Tuesday, 31 March 2026

The Fiction of Scientific Objectivity: 2 Models Without Innocence

If the purity of science is a myth, then its central product must be reconsidered.

Not the laboratory.
Not the institution.
But the model.


Models are typically treated as the point at which science touches reality:

  • representations of underlying structures
  • approximations of how the world is
  • tools for prediction and explanation

Even when acknowledged as imperfect, they are still assumed to aim at something beyond themselves.


This assumption now has to go.


1. Against the mirror

The dominant image is simple:

the world exists independently, and models reflect it—more or less accurately.


But this image depends on a separation that cannot be sustained:

  • a world “as it is”
  • and a model that represents it

From the perspective already established, there is no access to an unconstrued world.

There are only:

phenomena actualised through construal.


A model does not stand apart from what it describes.

It participates in bringing it forth.


2. Construal, not representation

This is the decisive shift.

A scientific model is not:

  • a picture of reality
  • a symbolic proxy
  • a passive mapping

It is a semiotic operation:

  • selecting distinctions
  • organising relations
  • stabilising patterns
  • enabling certain phenomena to appear

Different models do not represent the same thing differently.

They actualise different phenomena.


3. The discipline of constraint

This does not mean anything goes.

Scientific models are not arbitrary.

They are:

disciplined construals under constraint.


Constraints include:

  • prior models and theoretical commitments
  • experimental setups
  • mathematical formalisms
  • institutional expectations

These do not ensure truth.

They ensure stability and reproducibility of construal.


4. Precision without innocence

Scientific models are often extraordinarily precise.

They:

  • predict outcomes
  • generate technologies
  • coordinate large-scale action

This precision is frequently taken as evidence that they must be:

tracking an underlying reality.


But precision does not imply innocence.

It indicates:

that the construal is highly stabilised under constraint.


The model works—not because it mirrors the world,
but because it reliably produces the same phenomena under specified conditions.


5. Multiplicity without contradiction

Once representation is set aside, a familiar problem dissolves.

How can multiple, incompatible models coexist?


  • wave vs particle descriptions
  • competing formalisms in different domains
  • alternative modelling frameworks within the same field

From a representational view, this is a crisis.

From a construal view, it is expected.


Different models do not compete to describe the same reality.

They operate within different conditions of actualisation.


6. The role of mathematics

Mathematics is often taken as the guarantor of objectivity:

  • abstract
  • formal
  • independent of context

But within this framework, mathematics is:

a resource for construal.


It provides:

  • structured ways of drawing distinctions
  • stable relations that can be iterated
  • constraints that discipline variation

It does not anchor models to reality.

It stabilises how phenomena are brought forth.


7. From truth to viability

If models do not represent, what are they evaluated for?

Not truth in the correspondence sense.

But:

  • viability
  • stability
  • reproducibility
  • scope of application

A model is successful if it:

  • holds under specified constraints
  • coordinates practice effectively
  • continues to generate usable phenomena

Truth becomes a retrospective label
for successful, stabilised construal.


8. The illusion of discovery

Scientific practice is often described as discovery:

  • uncovering what was already there
  • revealing hidden structures
  • finding the laws of nature

But if phenomena are actualised through construal, this language misleads.


Science does not uncover a pre-given world.

It extends the range of what can be brought forth as phenomenon.


What is discovered is not “out there,” waiting.

It is made available
through disciplined semiotic work.


9. The coupling reappears

At this point, the earlier analysis returns.

Because models do not operate alone.

They are always embedded within:

  • practices
  • institutions
  • norms of validation

Which means:

their stability depends on value coordination.


The model construes.
The system coordinates.
Their coupling is misrecognised as objective knowledge.


10. No retreat to relativism

This position will again invite a familiar misreading:

“If models don’t represent reality, then anything is as good as anything else.”


No.

Because construal is always under constraint.

Not all models stabilise.

Not all generate reproducible phenomena.

Not all coordinate practice effectively.


The difference is not between truth and error.

It is between:

  • viable and non-viable construals.

11. The cost of clarity

What is lost here is comforting:

  • the idea that science tells us how the world really is
  • the sense of standing on solid ontological ground

What is gained is sharper:

  • an account of what models actually do
  • an understanding of their limits and power
  • a way to analyse scientific practice without illusion

12. The next step

If models are disciplined construals, and their stability depends on coordination,

then the next question is unavoidable:

What kind of system maintains this coordination while denying that it exists?


Next: Post 3 — Practice Without Neutrality

Where the everyday machinery of science is re-read
as a value system that stabilises the appearance of objectivity.

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