Even after seeing that nothing literally pushes, that dependencies govern sequences, and that laws and events co-emerge, we still carry residual intuitions about causation. These are the myths that slip in unnoticed, threatening to reintroduce metaphysical defaults.
Myth 1 — Chance is an External Agent
We often speak of randomness as if some independent “chooser” intervenes. Yet in the relational view:
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Probabilistic events are patterns in relational availability under complex or partially constrained architectures.
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There is no external agent deciding outcomes; probabilities summarise the density of feasible paths.
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What we call chance is a measure of constraint architecture, not metaphysical arbitrariness.
Myth 2 — Intervention Requires Agency
We assume that “intervening” requires a forceful actor: someone or something to push. Relationally:
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Intervention is merely a local re-cut in the network that opens or closes feasible paths.
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Agency is interpretive: we assign narrative prominence to a particular node because it modulates relational costs noticeably.
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No hidden causal power is needed — only constraint-altering context.
Myth 3 — Causes Are Fundamental
The deep intuition persists that causes are ontologically prior, that every effect must have a “real” trigger. But:
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Causes are summaries of network patterns.
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The only ontological primitives are events, constraints, and re-cutting costs.
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What classical thought calls a cause is merely the node(s) whose relational position makes a sequence intelligible.
Why These Myths Persist
Human cognition prefers:
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Linear narratives — easy to process
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Agents — intuitive loci of responsibility
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Push metaphors — tangible mental models
These shortcuts are adaptive, but they mislead when constructing an ontology. Recognising them as myths is the final step in fully internalising relational causation.
Implications
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Removes residual metaphysical baggage
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Prepares the mind to accept freedom as structured availability
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Clarifies that causal explanations are heuristic, not ontological
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