Albert Einstein once remarked, “The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” A few decades earlier, J.B.S. Haldane asserted, “The universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.” At first glance, these statements appear to speak to a common mystery: the strangeness and wonder of reality. But a closer look reveals that each embeds quite different ontological assumptions—and that both can be sharply reframed through a relational lens.
1. Einstein: The Miracle of Comprehensibility
Conventional readings of Einstein’s remark typically rely on a few implicit assumptions:
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A mind-independent universe: reality exists prior to, and apart from, human cognition.
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Comprehensibility as an intrinsic property: it is remarkable that the universe “turns out” to be intelligible.
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Human cognition as contingently aligned: our conceptual apparatus is coincidentally fitted to reality.
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Opacity as default: the natural state of reality would be incomprehensible.
From this vantage, Einstein’s astonishment is understandable. Intelligibility appears as a property of the universe itself—something to be discovered, rather than a condition of its very appearance.
Relational Ontology Recut
Relational ontology shifts the frame radically:
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No universe independent of construal: there is no “unconstrued universe” awaiting comprehension. The universe is already a network of relational cuts—phenomena actualised through semiotic-material interactions.
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Comprehensibility as constitutive: intelligibility is not a bonus; it is a precondition of a universe appearing at all.
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Mathematics and physics as selective actualisations: the “fit” Einstein marvels at is a product of disciplined relational co-actualisation, historically and semiotically contingent.
In short, the universe is comprehensible because only the comprehensible can appear as a universe. Einstein’s wonder, while rhetorically compelling, arises from treating intelligibility as an external miracle rather than an intrinsic precondition of experience.
2. Haldane: Queer Surplus
Haldane’s dictum, by contrast, celebrates excess:
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A mind-independent reality exceeding cognition: the universe has features beyond what humans can currently or even in principle imagine.
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Ontological surplus: queerness is a property of reality itself, independent of human conceptual schemes.
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Cognitive limits as fixed: our capacity to “suppose” is bounded, and the universe happily overflows it.
Haldane casts the universe as defiantly more extravagant than our intellects can contain—a proclamation of cosmic humility.
Relational Ontology Recut
Through relational eyes, the queerness Haldane celebrates is also relational:
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Queerness relative to a system of construal: what is queer is that which resists stabilisation within a particular semiotic-material configuration.
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No queerness without construal: phenomena only appear as strange or surprising relative to existing relational cuts.
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Limits are systemic, not absolute: what is unthinkable in one historical or cultural configuration may become approachable in another.
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Excess is relational: reality does not overflow cognition in itself—it overflows this system, at this moment, under these constraints.
Haldane’s defiance, like Einstein’s reverence, is rhetorically compelling—but the relational lens reframes queerness as emergent from systemic tension, not as a metaphysical surplus.
3. The Revealing Contrast
Together, these quotes form a mirror image of each other:
| Einstein | Haldane |
|---|---|
| Marvels at intelligibility | Celebrates excess beyond comprehension |
| Assumes universe prior to mind | Assumes universe exceeds mind |
| Reverent tone | Defiant tone |
Relational ontology cuts across both extremes: there is no universe prior to comprehensibility, and there is no queerness beyond all possible supposing. Both marvel and defiance can be seen as rhetorical performances stabilising authority in scientific discourse—a theme we will explore in the next post.
4. Looking Ahead
What does it mean to read these statements relationally, beyond their surface astonishment? It is to recognise that “intelligibility” and “queerness” are not metaphysical features but emergent from the semiotic-material networks that constitute our systems of knowing. Einstein and Haldane tell us less about the universe itself than about the structure of scientific discourse, and the relational cuts that shape what counts as intelligible, surprising, or authoritative.
In the next post, we will examine these quotes as rhetorical performances of realism—Einstein’s reverent authority versus Haldane’s defiant challenge—and explore how relational ontology reframes the performance of knowledge itself.
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