Sunday, 26 April 2026

Can everything be explained? — The totalisation of explanation beyond its conditions of applicability

Few questions express the ambition of inquiry as directly as this one. Science, philosophy, and everyday reasoning all proceed by explaining: accounting for why things are as they are. From this success arises a natural extension—perhaps everything, in principle, can be explained.

“Can everything be explained?” appears to ask about the limits of knowledge.

But this framing depends on a deeper move: treating explanation as a uniform operation that could be extended to the totality of what is.

Once that move is examined, the question no longer tracks a genuine limit. It reveals a familiar distortion: the totalisation of explanation beyond the strata in which it is meaningful.


1. The surface form of the question

“Can everything be explained?”

In its everyday form, this asks:

  • whether all phenomena are in principle intelligible
  • whether there are ultimate limits to explanation
  • whether some things are fundamentally inexplicable

It often appears as a binary:

  • everything is explainable
  • or there exist irreducible mysteries

It assumes that “everything” forms a coherent domain to which explanation might apply.


2. Hidden ontological commitments

For the question to stabilise, several assumptions must already be in place:

  • that explanation is a single, uniform process
  • that it can be applied without limit across all domains
  • that “everything” can be treated as a unified object of inquiry
  • that explanation can operate independently of the conditions that make it possible
  • that it is meaningful to ask for explanation of the totality of what exists

These assumptions elevate explanation from a situated practice to a global property.


3. Stratal misalignment

Within relational ontology, the distortion involves totalisation, externalisation, and de-stratification.

(a) Totalisation of the domain

“All phenomena” are treated as a single object.

  • diverse systems of instantiation are collapsed into “everything”
  • explanation is then asked to apply to this totality

(b) Externalisation of explanatory standpoint

A viewpoint outside all systems is assumed.

  • as if one could evaluate whether explanation covers everything
  • this implies a standpoint not itself subject to the constraints of explanation

(c) De-stratification of explanation

Different forms of explanation are collapsed.

  • causal explanation
  • functional explanation
  • semiotic interpretation
  • mathematical modelling

These are treated as instances of a single operation rather than stratified practices with different conditions.


4. Relational re-description

If we remain within relational ontology, explanation is not a universal operation. It is a family of practices realised within specific systems of constraint and instantiation.

More precisely:

  • explanation operates within systems where relations can be stabilised and articulated
  • different strata support different forms of explanation
  • explanation is always internal to the conditions that make it possible

From this perspective:

  • there is no single domain called “everything” to which explanation could apply
  • explanation cannot step outside the systems in which it is realised
  • limits of explanation are not global boundaries, but features of particular systems

The question arises when explanation is abstracted from its conditions and projected onto totality.


5. Dissolution of the problem-space

Once explanation is no longer totalised, the question “Can everything be explained?” loses its structure.

It depends on:

  • treating explanation as uniform and unbounded
  • collapsing all phenomena into a single domain
  • assuming a standpoint outside explanatory systems
  • requiring a global verdict on intelligibility

If these assumptions are withdrawn, there is no coherent sense in which “everything” could be the object of explanation.

What disappears is not explanation, but the expectation that it must be universally exhaustive.


6. Residual attraction

The persistence of the question is understandable.

It is sustained by:

  • the success of explanatory practices across many domains
  • the desire for completeness and closure
  • philosophical traditions that seek ultimate accounts
  • the discomfort of encountering limits or uncertainty

Most importantly, explanation tends to expand:

  • each success encourages further extension
  • local effectiveness is mistaken for global applicability

This creates the impression that explanation might, in principle, have no boundary.


Closing remark

“Can everything be explained?” appears to ask whether reality is fully intelligible.

Under relational analysis, it reveals something more precise:
a totalisation of explanation beyond its conditions of applicability, combined with an externalisation of the standpoint from which such totalisation could be assessed.

Once these moves are undone, explanation does not lose its power.

It is re-situated:
not as a universal property of reality, but as a stratified practice—effective within systems, constrained by their conditions, and not meaningfully extendable to totality as such.

No comments:

Post a Comment