Wednesday, 8 April 2026

1 Life Is Not Meaning: Reading Biosemiotics Under Constraint

Biosemiotics presents itself as an extension of semiotic theory into the domain of life.

In the work associated with Jakob von Uexküll, and later developed by figures such as Jesper Hoffmeyer and Kalevi Kull, the central claim is both simple and far-reaching:

life is intrinsically semiotic.

On this view:

  • organisms do not merely process signals,
  • they interpret them,
  • and meaning is already present at the most basic levels of biological organisation.

Semiosis, therefore, is not restricted to language or culture.

It is continuous with life itself.


At first glance, this appears compatible with a relational account of meaning.

It rejects:

  • reduction of meaning to physical causation,
  • and the confinement of semiosis to human language.

It emphasises:

  • organisation,
  • relation,
  • and the irreducibility of meaning.

But this apparent alignment conceals a deeper problem.


1. The Expansion of the Semiotic

Biosemiotics proceeds by expanding the scope of the semiotic.

Where traditional semiotics might restrict meaning to symbolic systems, biosemiotics extends it to:

  • cellular signalling,
  • genetic processes,
  • organism–environment relations,
  • and evolutionary dynamics.

In doing so, it redefines semiosis as:

the interpretation of signs by living systems.

This move is strategic.

It avoids:

  • strict mechanism,
  • and purely physical accounts of life.

But it introduces a critical ambiguity:

what counts as “interpretation,” and what counts as “meaning,” at this level?


2. The Ambiguity of “Meaning” in Biosemiotics

At the biological level, “meaning” is often described in terms such as:

  • relevance to survival,
  • functional significance,
  • adaptive response,
  • or selective value.

For example:

  • a chemical gradient “means” food,
  • a signal “means” danger,
  • a stimulus “means” an opportunity or threat.

But these descriptions rely on a shift.

They move from:

  • value (what matters for survival or functioning),

to:

  • meaning (as construed significance within a semiotic system).

This shift is rarely made explicit.

Instead, value-laden distinctions are redescribed as semiotic ones.


3. The Constraint: Meaning Is Not Value

Under the present framework, this shift cannot be accepted.

A strict distinction must be maintained:

  • value: organised selectivity within biological systems
  • meaning: organised construal within semiotic systems

These are not different levels of the same phenomenon.

They are distinct organisations.

This does not imply separation.

But it does require:

that one cannot be reduced to, or expanded into, the other.


4. Where Biosemiotics Crosses the Line

Biosemiotics crosses this line when it treats:

  • adaptive responsiveness
  • functional organisation
  • or selective sensitivity

as instances of semiosis.

This occurs when:

  • “interpretation” is used to describe differential response,
  • “sign” is used to describe causal correlation,
  • and “meaning” is used to describe biological relevance.

At this point:

value has been redescribed as meaning.

Not derived.

Not explained.

Simply renamed.


5. The Problem of Continuity

A central motivation for biosemiotics is continuity:

  • no sharp break between life and meaning,
  • no privileged threshold at which semiosis begins.

Instead:

meaning is continuous with life.

Under constraint, this continuity cannot be taken as given.

Because continuity here functions as a bridge:

  • it allows biological organisation to be read as semiotic,
  • and semiotic organisation to be grounded in life.

But this bridge depends on:

treating value and meaning as points along a single continuum.

This is precisely what must be refused.


6. Reframing the Relation

If meaning is not reducible to value, and value is not expandable into meaning, then their relation must be reconsidered.

We already have the resources to do this.

From earlier work:

distinct organisations can be coupled without collapsing into one another.

So instead of:

  • life as inherently semiotic,

we have:

biological organisation (value) and semiotic organisation (meaning) as distinct, but non-independent.

This preserves:

  • the irreducibility of meaning,
  • without projecting it downward into biology.

7. What Biosemiotics Gets Right

Despite its category slippage, biosemiotics captures something important:

  • living systems are not indifferent to their conditions,
  • they exhibit organised selectivity,
  • and their behaviour cannot be fully described in purely mechanical terms.

These are genuine insights.

But they concern:

value, not meaning.


8. What Must Be Refused

To maintain coherence, the following must be rejected:

  • meaning as a general property of life
  • semiosis as continuous with biological function
  • interpretation as equivalent to adaptive response

These moves collapse a critical distinction.

Once collapsed, it cannot be recovered.


Closing Formulation

Life is not meaning.

Biological systems are organised around value—
what matters for their continuation.

Semiotic systems are organised around meaning—
what is construed as such.

These are not stages of a continuum.

They are distinct organisations that may be coupled,
but cannot be reduced to one another.

No comments:

Post a Comment