Wednesday, 18 February 2026

Directional Epistemology: 4 Against Representationalism

In the previous posts, we reconstructed validity, truth, and proof without appealing to hierarchical foundations or correspondence from an elevated metalevel. Rigour survived. Constraint remained. What dissolved was verticality.

One more structure, however, continues to exert quiet influence: representationalism.

Representationalism is not merely a theory among others. It is an image of mind and world that shapes how questions are posed in the first place.

If knowledge is not grounded in foundations, and truth is not correspondence from nowhere, what becomes of the idea that cognition consists in internal representations that mirror an external reality?

This post addresses that image directly.


1. The Representational Picture

Representationalism begins with a separation:

  • There is a world “out there.”

  • There is a mind “in here.”

  • Between them stand representations.

Knowledge consists in constructing internal models that correspond, more or less accurately, to the external world. Error is misrepresentation. Truth is accurate representation.

This picture seems intuitive because it preserves realism while explaining fallibility.

Yet notice its structural commitments.

It presupposes:

  1. A world fully formed independently of construal.

  2. A cognitive system separate from that world.

  3. A mechanism by which the second produces representations of the first.

  4. A standpoint from which correspondence between them can be assessed.

Once again, we encounter elevation.

Even if implicitly, representationalism relies on a vantage that can compare representation and world.

But if metalevel is directional rather than ontologically higher, this structure becomes unstable.


2. The Hidden Hierarchy

Representationalism installs a hierarchy between:

Reality → Representation → Evaluation.

Reality is primary.
Representation is derivative.
Evaluation stands above both.

Yet in practice, we never access “reality” except through structured construal. Nor do we evaluate representation except from within further construal.

The supposed hierarchy collapses into a field of positioned relations.

What representationalism treats as levels may instead be roles within complementarity.

From one position, a construal functions as representation.
From another, it functions as phenomenon.
From yet another, as resource for further construal.

There is no stable ontological gap between mind and world to be bridged by copying.

There is structured participation.


3. Construal as Participation

A directional ontology reframes cognition.

Construal is not the construction of inner replicas. It is a mode of actualisation within structured potential.

The world is not first fully given and then internally mirrored. It is encountered through distinctions made possible by semiotic resources.

Perception, description, theory—these are not detachable layers placed over reality. They are ways in which structured potential becomes actual.

This does not collapse reality into subjectivity.

Structured potential constrains. Resistance is real. Not everything can be actualised. Not every construal survives.

But the relation between knower and known is not one of duplication. It is one of participation within constraint.


4. Why Representationalism Persists

If representationalism is structurally unstable, why does it endure?

Because it promises three things:

  1. Objectivity.

  2. Realism.

  3. A clear account of error.

Abandoning mirroring appears to threaten all three.

Yet the previous posts have already begun to show that these goods can be preserved differently.

Objectivity can be reconstructed as intersubjective stability of constraint.
Realism can be preserved as commitment to structured potential independent of any single construal.
Error can be understood as breakdown of coherence or failure of durability under repositioning.

Representationalism persists because it offers a simple spatial metaphor: inside and outside, copy and original.

Directional ontology replaces this with a relational one: positioning within a structured field.

The latter is less intuitively pictorial, but more structurally consistent.


5. Beyond Copying

If representation is not copying, what is it?

It is a particular form of positioning.

A scientific model, for example, does not mirror the world. It selects, simplifies, abstracts, and structures aspects of potential so that certain constraints become visible.

A linguistic description does not reproduce language as object. It organises patterns within semiotic potential to enable further analysis.

Representation, then, is not duplication but structured reconfiguration.

It does not stand apart from reality. It participates in its ongoing actualisation.


6. Error Without Illusion

One of the strongest motivations for representationalism is the phenomenon of error. If knowledge is participation, how can we be wrong?

The answer is straightforward within a directional account.

A construal is erroneous when it:

  • Fails to maintain coherence.

  • Fails to constrain future actualisations reliably.

  • Collapses under minimal repositioning.

  • Encounters sustained resistance from structured potential.

Error does not require misalignment between copy and original.

It requires instability within a field of constraint.

This preserves fallibility without invoking mirroring.


7. A Different Realism

What emerges is a realism without representationalism.

Reality is not a finished object waiting to be mirrored. It is structured potential that constrains and affords actualisation.

Knowledge is not reflection but disciplined participation.

Truth is not matching but durable adequacy.

Proof is not ascent to foundation but exposure of inevitability within positioned space.

The mirror metaphor fades.

The field remains.


8. The Next Movement

With representationalism set aside, one final concern becomes urgent.

If there is no elevation, no ultimate vantage, no mirroring from nowhere—what becomes of objectivity?

Can there be objectivity without transcendence?

In the next post, we address this directly.

Not by reintroducing hierarchy.

But by understanding objectivity as stability within complementarity.


The work continues.

Hierarchy recedes.

Participation deepens.

No comments:

Post a Comment