Constraint and Causation: 3 Why Explanations Travel Backwards

Having established that nothing literally pushes and that causation emerges from relational dependencies, a new puzzle arises: why do our explanations seem to run from effect to cause, rather than simply forward? Why do we instinctively say, “the apple fell because of gravity,” even when the relational architecture itself contains no agent or force?

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Causal Narratives Are Retrospective

When we narrativise the world, we construct paths of intelligibility. Explanations select sequences where:

1. Re-cutting costs are low

2. Dependencies are coherent and stable

3. Patterns are recognisable and reproducible

The “cause” is not an external push; it is a retrospective annotation on the network of dependencies, highlighting the events that made the observed effect minimally surprising or maximally intelligible.

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Example: Dominoes Revisited

Consider again a row of dominoes:

• Forward view: Each domino actualises where constraints allow, falling along a path of minimal resistance.

• Retrospective explanation: We say, “Domino A caused Domino B to fall.”

Notice the inversion: the explanatory arrow travels backward from effect to minimal-cost precursor, because that narrative is cognitively digestible. The network itself doesn’t privilege a “first cause” — we do.

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Why the Retrospective Construction Matters

1. Patterns, not pushes: Explanations summarise compatible sequences, rather than dictate them.

2. Selective highlighting: Causes are chosen as points of interest where relational costs shift most noticeably.

3. Misleading intuitions: Classical physics assumes a forward push; our cognition prefers a neat narrative. This is why we naturally “see” forces where none are ontologically present.

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Relational Architecture vs Narrative Bias

• The architecture: fully relational, constraint-based, emergent

• The narrative: imposed retrospectively to make sense of patterns

The key insight: explanations are an interpretive overlay. They help us navigate the network of dependencies, but they are not themselves part of the causal machinery.

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Implications

• We can account for complex sequences (mechanical, chemical, social) without ever invoking pushing agents.

• Laws and regularities emerge as summaries of dependencies, not prescriptive rules.

• Recognising this backward construction is crucial for avoiding hidden metaphysical assumptions — and for preparing the reader to see laws and events as mutually emergent (the next post).