Abstract
Modern physics is commonly interpreted as describing a reality that exists independently of observation, perception, and description. This independence assumption appears to ground scientific objectivity. However, when examined carefully, the assumption proves structurally unstable. Because all physical knowledge arises through observation and theoretical description, the claim that reality exists independently of these processes cannot be justified without relying on them. This creates a self-referential tension at the heart of scientific realism. The paper argues that the interpretative difficulties of quantum theory are symptomatic of this deeper ontological instability.
1. Introduction
A widespread assumption in the ontology of physics states that reality exists independently of observation or perception. On this view, physics aims to describe a world that would be exactly as it is even if no observers existed. This assumption is often presented as a minimal condition of scientific realism.
The assumption seems innocuous. It appears to safeguard objectivity against subjectivism. However, once made explicit, it generates conceptual difficulties. The purpose of this essay is not to propose an alternative ontology, but to show that the independence assumption cannot be coherently maintained without undermining itself.
2. The Structure of Scientific Knowledge
All scientific knowledge is produced through structured practices:
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experimental design
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measurement procedures
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mathematical modelling
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theoretical interpretation
These practices are not incidental. They constitute the conditions under which physics can make claims about the world.
Observation is therefore not a passive reception of facts. It is an organised activity involving conceptual distinctions: what counts as a system, what counts as a property, what counts as a measurement outcome.
In short, physical knowledge arises within structured observational frameworks.
3. The Independence Assumption
The independence assumption states:
Reality exists independently of observation, perception, and description.
This claim introduces a distinction between:
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the world as encountered through scientific practice, and
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the world as it exists independently of such practice.
The assumption implies that physics ultimately aims to describe the latter.
However, this introduces a structural tension.
4. The Self-Referential Problem
Any claim about reality must itself be formulated through observation, modelling, and description.
Thus, the independence assumption is expressed within the very conditions it declares irrelevant to reality.
This generates a self-referential difficulty:
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If the claim is true, then reality is independent of observation.
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But the claim itself is an outcome of observational and theoretical activity.
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Therefore, the claim depends on the very processes it declares ontologically irrelevant.
The assumption attempts to specify what reality is by appealing to a standpoint that it simultaneously denies exists.
This does not produce a contradiction in physics itself. Rather, it produces instability in the ontology used to interpret physics.
5. Consequences for Interpretation
The independence assumption becomes especially problematic in quantum theory.
Quantum mechanics does not describe systems as possessing all properties independently of measurement context. Instead, the formalism assigns probabilities to outcomes associated with specific experimental arrangements.
Attempts to interpret the theory while preserving the independence assumption lead to persistent difficulties:
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hidden-variable theories introduce additional structural commitments;
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collapse theories modify dynamical laws;
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many-worlds interpretations multiply ontological entities.
Despite their differences, these approaches share a common goal: to preserve the idea that systems possess definite properties independently of measurement.
The continuing interpretative disagreement suggests not merely theoretical complexity, but tension between the formal structure of quantum theory and the independence assumption guiding its interpretation.
6. Clarifying the Claim
The critique advanced here does not deny the existence of a world beyond individual perception. Nor does it suggest that reality is created by observers.
The argument concerns a stronger claim: that reality exists in a form wholly independent of any observational or descriptive framework whatsoever.
This stronger independence claim cannot be justified without relying on observational and descriptive practices.
Therefore, the ontology attempts to ground scientific knowledge in something defined as outside the conditions of its own articulation.
This structural instability may help explain why modern physics, despite its predictive success, remains interpretatively unsettled.
7. Conclusion
The independence assumption appears to provide a minimal foundation for scientific realism. However, when examined closely, it proves self-undermining. All claims about reality are formulated within observational and theoretical frameworks, yet the assumption defines reality as independent of those frameworks. The result is an ontology that depends upon what it excludes.
The interpretative turbulence surrounding quantum theory can thus be understood not merely as a technical puzzle, but as evidence of deeper ontological tension. Whether one adopts an alternative framework or not, the independence assumption itself requires critical re-examination.
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