Misreading Relational Ontology I: 5 Why This Is Not Social Constructionism (Stop Thinking in 20th-Century Terms)

Relational ontology is often misread as a new form of social constructionism. Critics hear “relations matter” and assume this is shorthand for “reality is constructed by social agreements, language, or culture.” This is wrong. Relational ontology is ontological, not sociological. It describes how possibilities actualise, not how humans negotiate reality.

Social constructionism operates within familiar categories: objects, subjects, and social systems. It asks, “How do groups construct meaning, knowledge, or truth?” Relational ontology suspends these categories. Actualisation occurs perspectivally within a relational lattice; social norms, language, or consensus are one set of folds among many, not foundational. Mistaking this for social constructionism collapses the ontology into a 20th-century frame it was designed to transcend.

A common symptom of this misreading: assuming that relational ontology is “dependent on human cognition or culture.” It is not. Systems actualise relational potentials independently of human participation. Humans may be folds within certain systems, but the ontology does not privilege them. Mistaking relational instantiation for social negotiation is a category error—akin to thinking a neuron “constructs” the brain.

Another trap: equating “relational” with “inter-subjective.” Relational ontology’s perspectival cuts are not social perspectives. They are formal, systemic actualisations. Social constructionism is about negotiation, interpretation, and consensus; relational ontology is about systemic potential and relational manifestation. The two are orthogonal.

How to navigate this error:

1. Identify the assumed categories. If someone says, “This is all constructed socially,” ask which relational principles have been replaced with social ones.

2. Return to the lattice. Focus on how folds actualise, not how humans agree.

3. Keep humans as folds, not as creators. Anthropocentric framing will always distort interpretation.

In short: relational ontology is not a theory of social construction. It does not depend on language, culture, or agreement. Thinking otherwise is a mistake inherited from 20th-century frameworks—and a mistake relational ontology anticipates and corrects with minimal friction.

Next: a field guide to how not to read relational ontology, spotting category errors before they propagate.