Misreading Relational Ontology I: 4 Why Relational Epistemology Strengthens, Not Weakens, Scientific Practice

A common misreading: relational ontology undermines science. Critics assume that if relations are primary and entities are perspectival, empirical investigation becomes impossible, observation becomes “subjective,” and reproducibility collapses. This is categorically false. Relational ontology strengthens scientific practice—it clarifies what is being measured, under what conditions, and from which cut.

Science often struggles with hidden assumptions about independence and objecthood. Experiments presuppose that entities exist fully formed outside their relational contexts. Relational ontology exposes this assumption: entities are actualised relationally, not monolithically. This does not invalidate measurement; it refines it. Understanding the perspectival cut allows scientists to precisely define the conditions under which phenomena manifest. Experiments become sharper, more reproducible, and more meaningful.

Consider reproducibility. Critics claim that “if phenomena are perspectival, they cannot be replicated.” But replication does not require independence of objects; it requires control over relational cuts. Two labs reproducing the same cut will observe consistent instantiation patterns. Misreading relational ontology as epistemic relativism is a mistake; it is a formal, structural refinement, not a claim that “anything goes.”

Another hazard: treating relational ontology as anti-objective. Some read it as “science is just interpretation.” This is false. Relational ontology does not deny reality; it clarifies the conditions of actualisation. Observables are perspectival, but they are neither arbitrary nor imaginary. Recognising this allows scientists to map relational dependencies, boundary conditions, and interaction structures explicitly. What was implicit becomes explicit, and this improves experimental rigor.

Finally, note the discursive advantage: presenting relational ontology as an epistemic strengthening pre-empts critiques of “subjectivity” and “relativism.” Scientists do not need to worry about the observer collapsing the world; they can instead focus on which relational cuts produce which phenomena, yielding deeper insight and more robust models.

In short: relational epistemology does not weaken science; it makes it more precise, more systematic, and more insightful. Misreading it as relativist or idealist is an avoidable error—one that careful attention to relational categories immediately corrects.

Next: why this is not social constructionism—and why 20th-century ontological frames will mislead anyone trying to interpret it.