Few questions feel more immediate than this one. We see, hear, and experience the world continuously—but reflection introduces doubt: are these experiences faithful to reality, or are they distortions, constructions, or simplifications?
“Do we perceive reality as it really is?” seems to ask whether our experience matches the world.
But this framing depends on a deeper assumption: that there exists a version of reality available independently of any construal, against which perception could be compared.
Once that assumption is examined, the question no longer holds its structure. It reveals a familiar distortion: the externalisation of construal conditions into an imagined comparison space.
1. The surface form of the question
“Do we perceive reality as it really is?”
In its everyday philosophical form, this asks:
- whether perception accurately represents the world
- whether there is a gap between appearance and reality
- whether our senses distort or reveal what is truly there
- whether a more accurate, less mediated access is possible
It presupposes:
- a distinction between appearance and reality
- the possibility of comparing the two
- a standard of “as it really is” independent of perception
2. Hidden ontological commitments
For the question to stabilise, several assumptions must already be in place:
- that reality exists in a fully specified form independent of any construal
- that perception produces representations that can be compared to that independent reality
- that a standpoint outside all construal is available for evaluation
- that distortion and accuracy can be globally assessed
- that appearance and reality are separable domains
These assumptions construct a comparison between two terms that cannot be jointly accessed.
3. Stratal misalignment
Within relational ontology, the distortion involves externalisation, reification, and symmetrisation.
(a) Externalisation of construal conditions
A viewpoint outside all perception is assumed.
- as if one could step outside construal to evaluate it
- this produces the idea of “reality as it really is” independent of any access conditions
(b) Reification of “reality-in-itself”
Reality is treated as a fully formed object.
- independent of any relational actualisation
- as if it could be specified without reference to construal
(c) Symmetrisation of appearance vs reality
A false opposition is constructed.
- appearance and reality are treated as parallel domains
- as if both could be compared within a shared space
- but “appearance” is already a mode of access to reality, not a separate domain
4. Relational re-description
If we remain within relational ontology, perception is not a representation that stands apart from reality. It is a mode of construal within the ongoing actualisation of relational systems.
More precisely:
- systems instantiate structured relations under constraint
- within certain configurations, these instantiations are construed as experience
- “perception” names the way these relations are made available within that construal
There is no second object called “reality-in-itself” available for comparison.
Instead:
- what is construed is the phenomenon
- construal is not a layer added to reality, but the condition under which reality is accessible at all
This does not eliminate variation or limitation:
- different systems constrain different forms of construal
- what is available to be perceived depends on those constraints
But this variation occurs within relational systems, not between perception and an unconstrued world.
5. Dissolution of the problem-space
Once the external comparison space is withdrawn, the question “Do we perceive reality as it really is?” loses its structure.
It depends on:
- assuming access to reality independent of construal
- treating perception as representation of an external object
- constructing a symmetry between appearance and reality
- requiring a global standard of accuracy
If these assumptions are withdrawn, there is no standpoint from which such a comparison could be made.
What disappears is not perception, but the demand that it be measured against an unconstrued absolute.
6. Residual attraction
The persistence of the question is deeply embedded.
It is sustained by:
- everyday errors and illusions, which suggest a gap between appearance and reality
- scientific practices that refine measurement and improve predictive accuracy
- philosophical traditions that privilege access to ultimate reality
- linguistic habits that separate “how things seem” from “how they are”
Most importantly, the intuition of distortion is real:
- perceptions can be limited, misleading, or partial
But this does not imply access to a fully unconstrued alternative.
It reflects variation within constrained systems of construal.
Closing remark
“Do we perceive reality as it really is?” appears to ask whether our experience matches an independent world.
Once these moves are undone, perception is not downgraded.
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