Truth Without Correspondence

Of all the myths inherited from an interior model of mind, correspondence truth is the most stubborn.

The idea is simple, intuitive, and deeply reassuring: a statement is true if it matches the way the world is. Language mirrors reality. Beliefs represent facts. Truth is accuracy of fit.

This picture survives enormous philosophical pressure because it seems unavoidable. If truth is not correspondence, then what could it possibly be?

From a relational ontology perspective, this question already gives the game away.

The Correspondence Picture

Correspondence theories of truth presuppose a familiar architecture:

• a world of facts, fully formed

• a mind that represents those facts

• propositions that mirror states of affairs

• truth as successful matching

Even when refined to avoid naïve realism, the structure remains intact. Something is “out there.” Something is “in here.” Truth bridges the gap.

But once interiors are abandoned, this bridge has nowhere to land.

Truth Is Not a Relation Between Sentence and World

The deepest problem with correspondence is not epistemic but ontological.

There is no uninterpreted world on one side and no representing sentence on the other. There are only construals actualised within practices.

Facts are not given. They are cut.

This does not mean they are invented or arbitrary. It means they are stabilised through relational activity — measurement, categorisation, norm-governed description, and coordinated use.

Truth cannot be a relation to a world that is already carved independently of those practices.

Why Correspondence Feels Inevitable

Correspondence feels inevitable because language makes it feel as though we are pointing at pre-existing chunks of reality.

“The cat is on the mat” looks like it simply reports what is there.

But reporting is itself a practice. The distinctions “cat,” “mat,” “on,” and even “is” are not discovered lying around in the world. They are part of a system of distinctions that has proved extraordinarily reliable for certain purposes.

Correspondence is not doing the explanatory work here. Stabilised practice is.

Truth as Relational Success

From a relational perspective, truth is not a mirror relation but a normative achievement.

A claim is true when it:

• holds up under relevant forms of challenge

• supports reliable coordination

• integrates with other established distinctions

• continues to work across contexts

Truth is what survives scrutiny within a practice — not because it matches reality in itself, but because it continues to make a difference that matters.

This is why truth is revisable without being arbitrary, and stable without being absolute.

Science Without Mirrors

Scientific realism often leans heavily on correspondence: surely science aims to describe the world as it really is.

But scientific practice tells a different story.

Models are refined, replaced, and sometimes abandoned — not because they suddenly stop corresponding, but because they stop working: they fail to predict, integrate, or coordinate action effectively.

The world constrains science, yes — but not by presenting itself as a finished object waiting to be mirrored. Constraint operates through resistance within practice.

Truth emerges where coordination succeeds under pressure.

Error Without Mismatch

If truth is not correspondence, what is error?

Error is not failure to match reality. It is failure to stabilise coordination.

A false claim is one that:

• breaks down under inquiry

• produces unreliable expectations

• conflicts with entrenched practices

• cannot be repaired without abandoning key commitments

This is why errors are often local, partial, and context-sensitive — and why they can persist for long periods before becoming visible.

Reality does not correct us directly. Practices do.

Objectivity Re-cut

Objectivity is often treated as correspondence’s moral cousin: freedom from perspective.

From a relational ontology perspective, objectivity is something else entirely: robustness across perspectives.

An objective claim is one that remains stable when subjected to multiple cuts — different observers, instruments, contexts, and purposes.

No view from nowhere is required. Only enough coordinated views from somewhere.

Truth Without Interiors

Crucially, truth does not live inside minds.

No one “has” the truth in their head. Truth is not a mental possession. It is a status conferred on claims within relational systems that sustain it.

This is why truth can outlive individuals, survive misunderstanding, and persist despite disagreement.

Truth is not private. It is public — not because it floats in an abstract realm, but because it is maintained through shared practice.

The Shift in Question

Once correspondence is abandoned, the guiding question changes.

Not: Does this statement match reality?

But: What relations stabilise this claim as true, and at what cost?

This question is sharper, more honest, and far more demanding.

The Cut Ahead

If truth is not correspondence, then value, normativity, and ethics cannot be grounded in inner convictions or external moral facts.

They too must be understood as relational achievements — sustained, contested, and revised within forms of life.

That is where this path leads next.