Do laws of nature really exist? This question has persisted from classical mechanics to modern physics, and from philosophy of science to metaphysics. Are the patterns we observe in the world “out there” as pre-existing laws, or are they constructions imposed by human thought?
As with time, the self, consciousness, and free will, the persistence of this question is not a lack of insight, but a structural misalignment: the attempt to treat relationally emergent patterns as things in themselves. This post reframes the problem through the relational ontology introduced in the origin story.
The Question
“Do laws of nature really exist?”
Presented sympathetically, the question is compelling. The universe appears orderly; patterns recur. Science measures, predicts, and abstracts. The assumption that these regularities correspond to something independently real seems almost unavoidable.
Why It Feels Legitimate
Several pressures make this question feel pressing:
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Empirical success: Science relies on reproducibility and regularity; laws seem to “hold” across time and space.
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Philosophical tradition: Realist accounts treat laws as ontologically fundamental.
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Cognitive bias: Humans naturally seek stable, predictable structures in a world of apparent complexity.
All of this lends the question the air of inevitability.
The Hidden Commitments
The question carries several implicit assumptions:
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Objectivity of laws: Laws exist independently of the events they constrain.
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Universality: Laws apply identically across all contexts.
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Substantiality: Laws are things — entities or forces — rather than descriptions of relational patterns.
These commitments frame the debate in a binary: laws either “exist” or they are “merely human constructs.”
The Endless Loop
Once the assumptions are in place, the debate cycles predictably:
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Realist camp: Laws are fundamental features of the universe; they govern independently.
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Anti-realist / constructivist camp: Laws are descriptive summaries, convenient fictions, or human conventions.
Both sides are trapped by the same thing-based framing: they search for existence or non-existence where none can be found. The loop is structural, not empirical.
The Structural Diagnosis
From a relational perspective:
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What we call “laws” are emergent patterns of relational actualisation across structured potentials.
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Regularities arise from the interactions of processes, not from pre-existing templates.
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Laws are real as observable patterns, but they are not things-in-the-world separate from the events they structure.
In short, the classical puzzle dissolves when we stop seeking laws as objects and begin tracing patterns across relational dynamics. Predictability and stability are properties of emergent coordination, not evidence for independent laws.
What to Ask Instead
Once the relational frame is adopted, productive inquiry replaces the unanswerable yes/no question:
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How do patterns of actualisation emerge from interacting potentials?
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Under what conditions do these patterns stabilise into predictable phenomena?
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How does our measurement, modeling, and interaction influence which patterns appear as “laws”?
These questions focus on tracing structure rather than verifying metaphysical existence. They are empirical, relational, and actionable.
Closing
The classical debate over the existence of laws persists because it smuggles in a thing-based ontology. In the relational frame, laws are not discovered as independent entities; they are traced as patterns of relational actualisation.
Just as with time, the self, consciousness, and free will, the puzzle of laws dissolves when the ontology aligns with phenomena. What remains is not a loss of order, but a new understanding: order arises from relational patterns, not from independent substances.
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