Once phenomenon is taken as ontologically primary, meaning enters the picture immediately.
But it must enter carefully.
One of the most persistent confusions in philosophy, cognitive science, and social theory is the conflation of meaning with value — or worse, the assumption that one can be reduced to the other.
This post draws a hard line.
Meaning Is Not Usefulness
Meaning is not:
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utility,
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function,
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fitness,
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preference,
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coordination success,
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or adaptive advantage.
Those are all forms of value.
Meaning, by contrast, concerns distinction:
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what counts as something,
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how it is differentiated,
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and how it is articulated within a system of possibilities.
Confusing the two collapses ontology into engineering.
First-Order Meaning Revisited
Recall: phenomena are units of first-order meaning.
This does not mean they are interpreted, symbolised, or evaluated.
It means they are articulated.
A phenomenon:
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makes a difference,
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under a cut,
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within a system.
That difference is meaning.
Meaning precedes valuation.
What Value Actually Is
Value belongs to coordination systems.
Biological systems, social systems, economic systems, technological systems — these operate by:
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reinforcing some states,
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suppressing others,
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optimising trajectories,
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stabilising behaviours.
They care about:
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survival,
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efficiency,
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coherence,
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reproduction,
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legitimacy.
All of that is value.
None of it is meaning.
Why the Distinction Matters
When meaning is reduced to value:
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truth becomes “what works”,
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explanation becomes “what pays off”,
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reality becomes “what survives selection”.
Value systems can function perfectly while being semantically blind.
Semiotic Systems Are Not Coordination Systems
Semiotic systems operate by:
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construing distinctions,
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organising relations,
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enabling articulation across contexts.
Their success is not measured by survival or efficiency, but by coherence and extensibility.
They can fail spectacularly in value terms while remaining meaningful.
They intersect — but they do not coincide.
The Persistent Temptation
Why is the conflation so tempting?
Because value is visible.
It leaves traces:
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behaviour,
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outcomes,
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optimisation curves,
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selection effects.
Meaning does not.
Meaning must be theorised.
So value is often smuggled in as a proxy — especially in accounts that want to remain “naturalistic” without doing ontological work.
This move always backfires.
Meaning Without Moralisation
Separating meaning from value also removes a common anxiety:
If meaning is not value-laden, does it become cold? Empty? Nihilistic?
No.
It becomes precise.
Confusing them moralises ontology and ontologises morality.
Neither survives intact.
Where This Leaves Us
We now have a disciplined sequence:
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Systems as structured possibility
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Instantiation as cut
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Phenomena as first-order meaning
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Meaning as distinction, not value
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Value as coordination, not meaning
This clears the ground for the final move.
If meaning is not value, and phenomena are not objects, then symbolic systems acquire a very specific role.
Post 7 — Symbolic Systems as Second-Order Meaning
Where language, mathematics, and theory finally land — not as mirrors of reality, but as architectures of relational stability.
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