Thursday, 18 December 2025

From Readiness to Commitment: How Meaning Becomes Binding: 3 Modulation Revisited: Obligation as Semiotic Stabilisation

In the previous post, we traced how proposals begin to stick through uptake, alignment, and expectation. At that point, futures acquire weight, but not yet force. They press, but they do not compel. What exists is orientation, not obligation.

This post takes the next step. We return to modulation, not as a grammatical footnote, but as the semiotic mechanism through which readiness becomes durable — and through which obligation emerges without becoming moral essence, coercive force, or value-in-disguise.


Modulation Is Not Morality

In everyday discourse, obligation is often treated as something external to meaning:

  • a moral rule

  • a social norm

  • a power relation

  • a psychological pressure

But in systemic functional terms, obligation is first and foremost a mode of meaning. It is realised through modulation — alongside inclination and ability — as part of the interpersonal organisation of proposals.

This matters because modulation does not introduce value into meaning. It introduces stability into readiness.

To modulate is not to command; it is to qualify the persistence of a proposal across time and interaction.


From Expectation to Endurance

Recall where we left off:

  • A proposal is taken up

  • Alignment forms

  • Expectation emerges

At this stage, the future is presupposed, but still fragile. It can be revised, abandoned, or renegotiated with minimal semiotic cost.

Obligation emerges when this fragility decreases.

This happens when modulation begins to function not just locally (in a single clause), but cumulatively across interaction:

  • “We should meet tomorrow.”

  • “We’re supposed to meet tomorrow.”

  • “We’re expected to meet tomorrow.”

  • “We have to meet tomorrow.”

What changes here is not the action itself, but the degree of resistance to reversal. The future has become harder to let go.

Obligation, then, is not a force that pushes action forward.
It is a constraint that holds orientation in place.


Obligation as Stabilised Readiness

We can now sharpen the definition:

Obligation is stabilised readiness that has become resistant to withdrawal.

This definition has several important consequences:

  • Obligation is relational, not internal

  • Obligation is gradual, not binary

  • Obligation is semiotic, not moral

  • Obligation is maintained, not possessed

Modulation marks where readiness has crossed a threshold — not into necessity, but into durability.

Once that threshold is crossed, non-actualisation requires:

  • explanation

  • justification

  • repair

  • or sanction

Not because a rule exists, but because meaning has been sedimented.


Why Obligation Feels Binding

Obligation feels binding because it restructures the semiotic field.

When a future is modulated as obligatory:

  • alternative futures recede

  • reversal becomes costly

  • silence becomes meaningful

  • inaction becomes accountable

This is not psychology. It is semiotic gravity.

The future pulls on the present because discourse has made it difficult to pretend it was never there.


What Modulation Does Not Do

It is equally important to be clear about what modulation does not do.

  • It does not guarantee action

  • It does not eliminate freedom

  • It does not impose value

  • It does not require intention

People can still fail to act. Institutions can still collapse. Obligations can still be broken.

What modulation does is ensure that failure is not neutral.

That is the mark of binding.


From Stickiness to Structure

At this point in the series, we can see the emerging arc:

  • readiness opens futures

  • uptake selects them

  • alignment coordinates them

  • expectation weights them

  • modulation stabilises them

Obligation is not the endpoint of this process — it is the threshold where meaning begins to behave like structure.

In the next post, we will push this insight further by asking a question that now becomes unavoidable:

If obligation is relational and semiotic, who is responsible?

To answer that, we will have to let go of subjects as the primary carriers of commitment — and rethink responsibility as a distributed property of configurations, not persons.

That is where the account becomes truly relational.

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