A persistent source of confusion in systemic accounts of meaning arises when relations between different kinds of systems are mistakenly treated as if they were relations within a single system.
In Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), strata such as context, semantics, lexicogrammar, and phonology are related by realisation. These are internal relations within a semiotic system: lower strata realise higher strata.
The problem begins when this stratal logic is extended beyond semiosis itself.
Strata are not everywhere
It is tempting to extend the notion of stratification outward and treat domains such as the biological, social, and semiotic as successive layers in a single hierarchical system:
- biological → social → semiotic
On this reading, each “higher” level would be realised by the one beneath it.
But this is a category error.
The biological, social, and semiotic are not strata of a single system. They are different kinds of systems, each with its own mode of organisation:
- biological systems
- social systems
- semiotic systems
These are not levels in a shared hierarchy. They are distinct domains of complexity.
Realisation is internal to semiosis
Within a semiotic system, realisation is a precise technical relation:
- context is realised by semantics
- semantics is realised by lexicogrammar
- lexicogrammar is realised by phonology/graphology
This is a stratal relation internal to semiosis. It governs how meaning is organised as meaning.
It does not apply outside semiosis.
The moment we attempt to extend realisation to relations between biological, social, and semiotic systems, we lose the distinction between:
- conditions for semiosis
- and the internal organisation of semiosis itself
This is where reductionism quietly enters.
Dependency is not realisation
If semiotic systems are not realised by biological and social systems, the question becomes: how are they related?
The answer is not independence. Semiotic systems are deeply dependent on both.
But this dependency must be understood precisely.
We can distinguish three kinds of relation:
1. Biological systems: enabling and constraining conditions
Semiotic systems depend on biological organisation in straightforward but non-semiotic ways:
- nervous systems enable perception and processing
- vocal and gestural capacities enable expression
- memory and attention constrain processing complexity
These are material-organic conditions of possibility.
However:
- biological systems do not generate semantic distinctions
- they do not determine meaning
- they do not constitute the internal organisation of semiosis
They enable semiosis, but they do not realise it.
2. Social systems: stabilisation and selection environments
Semiotic systems also depend on social organisation:
- recurrent interactional contexts
- institutional structures
- patterned coordination of roles and practices
These provide environments in which certain semiotic patterns are more likely to recur and stabilise.
But again:
- social systems do not generate meaning as meaning
- they do not define semantic structure
- they do not function as a stratum of semiosis
They shape the conditions under which semiosis operates, not its internal architecture.
3. Semiotic systems: autonomous organisation of meaning
Within semiosis itself, meaning is organised through stratal relations:
- context
- semantics
- lexicogrammar
- phonology
These are not derived from biological or social systems. They are internally organised relations of meaning potential and realisation.
This is the domain in which construal operates.
The crucial distinction: constitution vs conditioning
The entire picture can be stabilised around a single distinction:
- Biological and social systems condition semiosis
- Semiotic systems constitute meaning internally
To condition is to:
- enable
- constrain
- stabilise possibilities
To constitute is to:
- generate internal distinctions
- organise structure
- define relations of meaning
Why this matters
If this distinction is not maintained, three distortions arise:
- Biological reductionismMeaning becomes an output of neural or cognitive processes.
- Social reductionismMeaning becomes nothing but a function of coordination or ideology.
- Stratal inflationEverything becomes “levels of the same system,” and realisation is misapplied across domains.
Each of these collapses the autonomy of semiosis.
What dependency actually means
Once realisation is restricted to the internal organisation of semiosis, dependency can be stated more precisely:
Semiotic systems are materially and socially enabled, but not structurally constituted, by biological and social systems.
This is not independence. It is non-reductive dependency.
Semiosis cannot occur without biological and social conditions. But those conditions do not enter into the organisation of meaning as strata.
They form the conditions under which semiosis is possible—not its internal architecture.
A final clarification
It is sometimes assumed that if something depends on another system, it must be an expression of that system at a higher level of abstraction.
This is the assumption that must be resisted.
Dependency does not imply hierarchical realisation.
In this case:
- biology does not become meaning
- society does not become semantics
- and meaning is not a layer “on top of” either
Instead, we have:
- distinct systems
- asymmetric relations of enablement and constraint
- and a strictly internal stratal organisation within semiosis itself
Closing shift
Once this is clear, the architecture stabilises:
- strata belong only to semiosis
- realisation operates only within semiosis
- other systems provide conditions, not structure
And with that distinction in place, it becomes possible to think semiosis without either reducing it to biology or dissolving it into social coordination—
while still recognising that it cannot exist without either.
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