On Relation Without Representation: Introduction

In previous series, we explored how possibility becomes determinate (On Meaning as Possibility), how cuts articulate instances (The Cut That Makes Meaning), and how constraints structure intelligible variation (On Constraint as Generative). Together, they established a foundation: intelligibility is relational, not imposed; meaning arises where systems sustain structured potential; and freedom and novelty emerge under constraints.

This series takes the next conceptual step. It asks a question that is often overlooked, even when relational thinking is accepted:

What, if anything, is meaning about?

The common answer — representation — feels natural. Words, thoughts, and symbols appear to point to objects, mirror reality, or refer to states of affairs. Representation is assumed to be the foundation of meaning itself. But this assumption quietly imports what it purports to explain: objects, identities, and distinctions are treated as pre-given, and intelligibility is relocated outside the system that actually produces it.

On Relation Without Representation reframes the question. It shows that meaning does not need to be about anything. Objects, reference, and aboutness are derivative effects, arising from relational articulation, sedimentation, and constraint. Representation persists because it works, but it is secondary, not foundational. Meaning is generated within structured potential, not imposed from without.

Across six posts, the series develops this argument systematically:

1. Why Representation Is the Wrong Starting Point — representation presupposes what it seeks to explain; intelligibility arises first.

2. Relation Before Reference — relational articulation is ontologically prior; reference emerges downstream.

3. Why Meaning Is Not About Anything — meaning is intelligibility, not correspondence; aboutness is derivative.

4. Objects as Stabilised Relational Effects — objects are outcomes of relational patterns, maintained through repetition and constraint.

5. The Persistence of the Representational Reflex — representation persists because it is effective; it is a derivative, sedimented habit.

6. Meaning After Representation — a synthesis: meaning, freedom, novelty, and objects are fully intelligible in relational terms; representation is a tool, not the foundation.

This series is not a critique of representation, nor a dismissal of the world’s stability. It is a positive ontology: an account of how meaning, objects, and reference emerge from relational processes. Representation is explained, not discarded; freedom, constraint, and intelligibility are revealed as the true generative forces.

By the end, readers will see that meaning exists in the articulation of possibility itself, objects appear where relational patterns hold, and representation is a derivative, reliable, but secondary effect. This is meaning after representation, and it opens a clearer path toward understanding systems, cognition, and semiotic emergence on their own terms.