Saturday, 10 January 2026

When stratification is mistaken for semogenesis

A persistent source of confusion in interpretations of Halliday’s theory lies not in its conclusions, but in a misunderstanding of what its theoretical distinctions are for.

In particular, problems arise when stratification is treated as a theory of how meaning is produced, rather than as a way of analysing meaning at different levels of abstraction.

This post clarifies that distinction — and shows how its collapse forces instantiation to be reinterpreted as a ladder.

1. Three distinct dimensions in Halliday’s model

Halliday’s theory differentiates three things that must be kept apart:

  • Stratification: levels of symbolic abstraction within a semiotic
    (e.g. semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology)

  • Instantiation: the system–instance relation
    (system and text as complementary perspectives on meaning potential)

  • Semogenesis: the unfolding of meaning in time
    (logogenesis, ontogenesis, phylogenesis)

These are not alternative descriptions of the same process.
They are orthogonal dimensions of analysis.

2. What stratification actually does

Stratification does not describe how meaning comes into being.

It describes how meaning can be construed at different levels of abstraction.

To speak of phonology, lexicogrammar, or semantics is not to describe successive stages in meaning-making. It is to view the same semiotic event under different degrees of generality.

No stratum “acts”.
No stratum “produces meaning”.
Meaning is not made across strata.

3. The critical slide: “all strata make meaning”

The claim that all strata make meaning — including phonology — marks the point at which stratification is reinterpreted as semogenesis.

Once this move is made:

  • meaning must be generated progressively,

  • each stratum must contribute something,

  • and relations between strata must be directional.

Stratification has ceased to be analytic.
It has become developmental.

4. Why instantiation can no longer remain perspectival

If strata are treated as sites of meaning production, instantiation is placed under immediate pressure.

The system–instance relation can no longer be a matter of perspective. It must now explain how meanings produced at one level appear at another.

Instantiation therefore becomes:

  • a path,

  • a vector,

  • a movement from abstract to concrete.

This is the ladder.

It is not introduced as a metaphor.
It is required to manage the theoretical collapse.

5. Realisation reinterpreted as execution

In Halliday’s model, realisation names a symbolic relation between levels of abstraction. It is not a process of implementation.

When stratification is mistaken for semogenesis, realisation is forced to change its meaning.

It becomes:

  • specification,

  • execution,

  • or implementation.

Lower strata now “realise” what higher strata have already made.

6. Metafunctions under the same pressure

The same logic applies to metafunctions.

In Halliday’s model, metafunctions are simultaneous perspectives on the same act of meaning. They do not divide labour.

Once meaning is treated as something assembled or produced, metafunctions too begin to look like components whose contributions must be coordinated.

Again, simultaneity gives way to sequencing.

7. What is really at stake

This is not a dispute about terminology.
It is a dispute about ontology.

If stratification is analytic:

  • instantiation can remain symmetrical,

  • abstraction carries no priority,

  • and no ladder is required.

If stratification is developmental:

  • instantiation must become directional,

  • higher levels acquire authority,

  • and hierarchy enters the theory by default.

8. Restoring the distinctions

The remedy is not to refine the ladder, but to remove the pressure that created it.

That requires restoring the distinctions between:

  • stratification and semogenesis,

  • instantiation and development,

  • abstraction and production.

Only then can Halliday’s system–instance relation be understood as what it was always intended to be: a perspectival cut through semiotic potential, not a path meaning must travel.

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