Wednesday, 19 August 2026

The Topology of Mattering: V. Affiliation — Finding Our Neighbours

We have now reached the point at which individuals begin to matter to one another in a rather different way.

A social topology consists of relations among value-organised participants.

An individual inhabits that topology through a particular history of participation.

That history develops a repertoire.

The repertoire makes some relations, distinctions and pathways more readily available than others.

But a topology is not simply a collection of isolated trajectories.

Participants can discover that they repeatedly respond to the same situations in compatible ways.

They can rely upon one another.

Coordinate their activity.

Share practices.

Recognise similar possibilities.

Gradually, a pattern of alignment can emerge.

This gives us our next question:

How does affiliation arise within a topology of mattering?

Affiliation is not the same as similarity

It would be tempting to say that people affiliate because they are similar.

But similarity is not enough.

Two people can have very similar repertoires and never interact.

Two people can have very different repertoires and nevertheless cooperate closely.

Affiliation is therefore better understood relationally.

Perhaps:

affiliation begins when participants become recurrently consequential to one another around sufficiently overlapping patterns of mattering.

The overlap need not be complete.

Nor need it be consciously recognised.

What matters first is that their participation fits together.

Finding our neighbours

The title of this post is deliberately spatial.

In a topology, a neighbour is not necessarily someone physically close.

A neighbour is someone whose position is relationally near.

In a social topology, this might mean that two participants:

  • depend upon similar relations;

  • participate in overlapping practices;

  • respond to similar situations;

  • share important pathways through the system;

  • or repeatedly affect one another's possibilities.

They may live on opposite sides of a city.

They may never meet.

Yet they can occupy neighbouring regions of social mattering.

Conversely, two people can work side by side while being topologically distant.

Physical proximity and social proximity are not the same thing.

Affiliation begins in coordination

Consider a very simple case.

Two people repeatedly find themselves needing to coordinate.

They discover that each can rely upon the other's response.

Their actions become mutually predictable.

A pattern develops.

The pattern makes further coordination easier.

Eventually, they may seek one another out because their repertoires fit the relation.

Nothing symbolic has necessarily happened yet.

The affiliation begins as a pattern of successful coupling.

Only later may someone call it friendship, partnership, alliance or membership.

Shared mattering

A stronger form of affiliation arises when participants repeatedly encounter situations in which similar things matter to them.

Again, we should be cautious.

This does not mean they possess identical values.

Two people may both care about a child's welfare for quite different reasons.

Two workers may both care about the success of an organisation while construing their own responsibilities differently.

Two citizens may both care about social stability while disagreeing profoundly about how stability should be achieved.

What they share may therefore be less a value itself than a region of mattering.

Their repertoires overlap around a particular configuration of consequences.

Overlapping repertoires

This gives repertoire a particularly important role.

Two repertoires need not be identical.

They only need sufficient overlap for participants to recognise one another's actions as intelligible and consequential within a shared field.

We might therefore think of affiliation as something like:

recurrent coupling supported by overlapping repertoires.

The overlap provides a basis for coordination.

The coordination strengthens the relationship.

The relationship creates further shared experience.

That experience can enlarge the overlap.

Affiliation can therefore become self-reinforcing.

A repertoire can expand through affiliation

Affiliation does not merely depend upon prior repertoire.

It can transform repertoire.

A person joins a musical ensemble and learns new ways of listening.

Someone enters a profession and acquires new practices.

A newcomer to a community learns its expectations.

A member of a political movement acquires its concepts and narratives.

The individual's repertoire expands through participation.

So the relation is recursive:

overlap enables affiliation → affiliation expands repertoire → expanded repertoire enables deeper affiliation

A group can therefore become more internally coherent over time without its members ever becoming identical.

The emergence of a "we"

At some point, recurrent affiliation can become collectively recognisable.

Participants begin to distinguish:

we

from:

they.

This is an important transition.

The relational pattern has acquired a boundary.

The boundary need not initially be symbolic.

It may simply consist in differences of participation:

who helps whom;

who shares whose practices;

who can rely upon whom;

who responds to whose signals.

But once the pattern becomes salient, it can become available for explicit construal.

The social "we" can acquire a name.

From relation to membership

This is where the distinction between affiliation and membership becomes useful.

Affiliation can exist before formal membership.

A person can participate in the relations of a group without possessing an official category.

Conversely, someone can have formal membership without strong affiliation.

A member may rarely participate.

A participant may not be formally recognised.

The topology therefore gives us a more fundamental concept:

membership is a symbolic or institutional recognition of an already existing pattern of affiliation.

That is a hypothesis worth testing rather than a universal law.

But it allows us to keep the order of emergence clear.

Boundaries become meaningful

Once a stable "we" develops, a boundary becomes more salient.

Some participants are routinely included.

Others are excluded.

Some can enter easily.

Others require initiation.

Some are permanently outside.

The boundary may be based upon practice, trust, kinship, competence, geography, law or symbolic identity.

The topology gives us the relational substrate.

Meaning can later turn the boundary into a category:

insider / outsider,

citizen / foreigner,

member / non-member,

colleague / stranger.

The boundary has become symbolically legible.

Affiliation can occur without a name

This is important because it keeps the argument below the level of explicit ideology.

A group of people can repeatedly cooperate around a common task without naming themselves as a group.

A neighbourhood can develop shared practices without a formal organisation.

Friends can form an enduring social unit without a declaration.

A movement can exist before it chooses a name.

The pattern of mattering can precede its symbolic articulation.

This is another instance of:

mattering → meaning

rather than the reverse.

But affiliation is not always harmonious

Nor does affiliation require agreement.

Participants can disagree strongly and still occupy a shared region of mattering.

Indeed, some groups depend upon disagreement.

A scientific community contains competing hypotheses.

A political movement contains factions.

A family contains conflict.

An organisation contains disputes.

What holds the affiliation together is not identity of opinion.

It is a sufficiently stable relational configuration.

People continue to matter to one another in ways that sustain participation.

Conflict can strengthen a boundary

Sometimes disagreement sharpens affiliation.

A dispute makes differences visible.

Participants discover what they will defend.

The boundary between groups becomes more salient.

The groups may become more internally coordinated as a result.

This can create a paradox:

conflict between affiliations can strengthen affiliation within each.

The topology is therefore not necessarily smoother when relations are harmonious.

Competition and opposition can produce highly stable regions.

Affiliation can be layered

A person can belong to several overlapping affiliations.

Family.

Profession.

Friendship.

Local community.

Cultural tradition.

Political movement.

Each affiliation is a different region or pattern within the broader topology.

The overlaps can be extensive.

Sometimes they reinforce one another.

Sometimes they conflict.

A person can therefore experience social life as participation in several intersecting topologies of mattering.

This is one reason simple group categories can be misleading.

The same individual can occupy quite different relational positions in different systems.

Nested and overlapping affiliations

Some affiliations are nested.

A person belongs to a department within a university, which belongs to a university, which belongs to a national system.

Others overlap without nesting.

A person can belong simultaneously to a profession and a political movement.

The boundaries cross.

The topology is therefore unlikely to resemble a collection of isolated clusters.

It may be better imagined as a set of overlapping regions and pathways.

Why shared values can mislead us

This gives us a reason to be cautious about statements such as:

"These people share the value of freedom."

Perhaps they do.

But that tells us little about the structure of their affiliation.

What matters is what relations surround that value.

Freedom may be connected to:

autonomy,

non-interference,

property,

self-government,

collective liberation,

protection from domination,

opportunity,

or something else.

The word alone does not locate someone in the topology.

Their surrounding configuration does.

The same value, different neighbourhoods

This may become especially important when we eventually approach political affiliation.

Two groups can use the same vocabulary while inhabiting different topological regions.

Both may speak of:

freedom,

equality,

security,

justice.

But the relations through which these matter may differ radically.

One group's freedom may depend upon reducing external constraint.

Another's may depend upon increasing collective capacity.

One group's security may depend upon stable hierarchy.

Another's upon social provision.

The surface vocabulary can be shared.

The topology around it can be different.

Affiliation as a trajectory

Affiliation may also be dynamic.

People can move between groups.

They can become more deeply involved.

They can drift away.

They can occupy several affiliations at once.

A group can itself move through the social topology as circumstances change.

So affiliation should not be represented simply as a fixed point.

It may be better understood as a trajectory of recurrent participation.

What matters is not merely where someone is, but where their relations are taking them.

The role of transitions

This raises an important question.

What allows someone to move from one region to another?

Sometimes a new relationship.

Sometimes a change in circumstance.

Sometimes a new repertoire.

Sometimes a crisis.

Sometimes an institution deliberately recruits new participants.

Sometimes an affiliation itself creates the repertoire needed for entry.

The transition is therefore not merely spatial.

It is a transformation of the individual's capacity to participate.

Affiliation and learning

This means that affiliation is partly educational.

To join a group is often to learn its ways of acting.

Its expectations.

Its practices.

Its distinctions.

Its history.

Its language.

Its symbols.

The repertoire expands.

The boundary becomes more intelligible.

The participant becomes more deeply coupled to the group.

This helps explain why mature affiliations can become remarkably resilient.

Leaving them is not simply a matter of changing an opinion.

It may require reorganising a large portion of one's repertoire.

Affiliation can become identity

At some point, affiliation can become symbolically construed as an identity.

A participant is no longer simply someone who repeatedly occupies a relational pattern.

They can say:

I am one of them.

The affiliation now has a symbolic form.

The collective can acquire a name.

A flag.

A story.

A ritual.

A set of explicit norms.

The topology has received a symbolic map.

This is one of the major transitions we will explore next.

But identity can also reshape affiliation

Once affiliation has become symbolic, the relation feeds back.

A name can recruit new participants.

A symbol can strengthen coordination.

A narrative can reinterpret the group's history.

A boundary can become more rigid.

An institution can formalise membership.

The symbolic articulation can therefore change the social topology that produced it.

This is the beginning of the feedback from meaning to mattering.

Towards politics

We are now close to a question that has been waiting in the background.

Political affiliations are among the most symbolically elaborate forms of social alignment.

People join parties, movements and causes.

They inherit narratives.

They learn concepts.

They adopt symbols.

They recognise allies.

They identify opponents.

But beneath these explicit forms, there are patterns of mattering.

Some things matter enough to coordinate action.

Some relationships are regarded as just.

Others as threatening.

Some forms of dependence are accepted.

Others rejected.

Political affiliation may therefore be a symbolically elaborated configuration of social mattering.

We are not yet ready to test this.

But the topology gives us a place to begin.

The emergence of a social "neighbourhood"

We can now return to our title.

Finding our neighbours does not mean discovering people who think exactly as we do.

It means discovering participants whose patterns of mattering overlap sufficiently with ours to support recurrent affiliation.

A neighbour may disagree with us.

They may occupy a different role.

They may have a different repertoire.

What brings us together is that our trajectories through the social topology repeatedly intersect.

That is a much richer conception of social belonging than shared opinion.

What we have established

We began with a social topology constituted by relations among value-organised participants.

Individuals inhabit it through repertoires.

Some repertoires overlap.

Overlapping capacities make recurrent coordination easier.

Coordination produces shared experience.

Shared experience can stabilise affiliation.

Affiliation can become a socially recognised "we".

The "we" can acquire boundaries.

The boundaries can become symbolically articulated as membership and identity.

And once they do, the symbolic forms can feed back into the topology.

The movement is therefore:

topology → repertoire → overlap → recurrent affiliation → symbolic articulation → transformed topology

The next question

We have deliberately stopped just before the threshold of explicit meaning.

But now that threshold is unavoidable.

What happens when the patterns through which people matter to one another become named, narrated, classified and symbolised?

When an affiliation acquires a concept of itself?

When a social relation becomes a value in words?

When a "we" becomes an identity?

When a pattern of mattering becomes an ideology?

That is the transition Halliday leaves us with when he says that a semiotic system is a social system in which value has been further transformed into meaning.

The next question is therefore:

How does mattering become meaning?

The Topology of Mattering: IV. Living in the Topology

A social system can have a structure.

It can contain dependencies, boundaries, centres and peripheries. Some relations may be dense, others sparse. Some pathways may be familiar, others difficult to traverse.

But the structure exists only because particular organisms participate in it.

So we need to ask a more personal question:

How does an individual organism inhabit a topology of mattering?

The answer cannot simply be that the individual occupies a position on a social map.

No organism encounters the entire social system at once.

Each has a history.

Each has a particular set of relationships.

Each has developed particular capacities for responding to, recognising and participating in the relations that surround it.

This is where the concept of repertoire becomes important.

The social world is larger than any participant

A social system contains more possibilities than any one participant can realise.

There are roles they do not occupy.

Practices they do not know.

Relationships they do not enter.

Distinctions they do not readily make.

Institutions whose workings they barely understand.

Meanings that have never become part of their experience.

The social system therefore contains a much larger potential than any individual's participation in it.

This is where the distinction between collective reservoir and individual repertoire becomes useful.

The collective system provides a reservoir of available possibilities.

An individual develops a repertoire through their particular history of participation.

The two are related, but they are not identical.

A repertoire is not a possession

We should be careful about what we mean by repertoire.

It is tempting to think of it as a collection of things stored inside an individual.

But that would make it sound like an inventory.

A repertoire is better understood as a historically developed capacity for participation.

It includes distinctions someone can readily make.

Patterns they can recognise.

Practices they can perform.

Relations they can anticipate.

Ways of construing what happens around them.

It is therefore less like a library and more like a set of possibilities made available through previous participation.

The collective reservoir

The social system provides the wider reservoir.

A language has possibilities that no individual speaker exhausts.

A culture contains practices that no individual knows.

A profession contains procedures that some practitioners never encounter.

A political system contains forms of participation that many citizens never use.

The collective reservoir is therefore larger than any repertoire.

This is not a defect.

It is what allows social differentiation.

Participants can specialise.

They can occupy different roles.

They can develop different capacities.

They can learn from one another.

The social system depends partly upon the fact that its participants do not all know or do the same things.

Repertoire as differentiated access

This gives us a first approximation:

A repertoire provides differentiated access to the possibilities available within a social system.

But "access" should not be understood too literally.

A person may be aware that a practice exists without knowing how to participate in it.

They may occupy a social position that formally gives them access to something without possessing the repertoire required to use it.

Conversely, someone may develop a repertoire that allows them to move between regions of the topology that are difficult for others to navigate.

Repertoire therefore mediates the relation between what the social system makes possible and what an individual can actually construe and do.

Learning to move

This suggests a useful image.

A social topology contains pathways.

An individual's repertoire affects which pathways they can recognise and traverse.

A child entering a community does not initially know the whole structure.

They learn.

How to approach others.

When to speak.

What counts as appropriate.

What kinds of help can be requested.

Which relationships are close.

Which boundaries should not be crossed.

Which actions have consequences.

Much of this learning does not begin with explicit rules.

It begins with participation.

The individual learns the topology by living through its mattering-relations.

Mattering before explicit meaning

This is an important continuation of our earlier argument.

A child may learn that a certain action upsets another person long before being able to formulate a theory of that person's emotional state.

They may learn that some adults can be approached directly while others cannot.

They may learn that certain behaviours attract approval or disapproval.

The relations first become significant through consequences.

Only later are they necessarily named and symbolically articulated.

The individual repertoire therefore develops partly through experience of mattering before it becomes a repertoire of explicit meanings.

Repertoire is not the same as preference

Another distinction is important.

If someone repeatedly participates in a particular region of the social topology, that does not necessarily mean they prefer it in some simple psychological sense.

Their participation may arise from dependence.

Necessity.

Habit.

Opportunity.

Role.

Constraint.

Affection.

Obligation.

Or many things at once.

A repertoire describes what forms of participation have become available and practised.

It does not by itself tell us what the individual consciously prefers.

The topology constrains the repertoire

The relation is therefore reciprocal.

An individual develops a repertoire through participation in a social system.

But the structure of that system also constrains what repertoire can readily develop.

Some practices are accessible.

Others are difficult.

Some forms of knowledge circulate freely.

Others are restricted.

Some positions expose people to many social relations.

Others isolate them.

The topology therefore shapes the conditions under which repertoires develop.

The repertoire transforms the topology

But the reverse also occurs.

An individual can introduce a new practice.

Make a new connection.

Carry a practice from one region into another.

Teach someone else.

Refuse an established role.

Invent a new way of coordinating.

The repertoire can therefore become a source of structural change.

The relation is recursive:

topology → participation → repertoire → altered participation → transformed topology

The individual is not merely located within the social system.

They can help reorganise it.

Bridges and repertoire

This gives us a particularly interesting interpretation of the bridges we discussed in the previous post.

A bridge connects regions of a topology.

But what enables an individual to become a bridge?

Often, a repertoire spanning more than one region.

Someone who participates in two communities may understand practices that are unfamiliar to each.

They can translate expectations.

Recognise correspondences.

Carry information.

Coordinate action.

Their significance does not arise simply from being physically present in two places.

It arises from possessing a repertoire that allows them to participate meaningfully in both.

Boundary crossing

The same principle applies at social boundaries.

A boundary separates regions of mattering.

Crossing it may require learning another way of acting.

A person entering a profession acquires new practices.

Someone entering another culture learns new expectations.

Someone moving between social classes may encounter different repertoires of language, conduct and interaction.

The topology may remain continuous across the boundary.

But the participant's repertoire has to change for the new region to become navigable.

This suggests that social transformation can sometimes begin with repertoire expansion.

Repertoire can be narrow or broad

Participants can have very different repertoire breadth.

A highly specialised role may involve deep competence in one region of the topology and relatively little access to others.

A mediator may have a broader repertoire spanning several domains.

A marginal participant may have partial access to several regions without being fully integrated into any.

Again, breadth should not be equated with superiority.

A narrow repertoire can be highly effective in a stable environment.

A broad repertoire can become valuable when environments change.

The adaptive significance depends upon the topology and its dynamics.

Repertoire and uncertainty

A changing topology creates a particularly interesting problem.

A participant whose repertoire is well suited to the current configuration may become less effective when the structure shifts.

A new technology can make old practices less useful.

A new institution can create unfamiliar roles.

A political crisis can alter social boundaries.

A migration can bring previously separate repertoires into contact.

The individual then faces a mismatch between established repertoire and changed topology.

Adaptation may require repertoire transformation.

Innovation begins here

This gives us a possible mechanism for social innovation.

A participant encounters a problem that cannot be handled easily with their existing repertoire.

They experiment.

A new practice works.

Others adopt it.

The practice becomes part of the collective reservoir.

The topology changes.

Future participants now inherit a different field of possibilities.

So:

mismatch → innovation → uptake → expanded reservoir → transformed topology

This is not guaranteed.

Many innovations disappear.

But when one persists, the social system changes.

The repertoire is historical

An individual's repertoire therefore has a history.

It is shaped by what they have encountered.

Whom they have interacted with.

Which practices they have learned.

Which regions of the social system they have occupied.

Which transitions they have survived.

This history matters because it changes future possibilities.

Two people entering the same social situation can construe it differently because their repertoires differ.

They do not encounter exactly the same social topology.

They encounter the topology through different histories of participation.

The same topology, different worlds

This gives us a useful formulation:

There may be one social topology, but many experienced pathways through it.

The topology is relational and collective.

The repertoire is individual and historical.

The two should not be collapsed.

A person does not carry a private topology inside their head.

Nor does the collective topology determine exactly what the individual experiences.

The repertoire mediates between them.

Where affiliation begins

We are now approaching the question of affiliation.

People do not necessarily affiliate simply because they occupy the same location in a formal social structure.

Nor do they need identical repertoires.

Affiliation may become possible when participants have sufficient overlap in the ways they can participate in and construe particular regions of mattering.

Two people may have very different lives but share enough repertoire to recognise one another as participants in the same social world.

Conversely, people may share a formal institution while possessing such different repertoires that their experiences of it are quite different.

Affiliation therefore may involve overlap rather than identity.

Repertoire overlap

Imagine two participants whose repertoires overlap strongly around cooperation, mutual assistance and collective responsibility.

They may readily recognise one another's actions as compatible.

Another participant may occupy the same institution but have a repertoire organised around competition, autonomy and individual achievement.

The institutional topology is shared.

The repertoires are different.

The same interaction can therefore matter differently to the participants.

This is where social differentiation becomes increasingly interesting.

But we must not turn repertoire into ideology

At this stage, we should resist interpreting repertoires as explicit belief systems.

A repertoire can include practices long before anyone formulates a doctrine.

A person may know how to cooperate without possessing a theory of cooperation.

They may know how to behave in a hierarchy without believing hierarchy is desirable.

They may navigate a social boundary without being able to explain it.

Explicit ideology comes later.

Repertoire is about capacity for participation and construal.

From repertoire to symbolic articulation

Eventually, however, some of these distinctions can become available for explicit symbolic construal.

People name relations.

Describe roles.

Tell stories about their position.

Develop concepts of justice, authority, freedom, belonging or obligation.

A practice becomes a norm.

A relationship becomes an identity.

A pattern of mattering becomes a value.

The repertoire becomes increasingly semiotic.

This is where the social and semiotic levels begin to approach one another.

The collective reservoir changes

When an individual innovation is taken up by others, something important happens.

The new possibility no longer belongs only to one repertoire.

It enters the collective reservoir.

Others can now learn it.

Teach it.

Modify it.

Combine it with existing practices.

What was once an individual possibility becomes a collective resource.

This is one way social systems evolve their potentials.

The collective reservoir changes through the experiences and innovations of participants.

The social system learns

We can therefore describe social learning as a transformation of the collective reservoir.

Participants experiment.

Some practices succeed.

Others disappear.

Some distinctions become important.

Others lose relevance.

The reservoir changes.

The topology may change as a result.

And new repertoires develop within the transformed environment.

The process is recursive:

individual participation → innovation → collective uptake → transformed reservoir → new individual repertoires

The topology is therefore inhabited, not merely occupied

This may be the most important conclusion of the post.

A social topology is not a map on which people sit like counters.

It is a dynamic field of relations that participants learn to navigate.

They discover pathways.

Encounter boundaries.

Develop competencies.

Form dependencies.

Build bridges.

Become attached to regions.

Sometimes become trapped within them.

Sometimes discover routes between them.

Their repertoires make some trajectories more probable than others.

And their activity can alter the topology itself.

Before political affiliation

This is why we still should not begin with political categories.

Before someone can identify with a political movement, they have already acquired a repertoire of ways of construing social relations.

They have learned what kinds of dependence feel normal.

What kinds of hierarchy are intelligible.

What kinds of cooperation are expected.

Which boundaries matter.

Which forms of change are familiar or alarming.

Only later do these patterns become articulated as explicit political positions.

Political affiliation is therefore unlikely to be the beginning of the process.

It is a symbolically elaborated form of prior participation in social mattering.

A possible dynamic

We can now see a possible pathway:

social topology → participation → repertoire → repertoire overlap → affiliation

But the reverse must also remain visible:

affiliation → coordinated participation → altered social relations → transformed topology

This is why affiliation will need to be treated as dynamic rather than merely categorical.

An affiliation can change the relations that made it possible.

And now the biological substrate returns

There is another reason to keep the Edelman connection in view.

An individual repertoire does not float free of biology.

Participants remain organisms with value systems.

Their needs, sensitivities and adaptive histories shape the conditions under which social relations become consequential.

But social participation transforms the contexts in which those value systems operate.

The relation is therefore not:

biology or culture.

It is:

biological organisation participating within socially organised environments.

The social topology becomes part of the organism's world of significance.

What we have established

We began with a collective topology of mattering.

We have now added the individual participant.

Each participant has a value system.

Through history, they develop a repertoire.

The repertoire provides differentiated capacities for recognising, construal and participation within the social topology.

The topology constrains repertoire development.

Repertoire enables particular pathways through the topology.

Participation can alter the collective reservoir.

The reservoir can then alter future repertoires.

The resulting loop is:

topology ↔ repertoire ↔ participation

And from the overlaps among repertoires, new forms of affiliation may emerge.

The next question

But affiliation is not simply a matter of having similar repertoires.

People may share only part of their repertoire.

They may participate in the same region of mattering for different reasons.

They may move into new regions together.

They may discover that their repertoires overlap in some respects while diverging in others.

So what exactly makes an affiliation stable?

What makes a collection of participants begin to recognise themselves as a we?

And how does an alignment of mattering become a named social formation?

That is the next question:

How do we find our neighbours in a topology of mattering?

The Topology of Mattering: III. The Shape of Mattering

We have now reached the point at which we can ask what, precisely, we mean by social structure.

We began with individual organisms, each organised by its own system of biological value.

A difference produced by one organism can matter to another.

Such a difference can function as a signal.

The receiving organism's value system is engaged.

Its response changes the conditions encountered by others.

When such interactions recur, they can become coordinated patterns.

And when those patterns persist and differentiate, collective forms become social structures.

This gives us a provisional description:

social structure is an organisation of relations among value-organised participants.

But that description leaves something out.

Relations have a shape.

Some are close.

Some are distant.

Some are reciprocal.

Some are asymmetric.

Some connect many participants.

Others connect only a few.

Some are stable.

Some are fragile.

Some changes propagate widely.

Others remain local.

If social structure is an organisation of mattering-relations, then perhaps we should ask:

What is the shape of mattering?

That is where topology enters our investigation.

From landscape to topology

We have sometimes spoken informally of a value landscape.

It is a useful image.

We can imagine different things mattering differently, with participants situated in different regions of a field of significance.

But a landscape can tempt us into thinking in terms of locations and quantities.

Topology suggests something else.

A topology is concerned less with how much of something there is than with how things are related.

Proximity.

Connectivity.

Boundaries.

Continuity.

Paths.

Regions.

Transitions.

For our purposes, the important question is therefore not:

How much does this participant value X?

but:

How is this participant related to others through what matters?

The object of inquiry is the structure of the relations.

Mattering is relational

Suppose organism A's behaviour affects organism B.

B responds according to its own value system.

That response affects A or another participant.

The important feature is not simply that A and B have values.

It is that their value-sensitive organisations have become coupled.

A's possibilities depend partly upon B.

B's possibilities depend partly upon A.

Repeated coupling creates a relation.

The relation can be weak or strong.

Temporary or persistent.

Symmetrical or asymmetrical.

Central or peripheral.

A topology of mattering would therefore begin with these connections.

Not all relations are equal

Consider two participants who occasionally interact.

Their relation may be consequential, but only weakly integrated into their wider activity.

Now consider two organisms whose survival depends heavily upon one another's behaviour.

The relation is very different.

The consequences are stronger.

The interaction is more recurrent.

More future possibilities depend upon maintaining it.

The two participants are, in a topological sense, more tightly connected.

This gives us a useful distinction:

social proximity need not mean physical proximity.

Two people can be physically distant but deeply interdependent.

Two people can be side by side but socially unrelated.

Topology allows us to describe the structure of dependence without confusing it with spatial distance.

Reciprocity and asymmetry

Some mattering-relations are reciprocal.

A influences B.

B influences A.

Others are strongly asymmetric.

One participant's actions substantially affect another's possibilities, while the reverse effect is much weaker.

Parent and offspring provide one kind of asymmetry.

Dominance relations provide another.

A specialist whose activity affects an entire organisation may occupy another.

Asymmetry does not by itself make a relation pathological or unjust.

It simply tells us something about its structure.

The topology therefore needs to accommodate direction, not merely connection.

Dependency

Dependency may be one of the most important dimensions.

Suppose B can maintain an important part of its activity only because A performs some recurrent function.

Then A occupies a particular structural position.

If A disappears, B's possibilities change sharply.

The relation has high consequence.

Conversely, A may depend little upon B.

The relation is asymmetric.

A topology of mattering would therefore need to represent not only that A and B are connected, but how their possibilities depend upon one another.

This is where social structure begins to become more than a network diagram.

Dense regions

Now imagine a cluster of participants whose possibilities are tightly interconnected.

Many of their activities matter to one another.

Changes in one part of the cluster affect many others.

They share practices.

Resources circulate.

Expectations develop.

The group has become a dense region of mattering.

Families may form such regions.

Workplaces.

Communities.

Professional networks.

Institutions.

But the topology need not presume that every member is equally connected to every other.

The internal structure may contain centres, peripheries, bridges and boundaries.

Boundaries

Every organised system has some way of distinguishing what belongs within it from what lies beyond it.

A boundary need not be a physical wall.

It can be a pattern of mattering.

Inside the boundary, actions have many recurrent consequences.

Outside it, those consequences may be weaker or differently organised.

A colony distinguishes inside from outside.

A family distinguishes members from strangers.

A profession distinguishes participants through competence and role.

A nation distinguishes citizens from outsiders.

These boundaries can be porous.

They can change.

They can overlap.

But they are still relational structures.

Bridges

Some participants connect regions that would otherwise be relatively distant.

They move between groups.

They carry information.

Resources.

Practices.

They may belong meaningfully to more than one social domain.

Such participants can act as bridges in the topology.

A bridge can be structurally important precisely because its disappearance disconnects regions that were previously linked.

Again, this is not simply about physical movement.

It is about the circulation of consequential relations.

Bottlenecks

The reverse is also possible.

A system may depend heavily upon one small point of connection.

A particular participant, role or institution may mediate many pathways.

If that connection fails, many other relations are disrupted.

The topology therefore contains not only dense regions and bridges but bottlenecks.

This suggests that social structure has something like a relational geometry of vulnerability.

Some parts are robust.

Others are fragile.

Some disturbances remain local.

Others propagate.

The propagation of change

This brings us to an especially important property of a topology.

A change in one place can alter possibilities elsewhere.

A small disturbance can remain local.

Or it can spread through densely coupled relations.

A workplace can absorb the loss of one participant.

Or a highly specialised participant may be difficult to replace.

A shortage in one part of a system can propagate through dependencies.

A change in one institution can affect several others.

The topology therefore describes not merely who is connected, but how consequences can travel.

From structure to dynamics

So far we have mostly been describing a structure.

But social systems are not static.

Relations change.

Participants enter and leave.

Dependencies strengthen or weaken.

Boundaries move.

New connections form.

Old ones disappear.

A topology therefore gives us a map of possible and actual relations, but we also need to know how the system moves through that relational space.

This is where dynamics enters.

We can distinguish:

topology — the organisation of possible relational configurations;

dynamics — the trajectories by which the system moves among them.

A social formation can therefore retain a recognisable structure while continuously changing its state.

Stability

Some regions of a social topology are relatively stable.

Once established, the relations tend to reproduce themselves.

People know what is expected.

Resources circulate predictably.

Roles are familiar.

A change in one part is absorbed without reorganising the whole.

Such a configuration may function as an attractor in a loose sense: the system repeatedly returns to a similar pattern.

We should be cautious with mathematical terminology here.

But the intuition is useful.

Social structures can have preferred modes of organisation.

Instability

Other configurations may be fragile.

Small changes can produce large consequences.

A resource shortage can reorganise relationships.

A conflict can split a group.

A technological innovation can make an established role unnecessary.

A new dependency can create a new centre of influence.

A system may therefore move rapidly from one configuration to another.

The topology is not simply a set of stable regions.

It contains transitions.

A social system can survive by changing

This leads to an important distinction.

Persistence does not necessarily mean remaining in the same configuration.

A system can preserve what matters to it by changing how its relations are organised.

A colony reallocates labour.

A community changes its practices.

An institution reforms itself.

A society adopts a new technology.

The structure changes so that some underlying valued conditions can be maintained.

This will become important later when we consider the tension between reproduction and transformation.

For now, the important point is:

stability can itself involve movement through the topology.

What exactly is being valued?

We have been deliberately avoiding a list of abstract values.

That remains important.

The topology should not begin with categories such as:

freedom,

security,

equality,

loyalty,

tradition.

Those may eventually become important.

But they are already forms of symbolic articulation.

Our starting point is more concrete:

What consequences among participants become recurrently organised?

Who enables whose activity?

Who constrains whose possibilities?

Who depends upon whom?

Who protects whom?

Who competes with whom?

Who coordinates with whom?

These relations constitute the topology before we name them as values.

Social mattering as pattern

This gives us a more precise definition:

Social mattering is not a collective feeling or a shared substance. It is the patterned organisation of how the value-sensitive activity of one participant affects the possibilities of others.

A topology of mattering is therefore a model of those patterns.

This keeps individual and social levels distinct.

Individuals retain their own value systems.

The social system consists in the organisation of their consequential coupling.

That distinction will remain essential.

Topology is not yet meaning

Nor have we crossed into the semiotic realm.

A relation can have a structure without being symbolically construed.

A dependency can exist without having a name.

A hierarchy can operate without a theory of hierarchy.

A boundary can matter without being represented as a boundary.

The symbolic articulation comes later.

First there is the structure.

Then there is the possibility of construing that structure as meaning.

This preserves Halliday's sequence:

biological value → social value → meaning

while giving the middle term a more differentiated account.

A topology can contain multiple overlapping structures

Another important possibility follows.

A participant does not have to occupy one social topology.

The same person may simultaneously be part of a family network, professional network, friendship network, civic network and political network.

These structures may overlap.

Their regions may intersect.

Their expectations may conflict.

One relation may strengthen another.

Another may cut across it.

Social life may therefore consist not of one topology but of multiple partially overlapping topologies of mattering.

This could become important later when we consider affiliation.

Affiliation is not just membership

A named group tells us relatively little about how someone participates in it.

Two people can belong to the same organisation while occupying quite different relational positions.

They may depend upon different participants.

Have different responsibilities.

Have different pathways of influence.

Possess different repertoires.

Their formal membership is the same.

Their trajectories through the topology are not.

This suggests that affiliation will need to be treated dynamically.

Towards the individual

We have therefore reached the point at which the topology cannot be studied without asking how individual organisms participate in it.

The social structure provides a field of possibilities.

But participants do not all experience or construe that field in the same way.

Their histories differ.

Their capacities differ.

Their repertoires differ.

Some relations are highly familiar.

Others are barely accessible.

Some pathways are easy to recognise.

Others require learning.

The next step is therefore to bring the individual back into the picture.

Repertoire

This is where the distinction between collective reservoir and individual repertoire becomes useful.

A social system can contain a large potential of practices, meanings and distinctions.

No individual participates in all of them.

Each person develops a repertoire through their history of participation.

That repertoire gives them particular capacities to recognise and construe the social world.

In our present context, we can provisionally ask:

Does an individual's repertoire mediate how they participate in the topology of mattering?

Perhaps some regions of the topology are more accessible to them than others.

Some pathways are familiar.

Others are difficult.

Some distinctions are immediately salient.

Others barely available.

We should treat this as a question, not yet a conclusion.

The topology and the repertoire are reciprocal

The relation should not be one-way.

A participant's repertoire is shaped by their history within the social system.

But their participation can also change the system.

A new practice may spread.

A new relation may become established.

An innovation may alter the collective reservoir.

A participant can therefore transform the topology through their activity.

We have another recursive relation:

topology → repertoire → participation → altered topology

This recursion will become increasingly important as the series develops.

Before political affiliation

We can now see why it is premature to begin with politics.

Political affiliations are already symbolically elaborated patterns of social mattering.

They have histories.

Institutions.

Identities.

Narratives.

Symbols.

Before we can understand them, we should understand the relational structures within which they emerge.

Otherwise we risk mistaking the symbolic map for the territory.

And yet the map matters

This does not mean symbols are unimportant.

Quite the opposite.

Once a social relation becomes symbolically construed, the symbolic form can become part of the social structure itself.

A category can create a boundary.

A title can organise a role.

A legal designation can change dependencies.

An identity can coordinate affiliation.

Meaning can alter mattering.

We will eventually return to this feedback.

But first we need to understand the topology that meaning enters.

What we have established

We began with individual value systems.

Signals couple them.

Recurrent coupling generates collective form.

Persistent patterns become social structure.

Social structure has relational shape.

It contains:

regions,

boundaries,

dependencies,

asymmetries,

bridges,

bottlenecks,

pathways,

attractors,

transitions.

Together, these suggest that social mattering may be describable as a dynamic topology.

We should still be cautious.

We have not yet demonstrated that a formal topological model is possible.

We have identified a kind of structure for which topology might be a useful mathematical and conceptual language.

That is enough for now.

The next question

But there is a problem.

A topology belongs to a social system as a whole.

Individuals participate in it differently.

They do not possess the same histories, capacities or repertoires.

Some can recognise pathways that others cannot.

Some occupy several regions simultaneously.

Some can move between regions.

Some are confined by the structure.

Some transform it.

So the next question is:

How does an individual inhabit a topology of mattering?

The Topology of Mattering: II. From Coordination to Collective Form

In the previous post, we began with a distinction that will remain important throughout this series.

An organism has its own system of biological value.

A difference can matter to that organism because of its consequences for the organism's own organisation.

When another organism enters the picture, something new becomes possible.

One organism's state or behaviour can alter the conditions under which another acts.

A consequential difference can function as a signal.

Repeated signalling can produce coordination.

And when such interactions become recurrently organised, something larger can emerge:

a collective form.

But we need to be precise about what this means.

A collective form is not necessarily a new organism with a shared value system.

The organisms retain their own value systems.

What changes is the organisation of the relations among them.

This is where eusocial insects become particularly revealing.

A colony is more than a crowd

An ant colony, bee colony or termite colony contains many organisms.

But simply adding the organisms together does not explain the colony.

What matters is the organisation of their relations.

Some individuals forage.

Some care for young.

Some defend the colony.

Some reproduce.

Others perform different tasks depending upon circumstances.

The pattern is not fixed in every detail.

Individuals respond to local conditions.

Tasks can change.

Signals circulate.

The environment changes.

The collective organisation is continually produced through interactions among organisms whose own behaviour remains value-sensitive.

The colony is not an organism in miniature.

It is a collective pattern generated through relations among organisms.

Halliday's example

This is especially interesting because Halliday himself used eusocial insects as an example when discussing social systems.

His formulation is that a social system is:

a biological system with the added component of "value".

At first, that might sound as though social organisms acquire value that biological organisms previously lacked.

But biological organisms already have value in Edelman's sense.

The more interesting interpretation is that value becomes organised relationally.

The biological value system remains located in the individual organism.

What changes is that the organism's behaviour now enters recurrent relations with the value-sensitive behaviour of other organisms.

Social organisation emerges from those couplings.

Signals become part of a system

Ants, bees and termites coordinate through signals of many kinds.

Chemical traces.

Tactile contact.

Posture.

Movement.

Changes in local conditions.

These need not be signs in the symbolic sense.

They matter because they engage the value-sensitive organisation of other organisms and alter their dispositions.

A pheromone trail can alter where another ant moves.

An alarm signal can engage the defensive organisation of nearby individuals.

A change in brood conditions can alter subsequent activity.

The basic relation is therefore not simply:

signal → response

but:

signal → engagement of another organism's value system → value-sensitive response

That distinction matters.

The receiving organism is not a passive mechanism triggered by an external button.

Its response depends upon its own organisation and circumstances.

And that response can itself become consequential to other organisms.

Coordination becomes recurrent

A single signal can coordinate a response.

Repeated signalling can produce a pattern.

One organism acts.

Another's value system is engaged.

The second responds.

Its response changes the conditions encountered by the first or by others.

Those organisms respond in turn.

The relation develops a history.

Certain pathways become more probable.

Others become less likely.

The participants become coupled because each organism's value-sensitive responses alter the conditions encountered by the others.

Thus:

individual value systems become coupled through recurrent interaction.

This is the foundation of collective form.

From event to pattern

A signal is an event.

Coordination is a relation among events.

A collective form is a persistent pattern produced through recurrent relations.

Once a pattern becomes established, it begins to influence the very interactions that reproduce it.

A pheromone trail laid down by one ant changes the behaviour of others.

Their activity alters the trail.

A nest structure changes possibilities for movement.

The state of the brood changes patterns of activity.

The resulting organisation feeds back into subsequent behaviour.

We therefore have:

interaction → collective pattern → changed local possibilities → further interaction

The pattern is emergent, but it is also causally consequential.

Distributed memory

This gives collective organisation a kind of distributed memory.

Earlier interactions leave traces.

Those traces affect later interactions.

A chemical trail persists.

A structure remains.

A change in local conditions alters subsequent responses.

The collective therefore does not need a central representation of its own history.

Its history can be embodied in the environment and relations through which participants subsequently act.

This will become important when we later think about social structure.

Differentiated participation

Eusocial systems are particularly interesting because collective organisation becomes differentiated.

Not every organism participates in the same way.

Some forage.

Some nurse.

Some defend.

Some reproduce.

The important question is not whether these are "roles" in the human symbolic sense.

It is that different patterns of participation have different consequences for the other organisms in the colony.

A forager's activity changes the conditions encountered by others.

A defender's activity changes the conditions of those it protects.

Care of brood affects the future conditions under which other organisms operate.

Reproductive activity changes the demographic organisation of the colony.

Each organism remains organised around its own value system.

But its activity becomes embedded in a network of consequences for others.

Social mattering is not a collective feeling

This distinction is essential.

We should not imagine that the colony itself experiences a single undifferentiated value.

Rather:

social mattering is the organisation of individual mattering through relations among organisms.

The organisms have their own systems of value.

Their states and activities alter one another's conditions.

Those consequential relations become recurrent and structured.

The social level therefore lies in the organisation of the relations, not in the emergence of a collective subject that possesses values independently of its participants.

This is the sense in which we can speak of social value.

Value becomes structural

Halliday's formulation now becomes particularly interesting.

If social value is manifested in forms of structure, then structure can be understood as one way in which relations of mattering become organised and durable.

A social structure is therefore not simply a collection of positions.

It is a pattern of consequential relations.

Some participants depend upon others.

Some relations are reciprocal.

Others are strongly asymmetric.

Some pathways connect many participants.

Others are relatively isolated.

The structure is the organised form taken by these relations.

The collective organisation acquires capacities

Although the collective is not itself an organismic value system in the sense we have given to that term, the organisation can nevertheless possess capacities that no individual participant possesses.

A colony can regulate its environment.

Redistribute labour.

Respond collectively to threats.

Alter the structure of its nest.

Adapt patterns of activity to changing conditions.

These are collective capacities.

They emerge from the relations among participants.

But they feed back into those participants by changing the conditions under which they act.

This is a key feature of emergence:

the collective pattern is generated by individual interactions, then becomes part of the environment of those interactions.

Why this matters for social structure

Human social structure is obviously much more elaborate.

Humans have language.

Institutions.

Explicit rules.

Narratives.

Symbols.

Law.

But these later developments should not obscure the more basic substrate.

Before a role can be named, someone must occupy a position in a pattern of consequential relations.

Before an institution can be symbolically represented, behaviour must already be organised in some recurrent way.

Before a social value can become an ideology, something must already matter within the relations of the group.

The colony therefore provides a useful lower boundary for our investigation.

It shows that social organisation does not require symbolic meaning.

Structure without signs

This is where our distinction between signal and sign becomes especially useful.

A colony can coordinate through signals.

Its participants can engage one another's value systems.

Responses can become coupled.

Patterns can recur.

Roles can differentiate.

Collective capacities can emerge.

None of this requires signs in the human symbolic sense.

The sign therefore does not mark the beginning of sociality.

It marks a later transformation of an already organised social world.

This will eventually allow us to connect Halliday's social and semiotic levels without collapsing them.

From collective form to social structure

We can now sharpen another distinction.

A collective form is a pattern produced by interacting organisms.

A social structure is a recurrent organisation of consequential relations that becomes part of the conditions under which future interactions occur.

The difference is one of persistence and self-reproduction.

A flock may form a collective shape and dissolve.

A colony's patterns of organisation can persist across generations.

Human institutions can persist across centuries.

Yet persistence need not imply immobility.

Structure can be continually reproduced through changing interactions.

It can be stable through change.

Dynamics remain essential

This means that we should not imagine social structure as a static arrangement.

A colony changes with food availability.

Threats alter patterns of defence.

The development of brood changes labour.

Seasonal conditions alter activity.

The structure is continually reorganised.

So we need two related concepts:

structure — the organisation of relations;

dynamics — the ways in which that organisation changes over time.

This distinction will become important when we introduce topology.

A topology will describe relational organisation.

Its dynamics will describe trajectories through that organisation.

Local mattering, collective form

We can now formulate the core mechanism more carefully.

Each organism has its own value system.

Its state and behaviour matter to other organisms when they alter their conditions of action.

Signals mediate some of these interactions by engaging other organisms' value systems.

Responses become coupled.

Repeated coupling produces persistent patterns.

Those patterns become collective organisation.

The collective organisation then changes the conditions under which individuals act.

Thus:

individual mattering → relational coupling → collective form → changed individual possibilities

The collective does not replace the individual value systems.

It organises their interactions.

The topology begins to acquire an object

We can now see what our proposed topology might eventually describe.

It will not be a map of abstract values.

Nor a ranking of what people consider important.

It will concern the relational structure through which individual value systems become socially coupled.

We might eventually ask:

Who affects whose conditions?

Where are dependencies?

Which relations are reciprocal?

Which are asymmetric?

Where do several pathways converge?

Which parts of the network are densely connected?

Where are the boundaries?

Where can small perturbations propagate?

These are questions about the shape of relational organisation.

A topology is not a hierarchy

This distinction matters.

A topology is concerned with relations such as proximity, connectivity, boundaries and possible transitions.

Two participants may be socially "close" because many relations connect them, even if they occupy very different roles.

Two positions may be far apart because moving between them requires extensive reorganisation.

A boundary may separate one region of mattering from another.

A small change may produce a large reconfiguration if the system is near a critical transition.

None of this requires ranking.

The topology concerns relational structure, not a scale from high to low.

From colony to human society

The analogy must remain cautious.

Human society cannot be reduced to eusocial organisation.

Humans have vastly more differentiated repertoires.

We can represent our relations.

We can formulate rules.

We can imagine alternatives.

We can argue over what should matter.

We can redesign our institutions.

But these symbolic capacities operate upon a substrate of actual relations among organisms.

People matter to one another through dependence, care, authority, cooperation, exchange, competition, recognition and many other relations.

The symbolic layer can transform those relations.

It does not create the entire substrate from nothing.

Adaptation and continuity

This also returns us to Edelman.

Biological value is connected to the organism's continued organisation.

At the social level, recurrent patterns of relations can contribute to the persistence or transformation of the collective.

Some forms of organisation support continuity.

Others create vulnerability.

Some become useful under one set of conditions and maladaptive under another.

Social structure therefore has an adaptive history.

It reflects what forms of relation have enabled a collective to persist, reproduce and respond to changing conditions.

But adaptation can also require transformation.

A structure can preserve itself by changing.

That tension will become important later.

The beginnings of topology

We can now see why the topology idea matters.

A social system is not just a population.

It is an organised pattern of relations among participants.

Those relations can have:

density,

asymmetry,

reciprocity,

boundaries,

pathways,

persistence,

instability.

They can change over time.

They can reorganise suddenly or gradually.

The topology is therefore a way of asking about the shape of social mattering-relations.

We have not yet constructed such a topology.

But we now know what kind of thing it would have to describe.

Before affiliation

It is tempting to begin with familiar categories:

family,

class,

profession,

political movement,

nation.

But those categories are already symbolic and institutional elaborations.

Our question is earlier.

How do stable patterns of consequential relations arise in the first place?

How do they persist?

How do they differentiate?

How do participants become differently positioned within them?

Only after answering those questions should we ask how people come to recognise themselves as belonging to particular social formations.

Before meaning

The same principle applies to meaning.

A social relation can matter before it is explicitly represented.

A dependency can exist before it is named.

A role can operate before it is described.

A pattern of authority can be reproduced before anyone writes a theory of authority.

Meaning can later construe these relations.

Halliday's formulation therefore becomes particularly significant:

“Semiotic systems are social systems where value has been further transformed into meaning.”

The transformation presupposes the social organisation of value.

Meaning arrives into a world already structured by mattering.

What we have established

We began with organisms whose behaviour is organised by their own systems of biological value.

Their consequential differences can function as signals.

Repeated signalling can produce coordination.

Coordination can become recurrent coupling.

Recurrent coupling can generate collective form.

When those patterns become persistent, differentiated and self-reproducing, they become forms of social structure.

The result is:

individual value → signal → coordination → recurrent coupling → collective form → social structure

And social mattering can now be understood more precisely:

the organisation of individual mattering through recurrent relations among participants.

That is the substrate from which our topology will emerge.

The next question

We have reached the point at which "structure" can no longer be treated simply as a collection of positions.

If social structure is an organised pattern of mattering-relations, it must have a shape.

Some relations are near to one another.

Some are distant.

Some form clusters.

Some mark boundaries.

Some pathways are easy to move through.

Others are difficult.

Some configurations are stable.

Others unstable.

So the next question is:

What would it mean to describe the shape of social mattering as a topology?