I'm afraid I must.’

‘The future isn't necessarily a completed collection of facts.’

‘Correct.’

‘It can be structured possibility.’

‘Yes.’

‘And actualisation changes the possibilities that remain.’

‘Yes.’

Blottisham nodded.

‘Fine.’

Quillibrace looked at the board.

‘And finally—’

He wrote:

THEORY → PICTURE

Blottisham groaned.

‘Not again.’

‘Perhaps a theory does not need to terminate in a picture.’

‘It can still be about reality.’

‘Certainly.’

‘It can still be constrained by reality.’

‘Yes.’

‘It can still fail.’

‘Of course.’

‘But what it reveals most securely may be relations, constraints, probabilities and transformations rather than a hidden collection of classical objects.’

Quillibrace put down the chalk.

‘Precisely.’

Blottisham looked at the five lines.

‘All right.’

‘All right?’

‘They're all different.’

‘Yes.’

‘But they're connected.’

‘Yes.’

‘Things are related.’

‘Yes.’

‘Properties become determinate in relations.’

‘Yes.’

‘Observers participate in relations.’

‘Yes.’

‘Possibilities become actual through physical processes.’

‘Yes.’

‘And theories are themselves ways of entering into relations with the physical world.’

‘Yes.’

Blottisham looked at Miss Stray.

‘That's rather a lot of relations.’

She smiled.

‘It is.’

‘Are you suggesting that everything is a relation?’

‘No.’

‘Good.’

‘That would merely replace one dogma with another.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘Quite.’

‘Then what are you suggesting?’

Miss Stray considered the board.

‘That relation may be more fundamental than our inherited philosophy allows.’

Blottisham frowned.

‘But what does “fundamental” mean here?’

‘Perhaps it means what we should not explain away as secondary.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘That is a useful formulation.’

Blottisham pointed at the board.

‘So what physics has outgrown is not things.’

‘No.’

‘Or properties.’

‘No.’

‘Or observers.’

‘No.’

‘Or prediction.’

‘No.’

‘Or theories.’

‘No.’

‘It has outgrown the assumption that each of these must fit into a particular order.’

Miss Stray looked at him.

‘Yes.’

There was a silence.

Blottisham looked unexpectedly pleased.

‘I think I've found it.’

Quillibrace waited.

‘The problem is grammatical.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘Go on.’

‘We have a grammar for reality.’

Quillibrace nodded slowly.

‘And physics keeps producing sentences that grammar cannot parse.’

Blottisham looked at him.

‘Exactly.’

‘That is surprisingly good.’

‘Thank you.’

‘You may put down the list.’

Blottisham did so.

Miss Stray walked to the blackboard.

‘Perhaps that is why these problems keep recurring in different forms.’

She pointed to the first line.

‘We ask what a thing is.’

Then the second.

‘We ask what properties it possesses.’

Then the third.

‘We ask how the observer can stand apart from it.’

Then the fourth.

‘We ask whether the future already exists.’

Then the fifth.

‘And we ask what the theory is really describing.’

She turned around.

‘Each question seems different.’

‘But each presupposes the same grammatical structure.’

Blottisham nodded.

‘Thing first.’

‘Then property.’

‘Then relation.’

‘Observer outside.’

‘Future already there.’

‘Theory as picture.’

Quillibrace looked at the board.

‘And perhaps quantum mechanics keeps refusing the order.’

Blottisham sat down.

‘So what should replace it?’

Quillibrace paused.

‘We should be careful.’

‘Why?’

‘Because the physics does not hand us a replacement philosophy.’

‘Then what does it hand us?’

‘Pressure.’

‘Pressure?’

‘Pressure to revise the categories with which we interpret it.’

Miss Stray nodded.

‘Physics tells us where the inherited grammar stops working.’

‘But it doesn't write the new grammar for us.’

‘Exactly.’

Blottisham looked relieved.

‘Good.’

‘Why good?’

‘Because I don't want physicists writing philosophy.’

Quillibrace looked at him.

‘You are a physicist?’

‘No.’

‘Then why are you concerned?’

‘Professional solidarity.’

Miss Stray laughed.

Quillibrace returned to his chair.

‘There is another distinction we should make.’

‘Of course.’

‘Physics can tell us that certain experimental results occur.’

‘Yes.’

‘It can give us mathematical structures that predict them.’

‘Yes.’

‘It can constrain interpretations.’

‘Yes.’

‘But whether we call something a thing, a property, an actuality, a possibility or a representation is a conceptual question.’

Blottisham nodded.

‘So philosophy begins where the equations stop.’

Quillibrace shook his head.

‘No.’

‘No?’

‘Philosophy was already there.’

Blottisham looked at him.

‘What do you mean?’

‘The assumptions were already present in the questions we asked of the equations.’

Miss Stray nodded.

‘Philosophy does not begin after physics.’

‘It is already present in how physics is interpreted.’

Blottisham thought about this.

‘So when we say “the electron has a property”, we have already made a philosophical choice.’

‘Potentially.’

‘When we say “the observer measures the system”, we have already positioned the observer.’

‘Yes.’

‘When we say “the future is determined”, we've made another choice.’

‘Yes.’

‘When we ask what the wave function is really, we've made another.’

‘Exactly.’

Blottisham looked troubled.

‘Then common sense is full of philosophy.’

Quillibrace smiled.

‘Now you understand why I distrust common sense.’

‘You distrust everything.’

‘That is unfair.’

‘What do you trust?’

‘Well-conducted experiments.’

Miss Stray laughed.

‘A sensible limitation.’

Blottisham looked again at the blackboard.

‘But surely we can't just throw away the old philosophy.’

‘No.’

‘Why not?’

‘Because much of it remains useful.’

‘Things remain useful.’

‘Certainly.’

‘Properties remain useful.’

‘Certainly.’

‘Observers remain useful.’

‘Obviously.’

‘Prediction remains useful.’

‘Very.’

‘Pictures remain useful.’

‘Occasionally.’

Blottisham smiled.

‘So what changes?’

Quillibrace answered:

‘Their philosophical status.’

‘Explain.’

‘A thing need not be fundamental merely because it is useful to talk about things.’

‘A property need not exist independently merely because we can measure it.’

‘An observer need not be outside the world merely because objectivity is possible.’

‘A prediction need not imply determinism merely because it is accurate.’

‘And a theory need not be a literal picture merely because it is about reality.’

Blottisham sat back.

‘So we don't discard the vocabulary.’

‘No.’

‘We stop treating it as metaphysically innocent.’

Quillibrace smiled.

‘Precisely.’

Miss Stray looked at the clock.

‘Perhaps that is the deeper transition.’

‘Which is?’

‘We have been asking whether physics has discovered stranger things.’

Blottisham nodded.

‘And perhaps it has.’

‘But the more important question is whether physics has changed the relations among the concepts with which we describe those things.’

Blottisham looked at the board.

‘Thing.’

‘Relation.’

‘Property.’

‘Interaction.’

‘Observer.’

‘Participation.’

‘Future.’

‘Possibility.’

‘Theory.’

‘Constraint.’

He looked at Quillibrace.

‘That's a new grammar.’

‘Perhaps.’

‘And you still won't tell me what reality ultimately is.’

‘No.’

‘Why not?’

‘Because that would be another picture.’

Blottisham laughed.

‘You've thought of everything.’

‘Unfortunately.’

Miss Stray stood beside the blackboard.

‘Perhaps the achievement is not to discover a final interpretation.’

‘Then what is it?’

‘To become capable of asking a different question.’

Blottisham waited.

She continued:

‘Not: “How do we make this strange quantum world fit the reality we already understand?”’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘But: “What kind of reality would make the quantum world intelligible without forcing it back into the categories of classical common sense?”’

Blottisham was quiet.

Then he said:

‘That's harder.’

‘Yes.’

‘Much harder.’

‘Yes.’

‘But perhaps better.’

‘Yes.’

He looked around the Common Room.

‘So physics has outgrown its philosophy.’

Quillibrace shook his head.

‘Not quite.’

Blottisham frowned.

‘What then?’

‘Physics has outgrown a philosophy that no longer quite fits what physics has discovered.’

‘That sounds less dramatic.’

‘It is more accurate.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘And perhaps more hopeful.’

Blottisham looked at the five lines on the blackboard.

‘Because we don't have to choose between physics and philosophy.’

‘No.’

‘We need a philosophy capable of learning from physics.’

‘Yes.’

‘And physics needs to become aware of what its own success has made philosophically difficult.’

‘Yes.’

Blottisham nodded slowly.

‘So physics doesn't need philosophy in order to calculate.’

‘No.’

‘It needs philosophy in order to understand what its calculations have made possible to think.’

Quillibrace looked at him.

Miss Stray smiled.

‘Yes.’

Blottisham stood.

‘Then I think we've finished.’

Quillibrace raised an eyebrow.

‘Have we?’

‘The series.’

‘Ah.’

‘The five problems.’

‘Six discussions.’

‘Whatever.’

He looked at the blackboard one last time.

‘Things.’

‘Properties.’

‘Observers.’

‘Futures.’

‘Pictures.’

‘Relations.’

Quillibrace corrected him.

‘That is not quite symmetrical.’

‘I'm leaving.’

‘A wise decision.’

Blottisham reached the door.

Then he stopped.

‘Professor?’

‘Yes?’

‘If relations are fundamental...’

‘Yes?’

‘What is a Common Room?’

Quillibrace looked at the room.

Miss Stray looked at the three of them.

‘An excellent question.’

Blottisham smiled.

‘I'll leave you to it.’

He walked out.

There was a silence.

Quillibrace looked at Miss Stray.

‘Was that a philosophical question?’

‘Perhaps.’

‘Or an institutional one?’

‘Perhaps.’

‘Or merely a request for coffee?’

Miss Stray considered this.

‘At St Anselm's, I suspect those are not three different questions.’

Quillibrace looked at the blackboard.

Then at the empty doorway.

‘Perhaps,’ he said, ‘the institution has finally become intelligible.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘Don't push your luck.’

And the Common Room returned to its usual state of philosophical equilibrium: three chairs, one blackboard, several unanswered questions, and nobody quite certain which of them had been there first.

V. The Picture Department

Mr Blottisham entered the Common Room carrying a large framed photograph.

Professor Quillibrace looked up.

Miss Stray looked at the photograph.

‘What is that?’

‘Reality.’

Quillibrace regarded it carefully.

‘It appears to be a photograph.’

‘Exactly.’

‘Of what?’

‘Reality.’

‘Whose reality?’

Blottisham frowned.

‘Reality.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘That seems to settle it.’

‘Thank you.’

Blottisham placed the photograph on the mantelpiece.

‘I've been thinking about scientific realism.’

Quillibrace closed his book.

‘Ah.’

‘A successful scientific theory tells us what the world is really like.’

‘That is one way of putting it.’

‘The equations describe reality.’

‘Yes.’

‘The entities in the theory actually exist.’

‘Sometimes.’

‘The mathematical structure represents the underlying physical world.’

‘Yes.’

Blottisham pointed at the photograph.

‘And eventually, if the theory is good enough, we should be able to say what is actually there.’

Quillibrace looked at the photograph again.

‘Should we?’

‘Obviously.’

‘Why?’

Blottisham looked surprised.

‘Because otherwise what would the theory be telling us?’

‘Perhaps something other than what you have in mind.’

‘Such as?’

‘Relations.’

‘Relations between what?’

‘That is the question.’

Blottisham sat down.

‘You're making this unnecessarily difficult.’

‘That is one of my more consistent virtues.’

Miss Stray laughed.

‘Perhaps we should begin with the picture.’

‘The photograph?’

‘The demand for one.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘When physics becomes difficult to interpret, we naturally ask for a picture.’

‘Exactly.’

‘What is the electron really?’

‘Yes.’

‘What is the wave function really?’

‘Yes.’

‘What is happening during measurement?’

‘Yes.’

‘What is the particle doing when nobody is looking?’

‘Precisely.’

Quillibrace folded his hands.

‘And what do all these questions assume?’

Blottisham hesitated.

‘That there is an answer.’

‘More specifically?’

‘That there is something there.’

‘Good.’

‘Something physical.’

‘Good.’

‘Doing something.’

‘Excellent.’

Blottisham smiled.

‘You see?’

‘Yes.’

‘Then we're agreed.’

‘Not at all.’

Miss Stray looked at the photograph.

‘Perhaps the problem is that you have smuggled the answer into the question.’

Blottisham stared at her.

‘How?’

‘You ask what the electron is really doing.’

‘Yes.’

‘But that already assumes that the electron is the kind of thing that does things in the familiar sense.’

‘An electron certainly does something.’

‘Perhaps.’

‘It has a trajectory.’

Quillibrace raised an eyebrow.

‘Does it?’

‘Well... not always.’

‘That is the difficulty.’

Blottisham sighed.

‘Quantum mechanics.’

‘Quantum mechanics.’

‘In classical physics, at least, this was easy.’

‘Relatively.’

‘Newton gives us equations of motion.’

‘Yes.’

‘The equations describe bodies moving through space.’

‘Yes.’

‘We can draw the trajectories.’

‘Yes.’

‘The mathematics tells us what happens.’

‘And the picture tells us what is happening.’

Miss Stray nodded.

‘The two reinforce each other.’

‘Exactly.’

Quillibrace stood and took the photograph from the mantelpiece.

‘But quantum mechanics gives us a strange situation.’

‘The equations still work.’

‘Extremely well.’

‘So what's the problem?’

‘We have difficulty turning the equations into a single intuitive physical story.’

Blottisham looked at him.

‘But surely there is a story.’

‘Which one?’

‘The correct one.’

‘And how shall we identify it?’

‘By finding out what the wave function really is.’

Quillibrace smiled.

‘There it is.’

‘What?’

‘The picture department.’

Blottisham frowned.

‘What is wrong with asking what the wave function really is?’

‘Nothing.’

‘Then why are you smiling?’

‘Because the question is more complicated than it sounds.’

Miss Stray spoke.

‘Is the wave function a physical thing?’

‘Yes,’ said Blottisham.

‘Or is it a description of our information?’

‘Perhaps.’

‘Or a catalogue of possibilities?’

‘Perhaps.’

‘Or something physically real in a high-dimensional configuration space?’

‘Possibly.’

‘Does it collapse?’

‘Sometimes.’

‘Never?’

‘Depending on the interpretation.’

‘Does it describe one world?’

‘Yes.’

‘Or many?’

Blottisham looked annoyed.

‘Now you're just being difficult.’

‘I'm merely listing the possibilities.’

‘And there are too many.’

‘That may be the point.’

Quillibrace returned the photograph to the mantelpiece.

‘Notice what has happened.’

‘What?’

‘We began with one theory.’

‘Yes.’

‘One extraordinarily successful mathematical formalism.’

‘Yes.’

‘And immediately obtained several incompatible ontological stories.’

‘Yes.’

‘Yet the empirical predictions can remain the same.’

Blottisham considered this.

‘So the mathematics doesn't tell us which picture to choose.’

‘Not uniquely.’

‘Then perhaps we haven't understood the mathematics.’

‘Or perhaps we have misunderstood what understanding requires.’

There was a pause.

Blottisham looked suspicious.

‘That sounds dangerous.’

‘It often does.’

Miss Stray picked up a piece of chalk from the Common Room fireplace.

‘Perhaps a map would help.’

‘A map?’

She drew a small rectangle on the blackboard.

‘A map is a representation.’

‘Yes.’

‘Is it the landscape?’

‘No.’

‘Does that mean it is arbitrary?’

‘No.’

‘Why not?’

‘Because the landscape constrains it.’

‘Good.’

‘A bad map gets lost.’

‘Exactly.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘And a good map can be extraordinarily accurate without being a miniature landscape.’

Blottisham looked at the photograph.

‘So the equations are maps.’

‘Not necessarily.’

‘Models, then.’

‘Closer.’

‘But maps tell us about the territory.’

‘Yes.’

‘So scientific theories still tell us about reality.’

‘Certainly.’

‘Then we're back where we started.’

‘Not quite.’

Miss Stray turned from the board.

‘The distinction is between a formal structure that successfully tracks physical phenomena and a literal picture of what reality must be like behind that structure.’

Blottisham was silent.

‘That's rather fine.’

‘It is also important.’

‘So the theory can be true without giving us a picture.’

‘It can tell us something real without uniquely specifying a classical-style inventory of things.’

Blottisham looked pleased.

‘Structural realism.’

Quillibrace glanced at him.

‘You've been reading.’

‘Occasionally.’

‘The basic idea is that science may tell us more securely about the structure of physical reality than about the intrinsic nature of whatever occupies that structure.’

‘Relations rather than things.’

‘More carefully: relations and structural constraints may be what the theory secures most strongly.’

Blottisham frowned.

‘But a structure has to be a structure of something.’

‘Does it?’

‘Surely.’

‘Why?’

‘Because otherwise it's just a structure.’

‘And why is that insufficient?’

Blottisham paused.

‘Because...’

Miss Stray intervened.

‘Perhaps we're still imagining structure as a framework placed around independently existing objects.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘A relational conception would reverse the emphasis.’

‘How?’

‘Instead of beginning with things and asking how they are related, we might begin with the relations and ask how determinate things emerge within them.’

Blottisham looked at the blackboard.

‘We've been here before.’

‘Indeed.’

‘The thing problem.’

‘The property problem.’

‘The observer problem.’

‘And the future problem.’

Blottisham sighed.

‘You are building a rather large philosophical building.’

Quillibrace smiled.

‘We call it a series.’

Miss Stray laughed.

‘Perhaps the important point is that scientific progress need not be the gradual discovery of a better inventory.’

‘What else could it be?’

‘The discovery of increasingly adequate ways of articulating how physical possibilities are organised.’

Blottisham thought about this.

‘So the theory tells us what can happen.’

‘Among other things.’

‘And what relations constrain what can happen.’

‘Yes.’

‘And probabilities.’

‘Yes.’

‘And transformations.’

‘Yes.’

‘But not necessarily what everything really is underneath it all.’

‘Precisely.’

Blottisham stood.

‘I'm not sure I like that.’

‘You needn't.’

‘Science is supposed to discover reality.’

‘It does.’

‘Then why can't I have a picture of it?’

Quillibrace looked at him.

‘Because the world has not promised to resemble your imagination.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘Or your photograph.’

Blottisham looked at the framed picture.

‘It is a perfectly respectable photograph.’

‘Of what?’

‘Reality.’

‘Which reality?’

Blottisham sighed.

‘You are both very tiresome.’

Quillibrace sat down again.

‘There is another problem.’

‘Of course there is.’

‘Theories don't merely describe phenomena that were already sitting there waiting to be photographed.’

‘What do you mean?’

‘A theory can change what becomes observable.’

‘How?’

‘New concepts lead to new experiments.’

‘Yes.’

‘New instruments make new phenomena accessible.’

‘Yes.’

‘New mathematical structures allow us to distinguish patterns we could not previously see.’

Miss Stray added:

‘What can be observed depends partly upon the relations through which observation is organised.’

Blottisham looked at her.

‘So the theory changes the observer.’

‘Sometimes.’

‘And the observer changes the theory.’

‘Certainly.’

‘But then we're back to the observer problem.’

‘Yes.’

Blottisham looked increasingly suspicious.

‘You have arranged this.’

‘Arranged what?’

‘The entire afternoon.’

Quillibrace looked innocent.

‘I assure you, I have done almost nothing.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘Perhaps the theory does not stand outside the world and photograph it.’

‘What does it do, then?’

‘It becomes part of the relation through which the world is investigated.’

Blottisham considered this.

‘You mean the theory is an instrument.’

‘Not merely an instrument.’

‘A way of entering into relations with reality.’

Quillibrace nodded.

‘Better.’

‘But that sounds almost like instrumentalism.’

‘And that would be too easy.’

‘Why?’

‘Because saying that a theory is not a literal picture does not mean that anything goes.’

‘The world still constrains it.’

‘Exactly.’

‘Experiments can still prove it wrong.’

‘Yes.’

‘Its predictions can fail.’

‘Yes.’

‘Its mathematics can't simply be whatever we like.’

‘No.’

‘So reality still pushes back.’

‘Constantly.’

Miss Stray nodded.

‘That resistance is precisely why the theory tells us something real.’

Blottisham looked at the photograph again.

‘Then what is it telling us?’

Quillibrace paused.

‘That is the interesting question.’

‘You don't know.’

‘Not completely.’

‘Then what have we been doing all afternoon?’

‘Improving the question.’

Blottisham groaned.

‘Academics always say that when they don't know the answer.’

‘Sometimes we say it when we have found a better one.’

Miss Stray moved closer to the blackboard.

‘Perhaps the old demand was: “Show me the things that are really there.”’

‘And the new demand?’

‘“Show me the structure of relations, possibilities and constraints that the world permits us to uncover.”’

Blottisham thought about this.

‘That sounds less satisfying.’

‘Why?’

‘There are no things.’

‘There may be things.’

‘But they aren't the whole story.’

‘No.’

‘And there may be no final picture.’

‘Perhaps not.’

‘So what does scientific realism mean now?’

Quillibrace answered carefully.

‘That reality is not whatever our theories happen to say.’

‘Good.’

‘That the world resists our theories.’

‘Good.’

‘That successful theories reveal something about that resistance.’

‘Good.’

‘And that what they reveal need not take the form of a classical inventory of objects with intrinsic properties.’

Blottisham nodded slowly.

‘Reality without the picture.’

‘Perhaps.’

‘That's rather unsettling.’

‘Yes.’

Miss Stray looked at the photograph.

‘But there is something else.’

‘What?’

‘The demand for a final picture may actually make understanding harder.’

‘How?’

‘Because we become so concerned with what the equations are “really describing” that we stop asking what the equations have already forced us to abandon.’

Blottisham was quiet.

Quillibrace continued:

‘Perhaps quantum mechanics does not need to be translated back into classical ontology.’

‘Because classical ontology is the thing that has become inadequate.’

‘Exactly.’

‘So the question isn't “What picture lies behind the equations?”’

‘No.’

‘It's “What kind of reality do the equations require us to think?”’

Miss Stray nodded.

‘Yes.’

Blottisham looked at the photograph for a long time.

Then he took it down.

‘What are you doing?’

‘I think we should remove this.’

‘Why?’

‘It is beginning to give me the wrong idea.’

Quillibrace looked surprised.

‘Progress.’

Blottisham carried the photograph towards the door.

‘Where are you taking it?’

‘To the corridor.’

‘Why?’

‘It can hang there.’

‘Why there?’

‘Because the corridor is not reality.’

Quillibrace considered this.

‘An improvement.’

Blottisham stopped at the door.

‘Although...’

‘Yes?’

‘If the world doesn't come with a final picture...’

‘Yes?’

‘Then perhaps that's rather good.’

Miss Stray smiled.

‘Why?’

Blottisham shrugged.

‘It means we have somewhere to go.’

Quillibrace looked at him.

‘Where?’

Blottisham glanced at the photograph.

‘Into the world.’

And for once, nobody corrected him.