Ethical theory has long assumed that agency requires autonomy. To be an agent, on this view, is to be self-governing: to act freely, independently, and from within oneself. Constraint is therefore treated as a threat to agency, and dependence as its negation.
This assumption has shaped everything from moral responsibility to political theory.
It is also false.
The autonomy myth
Autonomy is typically defined as freedom from external determination. The autonomous agent is imagined as:
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bounded,
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internally coherent,
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the origin of its own actions,
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capable of standing apart from relations and choosing among them.
This figure does important cultural work. It supports ideals of independence, accountability, and dignity. But ontologically, it is a fiction — and a costly one.
Constraint as the condition of agency
To see why this belief is mistaken, we need only recall what has already been established.
Agency appears only within:
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systems of potential,
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structured fields of possible continuation,
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relations that support some actions and not others.
Without constraint, nothing could count as an action at all. There would be no difference between acting, failing, or drifting.
Agency as navigational capacity
Agency is not the power to act without constraint. It is the capacity to navigate constraint.
An agent is one who can:
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sense relational pressure,
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recognise breakdown,
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attempt repair,
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adjust participation in light of consequences.
This capacity is graded, situational, and unevenly distributed. It varies across:
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contexts,
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domains,
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bodily states,
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social positions.
Agency is not an all-or-nothing property. It is a local achievement.
Why autonomy misdescribes responsibility
The autonomy model encourages a particular picture of responsibility: one in which agents are fully accountable because they are presumed to be self-originating. Failure is therefore framed as fault, and harm as culpability.
But if agency is navigational rather than autonomous, responsibility must be reconceived.
One is responsible insofar as one’s participation shapes the space of possible continuation for others — and insofar as one is capable of sensing and responding to that shaping.
Dependency without passivity
A common fear follows immediately: if autonomy is abandoned, does agency collapse into passivity?
It does not.
Navigation always occurs through dependency. The ability to respond to pressure, to reconfigure participation, and to attempt repair is an active capacity — even when options are narrow.
In many cases, acknowledging constraint increases agency by making its limits explicit rather than denying them.
Freedom rethought
On this view, freedom is not the absence of constraint. It is room to manoeuvre within constraint.
Freedom increases when:
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constraints are legible rather than opaque,
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pressures can be anticipated rather than merely endured,
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repair is possible rather than foreclosed.
This is why freedom is relational and systemic, not individual and metaphysical. It can be expanded or contracted by changes in social structure, communicative norms, or institutional design — none of which autonomy theory can adequately explain.
Ethical consequences
Once agency is understood without autonomy, several consequences follow immediately:
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Responsibility becomes proportionate rather than absolute.
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Blame loses its metaphysical justification.
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Care becomes a condition of agency, not its negation.
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Ethical judgement shifts from character to situated capacity.
Ethics becomes less punitive and more attentive — not softer, but more precise.
Looking ahead
If agency does not depend on autonomy, then responsibility cannot depend on blame.
In the next post, we will examine responsibility as exposure rather than culpability — and show why repair, not judgement, is the ethical core that autonomy theory has obscured.
This is where ethics finally separates itself from moral mythology and becomes structurally intelligible.
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