The Trouble with Quantum Questions: Dialogue II — On the Wavefunction

Characters:

Professor Quillibrace

Mr Blottisham

Miss Elowen Stray

---

Blottisham:

I’ve brought a diagram.

Quillibrace:

I feared as much.

Blottisham:

You’ll find it very helpful. A wavefunction, plotted nicely along an axis. Peaks here, troughs there. Quite elegant.

Quillibrace:

You’ve already drawn the wrong conclusion.

Blottisham:

I haven’t said a word!

Quillibrace:

You’ve drawn a picture.

Elowen Stray:

What’s the problem with picturing it?

Quillibrace:

Pictures insist on asking what it is a picture of.

Blottisham:

Of the system, obviously. Of where it is, or what it’s doing.

Quillibrace:

There we are again.

Blottisham:

The wavefunction describes the system’s state.

Quillibrace:

It encodes a rule.

Blottisham:

A rule for what?

Quillibrace:

For the distribution of possible instances.

Blottisham:

You’re evading the question.

Quillibrace:

I’m refusing the picture.

Elowen Stray:

So the wavefunction isn’t a wave?

Quillibrace:

It’s an unfortunate name.

Blottisham:

Then why does it interfere with itself?

Quillibrace:

Because probability spaces can have structure.

Blottisham:

That sounds suspiciously mathematical.

Quillibrace:

The wavefunction is mathematical.

Blottisham:

But mathematics represents something.

Quillibrace:

Sometimes. Sometimes it constrains.

Elowen Stray:

Constrains what can happen?

Quillibrace:

Constrains what counts as an outcome.

Blottisham:

Then the wavefunction exists in some abstract realm?

Quillibrace:

No.

Blottisham:

In physical space?

Quillibrace:

Also no.

Blottisham:

You’re being deliberately difficult.

Quillibrace:

I’m being ontologically tidy.

Elowen Stray:

So where is the wavefunction?

Quillibrace:

It isn’t.

Blottisham:

Outrageous.

Quillibrace:

It doesn’t need to be. It’s not the sort of thing that has a location.

Blottisham:

Then why do physicists talk about it “evolving”?

Quillibrace:

Because its constraints change with the system.

Blottisham:

Through time!

Quillibrace:

Through parameterisation.

Blottisham:

You’re just renaming time.

Quillibrace:

No. Time appears in instances, not in the theory of them.

Elowen Stray:

So the wavefunction doesn’t tell us what is happening now.

Quillibrace:

It tells us what could be made actual under different cuts.

Blottisham:

That sounds dangerously close to ignorance.

Quillibrace:

Ignorance has an owner. This does not.

Blottisham:

So it’s not a catalogue of unknown facts?

Quillibrace:

No facts are waiting.

Elowen Stray:

Then when people argue about whether the wavefunction is “real”…

Quillibrace:

—they are asking the wrong ontological question.

Blottisham:

Surely it must be either real or not.

Quillibrace:

Only if “real” means “thing-like”.

Blottisham:

Doesn’t it?

Quillibrace:

Not in a theory of instantiation.

Elowen Stray:

So the wavefunction is more like grammar than furniture?

Quillibrace:

A beautiful analogy.

Blottisham:

Grammar isn’t real.

Quillibrace:

Try violating it in public.

Blottisham:

That’s social convention.

Quillibrace:

And this is physical constraint.

Blottisham:

So the wavefunction tells reality how it may speak?

Quillibrace:

It tells us which utterances are available.

Elowen Stray:

And measurement chooses one utterance?

Quillibrace:

Actualises one.

Blottisham:

Then the wavefunction collapses?

Quillibrace:

No more than grammar collapses when you finish a sentence.

Blottisham:

But something changes.

Quillibrace:

Yes. The relevance of alternatives.

Blottisham:

You’re stripping all the drama out of it.

Quillibrace:

Drama is a sign of misplaced metaphysics.

Elowen Stray:

So the wavefunction doesn’t float around space.

Quillibrace:

It never did.

Blottisham:

Doesn’t split into worlds.

Quillibrace:

Only in bad novels.

Blottisham:

Doesn’t hide behind reality.

Quillibrace:

Reality has no backstage.

(A pause.)

Elowen Stray:

Then the real puzzle was why we expected the wavefunction to be a thing at all.

Quillibrace:

Because we are very fond of things.

Blottisham:

Even I must admit… this makes the arguments feel rather empty.

Quillibrace:

They were arguments about furniture in a grammar book.

Blottisham:

So the wavefunction isn’t a picture, or a wave, or a shadowy object.

Quillibrace:

It is a constraint on what may be actualised.

Blottisham:

Which exists—

Quillibrace:

—as a feature of the system-as-theory.

Elowen Stray:

And the trouble with the wavefunction…

Quillibrace:

…is that we keep asking what it is, instead of what it does.

Blottisham:

And what it does is—

Quillibrace:

—limit the ways reality can be made definite.

(Silence.)

Blottisham:

I shall have to redraw my diagram.

Quillibrace:

Or stop drawing altogether.

The Trouble with Quantum Questions: Dialogue I — On Measurement

Characters:

Professor Quillibrace

Mr Blottisham

Miss Elowen Stray

---

Blottisham:

Before we begin, I should like to register a complaint.

Quillibrace:

As ever, you are early.

Blottisham:

Quantum theory is perfectly intelligible until people like you interfere with it. Measurement is not mysterious. One measures a system, and the system responds.

Quillibrace:

Responds to what?

Blottisham:

To being measured.

Quillibrace:

Ah. The reflexive hammer.

Elowen Stray:

Is the mystery that measurement changes the system?

Blottisham:

Exactly! That’s the scandal. Before measurement, the system is in some indeterminate state. Then—bang!—measurement collapses it.

Quillibrace:

You say “before” very confidently.

Blottisham:

Time does tend to come before other times.

Quillibrace:

Only if you’ve already decided what sort of thing a system is.

Blottisham:

A physical thing, obviously.

Quillibrace:

With properties?

Blottisham:

Naturally.

Quillibrace:

Which it has—

Blottisham:

—whether or not we look, yes.

Quillibrace:

There it is.

Elowen Stray:

There what is?

Quillibrace:

The entire problem, fully assembled.

Blottisham:

Rubbish. I’ve merely stated common sense.

Quillibrace:

Common sense is an ontology that has forgotten it is one.

Blottisham:

Measurement reveals what is already there. If it didn’t, it wouldn’t be measurement.

Quillibrace:

You’re assuming measurement is a revelatory act.

Blottisham:

What else could it be?

Quillibrace:

An instantiating one.

Blottisham:

You’ve smuggled in your jargon already.

Quillibrace:

I’ve smuggled in nothing. You smuggled in persistence.

Elowen Stray:

Persistence of what?

Quillibrace:

Of determinate properties.

Blottisham:

Are you seriously suggesting the system has no properties before measurement?

Quillibrace:

I’m suggesting “before” is doing illicit work.

Blottisham:

The system exists before we measure it!

Quillibrace:

The system—as a theory of possible outcomes—yes.

Blottisham:

That’s evasive.

Quillibrace:

No. It’s specific.

Elowen Stray:

So when physicists talk about a system being “in superposition” before measurement—

Quillibrace:

—they are talking about a structured space of possibility.

Blottisham:

Then why not say that?

Quillibrace:

Because everyone keeps trying to picture it.

Blottisham:

Pictures are helpful.

Quillibrace:

Only when they picture the right kind of thing.

Blottisham:

And measurement turns this… possibility-space… into a fact?

Quillibrace:

Into an instance.

Blottisham:

At a moment in time.

Quillibrace:

As a perspectival cut.

Blottisham:

That’s just collapse with extra syllables.

Quillibrace:

Collapse suggests destruction. Nothing is destroyed.

Blottisham:

Something must be lost! All those other possibilities vanish.

Quillibrace:

They cease to be relevant to this instance.

Elowen Stray:

So measurement isn’t violence—it’s selection?

Quillibrace:

Selection is closer. But even that suggests choosing from a shelf.

Blottisham:

Isn’t that what experiments do?

Quillibrace:

No. Experiments actualise one trajectory through a system’s potential.

Blottisham:

You make it sound as though the system was waiting.

Quillibrace:

Waiting implies time. The system does not wait. It affords.

Blottisham:

Affords what?

Quillibrace:

Different possible instances under different cuts.

Elowen Stray:

So measurement doesn’t answer a question we asked earlier.

Quillibrace:

It poses a question in a very particular way.

Blottisham:

Then the observer really does matter!

Quillibrace:

The setup matters.

Blottisham:

You’re dodging consciousness now.

Quillibrace:

I’m refusing it entry.

Blottisham:

But surely the mystery is why observation changes the system.

Quillibrace:

Observation doesn’t change the system.

Blottisham:

Everyone says it does!

Quillibrace:

Everyone is still treating the system as a thing with hidden furniture.

Elowen Stray:

Then what changes?

Quillibrace:

Which instance is actualised.

Blottisham:

From what?

Quillibrace:

From the system-as-theory.

Blottisham:

So nothing “happens” to the wavefunction?

Quillibrace:

The wavefunction was never a thing to begin with.

Blottisham:

Then why all the fuss?

Quillibrace:

Because people keep asking when properties appear, instead of what kind of object they think properties belong to.

(A pause.)

Elowen Stray:

So the measurement problem isn’t a physical problem at all.

Quillibrace:

It’s an ontological hangover.

Blottisham:

You’re saying we sobered up too late.

Quillibrace:

I’m saying we keep ordering another round.

Blottisham:

Then measurement doesn’t disturb reality.

Quillibrace:

It is the moment at which reality is specified.

Blottisham:

That sounds final.

Quillibrace:

Only for that instance.

Elowen Stray:

And the system remains?

Quillibrace:

As structured potential. Always.

Blottisham:

I don’t like this at all.

Quillibrace:

Of course not. It means measurement was never a magic act—just a badly framed question.

Blottisham:

Then the mystery evaporates.

Quillibrace:

Yes.

Blottisham:

Leaving only—

Quillibrace:

—the work of saying clearly what kind of thing we are talking about.

(A silence.)

Elowen Stray:

So the trouble with measurement…

Quillibrace:

…is that we expected it to reveal what was already there.

Blottisham:

And instead—

Quillibrace:

—it tells us what has just been made actual.

Three Ways of Missing the Point: Dialogue V — On What One Is Doing When One Reads This

Characters:

Professor Quillibrace

Mr Blottisham

Miss Elowen Stray

---

Blottisham:

I’ve become uneasy.

Quillibrace:

You say that as though it were new.

Blottisham:

Up to now, at least we were discussing things out there. Meaning. Wrongness. Theory. But I’ve begun to suspect—

Quillibrace:

—That you are implicated?

Blottisham:

That someone else is listening.

(A pause.)

Elowen Stray:

Listening where?

Blottisham:

Here. Now. Us. This conversation.

Quillibrace:

Oh good. You’ve noticed.

Blottisham:

You didn’t think to mention it?

Quillibrace:

I thought it sporting to see who would flinch first.

Elowen Stray:

So when someone reads this—

Quillibrace:

—They are not observing.

Blottisham:

They’re judging!

Quillibrace:

Worse. They’re participating.

Blottisham:

That’s outrageous. They haven’t said a word.

Quillibrace:

Neither does a match, until struck.

Elowen Stray:

When I read something carefully, I can feel myself leaning. Agreeing. Resisting. Sometimes rehearsing objections.

Blottisham:

Which proves my point! They’re evaluating correctness.

Quillibrace:

They’re rehearsing positions.

Blottisham:

Same thing.

Quillibrace:

Not at all. Evaluation assumes a fixed target. Rehearsal assumes future use.

Elowen Stray:

So reading isn’t consumption—it’s preparation?

Quillibrace:

Or calibration.

Blottisham:

Calibration to what?

Quillibrace:

To what the reader might say next, elsewhere, to someone who isn’t here.

Blottisham:

That seems… indirect.

Quillibrace:

Meaning always is.

Elowen Stray:

Then the reader isn’t trying to extract a message.

Quillibrace:

They’re testing a stance.

Blottisham:

Against what?

Quillibrace:

Against themselves.

Blottisham:

That sounds uncomfortably introspective.

Quillibrace:

Only if you believe the self is a private object.

Elowen Stray:

When I read something that unsettles me, I often argue with it silently.

Blottisham:

As one should.

Quillibrace:

And in doing so, you discover which assumptions rush to your defence.

Elowen Stray:

Yes. Some of them surprise me.

Blottisham:

So the reader is being diagnosed now?

Quillibrace:

No. The reader is diagnosing the text.

Blottisham:

You just said—

Quillibrace:

—and in doing so, reveals the instruments they brought.

Blottisham:

This is turning into a parlour trick.

Quillibrace:

All reflexivity looks like a trick until you notice it keeps working.

Elowen Stray:

So when I agree with you, Professor, that’s also meaningful?

Quillibrace:

Especially then.

Blottisham:

Because agreement can be lazy.

Quillibrace:

Or revealing.

Elowen Stray:

And when I disagree?

Quillibrace:

Then meaning sharpens.

Blottisham:

So the reader can’t win.

Quillibrace:

On the contrary. The reader cannot avoid playing.

(Another pause.)

Blottisham:

I object to being part of someone else’s experiment.

Quillibrace:

You object to it every time you read, too.

Blottisham:

Nonsense.

Quillibrace:

When you read, you supply tone, emphasis, patience, irritation. None of that is in the ink.

Elowen Stray:

So reading is an act of completion?

Quillibrace:

Of actualisation.

Blottisham:

Then the meaning of this dialogue isn’t settled yet.

Quillibrace:

It never will be.

Blottisham:

Even after the last word?

Quillibrace:

Especially then.

Elowen Stray:

Because that’s when the reader has to carry it somewhere else.

Quillibrace:

Yes. Into another conversation. Another silence. Another risk.

Blottisham:

I don’t care for this at all.

Quillibrace:

You’re reading it very well.

Blottisham:

Then let me ask them something.

Quillibrace:

Be my guest.

Blottisham:

What exactly do you think you’re doing right now?

(A longer pause.)

Elowen Stray:

Perhaps the better question is: what might they now find harder not to do?

Quillibrace:

Precisely.

Blottisham:

This is entrapment.

Quillibrace:

No. It’s an invitation with consequences.

Elowen Stray:

So reading isn’t passive.

Quillibrace:

It’s a rehearsal for responsibility.

Blottisham:

I preferred it when texts just meant things.

Quillibrace:

They still do.

Blottisham:

Without asking anything of me?

Quillibrace:

Ah. No.

(A final pause.)

Elowen Stray:

Then perhaps the question isn’t whether the reader understands this.

Quillibrace:

But whether they will notice where it next appears.

Blottisham:

In their own mouth.

Quillibrace:

Or their restraint.

Elowen Stray:

Or the moment they choose not to speak.

Blottisham:

You’ve ruined reading for me.

Quillibrace:

You’re welcome.

Three Ways of Missing the Point: Dialogue IV — On Why One Would Write Theory at All

Characters:

Professor Quillibrace

Mr Blottisham

Miss Elowen Stray

---

Blottisham:

I’ve been uncharacteristically charitable.

Quillibrace:

Alert the colleges.

Blottisham:

Hear me out. If meaning is situated, perspectival, and risky—if it only ever happens in the cut—then why write theory?

Elowen Stray:

That does seem like a fair question.

Blottisham:

At last. If theory doesn’t deliver truth, persistence, or guarantees, it looks like an elaborate way of narrating one’s preferences.

Quillibrace:

You’re proposing we stop.

Blottisham:

I’m proposing we be consistent. Live attentively. Speak locally. Abandon grand frameworks.

Quillibrace:

Ah. The moral high ground of quietism.

Blottisham:

Mock again if you must, but isn’t theory precisely the thing your account undermines?

Elowen Stray:

Because theory sounds like it claims authority.

Blottisham:

Exactly. And authority is what you’ve just dismantled.

Quillibrace:

No—I’ve dismantled invisible authority.

Blottisham:

That’s a distinction without a difference.

Quillibrace:

On the contrary. It’s the difference between a map and a mandate.

Blottisham:

Maps pretend to objectivity.

Quillibrace:

Bad ones do.

Elowen Stray:

So theory isn’t there to tell us what is, but to shape how we move?

Quillibrace:

Yes. To make certain movements thinkable.

Blottisham:

That sounds like manipulation.

Quillibrace:

All language does.

Blottisham:

Then theory is just rhetoric with better footnotes.

Quillibrace:

Sometimes worse.

Elowen Stray:

But rhetoric usually tries to win.

Quillibrace:

Theory, at its best, tries to fail productively.

Blottisham:

Now you’re romanticising incompetence.

Quillibrace:

No. I’m formalising exposure.

Blottisham:

Exposure to what?

Quillibrace:

To the limits of one’s own construal.

Elowen Stray:

So theory is a way of putting your assumptions on the table?

Quillibrace:

And inviting them to be broken.

Blottisham:

You could do that without writing at all.

Quillibrace:

You could garden without tools.

Some people do. They are called mystics.

Blottisham:

And perhaps they’re wiser.

Quillibrace:

Perhaps. But mysticism scales poorly.

Elowen Stray:

Then theory is a way of sharing risk?

Quillibrace:

Yes. Risk, and responsibility.

Blottisham:

Responsibility for what?

Quillibrace:

For the possibilities you normalise.

Blottisham:

You’re saying theory doesn’t describe the world—it biases it.

Quillibrace:

I’m saying it reweights it.

Blottisham:

That’s even worse.

Quillibrace:

Only if you think neutrality is an option.

Elowen Stray:

When I read a strong piece of theory, I don’t feel instructed. I feel… reoriented.

Blottisham:

Disoriented, more like.

Quillibrace:

A common first symptom.

Blottisham:

So theory is meant to unsettle?

Quillibrace:

If it doesn’t, it’s decoration.

Blottisham:

Then why not poetry?

Quillibrace:

Poetry unsettles experience.

Theory unsettles expectations about experience.

Elowen Stray:

So it works one level up?

Quillibrace:

Precisely where people are most complacent.

Blottisham:

This is starting to sound like an excuse for endless writing.

Quillibrace:

No. It’s an argument for timely writing.

Blottisham:

And when has enough been said?

Quillibrace:

When the framework starts answering questions it should be reopening.

Elowen Stray:

So theory should expire?

Quillibrace:

Gracefully, if possible.

Blottisham:

You realise this means your own work is provisional.

Quillibrace:

I should hope so.

Blottisham:

Fallible.

Quillibrace:

Cheerfully.

Blottisham:

Replaceable.

Quillibrace:

With better cuts? Yes.

(A pause.)

Blottisham:

Then theory isn’t a monument.

Quillibrace:

It’s scaffolding.

Elowen Stray:

Meant to be climbed—and then removed?

Quillibrace:

Or repurposed when the building turns out differently than expected.

Blottisham:

I must say, Professor… this makes theory sound almost humble.

Quillibrace:

Only in the sense that it knows where it can break.

Blottisham:

I still think silence has its virtues.

Quillibrace:

It does. But silence also leaves existing structures untouched.

Elowen Stray:

So writing theory is a way of intervening—without pretending to be final.

Quillibrace:

Exactly.

Blottisham:

An intervention that admits it might be wrong.

Quillibrace:

From the first sentence.

Blottisham:

Hmph.

Elowen Stray:

That doesn’t sound like quietism at all.

Quillibrace:

No. It’s closer to maintenance.

Blottisham:

Of meaning?

Quillibrace:

Of possibility.

Three Ways of Missing the Point: Dialogue III — On Whether Anything Is Actually Wrong

Characters:

Professor Quillibrace

Mr Blottisham

Miss Elowen Stray

---

Blottisham:

I’ve slept on it.

Quillibrace:

I hope meaning didn’t move while you were unconscious.

Blottisham:

Very droll. But I’ve reached a conclusion, and it’s a serious one.

Quillibrace:

They usually are.

Blottisham:

If meaning is perspectival—if it only occurs relative to a construal—then nothing can ever be wrong. Only different.

Elowen Stray:

That does sound troubling when you put it like that.

Blottisham:

Thank you, Miss Stray. At last, some sanity.

Quillibrace:

Before we erect monuments to it, tell me what you mean by “wrong.”

Blottisham:

Incorrect. False. A failure to match how things really are.

Quillibrace:

Ah.

Blottisham:

There’s no “ah” about it. Without wrongness, criticism collapses. Argument becomes taste. Scholarship dissolves into vibes.

Quillibrace:

You’re assuming “wrong” precedes relation.

Blottisham:

It must! Otherwise how could we tell?

Elowen Stray:

Tell what?

Blottisham:

Whether someone has misunderstood!

Quillibrace:

And what is a misunderstanding?

Blottisham:

A failure to grasp the meaning.

Quillibrace:

Whose?

Blottisham:

The correct one.

Quillibrace:

We’re orbiting again.

Blottisham:

Because you won’t land!

Elowen Stray:

When someone misunderstands me, I don’t usually think they’ve failed to access a Platonic object. I think they’ve taken a different path than I expected.

Blottisham:

Expectations are irrelevant. Truth isn’t negotiated.

Quillibrace:

And yet it keeps turning up in conversations.

Blottisham:

If nothing is wrong, then propaganda is just a “perspective.” Lies are just “events.” Surely you don’t want that.

Quillibrace:

I want to be precise about where the wrongness occurs.

Blottisham:

You’re evading again.

Quillibrace:

No. I’m relocating.

Elowen Stray:

Relocating wrongness?

Quillibrace:

From correspondence to consequence.

Blottisham:

That sounds suspiciously ethical.

Quillibrace:

It is suspiciously situational.

Blottisham:

So meaning can’t be wrong, only harmful?

Quillibrace:

Meaning can fail to do the work it claims to do.

Blottisham:

Which is just a softer way of saying wrong.

Quillibrace:

Softer, but sharper.

Elowen Stray:

If I say something that reassures when reassurance is needed, it feels right. If it reassures when action is needed, it feels wrong—even if the words are “true.”

Blottisham:

Now truth is conditional too?

Quillibrace:

Truth has always been conditional. It simply prefers not to advertise.

Blottisham:

This is relativism in a tweed jacket.

Quillibrace:

Relativism says all meanings are equal.

I say meanings are unequally consequential.

Blottisham:

According to whom?

Quillibrace:

According to the situation they actualise.

Blottisham:

So the situation judges us now?

Quillibrace:

It always has. We just pretended the verdict came from elsewhere.

Elowen Stray:

Then something can be wrong not because it fails to match reality, but because it fails the moment?

Quillibrace:

Yes. Or worse—it reshapes the moment in a way that closes possibility.

Blottisham:

You make it sound as though wrongness is something that happens, not something that is.

Quillibrace:

At last.

Blottisham:

I don’t like that at all.

Quillibrace:

Of course not. It means you can’t outsource responsibility to the universe.

Blottisham:

So we’re accountable every time meaning occurs?

Quillibrace:

Only every time it matters.

Elowen Stray:

Which seems to be… often.

Blottisham:

This is intolerable.

Quillibrace:

And yet oddly workable.

(A pause.)

Blottisham:

Then let me say this plainly. If wrongness isn’t guaranteed in advance, then critique is risky.

Quillibrace:

Yes.

Blottisham:

And failure is possible.

Quillibrace:

Yes.

Blottisham:

And meaning might betray us.

Quillibrace:

Frequently.

Blottisham:

Then why persist at all?

Quillibrace:

Because the alternative is silence—and silence is not neutral. It is simply a very loud refusal.

Elowen Stray:

So wrongness hasn’t disappeared.

Quillibrace:

No. It’s just stopped pretending to be eternal.

Blottisham:

I suppose that means I can still be wrong.

Quillibrace:

With admirable consistency.

Blottisham:

Hmph.

Elowen Stray:

But also… capable of doing better next time?

Quillibrace:

That is the entire wager.