If this series has done its work, then a peculiar situation now presents itself.
On the one hand:
value-based dynamics explain coordination
signalling language can be reduced to differential uptake
neural systems can be described without representation
On the other hand:
semiosis has not been eliminated
meaning has not been denied
and the possibility of genuine sign systems remains open
This produces a tension that cannot be avoided:
where, exactly, is the boundary?
The problem restated
We have argued that:
correlation is not representation
responsiveness is not interpretation
stability is not meaning
But these distinctions, once drawn, generate a new question:
what would count as enough to cross the threshold into semiosis?
It is not sufficient to say:
“when things get complex”
or “when behaviour looks communicative”
Complexity and appearance have already been shown to be unreliable guides.
The boundary must be drawn on structural grounds.
Continuity without equivalence
One temptation is to treat value and meaning as points along a continuum.
On this view:
simple systems exhibit value
more complex systems gradually acquire meaning
and semiosis emerges as a matter of degree
This is appealing, but it risks collapsing the distinction we have worked to establish.
Because:
a continuous transition in behaviour does not entail a continuous transition in kind.
A system may become increasingly complex while remaining non-semiotic.
More variation, more sensitivity, more coupling—none of these, by themselves, produce meaning.
The threshold problem
If semiosis is distinct, then there must be a threshold.
But this threshold is not marked by:
a particular behaviour
a specific trait
or a measurable level of complexity
It is marked by a change in organisation.
Specifically:
the emergence of a system of distinctions in which forms function relationally as signs.
This is not an incremental addition.
It is a reorganisation of the system’s structure.
What would have to change
For a value-based system to become semiotic, something fundamental must occur.
Not just:
more reliable correlations
more refined responses
or more stable patterns
But the introduction of:
structured alternatives
relational contrasts
and functional roles defined within that system of contrasts
In other words:
the system must come to operate over differences as differences.
Until then, differences are simply variations that elicit responses.
After that point, they are elements within a semiotic system.
The difficulty of detection
This creates a practical problem.
How would we know when this threshold has been crossed?
From the outside, both systems may look similar:
both exhibit patterned behaviour
both show sensitivity to variation
both produce coordinated outcomes
The difference lies not in the observable pattern alone, but in the organisation that generates it.
This makes semiosis difficult to identify empirically.
It cannot be inferred directly from:
correlation
predictability
or functional success
The risk of projection
In the absence of clear criteria, there is a tendency to project semiosis wherever systems appear sufficiently organised.
This is the move we have been tracking throughout the series:
from pattern to meaning
from coordination to communication
from value to semiosis
The boundary problem shows why this projection is so persistent.
Without a clear structural test, appearance fills the gap.
The possibility of rarity
One consequence of this analysis is that semiosis may be rarer than commonly assumed.
If the threshold requires:
a system of organised distinctions
functioning relationally as signs
then many biological systems may never cross it.
They remain:
highly structured
highly adaptive
and highly coordinated
but non-semiotic.
This is not a deficiency.
It is a clarification.
A candidate case
There is, however, one domain where the criteria appear to be satisfied.
Human language.
Here we find:
structured systems of contrasts
combinatorial organisation
and forms whose function depends on their relation to other forms
This is not merely:
differential responsiveness
or stabilised correlation
It is a fully developed semiotic system.
The contrast with other biological systems is instructive.
Not a conclusion, but a constraint
The boundary problem does not resolve the question of where semiosis begins.
It constrains how the question can be answered.
It tells us:
what is not sufficient
what must be demonstrated
and what kind of structure we are looking for
It shifts the discussion from:
“does this look like communication?”
to:
“does this system instantiate semiotic organisation?”
Holding the boundary
At this point, the temptation is either to:
- collapse the distinction (everything is meaning)or
enforce it too rigidly (nothing but human language counts)
Both moves are premature.
The task is to hold the boundary open:
clearly drawn
but not overextended
To recognise that:
value and meaning are distinct
their coupling is non-trivial
and their intersection, if it occurs, must be carefully specified
Closing the series
What began as a question about biological signals has led to a more general reorientation.
We have seen that:
coordination does not require communication
selection does not require representation
and value does not require meaning
At the same time:
semiosis, where it exists, introduces a different kind of organisation
one that cannot be reduced to value-based dynamics
The boundary between these domains is not given in advance.
It must be established case by case, on structural grounds.
Final question
We end, then, not with a conclusion, but with a constraint:
When we encounter a system that appears to communicate, what would we need to show for that appearance to count as semiosis?
Until that question is answered, it is safer—and more precise—to assume:
signal without semiosis,value without meaning.
And to treat meaning, when it does appear, as something that must be demonstrated, not presumed.
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