Misreading Relational Ontology: 2 Why “External vs Internal” Is Not a Distinction This Ontology Recognises

Relational ontology is often misread through a familiar metaphysical lens: the “external vs internal” distinction. Philosophers, cognitive scientists, and everyday reasoning alike habitually split reality into what is “out there” and what is “inside here.” This is not just misleading—it is category-incompatible with relational ontology.

To see why, consider what the distinction assumes: entities exist independently of their relations, and relations are secondary, either connecting objects in space or mediating objects and observers. Relational ontology reverses this assumption: relations are primary, entities are perspectival instantiations of systemic potential, and any appearance of “inside” or “outside” is derived, not foundational. There is no metaphysically privileged “external world” that sits opposite a “mind” or “subjective interior.” These are post-hoc construals imposed by pre-existing categories.

The danger of importing “external vs internal” thinking is subtle but pervasive. It prompts questions like:

• “Which relations exist independently of the observer?”

• “Which folds belong inside a system, and which outside?”

Both questions are category errors. In relational ontology, folds and systems actualise perspectivally. There is no privileged vantage from which “inside” and “outside” can be objectively determined. Asking which is external or internal assumes a detached observer and discrete boundaries—precisely what the ontology denies at the foundational level.

Another consequence of this misreading is that relational ontology appears to collapse into idealism, panpsychism, or structural realism. This happens when “internal relations” are mistaken for subjective experience, and “external relations” for an independent reality. In truth, the ontology is agnostic to the mental/material distinction. Relations exist in the relational lattice; actualisations are perspectival; any sense of interiority or exteriority emerges from the construal, not from an ontological hierarchy.

How to navigate this trap:

1. Identify the imported categories. Whenever someone asks, “What is inside?” or “What is outside?” check which assumptions are being brought from conventional metaphysics.

2. Return to systemic potential. Ask instead: “Which folds actualise this potential from which perspective?”

3. Focus on perspectival instantiation. Boundaries, interiors, and exteriors are not primitive—they are the product of perspectival actualisation, not pre-existing partitions.

The takeaway is simple: relational ontology does not recognise “external” or “internal” as ontologically primary. Any reading that treats these as foundational is misframing the system entirely. Recognising this early is critical—it prevents a cascade of category errors that will distort every subsequent interpretation.

Next in the series: why perspectival ≠ subjective, and why psychology is the wrong frame for understanding relational ontology.