Pragmatist and inferentialist accounts do not equate meaning with mere use.
They refine the claim:
meaning is use under norms.
That is:
- not just behaviour,
- but behaviour governed by correctness,
- participation in practices structured by rules,
- responsiveness to what one ought to say or do.
This appears to secure what simpler accounts lack:
- a distinction between correct and incorrect use,
- a notion of commitment and entitlement,
- a framework for evaluation.
Meaning is thus no longer:
- brute behaviour,
- but normatively articulated activity.
1. The Strength of Normativity
Normativity introduces something real.
It distinguishes:
- random behaviour from rule-governed action,
- mere response from accountable participation.
To use a term meaningfully is to:
- be bound by norms of its correct use,
- recognise when it applies,
- and respond appropriately within a practice.
This gives meaning:
- structure beyond pattern,
- constraint beyond causation,
- and coherence beyond coincidence.
At this level, pragmatism advances beyond:
- behaviourism
- and reductive functionalism.
2. The Critical Identification
But the key claim remains:
to grasp meaning is to grasp norms.
Or more strongly:
meaning just is normative role in practice.
This identification does the work.
It asserts that:
- once normativity is in place,
- nothing further is required.
3. Rules Without “As”
Norms and rules can:
- guide behaviour,
- regulate action,
- and establish standards of correctness.
They determine:
- what counts as appropriate,
- what follows from what,
- how one ought to respond.
But none of this, by itself, requires:
that anything is taken as anything.
Rules can be:
- followed,
- violated,
- enforced,
without introducing:
- construal.
4. Correctness Is Not Construal
Normativity introduces:
- correctness conditions.
But correctness is not the same as meaning.
An action can be:
- correct or incorrect,
- appropriate or inappropriate,
relative to a rule.
This does not entail:
- that the action involves taking something as something.
Correctness evaluates behaviour.
Meaning requires:
an “as”-relation.
5. The Externality of Norms
Norms operate at the level of:
- practice,
- coordination,
- and social organisation.
They are:
- public,
- shared,
- and enforceable.
They regulate:
- what participants do.
But they do not, by themselves, establish:
how anything is construed.
6. The Slide from Norm to Meaning
The identification of normativity with meaning depends on a slide:
- from being governed by rules
- to constituting meaning
Because norms:
- constrain behaviour,
- organise practice,
- and stabilise interaction,
it is inferred:
they must also generate meaning.
This inference does not hold.
7. Normativity as Value
Normativity can be understood as:
organised value within a practice.
It concerns:
- what counts as correct,
- what is sanctioned or required,
- what matters within an activity.
This aligns it with:
- value systems,
- not semiotic systems.
Normativity organises:
- action and evaluation.
It does not, by itself, produce:
semiotic construal.
8. Inferential Roles Reconsidered
Inferentialism sharpens the claim:
- meaning is a role within a network of inferences.
But inferential relations are still:
- governed by norms,
- evaluated for correctness,
- enacted in practice.
They determine:
- what follows from what,
not:
what anything is as.
Inference can proceed:
- correctly or incorrectly,
without introducing:
- construal.
9. What Normativity Actually Does
Under constraint, we can state:
normativity organises behaviour under conditions of correctness.
It provides:
- structure to practice,
- stability to interaction,
- criteria for evaluation.
But it does not:
- generate meaning,
- or establish aboutness.
Closing Formulation
Norms govern what is done.
They establish correctness,organise practice,and regulate participation.But they do not, by themselves, construe.
Meaning requires that something is taken as something.
No system of rules, no matter how refined,produces this relation.
The strongest version of “use = meaning” has now been weakened:
- not all use—only norm-governed use
- but even this does not suffice
The next step is unavoidable.
If not:
- structure
- behaviour
- or normativity
then where does pragmatism locate meaning?
No comments:
Post a Comment