Structuralism marks a genuine attempt to loosen the grip of representation.
In response to mentalism and the interiorisation of meaning, structural approaches redirect attention away from inner contents and toward systems of relation. Meaning is no longer sought in what a sign stands for, nor in what a speaker intends, but in the patterned differences that organise a system as a whole.
This move is not cosmetic. It alters what counts as an explanation. But it does not complete the ontological break it begins.
Difference Without Reference
At its strongest, structuralism suspends reference.
Signs do not derive meaning from a relation to objects, ideas, or mental contents. They derive meaning from their position within a system of contrasts. A sign is what it is because it is not other signs.
This reorientation does important work:
Meaning is no longer anchored in mental representation.
Explanation no longer requires tracing intentions or inner causes.
Teleology loses much of its footing, since signs do not aim at outcomes.
Meaning becomes relational in a strong sense: internal to the system, not directed outward.
The System as Explanatory Ground
Structuralism elevates the system itself to explanatory primacy.
To explain a meaning is to show how it occupies a position within a structured whole. The focus shifts from events to relations, from acts to structure, from production to organisation.
This move allows explanation to remain largely immanent. One need not ask what caused a particular sign to mean what it does, only how it contrasts with others.
In this respect, structuralism offers a real escape from both teleology and psychological causation.
The Persistence of the Sign
Yet the escape is partial.
Even as reference is suspended, the sign itself remains intact as a basic unit. Meaning is still something signs have, even if that meaning is now differential rather than representational.
The system explains which meaning a sign has, but not what kind of thing meaning is.
As a result, structuralism often inherits representational expectations implicitly. Signs are still treated as bearers of content, even if that content is defined relationally.
Synchrony and Its Limits
Structural explanation privileges synchrony.
The system is treated as a static arrangement of relations at a given moment. Change, use, and activity are backgrounded in favour of structural coherence.
This bracketing is methodologically powerful, but ontologically costly. It risks treating structure as an object rather than as a space of possibility. Meaning appears fixed by the system, rather than enacted through it.
When diachrony and practice return, explanatory pressure re-emerges: how does the system change, and why?
Without ontological revision, causation begins to creep back in.
Why Representation Is Not Fully Displaced
Structuralism reduces the role of mental content, but it does not displace representation as an underlying orientation.
The sign still mediates meaning. The system still organises sign-values. Meaning is still something that can, in principle, be extracted, analysed, and compared.
What is missing is a reconception of meaning as actualised rather than assigned.
Without that shift, structuralism remains vulnerable to being reabsorbed into representational explanation, especially when questions of use, error, or change arise.
A Genuine Turning Point
This should not be read as a dismissal.
Structuralism demonstrates that much of what had been attributed to representation, intention, or mental causation can be accounted for relationally. It shows that coherence does not require aboutness.
But it also shows how difficult it is to complete the break. The explanatory habits installed by representation run deep.
Structuralism opens a door. It does not yet step fully through it.
The next development pushes in two directions at once: it generalises the sign to everything, extending relational explanation outward, while simultaneously intensifying representational dependence.
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