Abstract
Scientific realism is typically understood as the view that successful scientific theories describe a mind-independent reality. This paper argues that ontological independence — understood as the claim that reality exists wholly independently of observation, measurement, and theoretical framework — is not required for realism. Empirical success, explanatory power, and theoretical stability can be preserved without committing to intrinsic, observer-independent properties. By decoupling realism from independence ontology, we obtain a structurally more coherent account of modern physics, particularly in light of quantum theory. Scientific realism can therefore be reconstructed as a commitment to structured invariance and intersubjective stability rather than metaphysical independence.
1. The Classical Form of Scientific Realism
Traditional scientific realism includes three central claims:
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Mature scientific theories are approximately true.
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The unobservable entities they posit (e.g., electrons, fields) exist.
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These entities exist independently of observation and description.
The third claim — ontological independence — is often treated as essential. It is thought to guarantee objectivity and to explain the success of science.
However, this linkage is not logically necessary.
Realism can be separated from independence.
2. What Realism Really Requires
At minimum, scientific realism requires:
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Commitment to the stability of theoretical structure.
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Commitment to the explanatory power of scientific models.
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Commitment to the intersubjective robustness of empirical results.
None of these commitments logically entail that reality consists of intrinsic, observer-independent properties.
Realism can instead be understood as the view that:
Scientific theories successfully capture stable structural relations in the world.
This structural commitment does not require classical independence ontology.
3. Independence Is Stronger Than Realism Requires
Ontological independence asserts that reality exists entirely outside observation, measurement, and theoretical framing.
But realism only requires that:
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The world constrains scientific theories.
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Successful theories are not arbitrary constructions.
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There are objective regularities that remain stable across contexts.
These requirements can be satisfied even if:
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Properties are context-dependent,
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Measurement participates in phenomena,
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Reality is structurally relational.
Thus independence is an additional metaphysical layer, not a logical component of realism itself.
4. Structural Realism as a Reconstruction
One way to reconstruct realism without independence is to focus on structure rather than intrinsic entities.
Scientific theories succeed because they:
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Identify invariant relations,
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Capture symmetry principles,
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Encode stable mathematical structures,
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Predict consistent patterns across experiments.
On this view, realism is a commitment to the reality of stable structure, not to observer-independent intrinsic properties.
The ontological commitment shifts from:
Objects with intrinsic properties independent of observation,
to:
Structurally stable relational patterns that constrain observation.
This preserves realism while removing the independence requirement.
5. Compatibility with Quantum Theory
Quantum mechanics provides strong motivation for this reconstruction.
The theory exhibits:
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Contextuality of measurement outcomes,
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Non-commuting observables,
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Entanglement,
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Structural resistance to global non-contextual value assignment.
These features challenge classical intrinsic-property realism.
However, quantum theory is extraordinarily successful empirically.
Therefore:
If realism were inseparable from classical independence, quantum theory would undermine realism.
But if realism is redefined as commitment to stable structural relations, quantum theory becomes fully compatible with it.
Indeed, the mathematical formalism itself is deeply structural.
Thus realism survives — but in revised form.
6. Objectivity Without Independence
Objectivity need not mean observer-independence in the metaphysical sense.
Instead, objectivity can mean:
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Stability of results across different observers,
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Reproducibility of experiments,
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Invariance under transformations,
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Formal consistency across contexts.
These forms of objectivity are fully compatible with relational or contextual structures.
Independence ontology mistakenly equates objectivity with absence of structure.
Modern physics shows that objectivity can arise within structured frameworks.
7. Why This Reconstruction Is Stronger
By decoupling realism from ontological independence, we gain several advantages:
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We avoid unnecessary metaphysical commitments.
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We align realism more closely with the actual structure of scientific theories.
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We reduce interpretative tension in quantum mechanics.
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We preserve the explanatory integrity of science without positing inaccessible metaphysical standpoints.
Realism becomes a commitment to the stability and constraint of theory by the world — not a claim about intrinsic, perspective-free existence.
This is a thinner, but stronger, position.
8. Conclusion
Scientific realism does not require ontological independence.
The independence assumption is an additional metaphysical thesis that has historically accompanied realism, but it is not logically necessary for it.
Realism can be reconstructed as a commitment to:
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structural stability,
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empirical constraint,
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explanatory coherence,
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and intersubjective invariance.
This reconstruction preserves the strengths of scientific realism while removing the ontological commitments that generate tension in modern physics.
Far from undermining realism, quantum theory invites its refinement.
The future of realism does not lie in defending classical independence.
It lies in recognising that objectivity and reality can be grounded in structure rather than intrinsic metaphysical isolation.
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