In enactivist theory, sense-making names the process by which an organism brings forth a meaningful world through its embodied engagement.
In the work of Evan Thompson and Alva Noë, this is often expressed as:
- organisms do not passively receive information,
- they actively enact a world,
- and meaning arises through their situated activity.
This formulation rejects both:
- representational models of cognition, and
- the idea of a fixed, observer-independent world fully specified in advance.
At first glance, this appears compatible with a relational ontology.
But the compatibility is only superficial.
Because even in its most refined form, sense-making still depends on a crucial assumption:
that there is a world—however enacted—in which meaning is realised.
It is this assumption that must now be placed under constraint.
1. What “Sense-Making” Presupposes
In its standard formulation, sense-making involves:
- an organism
- a world (or environment)
- and an activity that brings the two into relation
Even when the world is said to be enacted rather than pre-given, the structure remains:
- there is something that counts as a world,
- and something that makes sense of it.
This implies:
- a domain in which sense is made,
- and a distinction between what is making sense and what is made sense of.
2. The Constraint: No Pre-Given World
Under the logic of the cut, the following are no longer available:
- a pre-existing world as a domain of objects or states,
- a shared environment in which organism and world co-exist,
- or a process that connects an organism to a world through interaction.
This does not deny that something like “world” appears in experience.
It denies that “world” can function as an ontological ground.
3. The Problem with “Enacting a World”
Enactivism attempts to avoid realism by claiming that organisms enact their worlds.
But this still presupposes:
- that there is something that can be enacted as a world,
- and that enactment is an activity occurring over time.
This raises a problem under constraint:
what is being enacted, if there is no domain from which a world is drawn?
If “world” is not pre-given, but is enacted, then:
- enactment cannot be a transformation of something already there,
- nor a process applied to a substrate.
Otherwise, the world is simply reintroduced at a different level.
4. Removing the Domain of Meaning
Sense-making is typically understood as:
- the attribution or constitution of meaning within a world.
This implies:
- a domain in which meaning appears,
- and a distinction between meaningful and non-meaningful aspects of that domain.
Under constraint, there is no such domain.
So meaning cannot be:
- located in a world,
- applied to objects,
- or generated through interaction with an environment.
Instead:
meaning must be understood as intrinsic to the determinacy of what is construed.
5. Meaning Without “Aboutness”
A central feature of sense-making accounts is aboutness:
- meaning is about something in the world,
- perception is directed toward objects,
- action is oriented within an environment.
This introduces a relational structure:
- subject → world
- organism → environment
Under constraint, this structure cannot be maintained.
Because it presupposes:
- distinct relata existing prior to relation,
- and a domain in which that relation is realised.
Instead:
what appears as “aboutness” must be reinterpreted as a feature of determinacy within construal, not a relation to an external object.
Meaning does not point outward.
It is not directed at a world.
It is already fully specified within the conditions that make that construal determinate.
6. From Sense-Making to Construal
If we remove:
- world as domain,
- interaction as process,
- and aboutness as directed relation,
then “sense-making” can no longer be understood as an activity bridging organism and world.
What remains is closer to:
construal—the determinate organisation of meaning without reference to an external domain.
This does not deny that experience appears structured, oriented, or meaningful.
It reinterprets that structure as:
- internally constituted under constraint,
- rather than arising through engagement with a world.
7. The Residual Import: World as Container
Even when enactivism rejects objective realism, it often retains a weaker assumption:
- that there is a domain—call it “lived world,” “environment,” or “Umwelt”—in which sense-making occurs.
This domain may be:
- organism-relative,
- historically shaped,
- or dynamically enacted.
But it still functions as:
a container for meaning.
Under constraint, no such container can be admitted.
Because it would reintroduce:
- a shared domain,
- a medium of relation,
- and a place where meaning resides.
8. Reframing Sense-Making
We can now restate sense-making in a form that remains coherent under constraint:
- It is not the enactment of a world.
- It is not an activity that generates meaning through interaction.
- It does not presuppose a domain in which meaning appears.
Instead:
sense-making describes the determinacy of construal under conditions where no external domain is required for that determinacy to hold.
This preserves:
- the rejection of passive reception,
- the emphasis on structured experience,
- and the non-representational character of cognition.
But it removes:
- the need for a world in which meaning is made.
9. What Has Been Removed—and What Remains
Removed:
- world as domain
- interaction as meaning-generating process
- aboutness as relation to external objects
Retained (under reinterpretation):
- meaning is not given in advance
- experience is structured and non-arbitrary
- cognition is not reducible to internal representation
Closing Formulation
Sense-making does not consist in enacting a meaningful world.
It names the determinacy of construal under conditions where no world is presupposed as the domain of that meaning.
The moment a “world” is introduced—even as enacted—it functions as a container for meaning,and reintroduces the very domain the account seeks to avoid.
At this point, the core enactivist triad has been placed under constraint:
- coupling without domain
- autopoiesis without substrate
- sense-making without world
What remains is the final stabilising element:
continuity.
In the next post, we turn to that directly:
what does “history” or “development” mean when there is no process unfolding across time?
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