If the previous posts have drawn a firm line between value-based coordination and genuine semiosis, the natural pressure now comes from the edge cases.
There are biological phenomena that resist easy classification.
They look, at first glance, uncomfortably like signalling.
They appear structured, responsive, and context-sensitive in ways that invite semiotic descriptions.
These are the “hard cases.”
When descriptions begin to converge
Consider phenomena such as:
alarm calls in social species
mating displays with complex variation
colour changes that track environmental conditions
pheromonal emissions correlated with physiological states
behavioural cues that reliably precede interaction
In each case:
a feature varies systematically
other organisms respond differentially
and the outcome of that response is functionally significant
From the outside, these features resemble elements of a communicative system.
They appear to “stand for” something.
But appearance is not the same as structure.
The temptation to upgrade the description
In these cases, it becomes especially tempting to describe the feature as:
carrying information
encoding a state
or signalling an internal condition
This is not arbitrary.
The temptation arises because:
the correlations are strong
the responses are consistent
and the ecological consequences are non-trivial
At this point, descriptive language begins to shift from:
“this feature correlates with that outcome”
to:
“this feature indicates that condition”
The second formulation carries an implicit semiotic commitment.
Dissecting the alarm call
Alarm calls are often treated as paradigmatic signals.
A call is produced in the presence of a predator, and conspecifics respond with evasive behaviour.
On the surface:
a specific acoustic pattern
is associated with a specific environmental condition
and triggers a specific class of responses
This triadic structure resembles communication.
However, from the perspective of value-based dynamics:
individuals sensitive to certain acoustic features are differentially selected
responses that reduce risk are reinforced
and call production is stabilised through its consequences
The system can be described entirely in terms of:
conditional responsiveness
and selection over repeated interactions
No internal semiotic mapping is required.
Variation without representation
One might argue that variation in calls maps to variation in conditions.
But mapping is already a representational notion.
The critical question is whether the system itself:
treats the variation as part of a structured set of contrasts
or simply exhibits different outputs under different conditions
In many biological cases, what we observe is:
graded or categorical variation in output
matched by graded or categorical variation in response
This can be fully accounted for by coupling between systems without invoking a semiotic code.
The illusion of address
Some behaviours seem directed at specific receivers:
displays oriented toward potential mates
signals produced in the presence of conspecifics
gestures that elicit coordinated responses
This can give the impression of address:
as if the organism is producing a form intended for another to interpret.
But again, intention and interpretation are not required to explain the dynamics.
What is required is:
a history of interactions in which certain outputs reliably affect certain outcomes
and a system of responsiveness shaped by those interactions
The appearance of address emerges from the structure of interaction, not necessarily from communicative intent.
Complexity is not enough
One of the strongest sources of ambiguity in the hard cases is complexity.
As behaviours become:
more variable
more context-dependent
and more finely tuned to environmental conditions
they begin to resemble structured systems of meaning.
But complexity alone does not establish semiosis.
A highly complex value-based system can generate:
rich behavioural repertoires
context-sensitive responses
and intricate patterns of coordination
without requiring a semiotic layer.
The presence of structure does not automatically imply the presence of signs.
Coordination without code
A key insight from these cases is that coordination can emerge without a code.
Systems can become tightly coupled through:
feedback loops
selective pressures
and mutual constraints
In such systems:
one organism’s behaviour becomes a reliable input into another’s dynamics
and vice versa
This interdependence can produce stable, predictable interactions that resemble communication.
But resemblance is not identity.
When does the description overreach?
The descriptive leap to semiosis tends to occur when:
a pattern is reliably associated with a condition
and that association is useful for prediction
At that point, it becomes convenient to say:
the pattern represents the condition
But this convenience should not be mistaken for ontological commitment.
The description may be useful without being literally accurate.
A diagnostic tension
The hard cases expose a tension between two explanatory styles:
Value-based explanation:
focuses on differential responsiveness
explains patterns through selection and stabilisation
avoids attributing internal representations
Semiotic explanation:
introduces signs, meanings, and references
treats forms as standing for conditions
implies a system of structured interpretation
In the hard cases, both descriptions can seem to fit.
The task is to determine which is doing real explanatory work, and which is being projected onto the system.
Where the criteria apply
Returning to the criteria established in the previous post:
For semiosis to be present, we would need evidence of:
a structured system of distinctions
relations among forms defined by contrast
and functional roles grounded in that system of contrasts
In the hard cases, what we typically find instead is:
continuous or discrete variation in outputs
differential responses shaped by history
and coordination emerging from interaction dynamics
These are compatible with value-based systems without requiring semiotic organisation.
Why the hard cases feel persuasive
The hard cases are persuasive precisely because they sit at the boundary of our descriptive habits.
They force a confrontation with the limits of language:
when does “indicates” become “means”?
when does “correlates with” become “refers to”?
when does “elicits a response” become “communicates a message”?
The answer is not given by the behaviour alone.
It depends on whether the system itself instantiates the structures required for semiosis.
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