If representation is not foundational — if relation precedes reference, meaning is not about anything, and objects are stabilised relational effects — then a natural question follows:
Why does representational thinking persist so stubbornly?
The answer is not that philosophers, linguists, or cognitive scientists have simply made a mistake. The representational reflex persists because it works. It is a powerful, pragmatically successful way of coordinating action within systems that have already achieved high degrees of relational stability. Its persistence is itself a phenomenon that requires explanation.
Representation emerges where relational patterns have sedimented sufficiently to support reliable re-identification. When phenomena recur in stable ways across contexts, systems learn to treat those stabilisations as if they were independent objects. At that point, it becomes efficient to speak and think in representational terms. Reference is not imposed arbitrarily; it is earned through repeated success.
Once earned, it becomes difficult to relinquish.
Representational habits simplify coordination. They allow complex relational achievements to be compressed into apparently simple entities. Instead of tracking a dense web of constraints, histories, and contextual dependencies, systems can operate with compact stand-ins: “this object,” “that property,” “the same thing again.” These stand-ins are not illusions; they are relational shortcuts.
The danger arises when these shortcuts are mistaken for foundations.
Because representational practices are so effective, they invite reification. What began as a pragmatic condensation is mistaken for an ontological primitive. The system forgets the relational work that made representation possible and begins to treat objects and references as self-sufficient. The representational reflex is thus a form of conceptual amnesia: the erasure of the conditions of one’s own success.
This amnesia is reinforced by education, formalisation, and abstraction. As systems become more complex, they rely increasingly on stable representations to function at scale. Scientific models, legal categories, technical vocabularies, and bureaucratic forms all depend on representational compression. The more successful these systems are, the more natural representation appears.
At this point, representation feels unavoidable.
Importantly, none of this makes representation false. It makes it derivative. Representation is a second-order practice that operates within relationally structured systems. It is powerful precisely because it rides on the back of deep relational stability. But when that stability is taken for granted, representation is mistaken for the source rather than the effect of intelligibility.
This explains why representational critiques so often stall. Attacking representation directly provokes resistance, because it threatens tools that people rely on. A relational account avoids this trap by reframing the issue. Representation is not wrong; it is incomplete. It does not explain meaning’s emergence, but it can operate effectively once meaning has emerged.
The representational reflex also persists because it aligns neatly with phenomenology. From within a system that has already stabilised objects, meaning feels outward-facing. Words appear to latch onto things. Thoughts appear to be about the world. This experiential orientation is real — but it is not ontologically basic. It is a surface effect of deep relational success.
Recognising this does not require abandoning representational practices. It requires relocating them.
When representation is treated as a derivative, context-bound achievement, its limits become visible. It can be used where it works and set aside where it distorts. The system regains flexibility. Meaning is no longer held hostage to correspondence, and intelligibility is no longer forced into an object-first mould.
The persistence of the representational reflex, then, is not a failure of thought. It is evidence of how well relational systems can stabilise their own achievements. The task is not to eradicate representation, but to remember what makes it possible.
In the final post, we will draw these threads together and articulate what meaning looks like after representation. We will show how relational intelligibility, constraint, and cut together support a robust account of meaning — one that retains everything representation was meant to secure, without mistaking its derivative practices for foundations.
That is the final step.
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