Phenomenal Instability and Theoretical Discomfort
If Parts I and II established that contemporary physics often theorises without phenomena—and that this posture traces back to a misgeneralisation of the quantum exception—we can now sharpen the diagnosis by drawing a distinction that is routinely erased.
Not all speculative constructs in physics arise in the same way.
Some are born from phenomenal instability: stubborn, repeatable features of experience that resist existing construals. Others arise from theoretical discomfort: tensions internal to theory-space itself, such as failures of unification, mathematical inconsistency, or aesthetic dissatisfaction.
Both kinds of construct circulate today under the same rhetorical banner of “theoretical physics.” Ontologically, however, they occupy very different positions.
When Phenomena Refuse Their Construals
Dark matter and dark energy are often cited as emblematic cases of speculative excess. Yet their origin story is fundamentally different from that of purely theory-driven constructs.
In these cases, phenomena are not absent. Galactic rotation curves, gravitational lensing, and the accelerating expansion of the universe are stable, repeatable features of experience. What fails is not observation but construal.
From a relational perspective, this is a situation of phenomenal underdetermination:
There is first-order meaning — something is happening.
Existing theoretical systems fail to actualise that meaning coherently.
New construals are proposed to stabilise the phenomenon.
Here, the ontology is not outrunning actuality; it is struggling to keep pace with it.
To treat dark matter or dark energy as fictional is therefore a mistake. They are placeholders for unresolved construals of genuine phenomena. Their ontological status is provisional not because nothing has happened, but because too much has.
When Theory Seeks Relief From Itself
By contrast, many influential contemporary constructs originate almost entirely within theory-space. They respond not to anomalous events but to internal pressures: the incompatibility of formalisms, the desire for unification, or the pursuit of mathematical elegance.
In such cases, mathematics generates a system rich in possible instances. These possibilities are then treated as candidates for reality, even in the absence of phenomenal triggers.
What is missing here is not confirmation but instigation. No phenomenon has demanded a new construal; the demand arises from theory itself.
From a relational standpoint, this is a fundamentally different posture. It is the difference between:
We do not yet know how to construe what is happening,
and
We know what must exist in order for our theories to be comfortable.
Only the first is anchored in actuality.
The Rhetorical Flattening of Distinct Cases
Despite their different origins, both kinds of construct are commonly discussed in the same ontological register. They are spoken of as “entities,” “components of the universe,” or “hidden structures” awaiting discovery.
This rhetorical flattening matters. It obscures the crucial difference between:
responding to phenomenal instability, and
resolving theoretical discomfort.
In doing so, it allows mathematical possibility to masquerade as empirical necessity.
A relational ontology restores the distinction without disparaging either practice. It simply insists that their ontological commitments be assessed differently.
Graded Warrant, Not Blanket Skepticism
One of the advantages of this framework is that it replaces blanket judgments with graded warrant.
Constructs arising from phenomenal instability carry a different kind of ontological pressure. They are attempts—however provisional—to actualise first-order meaning that already insists upon itself.
Constructs arising from theoretical discomfort, by contrast, remain fully within the domain of structured potential until a phenomenal cut occurs.
Both may be valuable. Both may even, eventually, converge. But they are not ontologically equivalent in the meantime.
Restoring the Discipline of the Cut
The contemporary tendency to move seamlessly from anomaly to ontology—to treat unresolved phenomena and purely theoretical possibilities as ontologically interchangeable—marks a loss of discipline rather than a gain in ambition.
What is needed is not a retreat from theory, nor a suspicion of mathematics, but a renewed attentiveness to the cut that links theory to experience.
Without that cut, possibility drifts into assertion. With it, even the most speculative constructs remain answerable to actuality.
In the next post, we will argue that this drift is sustained by a deeper transformation: the elevation of mathematics from representational tool to surrogate intuition. Understanding that shift will bring the full arc of the series into view.
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