Thursday, 2 April 2026

Signal Without Semiosis: Value, Selection, and the Misreading of Meaning in Biology — 9 Signal Without Semiosis

We are now in a position to state the argument of this series directly.

Across the cases we have examined:

  • sexual selection

  • behavioural coordination

  • the so-called “hard cases”

  • and neural organisation

a consistent pattern has emerged.

The phenomena that are most often described in terms of signals, information, and communication can be accounted for without invoking semiosis.


What has been shown

Step by step, we have separated two domains that are usually conflated.

On the one hand:

  • systems exhibit differential responsiveness

  • patterns are stabilised through selection

  • coordination emerges across interacting components

On the other hand:

  • meaning requires structured relations among distinctions

  • forms must function within a semiotic system

  • and relations of standing-for must be internally organised

The first is pervasive in biological systems.

The second has yet to be demonstrated in most of the cases described as signalling.


The minimal account

If we restrict ourselves to what is required to explain the phenomena, we find that:

  • traits correlate with conditions

  • organisms respond to those traits

  • responses affect outcomes

  • and those outcomes feed back into selection

This is enough to generate:

  • stability

  • predictability

  • and coordination

Nothing in this chain requires that:

  • traits represent conditions

  • organisms interpret those traits

  • or meaning is exchanged between them


What the term “signal” is doing

The term signal enters at precisely the point where description begins to expand beyond what is required.

It gathers together:

  • correlation

  • responsiveness

  • and functional consequence

and redescribes them as:

  • information

  • communication

  • and representation

In doing so, it introduces a semiotic vocabulary without establishing a semiotic structure.


The compression of explanation

One way to see this is to consider what happens when we say:

“the trait signals X”

This statement compresses multiple relations:

  • the trait co-occurs with X

  • the trait affects behaviour in relation to X

  • the system has stabilised around this relation

All of this is redescribed as:

the trait means X

The compression is convenient, but it obscures the underlying dynamics.


Signal as shorthand

From this perspective, “signal” can be understood as a form of shorthand.

It allows us to speak quickly about:

  • reliable correlations

  • predictable responses

  • and functional coordination

But as shorthand, it is ambiguous.

It can refer to:

  • value-based dynamics
    or

  • semiotic relations

without distinguishing between them.


Why this matters

The ambiguity becomes problematic when the shorthand is taken literally.

If we treat signals as inherently meaningful, we risk:

  • attributing representational capacities where none are required

  • overlooking the role of value in structuring the system

  • and mislocating the source of coordination

In effect, we replace a dynamic account with a semiotic one without justification.


Recentring value

Once the shorthand is unpacked, the explanatory structure becomes clear.

Biological systems are organised through:

  • differential uptake

  • reinforcement of certain patterns

  • and the stabilisation of those patterns over time

This is the domain of value.

Value explains:

  • why certain traits persist

  • why certain responses recur

  • and how coordination is maintained

It does so without invoking meaning.


The absence of semiosis

To say “signal without semiosis” is not to deny that something is happening.

It is to specify what kind of thing is happening.

What we observe in most biological cases is:

  • structured responsiveness

  • shaped by history

  • and stabilised through selection

This is sufficient to produce the phenomena that are described as signalling.

But it does not, in itself, constitute a semiotic system.


A shift in default assumptions

The argument of this series can now be stated as a reversal of a common assumption.

Instead of beginning with:

signalling is present unless shown otherwise

we begin with:

value-based coordination is sufficient unless semiosis is demonstrated

This shifts the burden of proof.

Semiosis is no longer the default interpretation.

It becomes a specific condition that must be established.


What remains open

This does not eliminate the possibility of semiosis in biological systems.

It sharpens the question.

If semiosis is present, it must be shown that:

  • distinctions are organised into a system

  • forms function within that system

  • and relations of meaning are internally structured

Only then can we say that something is not merely responded to, but understood as meaningful.


Beyond the signal

With this in place, the concept of the signal can be reconsidered.

It need not be abandoned.

But it must be used with care.

We can distinguish:

  • signals as shorthand for value-based coordination

  • from signs as elements of a semiotic system

The two are not equivalent.


Closing perspective

What began as a question about biological signalling has led to a more general point.

Systems can:

  • coordinate

  • stabilise

  • and produce complex patterns of interaction

without meaning.

Meaning, where it exists, is not given by correlation or response alone.

It depends on a different kind of organisation.

Until that organisation is demonstrated, it is more precise to say:

what we are observing is signal without semiosis.


Transition

One final question remains.

If much of what is called signalling can be explained without meaning, what does this imply for the broader use of concepts like information, communication, and representation across the sciences?

The concluding post will take up this question, and consider what follows from consistently separating value from meaning across domains.

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