If general relativity and quantum field theory are not rival descriptions of a single ontological substrate, then what is their relation?
Surely they are not merely disconnected languages.
Surely physics is not an archipelago of unrelated frameworks.
If we refuse depth ontology, we must offer something in its place.
This post begins that reconstruction.
1. From Unification to Coordination
The traditional ambition of theoretical physics has been unification.
The aspiration toward quantum gravity extends this pattern: gravity must be unified with quantum theory because all fundamental forces must ultimately belong to a single framework.
But this ambition rests on a presupposition:
that coherence requires ontological integration.
Relationally, coherence requires something else.
It requires systematic coordination between different regimes of actualisation.
Unification seeks a deeper thing.
Coordination maps the constraints under which different construals can coexist without collapse.
2. Systems as Theories of Instances
Recall the relational premise:
General relativity and quantum field theory are both systems in this sense. Each defines:
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a space of allowable configurations,
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constraints on transformation,
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invariants under certain operations,
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and conditions for coherence.
The “conflict” appears when we assume that both systems must generate instances within the same underlying ontological field.
But that assumption is precisely what is under question.
3. The Real Task: Mapping Intersections of Constraint
Instead of asking for a deeper substrate, we ask:
Where do the constraints that stabilise relativistic coherence intersect with those that stabilise quantum coherence?
More precisely:
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Under what conditions does a relativistic instance remain stable when subjected to quantum constraint structures?
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Under what conditions does a quantum instance remain coherent under relativistic curvature constraints?
The problem shifts from ontology to compatibility of constraint systems.
This is not trivial.
It is more exacting.
Because it requires us to identify what counts as a constraint independent of any assumption about ontological depth.
4. Black Holes as Perspectival Stress Tests
Consider the standard case: black holes.
The “information paradox” arises because we treat:
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spacetime geometry as an ontological structure, and
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quantum state evolution as an ontological law,
and then discover that they cannot both be globally maintained.
But if both geometry and quantum states are perspectival stabilisations, the paradox shifts form.
The issue is not that reality contradicts itself.
It is that two different constraint regimes are being extrapolated beyond their domains of stable coordination.
The black hole becomes not a tear in reality, but a tear in our assumption of ontological unity.
5. What a Meta-Theory Would Actually Do
A genuine relational meta-theory would not:
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quantise spacetime,
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geometrise quantum states,
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or discover a smaller building block.
It would instead:
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Formalise the structure of constraint systems.
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Specify how different systems delimit instance spaces.
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Identify conditions under which two constraint systems can be jointly actualised.
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Map the failure modes of joint actualisation.
This is a theory of coordination, not constitution.
It does not seek what reality is “made of.”
It seeks how different structured potentials relate without collapsing into a single metaphysical frame.
6. A Quiet Consequence
Notice what disappears.
There is no need for:
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ultimate particles,
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fundamental strings,
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or quantised geometry as ontological primitives.
Such entities may appear within particular construals — and may function powerfully within them.
But they are not required as the foundation of being.
The demand for ontological primitives is replaced by analysis of relational constraint.
The metaphysical drama cools.
The structural work intensifies.
Closing Shift
If this direction is correct, then the search for a “theory of everything” is misnamed.
There is no everything.
There are structured potentials.
And the task of physics becomes:
mapping the relations between them.
The deepest theory would not describe the world.
It would describe how descriptions can stably co-actualise.
That is a very different ambition.
And it has barely begun.
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